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Anti-Scepticism or notes upon each chapter of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning
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Anti-Scepticism :

OR,

NOTES

Upon each CHAPTER of Mr. LOCK's

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Humane Understanding.

With an EXPLICATION of all the Particulars of
which he Treats, and in the same Order.

In Four BOOKS.

By HENRY LEE, B. D.

formerly Fellow of Emanuel- College in
Cambridge, now Rector of Tichmarsh in
Northamptonshire.

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THE HISTORY OF THE

ROYAL

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

AND ARTS

OF BERLIN

BY J. H. VAN DER KAMPE

OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

IN FOUR VOLUMES

BY W. A. V. A. E. D.

OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

OF BERLIN

1800

THE HISTORY OF THE

ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
Sir Nathan Wright,
Lord Keeper of the Great SEAL of
ENGLAND, &c.

My Lord,

I Have not prefix'd your Great Name to this *Traēt*, as false Coyners do the Royal Stamp upon *Money*, to cheat people into an unjust Opinion of its Value, for *Weight* or *Fineness*; but only to give so much Lustre to my obscure Name, as may represent the Contents not altogether unworthy of a *serious* Examination. And since I enjoy the Honour of being as long and as well known to your Lordship, as most others can pretend, I beg only that you would please to allow me also the Advantage of claiming your Patronage to the *Honesty* of my Design.

We live in such an Age that no Authority (I wish that I might except *Divine*) will give Reputation to any Writings which don't carry their own Credentials with them. 'Tis all in the Fashion, to be unlike every body else, and hardly to be constant to our selves. We all having an *equal* Right to pretend to be Lovers of and Searchers after *Truth*, 'tis now become the common Mode to go so *deep* in our Enquiries, and to be so *warm* in our Amours, as first to *doubt*, whether there be any such thing as a *real Truth*; for the *receiv'd* Maximes of all Mankind, which used to be the *Touchstone*, by which to try it, must be *tried* themselves, and in the mean time are to be reckon'd purely *artificial*, and wholly owing to the powerful Influence of Custom and Education. Our Philosophy, our Policy, our Religion must be all *new* or *none* at all. 'Tis not enough for Philosophers to make *new Hypotheses* to solve the *Phænomena* of Nature; but they are for making *new Worlds*, Earths and Creatures. 'Tis but small Game now for our *refin'd* Politicians to mend Forms of Governments, and frame new ones in Church and State: now adays the very Foundations must be new laid, and Government itself,

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tho of *divine* Institution, and founded in the Constitution of our *Natures*, must be suppos'd an Encroachment upon the *native* Liberty of Mankind; and a firm Adherence to any one Form, how *moderately*, how *wisely* soever establish'd, must be nicknam'd *Zeal for a Party*. And, that our Schemes of *Religion* may be fashionable, and all of a colour with our *Politicks*, the *common Principles* of Natural Religion, in which all the intelligent world seem to have well agreed, must be call'd *Priest-craft*; The asserting the Doctrines of *Christian Religion*, how clearly soever reveal'd, and vouch'd at first by uncontested Miracles, yet, if not level'd to our Comprehension, must be term'd *Creed-making*; and thus all Government and Religion must be reckon'd publick *Cheats*, and all Princes, Magistrates and Ministers no better than hired and well-paid *Tools* to support and carry them on. In this way, I am afraid, our Enquiries after Knowledge have carried us so far as hardly to leave room for *Ignorance*; for, if there be no *Reality* in *Knowledge*, 'tis certain there can be no such thing as *Ignorance*. Our Zeal against the *Errors* of Sects, and the ill *Practices* of Parties has involv'd us in *inextricable* Doubts, whether there be any such things as either *Truth* or *Error*, *moral Good* or *Evil*. Our Searches after the *true Principles* of Reason and Religion have led us into an endless Dispute, whether there be any *positive* Principles of either. And thus Religion and Morality are become *arbitrary*, *artificial*, and, in conclusion, purely *Negative*. What has been usually call'd *Knowledge* or *Ignorance*, *Truth* or *Error*, *Virtue* or *Vice*, *Religion* or *Prophaneness*, are made only the *Names* of things in or out of the common Fashion; the distinguishing Characters of particular Persons, Churches, and Societies, the *Idiotisms* of several Countries and Sects.

The celebrated Author of the *Essay concerning Humane Understanding* has all the Advantages desirable to recommend it to the *inquisitive Genius* of this Age; an avow'd Pretence to *new Methods* of discovering *Truth* and improving *Learning*, an *unusual* Coherence in the several Parts of his Scheme; a *singular* Closeness in his Reasonings; and above all, a *natural* Elegancy of Style; an *unaffected* Beauty in his Expressions; a *just* Proportion and tunable Cadence in all his Periods. These are Excellencies which I am better made to *admire* than *imitate*; and, having attain'd to no Heights in *Invention* or Flights of *Fancy*, for making *new Schemes*, am contented with the *honest* and *humble* Design of speaking the *common* Language of Philosophy, of taking off the Veil with which other Authors Beauty, but of this especially, is often shaded from vulgar Eyes; and to *obviate* or *caution* others against the Consequences of such Principles of his which seem to lead to *Scepticism*, not only in Philosophical and Theological Speculations, but the general receiv'd Maxims of Natural and Reveal'd Religion. This Design I have managed without any personal Reflexions; and hope that, if the Methods he proposes, for the Improvement of Knowledge or Learning, be of any real use, they will not be disparaged or lessen'd by any Endeavours of mine to *explain* or make them *obvious*. For tho my Love
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of *Truth* and useful *Learning* may not be so *courtly* as his, yet I pretend it is as *sincere*; and so both of us may obtain our *honest* Ends, without the Rudeness of common Rivalry. 'Tis a blameless and unenvy'd Ambition in any man to defend the Principles either of *Philosophy* or *Religion*, how common soever they be, to be reckon'd too *credulous* rather than *ingeniously scrupulous*; to write *intelligibly* rather than *politely*; and if I have obtain'd these Ends, 'tis the very Height of my Ambition. But if any ones refin'd *Genius* and generous Zeal for *Truth* and useful *Learning* (tho in a *new Method*) carry him to discover such *Errors* of Sects, such ill *Practices* of Parties, as are the usual Spawn either of habitual Ignorance and irregular Heat, or of Pride and worldly Craft, I will not envy him his just Honour. It shall raise no Passions in me, but of Admiration and Love, which are Passions which vulgar Spirits may fairly pretend to; and if any one advance such Principles of *Philosophy*, as are so modest as to give way to *clear Revelation*, and their Warmth against Sects and Parties don't transport them so far as to leave no certain Ground or Foundation for those Principles of *Natural Religion* in which all the intellectual world consent, and those of *Christian Religion* which are *clearly* reveal'd, I declare that I shall have no Controversie with this or any other Author.

My Lord, I am either not so fortunate in the Choice of my Patron, or have not so well learnt the modern Art of Dedications, as to tell the world without Flattery (a Crime which I know your Lordship would be harder to excuse than any other) that the Principles I go upon *have a Correspondence with that vast System of Sciences which your Lordship has made a new, exact, instructive, Draught of*, that's a Complement peculiarly due to my Author's right Learned, as well as Noble, Patron; unless it be chiefly intended for one to himself. But I think that I may say, without *Flattery* to your Lordship, or *Vanity* in my self, that the Principles I endeavour to defend, tho very *old*, are very agreeable to those by which you have conducted the whole Course of your Life; and in the Practice of which you have deservedly gain'd the Possession of the high Esteem of all that wish well to *Religion*, useful *Learning*, and *legal* Establishments; and if there hardly be an Instance in History of a Persons Accels to that great Dignity in the State, which you now enjoy, without *Noble Birth*, great *Importunity*, *artificial Applications*, or the *Powers* of a *Faction*, your Lordship has a fair Claim to be a *Precedent* in this and future Ages; and your *Example*, I hope, will have that genuine Effect upon all the Gentlemen of your own Profession, as to teach them, that besides an *unwearied Study* of, and *exact Skill* in the Laws of the Land, a *rational Piety*, an *unspotted Integrity*, a *steady* Adherence to Monarchy and the Church establish'd by Law, are the *best* and *safest* Accomplishments for Advancement under a *regular Government*.

That the same *Divine Providence*, which, in *favour to this Nation*, conducted your Lordship to that high Station, may long preserve you in it, and afford you a *firm* and *vigorous* Temper of Body, just like that of
your

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your Mind ; That this Church of England may have many such faithful Friends to its truly Catholick Doctrines and primitive Institutions ; That the Crown may have many such able and steady Counsellors to support its Weight and just Grandeur ; That the Universities may have many such Patrons to useful Learning and Exemplary Piety ; That you may live long to ennoble your numerous and hopeful Offspring with an hereditary Imitation of your singular Virtues, is the serious Prayer of many, very many honest Men ; and to be esteem'd one in that Crowd is the great Ambition of

Your Lordship's

in all due Respect,

and most humble Observance,

HEN. LEE.

THE

T H E

P R E F A C E

To the AUTHOR's two SONS in the Universities.

AS it was for your sakes (my dear Sons) that I first thought of penning Notes on Mr. Lock's Essay, so being disfurnish'd of all the usual Topicks of Apologies for publishing them, I designedly own that, not only because it will serve instead of an hundred artificial Pretences, but because it will easily insinuate a Belief in to other Readers that they were well intended; for there is so much Justice due to the common Sentiments of Human Nature, that hardly any one will suspect that I wilfully deceive you, especially in such matters which seem to concern the Settlement of your Minds upon the sure Foundations of Religion and Virtue.

I have so far confin'd my own Thoughts on the several Subjects of this great Author's Discourses, as to follow his Order and Method, exactly, but have given my self liberty to explain (as fully as I thought of any Use) not only his, but the most commonly receiv'd Notions of Others, concerning all the Particulars of which he treats; and have endeavour'd to express them in such words, whether his or my own, as I judg'd most intelligible, so that I hope that what I have written will appear so very obvious, that, whether true or false, you'll understand it with a running Eye, and all that is material, without reading his Book, or that Labour of Thought which often his Discourses on those several Heads, being writ in a kind of new Language, may require. But that I may let you in by the nearest way to a right understanding of the main matters that are Controversial in the following Treatise, I think it not amiss here to give you a brief Abstract of his and my own Scope, in the four several Books, into which his and my own Discourse is divided.

In the first Book, in order to the removing the Rubbish which incumbred the Foundation on which this Author intended to erect his new Scheme of Knowledge, He is very elaborate in the Proof, that there are no Innate Ideas, and consequently, Propositions, which are compounded of Ideas. All which I think might have been saved, in the strict sense which he puts upon the Word Innate; for therein surely he has no Adversary. For no one do's or at least can rationally assert, that the Minds of Embryo's in the first moment of their Creation or Union to their organiz'd Bodies, are ready furnish'd with Ideas, or have any Propositions, or Principles implanted in them, or stamp'd upon them, that's an idle Supposition. Such Expressions therefore, when they occur in Discourses, are to be understood only figuratively; and are intended by those that use them, only to signifie that they owe their Original to the constitution of Human Nature, as it stands necessarily related to other parts of the Universe; that they are not voluntary, are not taught them by others; are no more artificial or acquired, than Sucking, Eating, Drinking or Sleeping. But allowing so much Latitude (and that not improper or unusual) to the signification of the word Innate, as to comprehend all Perception and Knowledge, which do's not depend upon the contingent Impressions of external Causes, on Custom, Education and the Teaching of others, I conceive there are some Thoughts or Perceptions, and general Propositions too, so far innate or natural, that the Minds of Men are not left perfectly at liberty, or in a state of indifferency, to have those Perceptions, or form those Thoughts, and their Judgments concerning the Truth or Falshood of those Propositions; and that's all which I conceive is commonly meant by the Word Innate. And in that sense it may be rationally asserted, that there are Innate Thoughts and Principles also; and all This Author's Arguments against it easily obviated. Neither do I find there is that Necessity of running into another Extreme, which another very pious and learned Author has done lately in his Conferences with a Deist: He tells the world that Innate Ideas and Prin-

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principles (meaning chiefly moral Principles) are deservedly exploded, and therefore he is for tracing them all to original Revelation. In which particular, I doubt, he has disarm'd himself of as good a Weapon to defend Divine Revelation as any he has furnish'd his Philologus with. For all men, I think, before himself, suppos'd Divine Revelations to be made to Rational Beings; to such as were indued with the common Principles of Reason, antecedent to those Revelations; else it will be hard to understand how they should be of any Use or Efficacy. For how shall any one judge any Proposition is above or contrary to Reason, if he be not prepossess'd with Principles by which he may know what is agreeable to it? How shall he judge any matter of fact is a Miracle (which is the usual Attestation of a special Revelation) without some antecedent acquaintance with the Course of Nature? How shall he be satisfied that any Proposition comes from God, unless he be furnish'd with some Notions of his Nature, and such Principles of Reason by which he may be assured, that those Miracles are a sufficient Proof of the Divine Attestation, and consequently that the Reveal'd Proposition owes its Original to the Author of Nature, who can neither be deceiv'd himself or deceive us? If we were to convince a Man, that those several Actions, with their Modes and Circumstances, which amongst us have the common Names of Murder or Ingratitude, are moral Evils, or have an inevitable and natural Tendency to produce Natural Mischiefs to mankind; shall we be put to the proving those practical Propositions were originally deliver'd or reveal'd to Adam, or his early posterity; and convey'd to us in this age by uninterrupted Tradition, oral or written? That would be work enough for an Historian, but would require a greater measure of Credulity, than most Deists will allow in that, or any other case: besides it seems greatly derogatory to the Divine Providence, to suppose the Establishment of a certain Course of Nature, or Concatenation of Causes with their Effects, and yet make it necessary to alter them by miraculous Operations, on purpose to mend their common Imperfections or Failures in producing such common, such universally useful Effects or Notions in the Minds of Men. And therefore I submit it to the second thoughts of that Eminent Moralist, to consider whether that was not a needless and too bold a Concession to his Deist; and do's not in its consequence wholly deface the Distinction between Natural and Supernatural Truths, and make all Miracles useless and insignificant. And therefore, to avoid those two Extremes, I take it to be not only more safe, but rationally defensible, to assert, that there are some Propositions, as well practical as speculative, that do no more need either the being taught us by others or a special Revelation, than a man that his Eye-sight shall need either to know that the Sun is a luminous Body, or the Truth of such a Proposition as needs only the Exercise of his Senses or other natural Faculties with which he is born.

His second Book treats of Ideas in general, and of all the several sorts of them, and their Origin, in which there are many things excellent and curious; but not altogether so new, as they may appear at first view, or when express'd in the vulgar Language. There are, in his account, three sorts of Ideas; simple, complex and general abstract Ideas. Of the first sort, so far as I am able to judge of other mens thoughts by my own, there are none such in the minds of Men. For, I must confess, that I could never yet form any such Ideas as he calls simple; suppose of Existence, Thinking, Motion, Rest, Figure, Pleasure, Pain, without the Substances or Subjects of which they are the Attributes, Actions, Modes, or Qualities; and tho'tis very true, any one of these may vary or alter the Substances of which they are the Modes, and consequently the complex Idea of those Substances; yet wherever they are, whether out of the Mind or in it, they are neither really separated or conceiv'd as abstracted, from the Subjects or Substances of which they are the Modes. However, if we should so far submit to this Gentlemans Authority, as for the future to call all our single Apprehensions, and all the several Accidents, Qualities, Modes, Attributes, Actions, and Properties of all Substances by this new Name of simple Ideas, I can't yet perceive how our Knowledge of the things themselves, their Causes, Effects, Nature or Use will be thereby the least improv'd, except it may be so, to call them by new Names, and of them make a new Dictionary or Language. But as for complex Ideas of corporeal Substances, there is no manner of doubt but that there are Images of them in the Minds of Men, whilst they think of them singly, and that they may be consider'd with their Modes or Qualities, and as having thereby several Relations to themselves

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selves or other Substances at the same, or different times; but why they should be call'd complex Ideas, before the mind affirms or denies something of them; or unless they were compounded of simple or conceivably separate Ideas, is hardly agreeable to the common Rules of Speech. And 'tis certain again, we may have Images of visible Substances in our mind, when they are absent, or at a distance, from us; And for that very reason may very properly be call'd abstract Ideas: but if any man has general Abstract Ideas at any time in his Mind, I must own his Thoughts are more refin'd than I dare pretend mine are; for all my Ideas, properly such, are not only of that sort which he calls complex, but of visible, particular, individual Objects, so that when the word Idea is used in any other case it's wholly Metaphorical, and what this Author calls general Abstract Ideas of Substances seem to me only the Names of such or such Particulars given them in common with others, for the Qualities, Properties or Modes in which they agree or are related to one another. But if any man can find in his own mind, when he reads or hears the words Animal, Man, Horse, Tree, Gold, any Ideas but of the individual Substances of which those words are common Names, He is a better Idea-maker than I am: and yet upon this ground, which seems to me wholly Chimerical, all this Authors new Fabrick of Knowledge is built.

As to the Origin of all these Ideas, which in his stile are all the Ingredients of Knowledge, He derives them all from Experience, and as to the manner of gaining them, from Sensation and Reflexion. What Sensation is, we agree well enough, and that the primary notices we have of corporeal Objects are deriv'd from the Impressions that are made upon the Organs of our Senses; but that we improve those notices so receiv'd by the Exercise of other Faculties of the Mind, distinct from Sensation, and not barely by the Reflexion we make upon our Sensations, or the Effects of those external Impressions, is the common opinion. For this Word Reflexion is all new, for in common Language it can signifie nothing else but Knowing or Consciousness: and it seems a little uncouth, to make knowing or Consciousness a Source or Fountain of Knowledge. Besides, if it be true which this Author plainly insinuates, Book IV. Chap. III. Sect. VI. that 'tis as probable that our Souls are Matter indued with the Faculty of Thinking, as Immaterial Substances, then what he calls Reflexion may be only doubled Motion, or, in Mr. Hobbs's Language, Re-action, and so we have only that new Name of Reflexion for Motion modified by an organiz'd Body, to keep up the handsome Port of a Distinction between material and immaterial Substances and their Operations; whereas really and in plain English they are just the same.

His third Book treats of the Use and Abuse of Words in Language, particularly in the Names of simple and complex Ideas, and especially of mixt Modes. The Use of Words with a little variation in the Manner of Expression, He seems to have stated rightly, and as others commonly do, and has made very useful remarks upon the gross Abuse of Words in Discourse, and which have administer'd occasion for voluminous and trifling Disputes; but he sets so high a value upon his Performances therein, as to call them the breaking into the Sanctuary of Ignorance and Vanity; which seems to look something too big for the Substance of all that he offers. For the preventing those Abuses may be Epitomiz'd in this one plain Caution; That every one endeavour to use only such words as common usage has appropriated to a certain sense; or, if he uses them in any other, he explain it and give notice. But that which under that Head demands your special Observation or Caution, is what he writes concerning the Names of mixt Modes, particularly of Virtues and Vices, compar'd with his Notions dropt in many other places in this Treatise. For he seems not only to make the Names of moral Virtues and Vices to be voluntary or arbitrary; but the Set or Combination of those mixt Actions (which he calls Ideas of mixt Modes) so too; for else there is nothing so peculiar in the Names of them more than there is of other things, which he vehemently urges; for without doubt the Names of all things were originally voluntary, and arbitrarily impos'd by Humane Consent, as having no Connexion in Nature with the things themselves, of which they are the Names; but as for the Names of moral Actions, those, he says, are voluntary, peculiarly on this account, because there are no certain Rules or fix'd Standards by which to try them, as there are Substances and their single Modes; and thence one would naturally infer that in his reckoning, Virtues and Vices were meer Names indeed, being signs only of a Set or Com-
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plication of *Actions*, which are neither agreeable or disagreeable to any certain Rules or Standards; and that we call Charity or Murder had no certain Advantages or Disadvantages, commonly call'd natural good or evil Effects, annex'd to them by the Author of Nature; but all depended upon the contingent Efficacy of Education, Custom, Temper, or the Authority and Reputation of the persons we converse with: And thence it will follow, that the same Combination of mixt *Actions*, which in this and most civiliz'd Countries goes by that bad Name of Murder, in the Caribbee Islands, where his Historian tells him, they fatten Children on purpose to eat them, may be as justly honour'd with the Title of good Eating and Cookery. For if there be no Laws of Nature, but such as we must learn from Experience and Conversation, then no sort of *Action* can be a breach of them, but what is disagreeable to a mans own present Judgment and Opinion, which we must all confess is too apt to be bias'd by his own distemper'd Appetite, and by the Example and Thoughts of his Neighbourhood, Familiars and Superiors, and at that rate moral Goodness, which is the Glory and Excellency of the Divinity itself, will become mutable, precarious and only Nominal. Whereas those that are for keeping Morality upon its old Basis believe, that one of the most worthy Thoughts they can conceive of Almighty G O D is, that his Goodness is so immutable, that he can do nothing but what, all things consider'd, is for the Benefit or Natural good of his whole Creation: and therefore has not left us wholly at liberty to make Rules for all our own *Actions*; but has constituted such an unalterable Chain of Causes with Effects, that tho' Custom, Habits, Education, Example, and Human Authority may increase or diminish our Inclination to, or Abhorrence of some sort of *Actions*; yet they can no more quite extinguish the sense thereof, nor alter the natural good Effects of some such *Actions*, as we call virtuous, or the ill Effects of others we call vicious, than we can alter the Nature of Gold or Silver, by our mis-judging of some of their Properties or Qualities; and that the Standard or Rule, by which Virtue and Vice may be distinguish'd, is as universally known, as that of Silver or Gold, or any other Substance. However, I am willing to believe, that I have mistaken this Authors Notion in that particular, and shall reckon it a singular kindness in any one to set you and my self in a clearer Light; but I must arm you with this Caution, that you be not satisfied therein, with citations of some passages which may here and there be pick'd out of this Treatise, particularly where he mentions Laws of Nature, Natural Laws, Laws of G O D, the Commands of G O D; therefore insist upon desiring to know what he means by those words; for those words he may understand in a sense quite different from the common Interpretation of them. For, if the Author of Nature has contributed nothing to our gaining the Knowledge of them in the original Constitution of our Souls and Bodies; but left us wholly in the dark, wholly at liberty to gain our Knowledge of them from Experience and Conversation; then the Laws of Nature, the Laws of God, may be words interpreted to signifie only such Rules of *Action* as every man voluntarily makes to himself, and shapes by the mutable Sentiments, and exemplary Practice of his own Familiars or Superiors, and if that be true which Mons. Chardin reports concerning the Mengrelians (as it may, as well as some things which This Author reports from other Historians) that Murders and Assassinations are in such repute amongst them, as to be reckon'd the most Heroical *Actions*; then the Priests (for such they have, being Christians) have an hard task: for if they persuade the People to observe such as they esteem the Laws of God and Nature, as 'tis their duty to do, then they must preach the Necessity of knocking one another on the Head; and, which is harder still, of murdering themselves in the first place, as the most noble and meritorious Atchievements. And therefore, tho' there are here and there some such general Expressions drop'd in this Book, you must do so much Justice and Honour to this Great Author, as to think he is above the weakness of Self-Contradiction; and therefore you must impute the Appearance thereof rather to your own Misunderstanding the Sense of them, than to any Inconsistency with his main Principles; for, according to those Principles, the Laws of God or Nature can never be certainly known.

This Author having, as he conceiv'd, fully prov'd in the three first Books, that all which is in the mind is only its several Ideas, and explain'd how all those are deriv'd from Sensation and Reflexion; in the fourth Book, in consistency with that Scheme, he advances this Definition of Knowledge. That 'tis only the Perception of the Agree-

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ment or Disagreement of Ideas ; and then explains the several sorts of Knowledge, which he calls Intuitive, Demonstrative and Sensitive ; and thence proceeds to give the Reasons or Grounds of its Diminutives, such as Opinion, Probability, Conjecture, Faith. In this place I endeavour to fix the charge of Scepticism upon his Principles, or that they leave the Mind of man in an endless state of Doubtfulness concerning the Truth and Certainty of any Proposition whatever ; and therefore the Author of these Principles, if firm therein, may be very secure against all those Surmises, which he intimates in one of his Letters to the late Bishop Stillingfleet, of his being made a Party in all the great Controversies about Grace, Faith, Good works, Perseverance, Predestination, Original Sin, Idolatry, Satisfaction, &c. For, if I don't mistake them, they will be of no use at all to serve any Sect or Party to prove any positive Doctrines of theirs, but only to oppose them, how true soever. But I must there do my Author and my self so much right, as to declare, that I don't offer to charge his Person with Scepticism ; so far from that, that I can't believe, He or any Man else can possibly be a complete or rational Sceptick ; for he that is so, must draw his reason for doubting of every thing from something, from some Topick or other ; else it must be altogether groundless ; and that is so manifest a Contradiction, and stares every one so fully in his Face, that he must be a Mad-man that can withstand it : And therefore 'tis his Principles only that I meddle with, and there too, I tread so softly, with so little Confidence and so inoffensive assurance of making the charge good, that I could not well have said less ; and should not indeed have gone so far, but out of that regard we all owe to the Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, which, by this way of resolving all Knowledge or Certainty into Ideal Agreement, have been so boldly confronted by other Authors. But, for your readier understanding that general charge, I frankly own the main stress of it turns upon these three Points.

First, that, in the case of particular Propositions, whether affirmative or negative, there can be no Certainty by the way of Ideas only, so much as of the real Existence of those things which are the Subjects and Predicates of those Propositions. Any man may easily satisfy himself that his Hand is bigger than one of his Fingers ; that the Sun is not the Moon, merely by comparing their Ideas ; but then you must observe, that the Mind all the while supposes the real Existence of the external Causes or Objects of those Ideas. For, if it did not, it would not believe either of those Propositions true or false, but merely insignificant Sounds or Letters. But then, if you offer to suppose the real Existence of any thing out of the Mind itself, then you go beyond your Ideas ; for they are as wholly within the Mind, as the things themselves are without it, and therefore have no Connexion in Nature with each other. The Idea of one thing being no more an evidence of its real Existence, then its real Existence is of a persons having the Idea of it. Besides, if you suppose the real Existence of things out of the Mind itself, then you are inevitably led to suppose also the truth of your Senses and other Faculties, and all those common Maxims in which all that have their senses are agreed ; and thus you run upon the Rock, of *Præconcessa* and *Præcognita*, on which the Idealist will tell you Human Understanding has been split, and has occasion'd all those Errors with which the intellectual World is now infected. On the other side, if you will not suppose (as all Men in their Wits do, without proof) the real Existence of things without us ; but will be for proving it ; then you'll fail again ; for if you prove the real Existence of one thing from another, then that second will need the like proof of its Existence from a third, and that third from a fourth, and so in infinitum : But, if you offer to prove the Existence of any one or more things out of the Mind, from any such common Maxim as this ; Every Effect (and so consequently these Ideas) must have a Cause ; then you go beyond your Ideas again, for no man I think has Ideas of Cause or Effect. He may indeed of those Substances which have the Names of Cause and Effect, but no abstract general Ideas answering to those general or common words. And this is one reason why I conceive those Ideal Principles must involve us in an endless Scepticism ; namely because they will neither allow us to suppose, nor can prove the real Existence of things without us. And I appeal to any one of common sense, whether this Thoughtful Author himself was not aware of this flaw in his Principles. For who, but a down right Mad-man, would else have requir'd him to spend a whole Chapter to prove the Existence of things

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things without us, if it had not been necessary to serve this turn? But, I think that I have made it plain in that XI. Chapter, that he is forc'd to suppose that very Question he propos'd to prove, namely, the real Existence of things out of the Mind, the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties, and of those common Axioms in which all mankind are agreed.

The second point on which the charge of Scepticism leans, is, That there are no such things, in the Mind of Man, as he calls simple Ideas; so that, when the Predicate of any Proposition is a general word, there can be no Idea answering to that Word, and consequently the Knowledge of the Truth of it can't be the Perception of the agreement of the two Ideas. The Sun is luminous, is a Proposition, of which no one that has his Eyesight doubts; but I ask, has any one the Idea of the Sun abstracted from Light, or of Light abstracted from the Sun, or some other particular Substance? No surely, the Idea of the Sun includes that of Light, else 'tis no true Idea of it: Light is conceiv'd as included in the Sun, or some other particular Body, else he has no Idea of it at all. And so there are not two Ideas agreeing or compar'd; for, when in the Mind, there's but one Idea. So that, when we say the Sun is luminous, we mean only that it affects our Eyes, much after the same manner that the Moon, a Star, Fire, or Flame, or some such Bodies do; and therefore, give it that common name of luminous; but we have no Idea of the Sun abstracted from Light, or of Light abstracted from the Sun, or some such particular individual Substance; neither could we have the least reason to form that Proposition, meerly from the Idea of the Sun itself; it would be only a single Apprehension or Theme, as the old Logicians speak; and we must, before we affirm any thing truly of it, inevitably suppose the real Existence not only of the Sun, but of those other Bodies out of the Mind, with which it is compar'd and with which it has a common Name. And so we run upon the same Rock of *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*, as in the former instance which the Idealist, in consistency with his main Principle concerning Knowledge, must avoid for fear of splitting his whole Scheme.

The third Assertion on which I build this charge of Scepticism is, That there are no such things as general abstract Ideas in the Mind. That Man is an Animal, is an indubitable Truth; but no one, I think, has or can have any general abstract Ideas either of the Subject or Predicate of that Proposition. If he has any Ideas, they are of some one particular individual Man or Animal; and if so, he goes beyond his Ideas, when he forms that Proposition, or else he make it no true Proposition; for one Individual can't be another. So that what This Author calls general abstract Ideas of Substances are nothing but the Names of particulars or individuals, given them in common for their perceiv'd agreement in some Modes, Properties or Qualities: And therefore the Knowledge of the Truth of such Propositions can't be the Perception of agreeing Ideas, because there are no such Ideas in the Mind of Man. All that we mean therefore, when we say, Man is an Animal, is only this, That every single or individual thing or substance which has all the Properties, Qualities or Accidents which give it the common name of Man, has all the Properties, Qualities or Accidents which give any single or individual thing or substance the common name of Animal: But we have no general abstract Ideas in our Minds answering the words Man or Animal: So that, if in particular Propositions, whether affirmative or negative, this way of resolving Knowledge or Certainty meerly into agreeing or disagreeing Ideas will neither suffer us to suppose or can prove the real Existence of those things which are their Objects, nor in particular Propositions where the Predicate is a general term, there is no abstract or single Idea correspondent to that general term, neither are there any general abstract Ideas whatever: then there are no sort of Propositions which we can judge true or indeed false, meerly by the way of Ideas. But if other persons, by turning their Thoughts into their minds, find them not agreeing with mine in these three Assertions, then I freely own, that I must quit the general charge of Scepticism upon these Principles; but shall nevertheless flatter my self with the hopes, that I shall have done no disservice to the Truth in attempting to explain them, and make them less exceptionable to others.

But what needed, you'll say, all this pudder about Ideas? What's the meaning of all this Caution against a pretty new Word? Now, that's the next thing I shall endeavour to explain;

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plain; otherwise, I confess, the whole charge would be trifling about words: But, if I be not more cautious than well becomes me, this way of resolving all Certainty into Ideas leads in a direct line to the undermining the very Foundations both of Natural and Reveal'd Religion; tho' 'tis in no degree probable to have been design'd by this learned Author; for he has given the Knowledge of Gods Existence, and moral Truths a place under Demonstrative Knowledge; as, I think, it deserves, if the word Demonstration may be allow'd to comprehend the highest degree of rational Evidence. However I am afraid, afraid, I say (because I had rather seem too cautious than too positive) that his Principles tend to the supporting such Doubtfulness of every thing, that it will be hard to fix upon any certain ground for the belief of any Truth, much less that relates to Religion. All the reasons for my fears which concern Natural Religion, which I shall mention in this place, may be refer'd to those two intimated already. 1. Because they will neither prove, nor allow us to suppose, the real Existence of any thing out of the Mind itself, and yet 'tis from the regular Actions and Scheme of the Universe from which we make one of the best and most intelligible Arguments to prove the Existence of such an infinitely wise, good and powerful Being as we call G O D. 2. Because there are no such general abstract Ideas in the minds of men answering to the general words of which the Subject and Predicate of such Proposition consist, which we call Maxims, which all men use (not excepting this Author himself, notwithstanding his slighting them) for the proving or at least the facilitating the proof of that or any other Propositions less evident than they are. But I refer you to the Chapters which treat of that Truth and his Argument at large; and shall here only insist upon the ground on which his Principles set our belief of Reveal'd Truths or Doctrines: All positive Knowledge in his account is only the Perception of the agreeing Ideas; and thence you may readily infer, Reveal'd Truths cannot attain that degree of Honour as to be esteem'd known or certain; and so our belief of such Truths, let it be establish'd upon what evidence it will, must be humbled to the degree of bare Probability: and if again you'll take his measures or grounds of Probability to be just, there will hardly be found room for any Reveal'd Truths on that form, of high Probability. For tho' universal and uncontroll'd Human Testimony, when matters of fact are agreeable to our own Experience of things in the common course of Nature, or are indifferent, is a ground of high Probability; yet, when they thwart our common Experience, as Miracles, which are to confirm Reveal'd Truths, to be sure, do; then our Belief of those Miracles, and consequently the Truths thereby confirm'd, can rise no higher than Opinion, or the very lowest degree of Probability. Again, tho' he allows Miracles, and that they give some Credit to Propositions which need it; yet, so far as I can yet clearly learn, they can, in his way of proving, be of no farther use than to gain the Voucher of them some more than ordinary Attention: but if after Attention is given, the Ideas, of which the Reveal'd Truths consist, cannot be perceiv'd to agree, as to be sure, they cannot, if not discoverable by Reason, Miracles (tho' allow'd to be wrought) will afford no new Light to the Understanding or Conviction to the Judgement; for we shall still want an Ideal Proof, that they are wrought by Divine Authority; because such Effects as Miracles don't discover to the Senses (as in other sensible Demonstrations) the manner of their Connexion with their Cause. This Consequence this Author do's not own in express words, but rather seems to confess the just contrary: for he allows, with all seriousness, that what comes from G O D, the fountain of all Wisdom, must be true. But my business being only to examine the Consequence of his Principles, 'tis not to be expected that I should regard such general Expressions, and therefore should most gladly be inform'd how Miracles can in this way be a Proof of any Truth above Reason; or what new Evidence they afford to any Proposition whose parts have not any Connexion discoverable by natural Reason. And as for his owning, that every Reveal'd Proposition, as coming from God, is certainly true; yet if we cannot be certain, that this or that Proposition comes from God or is by him reveal'd, we are never the wiser: The case is just the same, as when he tells us, that Virtue ought to be taken for such Actions as are conformable to Gods Will, or the Rules prescribed by God, which is the true and only Rule of Virtue. But when we ask how we may come to the Knowledge of that Will of God we are refer'd to the uncertain and contingent Impressions made upon us by the Practice of
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our Familiars and Authority of our Superiors, and so are never the better for that certain Rule; because God has not possess'd us with any Knowledge of, or Inclinations to the Observance of it in the original Constitution of our Natures; but left us in a perfect Ignorance of, and in æquilibrio, as to all Actions whatever. Whereas the most common Opinion is, and, as I take it, a very true one, that, tho' there is no Connexion in Nature between Miracles and the parts of the Proposition they confirm, yet they are Acts or Effects as proper and peculiar to the Sovereign Author of Nature, as any Words spoken or written are the proper Acts or Effects of that individual Person who speaks or writes them. And tho' again, Miracles don't discover to the Senses such a Relation to their Causes, as Words or Writings do to the Person speaking or writing, as in Humane Testimony; yet they discover the Mind and Will of God, as plainly as Words, spoken or written, do the Mind and Will of the Speaker or Writer; and therefore are signs of Divine, as much as any Words are of Human Testimony; only with this difference, that Words spoken or written having no Connexion in Nature with the thoughts of him that uses them, they are an uncertain Indication of his real Thoughts, but Miracles being the peculiar works of God, who cannot either deceive or be deceiv'd, they are the certain, the infallible signs of real Truth. However I am not positive, that this is contrary to this Author's Opinion in that particular; because he has not fully explain'd it in any part of this Treatise: and therefore conclude only with giving you this plain Caution: If you find any Proposition clearly Reveal'd in the Holy Scriptures, especially if it have any influence upon Morality, don't enter into any Philosophical Enquiries after the Mode or Manner how the matter of fact was or will be wrought, or its parts cohere; for that perhaps is inexplicable in the most familiar Propositions that can be named: But reckon yourselves to have a rational Ground for your Belief of it, since it's deliver'd by inspir'd Persons, and such as wrought uncontested Miracles for the proof of their Inspiration. Relie upon the Veracity, that is, the Wisdom and immutable Goodness of the Author of Nature. Don't fear or doubt that he would alter the common standing Rules of his Providence, to impose upon you, or the rest of mankind, any thing like an inevitable Necessity of believing a Falshood. If he was not minded you should believe such or such a Proposition (tho' you cannot comprehend the Manner how its parts cohere) he would never have wrought or suffer to be wrought any real Miracles, which are his peculiar Works, to give it Credit: Because those Works are as much above the power of second or immediate Causes, as the manner of the coherence of the parts of such Proposition can be above human or common Reason. But to explain the Tendency and Use of that Caution, I will here give you instances in two Propositions, which, for want of the Observance of that just Caution, have sorely harass'd the Philosophical and Theological world, and to the prejudice of Divine Revelation of other Truths. And by these two instances you'll perceive, I hope, the right way and method of securing your belief of all other clearly Reveal'd Truths.

You find these two Propositions clearly Reveal'd; There was a Deluge. Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God. The former indeed cannot be properly call'd a Reveal'd Proposition, in respect of them who were Eye-witnesses of it; but to us in this age it may. As to the former Proposition, don't suffer your Philosophical Inquirer to suppose clear another sort of World or Earth than what there are now. For 'tis no Maxim, 'tis no such Proposition in which all mankind is agreed, and you may be sure of it, He can never prove his Hypothesis, (for if his Proofs be from visible Experiments, as they must, if drawn from the present state of the Earth or other parts of the Universe) for those alone can afford no manner of Evidence, that there was another sort of Earth or material World; because there can be no Connexion between the visible Effects in this present course of Nature and another; and therefore by no means allow that any thing ought to be suppos'd Possible, in matter of fact, but what has been done or is clearly Reveal'd will be done. Keep within those bounds, for if you allow any thing more to be possible, then you give him liberty to abstract Omnipotency from Divine Wisdom, and to make as many Worlds, Earths and Creatures, as he has Maygots in his fanciful Brain. If he says, there is an unavoidable Necessity of supposing there was clear another sort of Earth, because there was not a sufficient Quantity of Water to produce an universal Deluge; put him again on the proof of that: Namely, that there was not water enough in the Seas,
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in the subterraneous or submarine Abyss, nor Air, or other sort of matter enough in the Universe, convertible by the Almighty Word into the consistency of Water; and you may be certain he can never prove that, unless he could prove himself Omniscient, that he knows the whole state of all the inaccessible parts of the Earth, which may be the receptacles of Water, all the Powers of Nature and the Author of it. But as for yourselves let the Miracles, wrought by that Inspired voucher of that Proposition, be your rational Evidence, that there was and is sufficient Power in the Author of Nature to work such an Effect, and to make such alterations in the matter and state of the material World, as were necessary for that purpose; and all this without creating new matter for the Deluge or annihilating it afterwards. But, if he tell you, that 'tis unsutable to the perfect Wisdom of God, to make an Earth at first with so many Irregularities, with so many vast, so many useless Mountains and Oceans of Water: Answer, that it do's not become the Modesty of Philosophy, to pretend to the Knowledge of the secret Reasons and Springs of Divine Operations or Use of all his Creatures; and moreover, 'tis but going about the Bush to no purpose, to charge the Divine Wisdom with any imperfection on that account; because 'tis no more a blot (that is none at all) upon the Divine Artificers wisdom to make all the parts of the Earth and Universe much such at first as they are now, than it is to suppose that he establish'd such a Chain of Causes with their Effects, as would in a certain Period of time necessarily produce such an Earth as we have now. And yet all this is avowedly acknowledg'd by all that pretend to explain the Phænomenon upon purely mechanical Principles. So you may look upon that only as Argumentum ad Hominem, and a weak one too. Therefore, never rely upon curious Contrivances to make new Worlds; for you may rely upon it, they can never prove the very Hypothesis they go upon. And I take it also to be demonstrably plain, that, if for Discourse and Entertainment, you should allow their whole Hypothesis, yet they cannot solve that grand Revolution in the material world, without recourse to the extraordinary Operation of the Author of Nature, or Miracles, which they so studiously avoid; and therefore it seems to me altogether as impertinent to ask, where there was Water to make a Deluge; as it would be, where there were Bread and Fish to be found, when our Saviour Jesus Christ fed above Five thousand in a Desert, with five Loaves and two Fishes, and yet had ten times more left than before they began to eat. So that, tho' you may give such Philosophical Discourses the reading; yet by no means relie upon the Philosophy of the manner of the Divine Operation to the weakning your belief of any clearly Reveal'd Proposition. That's putting Faith off its right hinge, and treading upon Ice, which may look smooth, but is brittle, and slippery, when you may walk safer upon firm Land.

And as for that other Reveal'd Proposition, don't offer again to explain the Mode of of the Union or Relation between God the Father and his only begotten Son, by nice School-terms; content your self with knowing so much as God has been pleas'd clearly and expressly to Reveal: Assure yourselves only, That God would not have assisted any Person or Persons with a power of working any one, much less many uncontestable Miracles for the Vouching that Truth, if he had not intended by such words as those are, that you and the rest of the World should heartily believe that the Union or Relation between the Persons of God the Father and of our Blessed Saviour eternally was, is, and ever will be as great, intimate and inseparable as possible; for those very words and such as these, The brightness of his own Glory; The express Image of his Person; in whom all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, are Modes of Expression and Figures of Speech which the Holy Spirit has used in condescension to our Infirmities, taken from such instances and examples of Union and Relation, which is the nearest in Nature that we know or can conceive: And you may be assur'd that neither God, or good men will expect or require that you should believe, that the Union or Relation between the Persons in the Godhead, is other or greater than that which is the greatest and nearest that is possible. And, if you stand on this ground, you may easily defend the great Truths, both of Natural and Reveal'd Religion, by resolving the reasons of your Faith into the same Principles which are and must be allow'd for the proving any other Propositions discoverable by the light of Natural Reason. And you'll meet with no Arguments to shake your

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Faith, but what will equally serve to weaken the Credit of any Proposition in Euclid. And tho' indeed the Reasons on which Natural and Reveald Religion are grounded have not so universal an effect upon the minds of Men as Mathematical Demonstrations have; yet that is chargeable rather upon the degenerate Temper, Passions, Prejudices, and wilful Infirmities of particular persons than different degrees of rational Evidence.

Lastly, as for such points of Doctrine as are not fully express'd in the Holy Scriptures, or matters of Practice and Discipline that are not particularly therein directed, Provided they be not contrary to what is clearly Reveald nor to common Sense, nor the Maxims of Reason in which the whole intellectual World is agreed; you may and ought to guide your Thoughts and Practice by the Sense and Practice of the most antient Fathers of the Christian Church, and the determinations of that Church in particular of which you are Members. For you may easily observe, that such as will not allow so much deference due to Government, as to determine matters of that sort for Peace, Unity and Order, go upon such Principles as will not admit the Conveniences or Necessity of any National or establish'd publick worship of G O D or Profession of Faith at all. And, how fine and pretty soever their pretence is for universal Liberty in matters of Religion, which they call Worshiping the Deity according to every ones Conscience; it brings them, by a natural consequence, to allow all persons Liberty, not to worship God at all; or, if they please, to Worship Jupiter of Crete, Venus or the Devil. What Anarchy is relat to Government, that Scepticism is in matters of Faith, and universal Toleration in matters of Practice and Morality: They all three hang on a string, and are inseparably akin to each other. I am very sensible that what I have propos'd will be liable to this Objection; that 'tis only a fine popular and compendious way to be satisfied in matters of Religion, without curious Enquiries into second Causes or nice Disputes; and flatters the Vulgar into persuasions that they may be easily wise enough in matters of Religion and extemporary Believers. Be it so, it will be never the less rational for that, unless it were suppos'd that all men were equally wise or good, or that the Truths of Religion were not design'd for the unlearned as well as the learned, and that they had not Souls to save, as well as Philosophers. However, I am confident in this, that the Principles I insist upon are easily defended against both ignorant and bold Enthusiasts, designing Legendaries, imaginary World-makers, and projecting Reformers.

But after all (my dear Sons) if any one can instruct you in such Principles as will lead you by straiter and safer paths to useful Knowledge and Learning; if any one can infuse into you more worthy Thoughts of God, or of the Glorious Founder of our Christian Religion; if any one can teach you any such Doctrines, as naturally tend to make you steady or faithful to this most moderate, most happy Government in Church and State; if any one can learn you to retain a more Honourable Memory of your Royal or Noble Founders and Benefactors, whose Bread you now eat; or to be more grateful and respectful to all your Friends, who have any ways contributed to your present station, or any measure of Piety, Virtue or Learning: If any one, I say, can so Principle you, as to make you more innocent or more useful to the World, than I have endeavour'd to do; you have not only my free Consent, but my Command also so far to dissent from me, and I shall not reckon you less dutiful Sons or my self your less happy Father.

H. L.

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common and therefore more *intelligible*; that so every ordinary Reader
may easily discover what is either *singular* or *common*, *true* or *false*,
in this whole Tract; and whether, instead of advancing *Humane*
Knowledge, this new *Ideal Language* will not rather *confound* that little
Knowledge we have, make that *obscure* which in other words is clear,
that *doubtful* which is certain, and in the issue involve us in an inextric-
able *Scepticism*. I pass by the rest of this Chapter, till he comes to
give us his Sense of the Word *Idea*; because it contains nothing that
is *singular*, difficult to be understood, or matter of Argument; to
which Particulars these Notes shall be confin'd.

II. By the Word *Idea* he means, he says, *Whatsoever is the Object of* What Ideas are
in the Author's
Sense.
the Understanding when a man Thinks: And this Term, he says, he
could not avoid frequently using; and there is no wonder at that;
for if every thing that is within the reach of Thought be an *Idea*; then
all the World, of which we have the least Knowledge, must consist
only of several kinds of *Ideas*, and so it must come to pass that the
Word must be used in no *certain* Sense; and accordingly this Author
makes it stand, sometimes for the *Thoughts*, or *Conceptions* themselves,
in the Mind, and sometimes for the *Things* themselves *without the*
Mind, that are the Objects of its Thoughts; and this often in the
same Sentence and without any Distinction; which creates great Diffi-
culty in the understanding his Meaning.

III. But that I may lead the Reader the nearest way to the under- What an Idea
is properly.
standing this Authors Language, and save my self the Necessity of Repe-
titions, I shall here endeavour to shew the *proper* Sense of the word
Idea; and that it is a very *inadequate* Object of Thoughts in that Sense;
and, when used in any other, is apt to breed Misunderstandings and
Confusions; and that all which can be meant by it may be express'd in
other words that are *less* ambiguous and *more* intelligible. The word

Idea, we all agree, is deriv'd from the Greek word *εἶδω*, which originally signifies, *to see*, and therefore in its *strict* and *proper* Sense, that only can be call'd an *Idea*, which is a visible Representation or Resemblance of the Object, and, in some measure at least, *like* that thing of which it is the *Idea*. Thus a man's Face in the Glass is properly the *Idea* of that Face; or when we see any single Object, the little Picture or Image form'd at the bottom of the Eye may properly be call'd the *Idea* of the thing seen; and by a Latitude in Expression the Picture of a Man or of any thing else, may be call'd the *Idea* of that man or thing represented: In all which cases there is a Resemblance or some kind of Likeness between the *Thing* itself and its *Idea*; so that in the *proper original* Sense of that word, There is no *Idea* in the Mind, but when it is some Resemblance, Picture, Image or Likeness of that which is without it; and never occurs but in that Act of the Mind which is commonly and properly call'd *Imagination*: and there is then indeed a kind of Picture or Image of that thing in the Mind, whilst it thinks of it. And therefore whenever it's used in any other case, 'tis *metaphorical* and *improper*. And tho' this is no more than what this Author owns and proves in several places, and long before him *Des Cartes*, *Hobbs*, *Gassendus* and most others that have written of late concerning those matters; yet it was necessary to be noted here, to shew the Necessity of using *other* Words to express Things with any tolerable Clearness: for this *Impropriety* of the Word would wear off by degrees; because Common Use will make any word proper: And besides most other Words are *metaphorical* as well as this. But now this Author has stock'd our Language with such a Spawn of *new* Words, that one will need a new Dictionary to understand English. *Simple, Complex, Abstract Ideas; simple, compound, mixt Modes*; which does not only corrupt our Language, but, which is worse, raises such a *Mist*, that we are often deluded with the Hopes of some great *Discoveries*, when there is hardly Common Sense to be gain'd. To give an Instance or two. Suppose we were upon an Enquiry as this Author is, Book IV. Chap. III. after the Reasons of *Humane Ignorance*, One Reason assign'd by him, is, Want of *Ideas*. What is that, I wou'd know? Want of *Thoughts, Notions* or *Conceptions* about Things, or Want of *Objects* to entertain our Thoughts about? For it must be Want of some things *within* us or *without* us. Not the latter, for he owns in the same Period, the World affords *infinite* Matter; and if the former be his meaning, then it seems one Reason of our *Ignorance* is Want of Knowledge; for Want of *Thoughts, Notions* or *Conceptions*, is in plain *English*, nothing but Want of Knowledge. A second Reason is, Want of such *Ideas* as we are capable of *forming*; and what is that again, but want of such *Thoughts* or *Notions* of things that are within our reach? which is much such another learned Reason for our *Ignorance* as the former, namely, Want of Knowledge. A third Reason of our *Ignorance* is, for want of *tracing* our *Ideas*. What is it, I ask, to *trace* an *Idea*? It's either attending to our *present* Conceptions, or carrying them and our Thoughts from the Properties or Qualities of *one* Object to *another*; and so *comparing* them, in order to understand their *Relation* to each other; take the Phrase in which Sense you please. Then another Reason of our *Ignorance* in Mathematicks, (for of that he is speaking,) is Want of *Skill* in the Properties of Lines, Angles and Figures. Now if these three Reasons of *Ignorance* had been express'd in common *English*, they wou'd have amounted but to this one plain Tautology, Want of

of Knowledge. But being put into the *Ideal* Disguise, the Laugh is spoiled, and all this Author meant might fairly have been accounted for in the intelligible Words of my Lord Bacon. *Plurimæ sunt res quæ sensum etiam rectè dispositum nec ullo modo impeditum effugiunt, aut subtilitate totius corporis, aut partium minutiis, aut loci distantia, aut tarditate atque etiam velocitate motus, aut familiaritate objecti, aut alias ob causas.* But this way of charging our Ignorance upon the want of *Ideas*, wou'd set an inquisitive Man upon Search after things for the Cure of this Ignorance, which are no where to be found.

IV. The old Logicians used to rank all our *simple* Apprehensions or Notions (for so they generally call'd the Objects of our Thoughts, when nothing was affirm'd or denied) under ten Classes or Heads, which they call'd *Predicaments* or single *Themes*; but those Terms being not used of late, or at least not in that Sense they were at first intended, the Words now in common use in Philosophical Discourses, are *Substance* and *Mode*. All *Material* and *Immaterial* Objects of our Thoughts are reducible to *Substance*. All that are call'd *Properties*, *Qualities*, *Accidents*, *Attributes*, *Powers*, *Faculties*, *Actions* or *Operations*, may be compriz'd under the Word *Mode*: and all the Knowledge we can have is but of *Substances* and their *Modes*, and of their *Relation* to each other: and all Words whatever are only the particular Names or Signs by which *Substances*, their *Modes*, and *Relations* are distinguishable from one another. And so there will be no need of this new Word of *Idea*, except it may be to set up a new Way and Art of talking more obscurely than the old School-men ever affected. For Examples; *Heat*, *Cold*, *Pleasure*, *Pain*, *Hunger*, *Thirst*, &c. are only the Names of the Mind's several *Modes* of *Sensation*, of which it has no *Ideas*; there being nothing in the Mind itself of which they are the *Resemblances*, nor any thing without it to which they are in any manner like; and therefore there can be no *Ideas* of them. *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*, *Bulk*, *Position*, may properly be call'd the *Modes* of the Bodies; because from the varieties of them, so far as we can learn, all the other Qualities of Bodies derive their *Distinctions* and *Denominations*: and when they are conceiv'd or thought on by the Mind, they may be call'd its *Modes* of *Perception*, but not its *simple Ideas*: because we never have any *Ideas* of them at all, *abstracted* from the particular Bodies to which they belong: not of *Figure*, without the Body figur'd; nor of *Motion* or *Rest*, without the Bodies moving or resting; of *Bulk* or *Position*, without the Bodies which are said to be great or small, in this or that place. *Colours*, *Smells*, *Tasts*, *Sounds*, *Roughness*, *Smoothness*, and other Qualities which affect the Organs of Feeling, may be properly call'd, when out of the Mind, the *Modes*, *Powers*, or *sensible Qualities* of Bodies; when in the Mind, its various *Modes* of *Sensation*, but not again *Simple Ideas*; for no one can form any *Idea* at any time of any Colour, of Roughness or Smoothness, or any other tangible Quality, without conceiving at the same instant the *Idea* of a particular Body that is so colour'd, rough, or smooth; And if he does so, then 'tis a *complex Idea*, and if any one offer to conceive an *Idea* of a Smell, Taste, or Sound, his Thoughts will run upon the Bodies that produce them, and then they will be *complex Ideas*; and therefore they are only *Modes* of *Sensation*, and of them the Mind has no *Abstract* or *simple Ideas*. All the Operations of the Mind itself such as *Affirming*, *Denying*, *Understanding*, *Judging*, *Remembring* are only its various *Modes* of Thinking or Acting: but we have no *Ideas* of them, except we include the

the Things Affirm'd, Denied, Understood, Judg'd of, Remembred or Thought on; but then they are not *Simple Ideas*. And as for *Substances*, we have no Ideas of them abstracted from all their *Modes* and *Properties*, any more than we have of any one *Mode* abstracted from its *Substance*. And therefore all *Ideas* are *complex*; and as for the whole Tribe of *abstract general Ideas*, they are meer Fictions, they are only the common Names of *Substances* or their *Modes* given them, for their Agreement with others: but there are no Ideas, answering those *general Names*, in the *Mind*; all the Ideas we have are of *particular visible Substances*, in conjunction with their several *Modes*. I am very sensible that the Word *Idea* has been much used of late to express other immediate Objects of the Understanding, besides such as are visible: but if any one reflect upon his own thoughts he will easily find reason to judge, 'tis altogether *improper*, and only *Metaphorical*. To say we have an *Idea* of GOD, properly speaking, is only to have such Thoughts, Notions or Knowledge of his Perfections, Properties, Excellencies or Attributes, by which he may be distinguish'd from all other Beings; and the like of all other Substances and Modes, which I shall have occasion farther to explain in more proper places; and I noted it here, only to shew the *Impropriety* and *Needlesness* of the Word *Idea*, and that there are really in the Mind of Man no such things as *simple or general abstract Ideas*: on which *Hypothesis* this Author's whole Scheme about Knowledge, so far as different from the Common, is built.

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

The true State
of the Question
about Innate
Ideas.

I. I Am apt to think this Debate, about *Innate Principles*, is altogether needless; and that, if the Question was stated in *common Words*, this Author's Sentiments wou'd not appear so widely different from others, who speak Sense on this Subject, as may be imagin'd; but I confess, that if the Design of this and the two following Chapters was to make way to the proving, that our Souls are nothing else but finely *organiz'd Matter* (which, he intimates elsewhere, is possible) and that all its Operations are only the Modes of Motion or Impressions from *external Objects*, which is the natural Consequence of that Principle; then indeed it was with great Consistency to labour the proving, that there are no *innate Perceptions* or Principles, either Speculative or Practical. And, because some may carry his Notions farther than he intended, it will not be much out of the way to follow him so far as to examine them. But instead of Tracing this Author in all his Windings and Turnings, sometimes forming Objections himself, at other times answering those of others, I shall take this plain Course. 1. I shall endeavour to state this Controversie in plain Words, so far as I understand it my self. 2. To explain how far and in what Sense some *simple Apprehensions*, Perceptions or Thoughts may be said to be *innate*. 3. What is meant by *innate Principles*, and how they may be distinguish'd from *acquired Truths*: and then answer all the Objections which this Author has framed against such *speculative Principles*.

II. First then, for the obviating many of this Author's Objections, and bringing this matter in less compass; give me leave to premise, that I don't pretend that there are any *Characters* stamp'd upon the Mind at its first Creation: Those are only *Metaphorical* Phrases and *Rhetorical* Flourishes. In that sense there are no Notions at all in the Minds of Men, either *innate* or *acquir'd*: all that is properly or can rationally be intended by such Expressions as these; "the Soul of Man" is not a *rasa tabula*, is not *white* Paper, is not a *dark* Room or "Cabinet"; (which last is this Author's Phrase) is only this, that the Soul of Man is so framed by the Author of Nature, as not to be *equally* disposed to all sorts of Perceptions, to embrace all Propositions with an *Indifferency*, to judge them true or false; but, *antecedently* to all the Effects of Custom, Experience, Education, or any other *contingent* Causes, it is *limited* to perceive by certain *external* Motions or Impressions, is necessarily *inclined* to believe some Propositions *true*, others *false*; some Actions *good*, others *evil*: and so is not altogether like a *rasa tabula*, on which you may set any Impression indifferently: or a *white* Paper, on which you may write what you please: or like a *dark* Room, into which you may let any Objects with what degree of Light, what sort of Colour or Figure you desire: Because it's *prepossess'd* with such Inclinations and Dispositions, as cannot be alter'd by *accidental* Causes, and *preserves* those Inclinations and Dispositions to judge of the *Truth* or *Falseness* of some Propositions, of the *moral good* or *evil* of some Practices, as necessarily as a Stone retains its *native* Disposition to move towards the Centre of the Earth in all Circumstances; as the Loadstone has always a *Power* to draw Iron, tho' it never exerted it, or not till the Iron is placed within the Sphere of its Activity. Just so the Soul has an *innate Power* of *perceiving*, *affirming*, *denying*, *willing*, *refusing*; but that *Power* is not exerted till a *proper* Object is offer'd for its Perception and Judgment: but when it is, then it does as naturally perceive that Object, and judge some Propositions *true*, others *false*; some Actions *good*, others *evil*, as the Loadstone draws Iron, or the Stone descends when the Impediments are removed. Neither 2. do I pretend that any Perceptions, Notions, or so much as a single Thought are *actually* in the Mind at that moment, when it's first united to its *organiz'd* Body, in that sense of the Word *innate*. The Perceptions of *Warmth* or *Cold*, of *Pleasure* or *Pain*, *Hunger* or *Thirst*, as early as they are in the Mind, are not *innate*: because there is a Necessity of some *extrinsick* Impressions agreeable or disagreeable to the *natural* Texture of the *solid*, or *Motion* of the *fluid* Parts of the Body, to which it's united; *before* any such Perceptions can be excited in it. Neither 3. do I presume, that when any Thought, Notion or Idea is in the Mind, it's excited without the *Help* of some Cause distinct from itself; for the Soul can no more *form* a Thought or Judgment without a Cause *distinct* from itself, than it could create itself. But then I deny, that the Power of *exciting* any Thought, Perception or Notion, is *wholly* and *immediately* deriv'd from the Impressions of *external* Objects, upon the Organs of its Sensations, and that the Power of forming Perceptions, Notions or Ideas is *innate*, and deriv'd from the Author of Nature; and that *external* Objects by their Impressions are not the *adequate* Cause of those Perceptions, Notions or Ideas; but only administer *occasion* to the Mind to exert its *native* Powers. So that the only reason that I can frame, why any Perceptions, Thoughts or Notions can be said to be *innate*, is because, according to the *present* Constitution of our Souls and Bodies, and their Relation to other parts of the Universe, there is a necessary *Connexion* fix'd and establish'd be-

tween some sorts of *Motions* or *Impressions* from external Objects, and some sort of Perceptions or Thoughts, and they may properly enough be call'd *natural* or *innate*; because by the arbitrary Constitution of the Wise Author of Nature in uniting our Souls to our Bodies, there is a *necessary* and *mutual* Communication between both, that such *Motions* should produce such Perceptions: and for this reason only when the Soul is united to a Body rightly organized in all its Parts, the Perceptions of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Hunger* and *Thirst*, *Pleasure* and *Pain*, may be said to be *natural* or *innate* Perceptions. Not that they are *actually* in the Mind *antecedent* to all *foreign* Impressions, but because according to the *present* Frame of our Minds and Bodies, and their *necessary* Relation to other Parts of the Universe, there is settled a *natural* Connexion or *necessary* Concatenation between such *external* Impressions, as the *immediate* Causes, and such Perceptions as their *necessary* Effects. And in this Sense only, as I conceive, any sort of Thoughts or Perceptions can be said to be *innate*: namely, because the Powers or Faculties of the Mind, to form such Thoughts or Perceptions, are deriv'd from the Author of *Nature* operating upon it by *necessary* Causes; but the *actual* Perceptions or Thoughts must be own'd to be *acquir'd*, because they proceed from Causes *extrinsic* to the Mind itself: and that I take to be all this Author means; and therein I know of none that differ from him. 2. For the same reason as there can be no *simple* Apprehensions, Thoughts or Perceptions in any other sense *innate*; so, to be sure, there can be no Propositions which consist of the Conjunction or Disjunction of such *simple* Apprehensions in the Mind, can be said, in any other sense than I have explain'd, to be *innate*. But then it is to be observ'd, on the other side, that over and above the *natural* Capacities or Powers of perceiving, affirming, denying, doubting, judging, comparing, remembring, with which every intelligent Being is born, it's born also with a *native* Aptness, Facility, Inclination, Propensity, call it which-you please, of *forming* some Thoughts, rather than others; of judging some Propositions *true* rather than *false*, some Actions *good* rather than *bad*; and this without the help of any *Words* or any *Teaching*: And such Thoughts and Propositions we call *innate* or *natural*, tho there be no such *actual* Thoughts or Propositions *born* with the Mind itself, or which it brings into the World with it. For we think that *native* Aptness or Disposition to *form* those Thoughts, or *judge* such Propositions *true* rather than *false*, or *doubting* of them, is a sufficient Reason to call them, rather than others, *innate* or *natural*. And it is very agreeable to the *common* manner of Speech, used on the like occasions. When we say a School-boy can repeat his Task, which is perhaps three or four Inches of *Latin* or *Greek* Words, we don't mean that he has *actually* Thoughts or Ideas in his Mind of every word: Or, when we say, a Man understands Mathematicks, that he has *actually* Thoughts or Ideas of *all* the Lines, Angles, Figures, and their Proportions, in his Mind at that instant; all that we mean is, that the Boy has by application gain'd a *Facility* or *Aptness* to pronounce the words readily and in due order: And that the Mathematician has gain'd a *Facility* or *Readiness* to make his Thoughts easily succeed one another in the *Series* and *Train* of his Demonstrations. Now what *Application* or *Study* has done in *these* two Cases, that the Author of *Nature* has done for every Man, as to certain Thoughts and Propositions in the *Original* Frame of his Mind and Body: because the *forming* those Thoughts and *judging* of the Truth of those Propositions don't depend upon the *contingent* Efficacy of Education, Custom, human Laws or the teaching of others; but

but meerly upon the Efficacy of such Causes as, by the *wise* Constitution of the Author of *Nature*, necessarily produce in our Minds, and are the Effect of such Observations as all Men do and must make in the Exercise of their *native* Powers. And so we understand the words *Native*, *Natural*, or *Innate*, in the same Sense in which our great Master of the Propriety of *Latin* words, *Tully*, does, speaking of Self-defence or Self-preservation in Favour of *Milo*. *Est hæc non scripta sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti; non instituti, sed imbuti sumus.*

III. By *innate speculative* Principles, I mean only such *general* Truths, as the Mind in *all* its Reasonings, Arguings and Judgments *always* and *necessarily* supposes true, as it does the truth of its own Faculties. They are Self-evident, need no proof or indeed are capable of any; the Minds *Assent* to them *immediately* following the very *Perception* of the Relation there is between any of the particulars, of which the general words of which the Propositions consist, are the common names. They are call'd *innate*, because, as soon as we perceive or judge at all, we cannot but judge their Parts have the Relation between them, as is express'd in them: *Speculative*, because they don't *immediately* influence our external Actions: *Principles*, because all other Propositions, which are more *particular*, or whose Parts are less *common* Names than they are, are and must be resolv'd into them or *Identical* Propositions, as they are themselves, or *Negations* of that *Identity*, before we can be certain of their Truth. All Propositions are then *certain* or *known* to be such by the Mind, when it perceives that *Identity* or *Negation* of that *Identity*; or in other words, when it perceives there is *no* more included in the *Predicate* of a Proposition that is *Affirmative*, than what was included in the *Subject*; nor no more denied in the *Predicate* of a Proposition which is *Negative*, than a *Negation* of that *Identity*. Such are these, *Every thing is the same with itself in all respects. No one thing is Another in all respects. What is, is. It's impossible to be and not to be:* and several others, which are more particular than they are. As that, *the Whole of any thing is equal to all its Parts. The Whole of any thing is bigger than its part. Every Effect must have a Cause.* Which latter sort are intitled to *innate* Propositions, because they are not only universally assented to: but because their *Identity* or *Negation* of *Identity* is so *immediately* perceiv'd, and because they are not wholly learnt from the *Senses*, as all *acquir'd* Truths are: for therein it is that these we call *innate* Truths are distinguishable from *acquir'd*; that they cannot be learnt from the *Senses* wholly. As I shall explain more at large upon other occasions which will often occur.

What is meant by innate Principles, and how distinguish'd from others.

IV. Having thus rightly stated the Question in hand, it will be easie to answer all the *Objections* which this Author has collected against *innate Principles*, as we commonly understand those Words, which I shall endeavour to express in as *few* and *plain* Words as I can.

Objections answered.

His first Objection against *innate* Principles, is, that there are no Truths *universally* assented to, because Children and Ideots have not the least Thoughts or Apprehensions of them; and the Want of that destroys that *universal* Consent which is the necessary Concomitant of *innate* Truths. But why, I ask, does the Want of *their* Consent destroy *universal* Consent? For we were speaking of the Consent of all that *can* consent or dissent, of all such as are *able* to make *Affirmative* and *Negative* Propositions. This seems not fair. Besides, if there was any Strength in this Argument, it's thrown away by the Author himself; for he plainly reckons Embryo's no other than Vegetables, Infants no better than Brutes, and Ideots a sort of Animals between Men and Brutes; and therefore if all, that *do* or *can* make any Judgment,

Judgment, do judge these Propositions true, then *universal* Consent is well enough secur'd.

His second Objection, and which I take to have more Strength than all the rest, is, that Children and Ideots neither understand the *Terms* nor the *Ideas* for which those *Terms* stand.

Answer; that it's true, they don't understand the *general* Words of the Propositions; (for I think no one is such a Child or Ideot himself, as to pretend they have any *innate* Knowledge of *those* or any *other* Words, any more than the People in the *Indies* understand ours, or we their Language *naturally*.) But nevertheless it may be true, that as soon as they have any *Impressions* made on the Organs of their Senses, they do and must understand the *Things* themselves, of which those *Words* are the *Signs*. Children and Ideots understand what Pain, and Pleasure, what Heat, and Cold, Hunger, and Thirst are, long before they understand the *Words*; and if they understand any thing, they must judge, that Pain is Pain, and not Pleasure; that is, that every thing is the same with *itself*, and not with *another*. And, tho' they may understand the Words which are the common Names of *fewer* Particulars, before those that are the common Names of *more* Particulars; the word *Milk*, for example, before the Word *whole*; yet that does not argue they understand the *Things* themselves, of which those words are only the *Signs*, in the same order, but rather just contrary; for as soon as a Child understands *Milk*, or indeed any *corporeal* substance, it must understand; *Whole* because that is the common Name not only of *Milk*, but of all other *corporeal* Substances. Tho' therefore Children and Ideots don't understand the Words of a *general* Proposition so soon as they may such as are *less general*; for that is but *contingent*, that is, no more to Natural Knowledge, than Hearing and Speaking is natural to every intelligent Being; yet all the Actions Children or Ideots perform argue their Knowledge, that the *Whole* is bigger than the *Part*. And could we suppose an hundred thousand deaf and dumb Persons coming to their Speech and understanding Words, we should find them all agreeing in the same Tone, "That every thing was the same with *itself*; that no one thing was "another at the same instant; The Whole was equal to all its Parts; and "in all *general* Propositions we call *Innate*: and that without any Teaching or Learning: Which argues the *Belief* of those Truths is not the Effect of *Art* but *Nature*, and their Knowledge of them could not be deriv'd from their *Senses* only, because they could not or ever will reach to the *sensible* Perception of *all* the Particulars included in those *general* Words, and yet are as *certain* of the Truth of them, as if they had or could. And as for the other Part of this Objection, that Children or Ideots don't understand the *Ideas* for which those *Words* stand, I own it's very true; but withal, that they *never* will or can, tho' they grow never so *old* or *wise*: For no man has *Ideas* which answer those *Words*. He may have an *Idea* of such a *particular* substance, that has the common Name of *Whole*, for example; but will never arrive to the *abstract* Idea of a *Whole*, as long as he live, except he be very Seraphical. If they then can neither understand the *general Names* nor the *Ideas* which they stand for, my Author will ask, What is then *innate* or *natural*? I answer, only the *Disposition* or *Aptness* to judge of the Truth of *those* Propositions, rather than the *contrary*, or to *doubt* of them: and that's enough to give the Propositions that Title, without *actual* Perception of the *Particulars*; as I proved before.

His third Objection is, that the *more general* any Proposition is, the Truth of it is the *later* known, because the Mind of Man must come to the Knowledge of *Particulars*, before it can attain to that of *Generals*.

als. This I own to be right in all Truths acquir'd by *Experience*, and wholly by the *Senses*; but not in such as are acquir'd by the Mind's Exercise of its *innate* Power of *judging* or *comparing*; which do's not *wholly* depend upon the Information we receive by our *Senses*. We can go no farther than our own *Experience* will bear us out in things that are the Objects of our *Senses*; and our Knowledge grows of such things, as our *Experience* increases; but not so in these *general* Propositions. We can't say that all Gold is yellow, because there is no *Connexion* in Nature between any sort of *corporeal* Substance, and it's *Mode*. It can be known only by an *Induction* or *Exemplification* in *all* the particulars; but we can *judge* and certainly *know*, that all *Wholes* are *equal* to all their *Parts*, by our own Observation of *one* Particular only: but if that Proposition, "All Gold is yellow, be resolv'd into an *Identical* Proposition, then *that* may be as *certain* and *known* to be such as the *other*: for every thing to which we give the common Name of *Gold*, is yellow, as well as every thing to which we give the common Name of *Whole* is equal to all its *Parts*; but then it's an *Identical* Proposition, and I say no more of it than what I meant, and is included in the Subject of that Proposition: and so it is in all *other* Instances: they are not *known* or *certain* to us, till the Mind *perceives* the *Identity* or *Negation* of Identity. And this will make the Answer easie to his next Argument against *innate* Principles; which is,

Fourthly, If *General* Propositions are said to be *innate*, because *all* Mankind *consent* in the Belief of them, then such as these are *innate*: "the Sun is a Luminous body; "Snow is white; "White is not black; "and Millions of others. For all the intelligent World agree as well "in these as in any other general Propositions that can be named. To which I answer, that the Reason they do so, is, because they are *Identical* or a *Negation* of Identity, as those general Propositions are we call *Innate*, when we say the Sun is a *Luminous* Body, we mean no more than that the Body, to which we give the common name of *luminous*, is itself: when you say, Snow is white, you mean only that Substance which affects your Eye in the same manner that others do, to which you give the common name of *White*: when you say white is not black, you only *deny* that *one* mode of Sensation is not *another*. And so all these *particular* Propositions that are so *certain*, so universally agreed in, are *Identical* Propositions, or only such *Negations* of Identity, as the Mind *immediately* perceives. What is the Reason, that a Child do's not *readily* consent to this Proposition, Twice Nineteen is equal to Thirty-eight; as it do's to this, Twice Two is equal to Four? My Author will answer, because he has not the *Ideas* of Nineteen and Thirty-eight, but he has of Two and Four. No, say I, the Reason is, because he perceives the Subject and Predicate of the former Proposition are the *same*; but not so in the greater number. For as for *Ideas*, he has no other of Two and Four than he has of Nineteen and Thirty-eight; that is, he has no *Ideas* of either; for Two, Four, Nineteen, or Thirty-eight are only the Names of so many *repeated*, or supposed to be repeated, Thoughts concerning some *Substances* or their *Modes*: but we have no *abstract* Idea of any *Number* whatever, not so much as of *Unity*; as any one may find that reflects upon his own Thoughts.

His fifth Objection against *innate* Speculative Principles is: At this rate only the *Power* or *Capacity* of the Mind to perceive the Relation between the *Parts* of these general Propositions will be *innate*, and consequently all Propositions, which we do or can ever arrive at the certain Knowledge of, are *innate*: and so all are *innate* or all *adventitious*. To which I answer, that the *Power* of perceiving the Relation

between the *Parts* of all Propositions, of the Truth of which any one is certain, is equally *innate*; but when we come to *Exercise* that Power, the Difference is as plainly discoverable, as between Persons Temper or Frame of Mind or Body: For one man is born with Inclinations and Dispositions to observe *one* sort of Truths more than *others*: Every one has a native *Genius* which is not wholly *acquir'd*. As our daily Experience teaches in other matters, an Instance or two may help us to understand this, we are treating of, more easily. One Child may be born with an Aptness or Inclination to the Gout or other Distemper, contracted from his Parents: One sort of Dog may be fram'd for acute Smelling: one sort of Bird for Singing rather than others: But this *Aptness* in the Child do's not imply, on one side, an *actual* having that Disease, or the Dog or Bird an *actual* Sensation of those Smells or Sounds: but on the other side, it implies more than a bare *Power* or *Capacity* to have that Disease, or perceive those Smells, or make those Sounds, which nevertheless we call *innate* or *natural*. Just thus, tho' these Propositions are not *actually* perceiv'd or understood by the Mind, as soon as it's created; yet it may have an *Aptness* or *Disposition* to judge of their Truth rather than their Falshood, more than of others; and that is all, as I conceive, that can be rationally meant concerning such Propositions being call'd *innate* rather than others: Namely, that the Mind is so *disposed*, that as soon as it is *conscious* of its own succeeding Thoughts, and *compares* one Thought with another, it cannot but *judge* every Thing is the same with itself, and that no one thing can be another, and so of all other general *Identical* Propositions. And all this it can do without observing more Particulars than *one*, as it must in all other *acquir'd* general Truths, except they be resolv'd into *Identical* Propositions, as all those we call *Innate* are, or *Negations* of that Identity. And that is the true measure of *Certainty*, and not *Ideas*: for those are to be had only of *particular* and *visible* substances.

His sixth and last Objection, that I can pick out, that has any face of an Argument, but what is obviated in the right State of the Question about *innate speculative* Principles, is, That Children are not always *conscious* of them or don't *remember* them.

Answer: That tho' they are not always *conscious* of them or don't *remember* them, yet all their Actions are govern'd by them, and which argues a Sense or Knowledge of them. Memory is of no use but to make any thing the easier thought on, as occasion arises. And this *Facility* or *Aptness* to judge of the Truth of *such* Propositions, is deriv'd from the Author of Nature, as that of judging of *other* Propositions is by Habit and Practice, and is as conceivable as the Minds laying up things in its Memory. Shew a Savage or an illiterate Person a piece of Gold and a piece of Iron, He'll presently judge, one is not the other; tho' he never heard of the words *Gold* or *Iron* perhaps in his life; because he had *that* Part of Knowledge ever since he knew any thing. He'll neither need *Reason* or *Memory* for that, because that was *natural*: but in *acquir'd* Knowledge the case is quite otherwise; he must have *heard* and *remember* too, that Gold is more valuable then Iron, else he'll make no scruple of giving you Gold for Iron, as they say the *Americans* would before they knew better.

All these Arguments of the Author's are so far from convincing me that there are no Truths but what are *acquir'd*, (for that's his meaning in all this Chapter) that they rather confirm me, that as 'tis in Painting and all sort of Manufactures, the nearer they come to the imitation of Nature; so in all *acquir'd* Truths, the nearer they are to these

these *innate* or *natural* Truths, the clearer or the more certain Perception of *Identity*, or its *Negation*, is the measure of *Certainty*, not the Agreement or Disagreement in *Ideas*.

C H A P. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

I. IF the Design of this Author was, out of History to shew such Persons as never were out of the Smoak of their own Chimnies, as he expresses it; that some Men are not so *wise* as they might be, and others not so *good* as they should be, he has certainly effected it with a singular *Exactness* and a compleat *Elegancy* of Phrase; but if it was to prove that *GOD*, antecedently to Divine special Revelation and all Humane Institutions, has contributed nothing towards the laying the *Foundations* of Truth, Morality and Religion, I think he has not gain'd the point, tho' all his Arguments are new-shav'd and dress'd with all the ornamental advantage that Language could give them. In order therefore to the clearing this matter, I shall endeavour to explain, 1. What is meant by *innate Practical Principles*. 2. Offer some Reasons that seem to evince there are *such* Principles planted in the Minds of all Men; and, 3. Attempt to answer the Arguments which this Author has brought against any such Principles. By *Practical innate Principles* I mean, such Propositions as contain an *immutable Obligation* upon all single Persons and Societies to conform their *Practices* to the Sense of them. Such as these: Preserve your Lives and Offsprings; Promote your own and their Happiness, as much as you can; and this every man knows as well as he do's his own Existence, and that his Legs and Hands are *Parts* of Himself. Promote the Happiness of all Mankind as far as you can; which is as easie and natural to understand in *Practice*, as in *Speculation* it is, that the Whole is *Greater* than its Part. Promote and preserve Peace; which is as obvious a Truth, as that a *strait* Line is the *shortest*. Do as you wou'd be done by; which is as plain as that Equal added to Equal makes the *Whole* Equal. When Differences arise, don't insist upon the being Judge in your *own* Case; which seems as reasonable to *practise*, as 'tis to believe, that *one* Body can't be in *two* Places at the *same* Time. Don't wilfully offer violence to an innocent person; which is as plain in *Practice*, as 'tis in *Observation* of Bodies, that they will continue in the state of *Rest* or *Motion* wherein they are, till something else alters it. Observe your Contracts; which is as natural as 'tis for a Body to move but *one* Way at *one* Time. Worship God, Honour your Benefactors; which is every whit as natural as for *heavy* Bodies to *descend*. These and many such like Principles *equivalent* to them or *deducible* from them, we call *Practical*, because they influence external Actions; *Propositions*, because they have all the *essential* parts of a Proposition, that is, Subject, Predicate and Copula; as the single Word *Go* in English, or the single Letter *I* in Latin is; because 'tis the same in sense with those three words, *you must go*; where all the *three* Parts manifestly appear. We call such Propositions *Laws*, because they have all the *Essential* Parts of a *Law*, Authority, Promulgation, Sanction. *Authority*, because they are impress'd upon our Minds by the Author of Nature; *Promulgation*, because every one that can judge at all, or can do good

What *innate*
practical Prin-
ciples are.

or harm, judges them true; *Sanction*, because Rewards are naturally entail'd upon the Observance of them, and Punishments upon the Breach of them. Insomuch that no *morally good* Action whatever can be named, but one way or other, all things consider'd, even antecedent to Humane Constitutions, it has some greater natural Advantage annex'd to it than Disadvantage; such as Health, Strength, Beauty, long Life, Wisdom, Memory, Honour, Riches, Power, but especially Ease of Mind, Satisfaction or some inward Pleasure, the inseparable consequence of it. Nor can any *moral Evil* be mention'd, but has one or other of the contrary natural Inconveniences invariably annex'd to it by the common Course of Nature (that is) by the unavoidable Relation in which *Rational Beings* stand, by their Minds, Bodies or both, to other Parts of the Universe. But this I shall not need to insist upon, because 'tis the daily Subject of all Mens Discourses about particular Virtues and Vices: and is besides at large prov'd even to Demonstration by the eminently Learned Dr. Cumberland now Lord Bishop of *Peterborough*, in his Philosophical Treatise *de Legibus Natura*.

The Question
stated about
Innate Practi-
cal Principles.

I shall now therefore only fairly state the Question, and offer the Reasons which convince me, there are such *Principles* impress'd upon the Minds of *all* men, by the wise Author of Nature, in his original frame of our Souls and Bodies and other Parts of the Universe.

II. The true State of the Question seems to me this, Whether the Minds of Men are so fram'd, as to be just like White Paper, equally capable of any Letters or Characters, *indifferently* disposed to believe any Propositions *true* or *false*, any Actions *good* or *bad*? Suppose, for Example, such as this Author has collected, "Expose your Children; Murder or expose to wind and weather and wild Beasts your Parents, or any Persons very Aged or Sick, beyond hopes of Recovery; Bury your Children alive; Geld your own Children, got on Female Captives kept for that purpose, &c. The Question, I ask, is, whether Human Nature, *antecedent* to Custom, Education or Law, be so form'd as to be *free* to believe such Propositions *true*, such Actions *good*? Or rather, whether, in the moulding of our Souls and Bodies, the Author of our Natures has not *prepossess'd* us with Inclinations to judge them *false*, and the Actions agreeable to them *evil* and *mischievous*? I must do this Author so much right as to own, that he has profess'd, that God has by an *inseparable* Connexion joyn'd *Virtue* and publick *Happiness* together, and made the Practice thereof necessary to the Preservation of *Society*, and visibly *beneficial* to all with whom the Vertuous Man has to do. No good Man can be ambitious of expressing his Thoughts in better Words than these are. But if all that, which he calls *Virtue*, be nothing at all else but what Education, Law or Custom has made *honourable*, I doubt we are but where we were before: For the Question is not, whether *some* sort of Actions be not conducive to Publick Good, and *others* destructive, where Government is establish'd, and Rewards and Punishments settled by Law; but, whether *antecedent* to any such Establishment, there be any such *native* Excellency in any sort of Action as to make them *good*, or *natural* Vileness in others as to make them *bad*? And accordingly, whether there be any such *innate* Impressions upon Human Nature, as disposes Men to Judge some Propositions *true* and others *false*, some Actions, agreeable or disagreeable to them, *good* or *bad*? For if the Relation between *Virtue* and *Happiness*, *Vice* and *Unhappiness* be not fix'd by an *immutable* Law, made by the Author of Nature, it's impossible to conceive how *Human* Constitutions should
create

create that *necessary* Connexion, unless my Author will say, that all Men, in the Frame of their Laws, *necessarily* fall into *those* Persuasions, and *conform* their Commands and Prohibitions accordingly; but this is down-right *contrary* to all those barbarous Enormities he mentions, and *contradicts* the whole Design of his alledging them; which seems to have been for the proving, that, *antecedent* to *Divine* Revelation and *Human* Constitution, there was nothing really *good* or *bad*.

I am very sensible that this Author will say, that we form our Notions of the *Difference* between *Virtue* and *Vice* from our own Observation of the *different* Consequences of them, just as we gain our Knowledge of the sensible Qualities of *Bodies* from their different Operations upon the Organs of our *Senses*. But alas, the Case is quite different; all the Men in the world agree to call that *white*, *black*, or *blue* which we do (I mean by Words in their Languages which signify the same:) but 'tis not so in *moral* Affairs; for we call that *Murder* in *England*, which, it seems, in *Peru*, *Mengrelia* and the *Caribes*, is very allowable, if not laudable. We must get therefore our Notions of *good* and *evil* from some Cause *superior* to those of Custom, Education or Human Laws, else we shall be upon great uncertainty. We don't reckon that *heavy* Bodies naturally *descend* to the Centre of the Earth, because *here* and *there* one, or twenty to one, do; but because *all* do or endeavour it. Just so we call those Propositions *Laws* of *Nature*, because *all* Men both *know* them and *judge* them true, and that they operate as *necessarily* upon all, as Stones descend, if not *hindred* by other Bodies. And the Reason they have not a *constant* Effect is, because some Passions of one sort or other *over-power* those *natural* Inclinations, but that they don't *destroy* them, no more than other Bodies destroy the natural *Conatus* of heavy Bodies to descend, tho they *hinder* the Effect at the *present*.

Now the Reasons which make me believe there are such *innate* or *natural* Laws of *good* and *evil* are such as these:

That there are
Innate Practi-
cal Principles.

III. First, if there were no such *immutable* Laws of Nature, *antecedent* to all *Human* Institutions, there can be no Reason given why any Action whatever should be in *itself* really *good* or *bad*; all Actions would be in *themselves* *indifferent*; and at that rate, cutting of an innocent Persons Throat or stabbing him, *antecedent* to the establish'd Penalties by *Human* Laws, would be as *indifferent* Actions, as cleaving a piece of Wood or boring a Hole in it. But if our Natures are so fram'd as *unavoidably* to have a great Abhorrence of *one* and not of the *other*, 'tis an Argument that *murdering* our Parents or innocent Children is a *Fault*; tho punishable by no other *Natural* Evil, but that of a *guilty* Conscience, which some have found so great a Torment as to prefer hanging or drowning themselves before it. I am sure some of the Heathen celebrated for that very reason for wise Law-makers, such as *Solon*, have judg'd *Parricide* so horrid a Crime, as to think it needless to confirm *Nature's* *Aversion* with any *Positive* Law or Penalty; and *Tully* in his defence of *Roscius Amerinus*, who was accused of that crime, tells a story to that Effect of one *Clælius* of *Terracina*, when after supper he went to bed and lay in the Room with two of his Sons, and was in the Morning found murder'd in his bed, and there could be found none on whom they could fasten the Suspicion but the Sons; yet because they were found fast asleep they were acquitted, because no man could think such could sleep soundly, that had committed such an *unnatural* Crime.

Secondly, If there were no Laws founded in Nature by a Power *superior* to that of *human*, there can be no account given why such

Emperors and Princes should ever torment themselves with the *Consciousness* of their *evil* Acts, who knew themselves out of the reach of human Penalties; and yet antient and modern History affords us an account of more than *Nero* and *Caligula*, who were so haunted by the Fore-bodings of their own miserable Fate, that no Musick or more exquisite Arts of Divertisement could procure them Sleep or Rest, which even Nature requires; and that very Expedient, namely the *Dis-belief* of a *Providence*, which they improv'd by all the artificial Inventions that Debauchery could afford, proved rather an effectual means to increase than mitigate their Fears; and such as have been the *boldest* Hectors for *Atheism* in all Ages have been the most *timorous* Men living, and the greatest Martyrs in those Flames which their own *guilty* Consciences have kindled.

Thirdly, No probable Reasons can be given, but such as are fetch'd from Nature's *powerful* Efficacy, why any Persons, tho never so profligate all their days, yet at their *Death*, when they can receive no more Pleasure or Punishments from their *lewd* Practices, yet cannot forbear *wishing*, at least, they had been better; and we never yet heard of any that had so far *master'd* Nature's Inclinations, as to wish their *Sons* should be such as they had been *themselves*: Which seems to argue which way *unprejudic'd* Nature leans.

Fourthly, There are some Laws of Nature which seem to have a *deeper* Root than meer Custom, Education or the Hopes of *human* Rewards, or Fears of *human* Punishments could plant; because *human* Laws themselves derive their *whole* or *main* Strength from those very Laws of *Nature*, and are more or less *valid*, as they are more or less *agreeable* to those *natural* Laws, or sooner or later resolv'd into them. We all know, that the *bare* Act of Coyning false Mony is in itself no more a *moral* Evil, than setting ones Seal in Wax or the Impression of ones Foot in the Snow; and, that Murdering ones *lawful* Prince is in *itself* but the same Action by which one murders *another* Person; What is it then that makes the former at all *Criminal*, and the other the most *horrid* Villany, but only the Law of Nature, which makes the *publick* Good more valuable than the *private*, which cannot be preserv'd without Property, of which Coin is the Measure; nor the Peace and Happiness of *Kingdoms* maintain'd, without special regard to the Lives of *Princes*. When a man comes to be hang'd for Treason or Coy-nage, it may convince him or others he was an *unfortunate* Fool, but never that he was an *ill* Man, unless some more *powerful* Cause influence his Conscience. All *morally* good or evil Actions, all *Heroick* Virtues and *barbarous* Massacres would *abate* of their Value or Horror, if the Author of *Nature* had not laid the *Foundation* of Virtue and Vice upon surer Grounds than the *uncertain* Opinions of some *particular* Men, who were to set the Mark of Distinction and the Price upon them by their *different* Resentments. But these arguments will be farther explain'd and confirm'd by the Answers to the several Objections which this Author has framed against the Laws of Nature or the *natural* Distinction of *Good* and *Evil*: for I take that to be all one.

Objections answered.

His first Objection is; No *moral* Rule whatever can pretend to so *general* and *ready* Assent as *speculative self-evident* Propositions.

Answer: All *moral* Rules are as generally and readily assented to as any *self-evident speculative* Principles, and all Men too would be govern'd by them as constantly as the others are judg'd true, but that some unreasonable *Passion over-powers*, for the *present*, those Inclinations which Nature has planted in their Minds: And, was it as much for the Interest of Mens Lusts and Passions, they would as readily deny that the
Whole

Whole is greater than any one of its Parts, that the Sun is luminous, Snow white, as that the *publick* Good is to be prefer'd to the *private*; keeping Contracts needless; murdering innocent Persons just and lawful. Heavy Bodies don't less always endeavour to descend, because other Bodies *hinder* the Effect, nor all Men the less know *moral* Rules, because their own Passions sometimes *blind* their Eyes, or *over-balance* their *natural* Dispositions. Men are to be consider'd as *free* Agents, and as such, have power to raise in themselves such Hopes, Fears and other Passions as may hurry them to the Practice of such things as they themselves are conscious are against Reason and their own true Interest; as a Man by the Violence of Wind may be *driven* out of that Path which he knows to be the *right* one.

His second Objection: Keeping *Contracts* is by most Men agreed to be an *innate practical* Truth, and to extend to the Dens of Thieves and the Confederacies of the greatest Villains. This Rule, he allows that, even Out-laws observe amongst themselves; but then, he says, they practise it not by virtue of any *innate Law*, but as a Rule of *Convenience*.

Answer: It seems then, *Convenience* is so inseparable and remarkable a Consequence of the Observation of that Rule, that the worst of Men see it's their Interest to observe it. And that, one would think, was a good Argument that the Connexion between the *Observation* of that Rule and that *Effect* of it, was *natural*, and therefore that's deservedly reckon'd a Law of Nature. For that's all we mean by a Law of Nature, that it's such a Rule of Action as has a *natural* Advantage the Consequence of its Observation, and that nothing hinders its operating upon *all* Men, and at *all* times, but the Power of a more *prevalent* Passion that diverts the Effect. The Sun can do no more than enlighten a well-disposed Organ of Sight; but if Men will shut or cover their Eyes, that may *bereave* them of the Benefit of that Light, but not of their Knowledge that they *might* have it. Pride, Covetousness or Lust may so *discolour* or *misfigure* Virtue as to hinder their present Sight of its Comeliness or Advantage, may so *misrepresent* Knavery and Murder as at that time they may not discover their evil Consequences; neither can I see a reason why Men may not embrace that Rule of Justice as an *innate Law*, and yet *break* that very Law of Nature at another *time*, and with other *persons*, by committing Villany, as well as do *well* at one time and *ill* at another: and that's every whit as possible as for a Body *naturally* to endeavour to move in a *strait* Line, and yet be so *over-power'd* by another body as *actually* to move in a *crooked* Line; which, our daily Experience convinces us, is usual. Justice and Veracity are the *common* Ties of *Societies*, and that which makes them so is *common* Interest, and that *common* Interest is the *natural* Effect and Reward of the Observance of those Laws of Nature. Why therefore may not Men, who live by Fraud and Rapine, be as well said to have *innate* Principles of Veracity and Justice, tho they act *contrary*? As a man may be said to act *contrary* to the Dictates of his own Conscience; and that we must allow possible, unless we'll suppose all Men as *good* as they themselves think they *ought* to be.

His third Objection is: *Actions* are the best Interpreters of Mens *Thoughts*, and therefore since the Actions of Men are so frequently, *contrary* to *innate practical* Principles, there can be *none* such; because then they would be woven into the *Constitution* of Human Nature to no purpose, and would not be distinguishable from meerly *speculative* Principles. This Objection would be of great Weight, if Mankind were either pure *Spirits*, or only the Master-piece of *Mechanism*: if
pure

pure *Spirits*, they would necessarily be as good as they know they ought to be; or if all their Actions were the pure Effects of *refin'd* Matter; for then indeed they must obey the Laws of Motion, as all Matter, how *refin'd* soever do's. If all their Actions were nothing else but the natural Effects of the *Impressions* which are deriv'd from *other* bodies to theirs, then there can be no account given why *one* Motion should not beget *another*; and so, by a necessary Concatenation of Causes with their Effects, all their Actions should be just like those of a regular Machin; and so not only *eat* and *drink*, but *walk*, *talk*, *think* and *reason* by as certain Rules as the Wheels and Weights of a Clock move and turn its Index, and make it strike in due Time, Mood and Figure. But now, if Men be neither pure *Spirits* nor pure *Bodies*, but consist of both; are free Agents, have an *inward Power* of their own of moving their *own* and *other* Bodies within certain limits, and of *abating* or *increasing* the Motion deriv'd from other bodies: of which *Power* we are all as conscious as of our own *Existence*: I can't see any necessity that their *Actions* should be the constant Interpreters of their *Thoughts*, or why they may not either act *contrary* to those *innate* Principles of Knowledge which they have, or by the Violence of Passion be *hindred* from attending to those Rules of Action which they judge the best: just as a Stone in a Sling may, by the force of that motion which is deriv'd from the Hand, move in a Circle, yet all the while retain its natural *conatus* to recede from the Centre of that Motion in every point of the Circle which it describes: And all the difference in the case would be, that as the Stone has its *violent* motion, as indeed it has its *natural*, from some Cause different from *itself*, the Mind in all its *voluntary* Actions and Passions has the Causes *within itself*, and is therefore, as a free Agent, the Subject of Rewards or Punishment for well or ill using that *native* Power or Liberty. Neither is there any reason why the Laws of Nature should necessarily operate upon the Minds of Men more than *human* Laws, or why their not operating upon all Persons casts a greater Blemish upon the Author of *Nature*, as if he form'd them for no purpose, than the non-observance of *human* Laws, by all Subjects, derogates from the Honour of the Law-givers. Nature has ~~induced~~ all men with a Desire of *Happiness*, and an Aversion to *Misery*; and so, without doubt, it has with a *Knowledge* of some Actions that have an *immutable* Connexion with some sort of Rewards and Punishments; else that Desire or Aversion would signifie very little or nothing: Yet a Man may mistake in Judging those Rewards or Punishments less valuable than they are, in comparison with other Advantages or Disadvantages that are nearer at hand and more pressing: but the fault lies at his own door, for not attending to the Laws of Nature which always dictate that which is *best*, and, all things consider'd, most for his *Interest* and *Advantage*.

His fourth Objection: There can be no *moral* Rule propos'd whereof a man may not demand a *Reason*; and therefore it cannot be *innate* or *self-evident*.

Answer: It's true, there may be occasion to *explain* the Sense of the words of a *practical* Proposition (as there may be of a *speculative*) but there needs no Argument to convince any unprejudic'd Person of the Fitness of *observing* it, after he knows the Sense of the words. This *practical* Proposition, *Do as you would be done unto*, carries its own Evidence and Reasonableness with it; and, tho it want *Explication*, yet needs no *Proof*: for every one understands that what's equal in *one* Mans case is equal in *another's*: and that he understands as well as he do's that, if two pence added to two pence makes four pence, so two Shillings

Shillings added to two Shillings makes four Shillings. The Words in both Cases may need *Explication*, but no *Proof* of the Reasonableness of that which is the Sense of either.

His fifth Objection: That Men should keep their *Compacts*, is certainly a great and undeniable Rule in *Morality*; but yet a Christian, an Hobbist, and an Heathen Philosopher would give *different* Reasons for the observing of it.

Answer: They may give *different* Reasons and use *different* Expressions to add *new* Force to a Law of Nature; but need *none* sufficiently to convince an unprejudic'd Person of his Obligation to observe it; but what the wise Author of Nature has suggested before. The Christians using the Hopes of *future* Rewards and the Fears of *future* Punishments; the Hobbists using the *Magistrates* Power; and the Heathens the *Dignity* of Virtue, argues they have all the *same* Sense of the Obligation, tho they *differ* in *expressing* the Arguments to enforce it: And their very *agreeing* to give *different* Reasons shews that Nature *operates equally* in them all, in disposing them to use such Enforcements. We don't deny but that *divine* Revelation, *human* Laws, and a *generous* Sense of Honour, may add great Force to remove the Prejudices which Men by Custom or Education may have imbibed against the Laws of Nature. All that we contend for, is to do so much Right to *human* Nature and the ever-blessed Author of it, as to assert that *antecedent* to any such *adventitious* Enforcements. All Men have such a *native* Anticipation of the different Consequences of *moral* Good and Evil, as not to be *indifferent* to either; but are naturally inclin'd, for Example, to *keep* Contracts rather than *break* them; to do *Good* rather than *Harm*; to *nourish* rather than *murder* their Children. That's the Pinch of the whole Cause, as it ought to be stated.

His sixth Objection: Virtue is generally approv'd, not because *innate*, but because *profitable*.

Answer: Does then the *Profitableness* of Virtue to individual Persons, or whole Societies, prove the Sense of Virtue is not *innate*? I should have thought just the contrary, it proves it is *innate*: for where an Effect is *constant*, there the Cause is the Author of Nature. If therefore *Virtue* and publick *Happiness* are join'd by an inseparable Connexion, as this Author himself owns in express Words in Sect. VI. of this Chapter, then 'tis as necessary for every *individual Person* to be virtuous, in order to his *own* Happiness, as 'tis for a *Kingdom* or *Commonwealth* to be so, in order to the *publick* Good: for what's true of the *whole* Body, consider'd as made up of several Parts, is true in every *individual* Person, consider'd as a Part of that Whole. If keeping Contracts be for the Honour, Security, and Advantage of a *whole* Kingdom (as without doubt it is) and at all times too, all things fairly consider'd; so it must be for every *single* Person: and that which makes it seem otherwise at some certain times to some certain Persons, is because they either don't consider *future*, but only *present* or *nearer* Advantages, or value a *particular* Advantage above a *publick*; become Penny-wise and Pound-foolish: Which is acting as *contrary* to the *Practical* Principle of Nature, as he that should judge a Penny equal to a Pound, or the Part equal to the Whole, would misjudge in *Speculatives*.

'Tis no Wonder, says this Author, and so say I too, that every one should not only *allow*, but *recommend* and *magnifie* those Rules to others, from whose Observance of them he is sure to reap Advantage to himself: he may, out of *Interest* as well as *Conviction*, cry up that for *Sacred*, which if once trampled on and profaned, he *himself* can-

Hypocrisie
proves that it's
most natural
to be really
good.

not be *safe* and *secure* ; from which I infer, that tho these *outward* Acknowledgments and Honour which they pay these *moral* Rules, do not prove that the Persons *inwardly* assent to them, as the inviolable Rules of their *own* Practice, because they may be prejudic'd ; yet those *Acknowledgments* do prove, that it's for *every ones* Honour and Interest to persuade all *others* to observe them. And surely that which it's *every* Mans Interest to persuade *every* Man else to *do*, is much more his *own* also to *practise* : for every Man is more concern'd for *himself* than for *others* : and sufficiently demonstrates, that he that breaks those Rules himself is so far a Fool and a Knave ; a Fool, for not considering the *future* Evils he exposes himself to ; and a Knave, for not doing that which he himself *owns* to have been his Duty, by persuading others to it ; that Hypocrisie proves that it's most *natural* to be really *good*. We don't pretend that the Laws of Nature so *irresistibly* operate, as to make Men *wise* and *honest* against their *Wills*, but only *incline* them to be such, for their own Interest, Security, and Happiness. The Truth is, this Author gives such good *Words* to *Virtue*, that it would tempt a Man to put up the Controversy ; but when he comes to tell us what this *Virtue* is, which has *Happiness* entail'd upon it, he makes it nothing *certain*, but what every Man by Custom, Education or Humour is inclin'd to call by that *honourable* Name ; and so it *changes* its Nature according to the Climate in which a Man lives : and so eating Children, when well fattened, is a *Virtue* in the *West-Indies*, which is *Barbarity* in *Europe*. Set that right, and the whole Matter is accommodated.

His seventh Objection : Mens Actions convince us that the Rule of *Virtue* is not their *inward* Principle.

Answer : They convince us indeed, that *all Men* are not so good as to govern themselves by the *natural* Sense they have of what is good ; but not that those Persons don't act *contrary* to their own *Consciences*, unless we could suppose every Man as good as he *knows* himself oblig'd to be. Hardly any Man perhaps will own himself a down-right Fool, but few will own themselves such complete Saints.

His eighth Objection : Perhaps, says this Author, *Conscience* may be urg'd as checking us for such Breaches, and so the *internal* Obligation and Establishment of the Rule may be preserv'd. And this indeed I take to be a great Truth ; but this he thinks answer'd (tho I don't) by saying, that *many* Men (he should have said, if at all to his purpose, *all* Men) may come to the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature by the *same way* they do to the Knowledge of other things. He do's not indeed, in this place, tell us *how*, but by his Principles I am well assured he do's and must mean, by Custom, Education and Conversation. For if the Author of Nature has not provided for our Knowledge of those Laws in the *original* Constitution of our Minds, Bodies and other Parts of the Universe, which he utterly disowns, and is the main Design of this Chapter to confirm, then there remains no way to gain the Knowledge of those Laws, but by every Man's own Observation of the Custom and Laws of his own Country, and the Practice of those with whom he converses.

And to this I reply : That Education, Company, Custom, human Laws may contribute mightily to the adding *new* Force to the Laws of Nature ; but if there be no *Foundations* laid into the Constitution of our Natures, for the Distinction between Virtue and Vice, *antecedent* to them, then I doubt they'll prove but very *uncertain* and *ticklish* ; because they will depend upon very *contingent* Causes : And the Consequence of this Doctrin will be, that Good and Evil are
meerly

meerly *arbitrary*, and the Names only of *fashionable* and *unfashionable*; and *Natural Religion* itself, of which *Virtue* is an *essential* Branch, will be nothing else but the Effect of *Education*, *Custom* and *Conversation*, and *that* infused by no nobler a Cause than a Nurse, Mother, Tutor or Playfellow; and *Conscience* again be nothing else but the *Opinion* a Man has of his own Actions, and that *Opinion* be wrought in him and govern'd wholly by his *own* Observation. Then there's no room for *Natural Conscience*; 'tis but the *honourable* Title every Man gives to those *Opinions* which he has fortunately got by the Chance of his *Education*. And this Author was aware of this Consequence, as appears by his express owning, that if *Conscience* be a Proof of *innate* Principles (as without doubt it is) then *Contraries* may be *innate* Principles; since some Men with the *same* Bent of *Conscience* *prosecute* what others *avoid*. But stop there: for tho *false* Notions in Religion may go a great way to *corrupt* Mens Manners and Tempers, as every one knows that has heard of or believes, there have been *Martyrs* for *true* Religion; yet we never heard of any that were so far corrupted as to own it *lawful*, to *murder* an *innocent* Person, or *break* any Law of Nature, meerly out of *Conscience*. 'Tis true, Religion may seem to carry one Man so far as to think he's bound in *Conscience*, in some cases, to *kill* another; and another again so far as to make him think himself bound in *Conscience* rather to *suffer Death*, than to desert his Cause (which is the case of *Persecutors* on one side, and *Martyrs* on the other:) yet, I believe, it will be impossible for this Author, or any one else, to clear such as kill others, for Matters *meerly religious*, from Envy, Pride, Revenge, Covetousness, Lust, or some such wilful Prejudice: And so 'tis not *Conscience* (whatever is pretended) but some *irregular Passion*, mingled with *Religious Phrenzy*, that proves so *venemous* and *mischievous*. But how *false* as well as *dangerous* to the Foundation of *Morality* and *Natural Religion* this Doctrin is, I shall have farther occasion to explain and prove, after I have given the Reader an Account of the several Instances this Author has collected for the proving, that what we call *Natural Religion* and *Natural Conscience* are wholly owing to *Custom*, *Company* and *Education*. Such as these in Sect. IX. of this Chapter.

V. Robberies, Murders and Rapes are but the *Sports* of Men set at Liberty from Punishment and Censure, as appears by the usual Practices at sacking Towns; no Footsteps of the Law of Nature for preserving of Children amongst the *Grecians* and *Romans*, tho *civiliz'd* People; because *exposing* them was allow'd and uncondemn'd; and *burying* them alive with their Mothers, if they died in Childbirth; usually practis'd in some Countries, and even amongst the *Mengrelians*, tho they profess'd Christianity; Parents gelding their own Children, practis'd by the *Caribes* on purpose to fat and eat them; nothing so common in *Peru*, as fattening and eating Children got on Female-Captives kept for that purpose; no signs of any Law of Nature for Children *honouring* their Parents, nor for reverencing *Old Age*; or taking care of sick and aged Persons; because *killing* or *exposing* Parents or other *sick* Persons, when their Recovery became desperate, usually was practis'd in several Parts of *Asia* without any Remorse; no Law of Nature against *Revenge* appears by the *Tavoupinambo's* thinking they merited Paradise by *eating* abundance of their *Enemies*; *Virtue* no Part of *Natural Religion*, because the *Turks* canonize those for *Saints* who lead such *lewd* Lives as Modesty can't relate: and in *Egypt* they honour *Madmen* for *Saints*, and such as have led *profligate* Lives are in such high Estimation, that if they voluntarily reform, they have liberty to do what they list; and

Instances
given by the
Author to
prove no Laws
of Nature.

and such as are begotten by such, are esteem'd an holy Off-spring ; and *Madmen* cried up for Persons of *Divine* Virtues for never having the carnal Knowledge of Women or Boys, but contenting themselves only with She-Asses. These are the Instances which this Author has raked together to prove there are no such things as *Natural* Rules of *Morality*, *Conscience* or *Piety* ; but all depends on Education, Custom and Company. For, if that was not his Intention, all these Stories are impertinent. To which I make this Reply :

Answer'd.

VI. First, I own all such Practices to be *against* the Laws of Nature and *Natural Religion* ; neither 2. shall I dispute the Truth of them, tho some of those Stories out of the *West-Indies* may be much doubted, because they come from such whose Interest it might be to represent those People worse than really they were, on purpose to justify the horrid Barbarities which they committed in the Conquest of them ; and the Story out of *Egypt* seems pick'd up from the Hackney Master : But admitting all these Matters of Fact true ; yet they don't prove that these People were *wholly ignorant* of the Laws of Nature ; only that they were such Monsters of Men, as not to *regard* or *attend* to them, as they ought ; besides in all these Instances there's no Mention of any Laws of the Country to Oblige the People to these Enormities. 'Tis one thing *not to punish*, or *allow*, a Fact, another to *command* or *reward*. Law-makers are generally more free from irregular Passions in the Debate about *making* Laws, than they are in the *breaking* good ones. But suppose the worst, That these Enormities had been commanded (tho the Want of that abates something of the Strength of the Argument) yet that would not demonstrate that they *knew no better*. The *Romans*, as celebrated as they are, for Justice and many instances of Generosity, made a Law or Decree for their endeavouring to conquer *Cyprus*. But that do's not evince that they were *ignorant* of their own *Offence* ; for the contrary appears from their own best Historians, who acknowledge that it was attempted out of Covetousness of the Riches of the Island, and to enlarge their Dominions : and the then prevailing *Clodian* Party in the Commonwealth sent *Cato* upon the Enterprize, to whom they were ill-affected, on purpose to blemish his Reputation by the Foulness of the Fact. And therefore to make any of these *barbarous* Practices a convincing Argument against *innate* Principles of *Morality* and *Religion*, there must be Proof, that the Persons who committed them were under no Prejudices, under the Power of no Passion, Lust, Fear or Hopes of more present Advantages or Disadvantages than what Nature suggests for the contrary Practices. For I never yet met with any such zealous Asserters of the Laws of Nature, as believ'd that it was not in the Power of Man, as a *free Agent*, to *break* them, or that they operated with such an *irresistible* Force, as to place Men out of the Reach of *contrary* Impressions from present Objects that offer Pleasure or Profit. This our Daily Experience would confute, and we need not travel to the *Indies* or *Africa* for Arguments to prove that Men may be Fools or Knaves : for the Instances we meet with at our own Doors are far *more pertinent* Proofs of that. We have the *additional* Advantages of wholsom Laws, and of *special Divine* Revelations, to set before our Eyes the *noble* Hopes of a *glorious* Immortality ; and the *Terrors* of *Hell* to inforce the Observance of the same Laws of Nature ; and yet for all this we have frequent Examples of *wilful* Folly and Knavery. But will any one hence infer, that we are *ignorant* of the Laws, or are not *conscious* that we do amiss, no more than they can, that Highway-men
never

never heard of a Gallows, or that they are inwardly persuaded (whatever their Actions argue) that Hanging is for their Health, Honour or Happiness.

For the true State of this Question between those that assert and those that deny *innate practical* Principles, or Laws of Nature, is not, whether Men *can* act contrary to them or not; for in that point there is no dispute; those Examples which every one sees at home, as well as those which this Author has fetch'd so far off, sufficiently evince that; nor, whether the Idea or Notion of the Subject and Predicate of these or any other *practical* Propositions; *Parents, preserve your Children; Children, honour your Parents*; be stamp'd upon the Souls of all Men, as soon as they are united to their Bodies; That's an idle thing to talk for or against: But the whole Question is, whether *human* Nature be not so *constituted* by the provident Author of it, as to be more *inclin'd* to the *Observance* of some *Rules of Action*, for the promoting their own and the Happiness of all Mankind, than to the *Breach* of them? Or, in other words, whether *all* Men or *any one* Man is *free* from all *Sense* of Duty, and *indifferent* to all sort of Actions? For example, whether antecedent to *divine special* Revelation or *human* Institution, Law, or Custom, a Man is as *free* to *murder* his Off-spring as to *preserve* them, to *kill* his Parents, aged or sick Persons, as to *honour, reverence* and *take care* of them? And now I appeal to the *Sense* of all Mankind, whether they don't feel within themselves *Inclinations* to one, and *Abhorrence* of the other sort of Actions, of which this Author has given us Specimens? And, that *Abhorrence* or *Recoil* of Nature against such *lewd* and *barbarous* Practices, is, what we mean by *natural Conscience*; and is an evident Demonstration, that we are all born with an *Inclination* to the *Observance* of those Rules which we call, the Laws of Nature. God we reckon the Author of *Nature*, and of all the *necessary* Effects in the World, as well as of *special* Revelations, and has set up that *Light of Knowledge* in the Minds of all Men, *antecedent* to all sort of *other* teachings, to guide them into the ways of *Happiness*; if their own *wilful* Ignorance and *irregular* Passions don't mislead them into the Paths of *Misery*. We can't indeed so impartially judge what others in *unciviliz'd* Nations may be inclin'd to do, because we are under the powerful *Prejudice* of good Education, Laws and Customs, to create an *inward* Aversion to such Practices; but we can nevertheless judge whether it be not the *Interest* of all Mankind to be under the like *Restraints* we are; we can judge whether those Advantages we receive by *Government* be not such as *incline* all Men, who desire their own Happiness (as all Men do) to enter into *Society*; we can judge whether *all* Men are not *naturally* inclin'd to *Society*, and whether we ourselves ever wish ourselves at *liberty* from such Laws as restrain us in such Particulars or not, and so by ourselves judge of the *natural* Inclinations of *all* Mankind. And I can't forbear making this Remark, that this Doctrine, namely, that Nature has made no *Distinction* between Good and Evil, is a great Refine upon Mr. *Hobbs*; for he owns Laws of Nature, and has given us a Scheme of some of them; and he acknowledges too the *immutable* Obligation of them *in foro interno*; by which he means the same we do by *natural Conscience*: And I am not willing to believe that this Author is so fond of the Honour of a *new Hypothesis* as to court the Name of exceeding Mr. *Hobbs* in Disservice to *Natural Religion* and *Morality*. But let that pass; for I own 'tis no Proof against a Doctrine to say, tis worse than any of Mr. *Hobbs's*. But I think this is: That every Man (except we'll suppose him *naturally*

turally more unhappy than Beasts) is born with a *natural* Inclination to promote his own Happiness, and with so much Sense that the preserving his Life and Being is a necessary Means to it ; because every one knows that there is no Happiness without the Sense of it. But yet, we frequently observe, Persons wilfully offer Violence to their own Lives ; will any one from hence argue, that it's possible for such Persons to have been *ignorant* of the Law of Nature ; or not to be *conscious* that they act against it ? No surely : but either their affected Scorn to receive the Benefit of their Lives from others, which was the case of *Cato Uticensis*, or from some kind of Revenge, however odd, or from Fears, however irrational, of some greater Evil than the Loss of their Lives, or some such extravagant Passion, they are made not at that instant to *attend* to the Dictate of their Consciences, and are thereby hurried into the Commission of that *horrid* Crime. Now if it be possible for Persons for such *slight* Reasons to offend against a Law of Nature, which looks every Man in the face with such a terrible Aspect, why is it not as easie to conceive and rational to believe, that all such *lewd* and *barbarous* Practices, recited by this Author, proceeded from some such over-ruling Passions or *superstitious* Conceits (without the necessity of owning any such *indifferency* in Nature to Good or Evil :) For 'tis demonstrably plain, that no Persons can *voluntarily* act either ill or well, without some sort of *leading Reason* or other ; and therefore such Practices do not evince, that either there are no Laws of Nature, or that the Persons who offended against them were *ignorant* of them, unless we could suppose they did not *know* what they did, or, which is the same, that they had *no Motive* or *Reason* for their Actions ; for, whatever that Reason was, it might be effectual enough in their Case, as in that of Self-murderers, to *over-balance* the Inclinations of Nature. Besides, if all Mankind was *indifferent* to all sort of Actions, and those Actions in *themselves* also *indifferent*, as to *Moral Goodness* or Evil, it would not only derogate from the Dignity of *Human Nature*, but *Virtue* and *Goodness* itself : For surely Innocency, Honesty and Charity are not only said to be *good*, because of the *natural* Advantages that are entail'd upon them ; and Murder, Rapine and Malice *evil*, because of the *natural* Evils which are the Consequences of them ; but rather that the former are so *rewarded*, and the latter so *punish'd*, because there is an *eternal* and *immutable* Reason that makes the one sort *good* and *honourable*, the other *evil* and *vile*. For, so far as we can conceive, 'tis as impossible for that to be *evil* which is *good*, or that which is *good* to become *evil*, as 'tis for a *Whole* to be less than its *Part*, or a *Triangle* to be a *Circle*. 'Tis true we could not have known this *intrinsic* or *eternal* Reason for the *Distinction* between *moral* Good and Evil, but from those *natural* Rewards of one, and Punishments of the other : yet when we consider, that those Rewards and Punishments are made the most *usual*, and all things and all times consider'd, the *certain* Effects of Good and Evil, we cannot without a notorious Derogation to the *Honour* and *Immutability* of the Divine Nature, judge that it can or *ever* could have been *otherwise*. And I am apt to hope this Author himself has some such Thoughts, from this Passage of his, Book II. Chap. 21. Sect. 49. *God himself cannot choose what is not good*. But surely, say I, he can, if *nothing* be *really good*, but what he was *free* to have made *bad* ; and that he must have been, if the Reason of *moral* Good and Evil be *mutable*.

His next Objection is : That there is scarce that Principle of *Morality* to be named, which is not somewhere or other *slighted* by the general Fashion of whole *Societies*.

Answer:

Answer: This may be own'd true, and yet not be a good Proof that those *Rules* of Morality are not founded in *Nature*, unless he could prove that those People, who do or have slighted them, have, all things consider'd, far'd the *better* for it. The old *Romans* made a kind of *Sport* in stealing themselves Wives; and the People of *Algiers* and *Sally*, in this age, make a *Trade* of Piracy; and many Princes and Common-wealths keep their Alliances and Contracts no longer than their *Interest* requires: But he that with Indifferency considers the numerous Mischiefs which the *Romans* suffer'd by the *Sabine* Wars, almost to the utter Ruin of their young Government; the Poverty at home and the Contempt abroad which those *African* Pyrats continually sustain; the dreadful Wars and eternal Infamy in which such Princes and Governments involve themselves, their Subjects and Posterities, by the *Breach* of those Laws of Nature and Nations, will see no reason to be fond of such Enormities. Covetousness, Lust and Ambition may weaken the strongest Obligations which God or Men can devise for the Observance of any Laws; but as those Laws don't destroy the *Freedom* of human Nature on one side, so neither do's the Breach of them on the other demonstrate that the *Sense* of that Obligation is utterly cancell'd in the worst of Men: Tho its not in the Power of Man, how *free* an Agent so ever he is, to act *contrary* to that which at the instant he thinks *best*: For that seems a Contradiction. But that it's possible for any Man to act contrary to that Rule which his own *natural* and *unbias'd* Reason informs him is *best*, all Men must own, except they suppose a Man can never offend against his own Conscience.

His last Argument, so far as I can see, which he uses to prove there are no Laws or Rules of *Nature*, is, that the *Breach* of several of those which are call'd so, is generally *allow'd*: as particularly, the *exposing* Children amongst the *Grecians* and *Romans*. To this I gave a general Answer before, but now more particularly. That it was practis'd only by *lewd* or extremely *poor* People, who by the hopes of having them better maintain'd by the publick, than by themselves, or often of having them exchange'd by great Persons and entertain'd and educated as their own, might be tempted so to expose them, which was no unusual Practice; as appears by that Passage in *Juvenal*, Sat. VI.

*Transeo suppositos, & gaudia, votaque sepe
Ad spurcos decepta lacus, atque inde petitos
Pontifices, Salios, Scaurorum nomina falso
Corpore laturos: ———*

And as for the Magistrates Connivance, that may be easily accounted for, as proceeding either from an interested Hope in such Exchanges, for the Preservation of the Honour and Estate of their Families, or to prevent too nice Enquiries of that kind, for fear their own or near Relations Debauchery might become too publick. But that extreme Poverty or Lust should *over-power* the Inclinations of Nature, we should not need to go so far as *Athens* or *Rome* for an Argument, if it be true which is commonly reported, that there's a certain Hospital nearer home, where there is seldom a Month passes without some such Practice; but we might as easily prove, that the Mothers of such Children came all from *Peru* or *Mengrelia*, as that they *know nothing* of a Law of Nature, of God or Men, against it. But this Author endeavours to strengthen this Argument by telling us, that this Law of Nature, *Parents, preserve your Children*, is so far from

a true, that its *no* Proposition at all; but only a Command. But, with his leave, every Command is a Proposition: for it contains all the *essential* Parts of a Proposition, *Subject*, *Predicate* and *Copula*; tho' the Command be never so short, or but one Word, or but one Letter, as it may happen, as I shew'd before in the Latin Letter *I, go*. But his insisting upon that Nicety was to introduce this great Discovery; if, *Parents, preserve your Children*, be a true Proposition, it must be melted down into this Form of words: *It's the Duty of Parents to preserve their Children*: and so it implies the Knowledge of a God, of a Law, of an Obligation, of a Punishment after *this* Life; all which cannot be pretended to be *innate*. To this I shall have a better occasion to reply, when I come in the next Chapter to consider how far the Notion of **GOD** may be said to be *innate*; at the present I only remark, that for the Knowledge of the Obligation of that Law of Nature, of which we are now speaking, there appears no such Necessity of the Knowledge of **GOD**, much less of a *future* State, because we find that ~~such~~ Brutes observe ~~it~~, tho' I guess no *one* will presume they have any Notions. It cannot be deny'd but that the Knowledge of the Existence of **GOD** and of a *future* State add wonderful *Force* to the Impressions of Nature, and so do *human* Constitutions too: But the Question is, whether, *antecedent* to such Knowledge and such *human* Laws, all Men are not so framed as to feel *Inclinations* of Nature to the preserving their Off-spring; else they are worse than Beasts: and, if there be any instances of Parents unnatural exposing their Children, for such reasons as may *outweigh* Natures Inclinations; yet there are millions to one of such Parents as are so fond of their own Children, how weak or deform'd soever in Mind or Body, that they would not part with them or exchange them tho' upon such tempting Considerations: Which seems to be as clear a Demonstration as can be, that *Nature's* Logick is too quick for *artificial* Arguments. And the truth is, if Nature had not a predominant Influence upon all Mens actions, there could be no *rational* account given why all the civiliz'd Nations in the world have conspir'd to secure, as much as Laws can, the Observance of that Law of Nature. So that, how much soever we are obliged to our Governours for such *confirming* Laws, we are infinitely more to the Author of our Natures, for so *universal* a Disposition to enact them. So that *human* Laws and the Penalties annex'd to them do rather seem *Copies* than *Originals*, and rather *confirm*, than lay the first *Foundation* of that or any other Laws of Nature.

My Author at the End of Sect. XIII. seems to make a Distinction between an *innate* and a *natural* Law: The first he reckons should be imprinted in our Minds in their *Original* Constitution at the *first* moment after their Creation, just like the *Roman* Laws in Brass; and then I have no contention with him, nor I presume will any body else; but the latter may be *acquir'd* by our *natural* Faculties from *natural* Principles. But I would fain know what he means there by *natural* Principles; for except he intends such as he has been so long sweating to undermine, he can mean none but such as we may get by Custom, Education and Conversation; and then *gelding*, *fatning* and *eating* Children may be one of *his* Laws of Nature, as well as nourishing and preserving them alive. And therefore those words seem'd to be wedg'd in, to blind the Reader from seeing, the ill-favour'd Consequence of his Doctrine, namely that *natural* Religion, *natural* Conscience, and *natural* Laws, are but Names of things in the Country-fashion. For, according to his Philosophy, the Belief of *God's* Existence, which is the Foundation of *natural* Religion, must be gain'd by a long *artificial* Train

Such Notions

Train of Thoughts of the nature of Matter and Thinking, and *natural* Conscience is only the *Opinion* of a Mans own Actions of what kind soever; *Vertue* and *Vice* the Names of Actions in or out of the Country-fashion. And so there may be as much *Difference* in the Laws of Nature and Rules of Vertue and Vice, as there is of Climates; and the People at the *Caribes*, Bay of *Soldania*, *Peru* and *Mengrelia* may be as good Men as the best-natur'd People in *Europe*, notwithstanding their awkward Customs in Cookery, and then eating of their own Children.

VIII. In his XIV. Section, he seems hugely discontented that those who are for laying the Foundation of *Natural* Religion, Conscience and Morality something *surer* than Custom, Education and Company can, don't give a *Complete* Catalogue of those *innate* Truths; and therefore cruelly suspects either their Charity or their Consciousness that there are *none* such. Let others speak for themselves, that are concern'd to acquit themselves of that heavy charge. For my own part, every Art, Science and Trade have so many Principles, which it's suppos'd every one knows, that understands the meaning of words, that I am no more able to give a List of them, than I am to write of all Sciences, Arts and Trades. All that I can say is, there are so many *speculative* Propositions as there are *general* Propositions, which every one knows that knows any thing, and is ready to declare his consent to, when put into words which he understands; and are deservedly call'd *innate*, because the Connexion between the Subject and Predicate is *natural* or *necessary*; and are thereby distinguishable from other Propositions which are as certainly *true* as they are, that they are *general* Propositions form'd in the Mind by the *native* Power it has of *comparing*; whereas the others are *particular*, and known to be true wholly by our *external* Senses, as *innate* are not, nor can be: of which there are almost an infinite number in Logicks, Ethicks, Politicks, Natural Philosophy and Mathematicks. And as for *practical* Propositions, there are so many of them as there are *moral* Rules for *humane* Actions, in the Observance of which the *natural* Happiness of Mankind in general, and of every individual Person, all things consider'd, is promoted; and which every one do's and must know that knows any thing. And we call them *Laws* of Nature, because in the common course of the world there are *Rewards* and *Punishments* annex'd to the Observance or Breach of them, *antecedent* to Human Laws; and are therefore derivable from no *less* or *other* Cause than the Author of Nature, the Cause of all *necessary* Effects. But if any Man will bring Children or Ideots, such as are born and continue deaf and dumb, as Arguments against *universal* Consent, or Mad-men out of *Bedlam*, Monsters of Men out of the *Indies* and *Africa*, as disowning those Laws of Nature, I am no more able to confute them, than I am to make Embryo's and Infants at years of Discretion, or Ideots wise, to cure the deaf and dumb, to make Mad-men sober, or *Indians* speak *English*. But, if all this was practicable, I see no reason to doubt but that they would unanimously agree in consenting to these *speculative* and *practical* Principles: and, as for those villanous and barbarous Practices mention'd by this Author, they do no more prove that the Persons who commit them are *ignorant* of the Laws of Nature, than that such as commit Murders and Rapine are *ignorant* of the Laws of the Country where they live; and he that can allow or prove that, will make a better *Advocate* for all sort of Roguery, than *Judge* to punish them.

The XV. Section and the rest to the end of the Chapter, are most spent in confuting my Lord *Herbert's* Opinion concerning *innate* Principles, and I shall meet with the Substance of his Arguments in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Other Considerations concerning innate Principles, both speculative and practical.

Arguments against *Innate* Principles further urg'd and answer'd.

I. **T**His Author is still upon the same design in this Chapter, that he was in the two former ; namely, to prove that there are no *innate* Truths: and his first Argument is, because the *Ideas*, which are the Parts which constitute the Propositions, are not *innate*; that is in other words, because we have no *actual* Knowledge or *in-born* Notions of the Subject and Predicate of those Propositions. To which I answer; there is no need of an *actual* Knowledge or *present* Thoughts of the Subject and Predicate in *general* Propositions, to the forming a certain Judgment of their Truth; but only a *Readiness* of Mind to assent to them, as soon as the things signifi'd by the Words are propos'd; and to form them into *verbal* Propositions, as soon as the Words are understood. As there is no necessity for a *deaf* and *dumb* Person to have *heard* or to be able to *speak* these Words, *white is not black* : *The Sun is luminous* ; *Snow is white* ; in order to his forming a *Judgment* concerning the Truth of those three Propositions; so there is no need he should have *heard* or be able to *speak* these words, *every thing is the same with itself* ; *Any one thing is different from another* ; *Any Whole is equal to all its Parts* ; in order to his forming a certain *Judgment* concerning the Truth of those three *general* Propositions: because there is a *natural* Connexion between every thing and itself, a *natural* Difference between any one thing and another, a *natural* Relation between a Whole and all its Parts; and tho' there is the like necessary Relation between the several parts of the three former Propositions, yet we don't reckon them *innate*, unless they be resolved into *Identical* Propositions; because we find by experience that there is a *particular* Organization of Body requir'd for the coming to the *certain* knowledge of the Truth of them, with which every one is not born; but the Knowledge of the three *general* Propositions requires no such *particular* Organization, but only a *Power* in the Mind of comparing its own Thoughts in order to the forming *general* Propositions, and the Proposal of the Objects about which they are form'd; and because that power of *comparing* Perceptions is *natural* to all *intelligent* Beings, and that there is no need of Information from any of our *Senses* concerning all the Particulars imply'd in those *general* words, therefore such Propositions may be call'd *innate*, in the sense before explain'd. And, as for Childrens not having *Ideas* or Notions which answer the Terms which make up those *general* Propositions, 'tis nothing to the purpose: For grown Men cannot have any such *Ideas*. No Man can have *Ideas* or Notion of all the Wholes in the world, or of all the Parts of those several Wholes; yet a Child, that knows any thing or can judge of any thing, can certainly know or judge, that all Wholes are bigger than any one of its Parts; and so of all other *innate* Truths. And that's the reason we call some Propositions

positions *innate* rather than others as certainly *true* as they are ; namely, because we cannot come to the knowledge of the Subject and Predicate, in their full Latitude, from any of our *Senses*. And that I guess this Author was aware of, because it spoils his Scheme of deriving all our Knowledge from *Sensation* and *Reflexion*. And 'tis as little to the purpose to say, as this Author do's over and over, that we cannot *know* these Truths, because we have no *Ideas* of the *Terms* : For a Man may properly enough be said at this instant to *know* a thing, tho he has no *present* or *actual* Thoughts of that thing ; as he may be said, for example, to know the Ten Commandments, tho at that moment he has not, or indeed can have, the Thoughts of Murder, Adultery, and all the rest of the Particulars ; but nevertheless he may be said to *know* them, because he can readily recite them, and upon occasion offer'd, give a particular account of them. For the like reason a Man may *know*, that all Wholes are equal to all their Parts, tho he has not, or ever can have, the knowledge of all the Wholes in the world : Because what the *Memory* by Application has done in the former case, that the Author of *Nature* has done for all Men in the latter. And 'tis every whit as trifling to say, that, because we have no *innate* knowledge of the precise Nature or Sense of the words, *Impossibility*, *Identity*, *Diversity*, *Relation*, *Extension*, and *Number*, we cannot know or judge, that, it's impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; that, Every thing is the same with itself ; that, One thing can't be another ? that, The Whole is bigger than its Part. Is not all this contrary to common Sense ? Cannot I safely say, that, I cannot reach the Skies, without knowledge of all the Powers of Nature ? that, My Pen is the same that wrote this and the former Line, without an Assurance that it has not gain'd any new or lost any of the old particles of its substance ? that, My Pen is not my Ink, without knowing all the Materials or Properties of one or t'other ? that, my whole Body is bigger than my Finger, without understanding that Whole and Parts are relative Terms, and how I got the Notions of Extension and Number ? And if I can judge these *particular* Propositions true, without so much Philosophy as to know the *Nature* of the Subject and Predicate, can I not with *equal* Certainty, at least, *know* and *judge* of the Truth of the *general* Propositions ? Is there more *Uncertainty* in the Judgment concerning the Truth of the *one* sort than of the *other* ; or greater *Difficulty* in the understanding ? No certainly, the very *same* in both sorts ; because of the *natural* and *inseparable* Connexion between the Terms, which every one knows that knows any thing, and judges true, if he can judge of/thing. Nay tho he never heard the words, which is the case of the deaf and dumb ; or if he has heard and do's understand the words, he can put into Propositions, and *assent* to them as readily as he can *speak* them, without fetching any Philosophical Reasons for them ; and that's the reason we call them *innate*. Not because we are born with an *actual* Notion of all the *Particulars* in our Minds, but with a *natural* Facility to know them, as soon as the Things imply'd in those Words are presented to the Understanding, and a *natural* and *unavoidable* Determination to judge them true, as soon as we know the Things themselves or the Words by which they are signifi'd to others. To this I may add, that, if there be any difference, as to certainty, between the *general* and the *particular* Propositions, the odds is on the side of the *general* Propositions ; because *those* might be known true, if any of our Faculties be true, if any of our Senses be infallible ; but the *particular* Propositions not so, if our Senses of Seeing and Feeling should be deceiv'd.

II. This

How far the
Notion of God
may be innate.

II. This is the Substance of the six first Sections of this Chapter, and in the seventh this Author undertakes to prove this Proposition, *God is to be Worship'd*, no innate Proposition; and tho he honours it so far, as to give it the Title of *deserving the first place amongst practical Principles*, yet I doubt that, according to his Principles, it must go down and be clapp'd under Deck with the rest of my Lord Herbert's innate Notions, as an *useless* Proposition; and all for the same Reason, namely, because we have no innate (he might have said plainly, for that's the Drift of all his Arguments, no *fix'd, certain or natural*) Idea or Notion of the Subject or Predicate of that Proposition; that is, either of *GOD*, or *Worship*. Not of God, because, as he says (tho' some Travellers report other things) that there are whole Nations at the Bay of *Soldania*, *Brafile* and the *Caribes*, that have not so much as a Name for God. And, of those that have, their *Idea* of him is so defac'd and misfigur'd, that it do's not deserve the name of a Picture of God, much less of his own drawing, in the Minds of Men; and as for the *acquir'd* Notion of *GOD*, we shall have no help from thence. Unless we have had the luck to meet with the Writings of some of those ingenious Men, who studiously observ'd the Relation of Cause and Effects, and by the help (I suppose he means) of attending to the Observation of the Disagreement between the *Ideas* of Matter and Thinking (tho, according to the blind account he gives of their Natures, they are as obscure as that of God) at last found a God, and then starting the Notion, it spread with a wonderful success, because agreeable to the common Reason and Interest of Mankind; and 'tis indeed no Wonder that it should: but 'tis for that very reason a greater Wonder to me, that this Author or any body else, should think that Notion an *human* Invention, and should not rather ascribe it to the Author of Nature, as such *universal* Effects ought to be. But if it was an *human* Invention, a Creature of *Mans* making, those may very well pass not only for *ingenious* Notion-makers, that could frame one that could take with all Mankind; but wonderfully *lucky* too, that could find out an Argument to *confirm* it, that should take with the *illiterate*, as well as the *literate*, who perhaps never heard one word of such an Argument. And as for the Predicate of that Proposition *Worship*, we cannot have the least Idea or Thought of it, according to his Principles, from *Nature*, but only from *Custom*, *Education* and *Company*. For we find by experience the *external* Signs of Worship or Honour as *different* in several Countries, as the *Idea* of God: Putting off the Hat is rather a sign of Contempt than Honour amongst the *Turks*, tho they live so near us; and as for *Vertue*, which my Lord Herbert wisely made an *essential* part of Divine Worship, that's an ambiguous word, too; and what is call'd so by some Persons and in some Countries, is a mark of Vileness and Contempt with others. So that for all that I can perceive, by the Principles this Gentleman has laid down, all my Lord Herbert's *common* Notions must be *useless* Propositions; tho, so far as I am able to judge, if that Learned Nobleman meant by *common* or *innate* Notions such as all persons might arrive at by the Exercise of their *natural* Reason, without the help of *special* Divine Revelation, or any *human* Customs or Laws, there are none of those he names but are justifiable to be such.

And therefore here I stop, and and crave leave to take this Method, instead of following my Authors Track, 1. I shall endeavour to explain what all Men mean by the *Idea* or *Notion* of *GOD*: 2. In what *Sense* that *Idea* or *Notion* may be said to be *innate*: 3. Offer some Reasons

Reasons for my believing that Notion of GOD is *innate*: and lastly, to answer the Arguments which this Author brings against any such *innate Idea*.

1. III. First, By the *Idea* of GOD, I think all mean the Notion we have of a Being *distinct* from our selves and every other *finite* Being, which is the *Cause* or *Author* of us and every other *finite* Being; which implies, the Creator or Maker, the Preserver and Supreme Director of all finite Substances, their Powers, Operations, Qualities, or Accidents; or in fewer words, the *Author* of *Nature*, or *primary Cause* of all *necessary* Effects in the Universe. This seems to have been the Definition or Description which the old Heathens gave of GOD, as appears by all their Writings *Greek* and *Latin*, whether of Oratory, Poetry or Philosophy; *Optimus Maximus, Deum hominumque Stator*, &c. And such an *Idea* or *Notion* of GOD may be call'd *innate*, because 'tis form'd in the Minds of Men, without any *teaching* or *artificial* Arguments, or so much as the Knowledge of Words, and by the Efficacy of *natural* Causes operating upon us, and the *unavoidable* Observation of such Effects as can proceed from no less or other Cause, than such as we all mean by the Word GOD. To say such an *Idea* is *innate*, it is not necessary that it be written *on* or *in* our Souls, the first Moment of their Creation; but only, that it is impress'd upon them by *natural* Causes; and that we are so form'd that, as soon as we can judge of any thing, or can exert our *native* Faculty of Reasoning (for before that, it would be of no use) we cannot fail of having such a Notion in our Minds, from the Observation of the *common* Effects which are to be discover'd in all Parts of the World. And it's easie to understand how all Men come by this Notion of a GOD, without any *Art* or *Teaching*, but only by the Observation of what they *naturally* find within themselves and the other sensible Parts of the Universe. For 1. we cannot but necessarily know and believe our own *Existence*. 2. We cannot but know and believe, that we have and had our own Existence from something *distinct* from our selves; because if we had it from our selves, we should be *conscious* of it; for every *intelligent* Being is necessarily *conscious* of all such Actions as are properly its *own*; besides, if we had any thing to do in the making or preserving *our selves*, we should have made our selves *wiser*, *stronger*, and with many *more* Perfections than we find we have. 3. Such as we are, we cannot but think, we were made by some Being, that has *more* Wisdom and Power than we are *conscious* that we have *our selves*. 4. We cannot but observe there is an *infinite* Number of *other* Things in the World; and, so far as we can perceive, not one of *them* has more Wit, Thoughtfulness, Contrivance or Power to make or preserve itself, such as it is, than we *our selves* have; and, for our own parts, we are *conscious* that we have not *Skill* and *Power* enough to make a Spire of Grass, a Flower, or a Fly; much less an Horse, a Dog, a Sun, Moon or Star. And therefore from the *natural* Observation of the *ample* Order and *wise* Contrivance of *our selves* and all *other* Parts of the World, we are *unavoidably* led to conclude, we and every thing else were made, are preserved and govern'd by some Being *infinitely wiser* and *more powerful* than we or any *other* sensible Being is or can be. And that is what we and all the rest of the World mean by the Word GOD. And since these *visible* things in the World are not *peculiar* to this or that Person, this or that Nation; but, as to the main, are *common* all the World over, 'tis but reasonable to believe that this Piece of *natural* Philosophy is understood by all Mankind upon the face of the whole Earth, or in the

What is meant
by the Notion
of God.

How we come
naturally by
the Notion of
God.

Words of the *inspir'd* Philosopher St. Paul, that *the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are (and were) clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead.* And that which makes me believe that God has taken so much Care of Mankind, as not to leave them to the Uncertainty of *artificial* Arguments, but to *impress* some Notion and Belief of his *own* Nature and Existence by *natural* Causes and Effects, are such Reasons as these.

Arguments to prove the Notion of God is innate or not artificial.

I. IV. First, Because we find by daily Experience and Conversation with the *generality* of Men, especially the *illiterate*, that not one of an hundred, or thousand perhaps, that, if we ask them, why they believe the Existence of God? can give any such Reason as will in any measure convince any one that is doubtful therein: and, if we observe their *Devotion*, *Actions* and whole Course of their *Lives*, we shall not have the least Reason to doubt of the *Sincerity* of their Faith; and that such are as ready, as the most *refin'd* Philosophers, to hazard their Lives and all that is dear to them, rather than *desert* their Faith. And the History of Martyrs for *other Religious* Matters afford abundance of Examples of that kind: which seems to me a convincing Argument, that the Author of Nature *himself* has contributed something towards the forming a Notion of his own Nature, and a Readiness to believe his Existence, *antecedent* to all sort of *artificial* Arguments whatever.

2. As to the more *learned* part of the world; such, I mean here, as have search'd into the *immediate* or *natural* Causes of the *sensible* Effects in the World, God seems to have provided a *sufficient* Security for them against a Disbelief of his Being and Providence, by discovering to them, that the *deeper* they search into the Principles of *Mechanical* Philosophy, the more Necessity they find of admitting the *Concurrence* or *Co-operation* of the *powerful* and *wise* Author of Nature to make up an *adequate* Cause of the most *common* and seemingly *least* difficult *Phænomena* in the visible World. 'Tis not only the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, Magnetism, Gravitation, Elastick Motions, that have baffled all the Masters of Mechanical *Hypotheses*; But the most obvious and familiar *Phænomena* in Nature, such as Rest and Motion, which to be sure are the *main* and *immediate* Causes of all other Effects whatever. The most curiously thoughtful *Descartes*, who has gone perhaps as far as any one Man in this Age, to give an *adequate* Cause of all the *Phænomena* in Nature, by merely *mechanical* Principles; yet was so wise as to see the Necessity of a *first* Cause of all Motion; and not only so, but for the *continual* Preservation of *that*, and all *Substances* also whatever, by his avow'd Principle, that *Conservation is continual Creation*: And for that Reason I am apt to believe, none of his Principles will do any *Disservice* to *natural* Religion or *Morality*. But as for Mr. *Hobbs's* Principle, that all the *Phænomena* in the Universe may be fairly accounted for without supposing any *immaterial* Substance, merely by *Matter* and *Motion*, 'tis not only easily refuted by the Operations of our *own Minds*, and particularly that *Liberty* of Action, which every one is as conscious of as of his own *Existence*, but by the *sensible* Effects in *Matter* itself. For 'tis demonstrable, even to our very *Senses*, that *Rest* or *Cohesion* of the *Parts* of Matter (which he utterly excludes from being the Cause of any Effect whatever) is the manifest, tho not so immediate, a Cause of as many and great Effects, as *Motion* itself. No sensible Qualities whatever, Smells, Tasts, Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, Roughness, Smoothness, can possibly be produc'd without the mutual *Cohesion* of the

Parts

Parts of those Bodies, how small soever, as well as their *Motions*; neither can there be any *Impression* upon the Organs of our Senses without it. Nay, tho all the vast Bodies in the Universe, such as the Sun, Moon, Stars and the Earth too, were suppos'd in *continual Motion*; yet if there was not a *mutual Cohesion* of their *Parts*, they could neither *continue* their *own* nor *communicate* any Motion to any *other* Parts of the Universe. And if any cast but one Eye into the Writings of that admir'd Naturalist, he may easily see how he is puzzled to give any tolerable Account of that Resistance which Bodies make to one another; insomuch that he is forc'd to suppose, tho contrary to *common* Sense and Reason, a kind of Motion in a shorter Line than one *imaginable* Point of Space. And all this to serve his *Hypothesis*, that *all Effects are the Effects of meer Motion and Matter*. And in the last Resort must own either a *self-moving* Matter and a *self-resting* Matter, which is contrary to all the Rules of Mechanism and his own too, or else acknowledge a *primary* Cause for the creating and preserving both; and if there cannot be so much as a *probable* Cause assigned, as 'tis certain there can't, either for Rest or Motion (that is for the *Cohesion* of the several *Parts* of Matter, or for the *Conveyance* of Motion from one body to another) 'tis impossible there should be any *adequate* Cause assign'd for any other the minutest *Phenomenon* in Nature; because those *two* Qualities are by all Mechanicks own'd the *immediate* Causes of all other Effects whatever.

3. Another Reason that makes me apt to believe, that God has laid the *Foundation* of all Mens Notions concerning his *own* Existence into our very *Natures*, is because all the Arguments which have been hitherto framed, to prove his *Being*, have their *main* Force either from a *natural* Anticipation concerning his Being, or are at last resolv'd into that Observation of such *natural* Effects in the World as argue the Existence of an *infinitely wise, good and powerful* Cause; as will appear by a brief Survey of them. The first and most popular Argument, which is generally brought for the proving the Existence of God, is, the *universal* Consent of Mankind; but this Argument is rather to *confirm* any particular Person in that Belief, than to *convince* him that disbelieves it; because his *own* Disbelief weakens the Strength of it; but, if he do's *himself* believe it, 'tis a good Argument to *confirm* him in it: because it shews him, that the *common* Course of Nature is such, as to have wrought the *like* Persuasion in *all* or *most* others. And so the *main* Force of it is resolv'd at last into this, that, every Effect must have an *adequate* Cause. Since therefore that Effect, namely, the Belief of God's *Being*, is so general as to extend to *all* or *most* Men in all Ages and Places, it could have no *other* or *less* Cause than the *same* Being, that is, the Author of all *necessary* Effects, namely, the Author of *Nature*. The second Argument is, the Original of the *visible* World; but whether this *visible* World has been much such as it is from all *Eternity*, or *created* out of nothing, cannot be prov'd or disprov'd meerly by the *Light* of Nature; but being a Matter of *Fact*, only by *Testimony*. We Christians, and the Jews indeed, believe it had a *Beginning*, and have great Reason for it; because we have not only an *Account* of the Creation in the History which we believe written by *divine* Inspiration; but by one also that shew'd his Authority for what he wrote by the many *Miracles* which he wrought: and so the Reason of our Faith is ultimately resolv'd into this Principle, that *no* Cause or Being can alter the *constant* Course of Nature, but the *same* that at first *settld* it; and so our Belief of the Nature of the Cause is grounded upon such
visible

visible Effects as argue an *infinitely powerful* and *wise* Cause, as the *common* Course of the World do's. And we have moreover an unanswerable Evidence of a *Tradition* for that Matter of *Fact*, at least as old as *Moses* and the *Jewish* Nation, by the *Jews* observing *one* day in *seven* in *Commemoration* of it. But this Argument the greater part of the *Heathen* World never heard of; and therefore the whole Strength of it, as it relates to *Mankind* in general, comes at last to this, that, taking the *visible* World as they find it, there are such and so many obvious Effects in all Parts of it, of *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, that they cannot possibly be wrought or contriv'd in that *excellent* Order, wherein we see they are, meerly by the *blind* and *unguided* Motions and Operations of *senseless* Matter: because in that alone or in any Bodies that consist only of *Matter*, we can't perceive the *least* Signs of that *Contrivance* and *Thoughtfulness* which is necessary to such *useful* and *glorious* Effects. A third Argument for the proving God's Existence, is from *Providence*; by which is meant, the signal *Happiness* which in the *common* Course of the World, is entail'd upon *virtuous* Actions, and *Unhappiness* upon *vitious* Actions, and the vast Advantages we receive by *Society* and *Government*. These Observations indeed may be sufficient to convince an indifferent Person, that there must be some such *wise*, *good* and *over-ruling* Cause that made such a *natural* Connexion between such Causes and such Effects, and that has woven into all Men such *natural* Inclinations to *Society* and *Government*; by which such infinite Advantages are procur'd and Evils avoided. But still we must own, that this Argument would hugely abate of its Strength by the frequent Evils which befall *good* Men, and Advantages which happen to *ill* Men, and the frequent *Failure* of the Benefits of *Government*, by *unequal* Dispensations, if we are not prepossess'd, that this *supreme* Governour of the World has appointed *another* Scene and State, wherein all these *seeming* Irregularities shall be *adjusted*. And so the main Strength of that Argument lies upon the *natural* Anticipation which all Men have concerning the Being and Nature of God.

As for the *Cartesian* Argument for proving the Existence of God from the *Idea* we have of such a Being, 'tis rather a true *Explication* of the Nature, than *Proof* of the Existence of God. The Proposition in Question is, *God exists*. If we be ask'd, what we mean by the Word *GOD*, we answer, a Being of *all* sort of *Perfections*, and amongst the rest, of necessary *Existence*. This may convince us indeed, that if our Notion be true, then that we do *already* believe his Existence; because it is an *Identical* Proposition, the same with this, *Whatever is is*. But *Identical* Propositions need no *Proof*, or indeed can have. And if there be any Evidence of God's *Existence* from that Notion we have of his *Nature*, 'tis from this, that 'tis such an *Effect* wrought in our Minds, as could come from no *other* Cause, than such as *GOD* himself is. And as for that Argument, which this Ingenious Author has attempted to improve, namely, that there can be no Account given of the Original of *Thought*, without such a Cause as an *infinitely wise* Being is; 'tis just the same, tho in other Words, with that into which, as I conceive, all other Arguments are finally to be resolv'd; namely, the *visible* Effects in the World, which argue an *infinitely wise* and *powerful* Author. And I judge he meant it so by his pertinent Quotation of the Words of St. Paul, Rom. i. 20. So that if all the *artificial* Arguments, that have been hitherto devis'd to prove the Existence of God, have all their main Strength from the Observation of the *natural* Connexion there is between the several Effects in the World,

World, and such a Cause or Being as we all mean by the Word **GOD**: then the Notion of **GOD** may be so far reckon'd *innate* or *natural*.

4. Another Reason that makes me believe, that we are more beholden to *God himself*, in the Frame of our Natures, than any *human* Invention of Arguments to prove his Being and Providence, is this, because it has been, is, and ever will be the *Interest* of all Mankind and of every individual Person to believe his Being: For such a Truth, as is of such *universally* good *Influence* for the making all Men *happy*, can come from no *other* Cause than the *same*; that is, the *wise*, the *good* and *powerful* Cause of Nature. I know it may not be thought the *Interest* of *ill* Men, that there should be such a Being in the World; or for them to believe it, *continuing ill*: But it comes to the *same*; because 'tis for the *Interest* of *all* Men to be *good*; and if they be so, as 'tis their *own* fault if they be not, then 'tis for their *Interest* to *believe* it, and *act* according to that Faith. And we may defie all Mankind to *give* or so much as *frame* an Instance of any Error, which it would be for the advantage of *all* Men whatever to believe. And therefore, if this be one, 'tis an odd one, that none should be like it, for the making all the World *happy* that do *believe* it, and *act* as if they did. It may *happen* sometimes to be for a Man's Advantage to *miss* the right way, because he may have mis'd Thieves that way-laid him; but that it should be for the *Interest* of the *same* Man and every *other* Man, and at *all* times, to *miss* the *right* way, is a Contradiction. But that's the case in this matter. If it be an Error, 'tis the *Interest* of all the Men in the World to be so much Fools as to be always in that Mistake. Which seems to me an unanswerable Argument, that it's not only *true*, that *there is a GOD*, but that the Truth itself is deriv'd from no less or other Cause, than the Cause of all the *good* and *necessary* Effects in the world. And I conceive it will be easie to answer all the Arguments which this Author has collected against an *Innate Idea* of **GOD** in that sense.

5. His first Argument is, that many of the Antients have been Recorded for *Atheists*, such I suppose he means as *Protagoras*, *Diagoras Melius*, *Theodorus Cyrenaicus*, and whole Nations at the Bay of *Soldania*, in *Brasile*, and in the *Carribbe* Islands, had not so much as a Name for **GOD**. As to the first, some have been so favourable to those Ancients, as to think they did not deny the *Being* of one supreme God; but only that such as *Jupiter* of *Crete*, and the rest which the Poets represented for Gods, were not so: and *Tully*, I am sure, in the same Period in which he gives us their Names, makes the Belief of God *natural* to all Men: *Quo omnes duce natura vehimur*, is his very Expression. But suppose they did disown the Being of God in Words, yet *Seneca* who lived nearer to their time, and knew the humour of such as they were, better than we can, tells us, *Mentiuntur qui dicunt se non sentire Deum esse; nam etsi tibi affirmant interdum, noctu tamen & sibi dubitant*: As if it was not their fix'd Opinion, but a silly sort of Pride or Affectation of seeming *more thoughtful* and *less credulous* than ordinary Men, that tempted them to make themselves more ignorant than really they were. Like an ordinary trick some in our days have got, in pretending to a wonderful Modesty and Humility, to gull others into a Belief of their extraordinary Wisdom and Sanctity. And 'tis certain enough, that *Epicurus*, that took so much pains to free himself and others of their *natural* Fears of God, is represented, by his Contemporaries, to have been one of the most *fearful* Men in the World, both of Death and the Gods. And as to those *barbarous* People, &c. It's impossible to

Arguments against an innate notion of God answer'd.

know the Sense of *whole* Nations in their disowning the Existence of God, unless we were to speak with every single Person; which is impracticable. 2. 'Tis impossible to know they had no Name for the *natural* Notion of God, unless one understood the signification of every single word in their Language, which no Traveller will be so vain as to pretend to. 3. The having no publick Temples, Sacrifices or Prayers, is no Demonstration, that the People had no sense of a God. The *particular way* of expressing Honour and Worship is without doubt owing to *Custom*, and not discover'd by the meer Light of *Nature*: but the having *honourable Thoughts* of such a Being as we own the Author of our Existence, or any sort of Happiness, is as *natural* to all Men, (as 'tis to Stones to descend) if not hindred by more prevalent Passions. 'Tis very likely such rude and unciviliz'd People might have *mean* and *unworthy* Thoughts of God, as 'tis certain they have of all other things; but that do's not prove they had *no* Thoughts of God, any more than it do's, that our common people have none of the Sun, because they judge it not much bigger than the brim of their Hats: And therefore when my Author meets next with any People of those Countries, I would, with Submission, desire him to ask them, Whether they *made* themselves, Sun, Moon, or Stars, or have any share in the *Government* of their orderly Actions or Operations? And by their Answer to that Question, we shall see whether *they* or *Beasts* have more Sense of a **GOD**.

II. If it was own'd, says this Author, that *all* Mankind had some Notion of a *God*, yet it would not follow thence, that is was more *innate* than that of the *Sun* or *Fire*, which are as generally known.

Answer: If every Man did as *necessarily* feel Light and Heat as he is *conscious* of his own Existence, then he would as naturally infer, that there were some such things as we call the *Sun* and *Fire*; as he, that is *conscious* of his own Existence, infers from thence the Existence of some thing *distinct* from *himself*, that has more Wit and Power than he finds himself to have. And so far he is *naturally right* and *just* in the Knowledge and believing a God; and, when he *extends* his Thoughts to other Effects in the visible World, he enlarges his Thoughts concerning the Nature and Perfections of God by such *natural* and *unavoidable* Impressions from *external* Objects, without the help of Teaching or Words, as he may do of Fire or the Sun, by such *natural* Effects which come from such Causes. And now let any one judge, whether it be possible, for any Person of *common* Sense, to *think* that he made *himself* without being *conscious* that he did? And, if he did *not* make himself, whether he can possibly believe, that he was *made* by a Being or *produc'd* by a Cause that has not more *Wisdom* and *Power* than he has himself or any Man else? And the like for all the other *visible* Parts of the Universe. If so, then he must *unavoidably* have some Sense of a God. But my Author seems to be of opinion, that there is no need at all of any Efficacy deriv'd from the Author of Nature for the *forming* the Notion and *believing* the Existence of *God*, because 'tis so easie for Mankind by common Conversation and the Knowledge of Language to come to the Notion of God, the Word *God* carries such a weight of Thought with it, and imports such extraordinary Excellences, that it cannot but command a regard. But I am much afraid, that, if God *himself* had not founded some *natural* Notions of his own Perfections, and Inclinations to believe his Being; all the great Words that are or can be invented, or all the most *artificial* Arguments that can be framed, by the wisest Men, would not be sufficient to excite that Notion, any more than the most lively Descriptions of the

the *Sun* or *Fire* would produce the Sense of *Light* and *Heat* in them that never *felt* either of them. And, so far as I am able to perceive, by this Author's *artificial* way of *acquiring* the Notion of *God*, the *Vulgar*, which are vastly the greater part of Mankind, are no better Deists than *Parrots*, which talk by Rote, and have no *real* Sense themselves concerning *God*. But I am so far from thinking so, that I rather believe they understand *that* Part of *Natural Philosophy* as well as the most *refin'd* Argument-maker; and that they owe their Learning, in that *fundamental* Point, to the Author of their *Natures*, tho' they may borrow the Modes of *expressing* their Worship, by Words or other Signs, from the *Language* or *Custom* of their Country.

A third Argument is, that the *Idea*, or Notion of *God*, is so *various* in different Men, as appears by the Multiplicity of *Gods* worship'd by the *Heathen*. Whereas if there was but *one GOD*, and that Notion of his own *planting*, it would be, like himself, *perfect* and *uniform*.

Answer: Notwithstanding this Multiplicity of *Gods* amongst the *Grecians*, *Romans*, and especially the *Ægyptians*, yet we never find that they ever went so far as to ascribe their own Being, or the Creation of the World, or the supreme Government of it, to *Jupiter* of *Crete*, *Ceres*, *Bacchus*, *Mercury*, *Vulcan*, *Hercules*, or any of their reputed *Gods* or *Idols*. Nor were their Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Lusts, Quarrels ever attributed to him whom they call'd *Jupiter Optimus Maximus*, *Deum hominumque stator*, *Omnium Pater*, *Omnipotens Genitor*, *Jupiter Omnipotens Regum*, *Rex ipse Deusque*, *Progenitor Genetrixque Deum*, *Deus unus & Omnis*; but only to such inferior Persons, as they indeed stiled *Gods*, for some signal Advantages they believ'd were deriv'd from them. But 'tis impossible they should be such down-right Sots, as to think any of those Persons *made* Themselves and the World. Could the *Ægyptians* possibly believe, that *Crocodiles* or *Onions* *made* them? Could the People of *Alabanda* in *Asia*, who worship'd the Builder of their City for a *God*, think he *fram'd* Themselves also? Could the Inhabitants of *Smyrna* in *Asia*, who pass'd such a Complement upon the City of *Rome*, as to make it a *Goddess*, and built a Temple in honour of it, imagine the City of *Rome* made the vast Fabrick of the World? They thought these Person or Things had, would or could do them some *Good* or *Harm*, and therefore gave them the Title of *GOD*; but never that of *Optimus Maximus*, &c. And this *Multitude* of *Gods* seems rather an Argument that those *Heathens* were *conscious* that they were not the Authors of their own Happiness, or had Power to prevent their Calamities; and so far they were in the right, but mistook only in their judging such Persons or Things were *Causes* of them, which were not, or at least, not in that measure which they imagin'd. Nor do we find there was any such difference between the *Heathens* themselves about the acknowledging one *Sovereign* Author or Cause of all things, which is the most *obvious* and *natural* Notion of *GOD*; or that the vulgar ever degenerated so far as to believe any of those *inanimate* Creatures or *Idols* were their own or the World's *Makers*. The *Heathen* of old (as the *Siamites* and other *Indians* may now) acknowledg'd many *Gods*, 'tis true, and that argues an *invincible Inclination* in them and all Mankind to attribute their Happiness or Calamities to any other Cause rather than *themselves*; but not that they thought all those several Persons or Things which they worship'd were the *God*, the *ὁ Θεός*. For, however the several Nations in the World differ'd from each other in the Nature and Number of their *inferior* Deities, and in their Customs, Languages and Modes of Worship, yet they all agreed in this,

this, that there was *one God, Lord and Father of all*; and that Philosophers and common People did believe one God, the Author of all things, as the late Learned Bishop *Stillington* has at large proved by the Testimonies of *Seneca, Maximus, Tyrius, Orosius*, and others, in his Treatise about the Idolatry of the Church of *Rome*. And the case stands much the same amongst *Christians, Jews and Mahometans* now, tho' they may have *different*, and some of them *imperfect and unworthy* Thoughts of God, yet they all agree in acknowledging *one Cause or supreme Author of Nature*, and of all Happiness and Calamities.

VI. As for that which this Author repeats in Sect. XX. If there were any *innate Ideas* in the Mind, they would be lodg'd in the Memory, or nowhere: It was answer'd before to this effect; That it's full out as easie to conceive how the Author of our *Natures*, in the Frame of our Souls and Bodies, may make it easie and natural to judge a Proposition *true*, as soon as the words of it are understood, tho' we had not before any *actual* Notion of the Subject and Predicate, as 'tis to make us *re-perceive* or *remember* any thing which we have not in our Thoughts at that instant. *Des Cartes* thinks Memory to be preserv'd by several Tracings or *Vestigia* left in the Brain by the motion of the Animal Spirits, which, just like the Foldings or Creases in Paper or Linnen, make them readier to fall into those Forms and Postures again. Whether it be so or not, I will not presume to say; but if it was so, 'tis as easie to conceive, how the like may be done in the first moulding of our Brains, and forming the *natural Powers* of our Souls, as by *Art, Practice* or any *acquir'd Habit*. Let any Man therefore shew me how and for what Reason any thing may be said to be in the Mind, when it is not *actually* thought on; and 'tis very likely I may be able to tell him how a Proposition may be in the Mind by the Powers of *Nature*, tho' there are no *actual Ideas* or Notions of the Subject and Predicate of it. For certainly *Nature* can do as much as *Art*, 'tis as easie for a Plant naturally to grow crooked, or of any shape, as to be *made* such.

VII. 'Tis an idle thing to talk of *Characters* or *Impressions* made in the Mind like Letters on Paper (those are but Metaphorical and Rhetorical Expressions:) Cannot any one that is, or has been Twenty years deaf and dumb, have the Notion of *Cause* and *Effect*, without ever understanding, or so much as hearing any of those two words, by the *feeling* Heat from the Fire, or Light from the Sun, or a hundred other ways? Why not then of Whole and Part; and judge what we call Whole is bigger than its Part, without understanding or hearing the *Sound* of those Words: and so form such a Notion in his Mind, as we call a *general Proposition*, when put into words? And why not, by the same Method, namely, feeling his own *Existence*, and being conscious that he did not, or could not, *make* himself, conclude something *else* did, which has *more Power* and Wit than he is conscious of in himself: and thereby form a Notion of *GOD*, how imperfect soever it is? Suppose there be as many, or ten times as many, Planets, as there are fix'd Stars; and every one of these inhabited as the Earth is; will any one say, that before *Des Cartes*, who, I think, first started that Supposition, no Men had *right, just or worthy* Thoughts of *GOD*? People may improve, enlarge or explain the Perfections of God, as they improve in the Knowledge of the Effects of his Wisdom, Power and Goodness; but still they that are conscious that they could not *make* themselves, for want of Power and Wit to do it, and therefore conclude, as they must, that they have their Being from *another Cause*, must be allow'd to have some Knowledge

Knowledge of a God, or the Author of their Beings. And as they improve in their Observation of other Effects in the world, which have no more, but rather *less* Thoughtfulness and Power to make or govern themselves; they *naturally* infer the Existence of a *supreme* Cause and Governour of all things. And all this may be done without any *Teaching, Law, Custom or Education*. And this is all we mean, when we say, that the Notion of GOD, is *innate or natural*.

To conclude, so far as I can learn to the contrary from any thing this Author has said, 'tis so far from being true, that there are no *innate speculative* Principles, in the Sense I have explain'd, that we cannot be *certain* of any *other* Truths, unless they be suppos'd or are resolved into *Identical* Propositions or the *Negatives* of that Identity: Because all Truth whatever, if express'd in words, is nothing else but an *Explication* of the Identity in Affirmative, and the *Negation* of it in Negative Propositions. Tho' it be never so true, for Example, that every Man is an Animal; all Fire hot; the Sun a lucid body; a Triangle is not a Circle; Two is more than One: Yet that which makes them appear so certain, is, that the Predicate is suppos'd to be *included* in the Subject of the Affirmative, or *excluded* in the Negative Propositions. And so you say, in effect, no more than that every Man, all Fire, the Sun are the same with *themselves*; a Triangle is not *another* Figure; Two the Whole and One the Part of it: which are but the *particulars* included in the *general* Propositions we call *innate*; and the Reason we call the *generals* innate, and not the *particulars*, is, because our Senses may inform us of the certain Truth of the *Particulars*, but don't nor cannot of the *Generals*. But yet by the Exercise of our *innate* Power of *thinking*, which reaches farther than our Senses, we can as safely judge them *true*, as if we had by our Senses perceiv'd all the *Particulars*. And, tho' we don't pretend that all *acquir'd* Truths are deduc'd from the *innate* ones; or that they teach us any thing *new* towards the advancing our Knowledge: for no one was so fond of them as to judge so: yet we do pretend that, till they are analyzed into *them* or *Identical* Propositions, we cannot be absolutely *certain* of their Truth: But *then* we are as *sure* of their Truth, as we are of the Truth of any of our Senses or Faculties; and any one may find it thus, in the Trial of any Proposition whatever. As in that noted one of *Des Cartes*; *Cogito ergo sum*. Why so plainly true? Because, if we doubt of it, our very *doubting*, which is one Mode of *thinking*, proves it. Why so? Because *doubting* is an Action, and every Action must have an Agent; or *nihili nulla sunt affectiones*: and then we must be satisfied, because we can go no farther, without *doubting* the Truth of all our Faculties, because those are *innate* Truths.

'Tis so far from being true, that there are no Laws of *Nature* or *Practical* Propositions impress'd upon the Minds of all Men, that all *Human* Laws whatever derive the main strength of their Obligation from them, and are either valid or invalid, as they are *agreeable* or *disagreeable* to them.

'Tis so far from being true, that we have no *natural* Knowledge of a GOD, or Inclination to believe his Being, that without it, all *Definitions* would be insignificant, and all *artificial Arguments* to prove it would be ineffectual; unless the provident Author of Nature had in the *original* Frame of our Minds, Bodies and other parts of the Universe, made some Impressions thereof, from our *natural* Observation of such Effects, as argue the Nature and Being of such a *wise, good and powerful* Cause, as we mean by the word GOD.

But if, after all, this Gentleman can make it appear, that, upon his Principles, any Proposition is certainly *true*, without those *innate* Maxims, or any Action whatever really *good*, without supposing Laws of Nature, or any Definition of *God intelligible*, or any Argument to prove his Being *convincing*, without such *natural* Impressions upon our Minds; the whole Matter is accommodated. But, till that appears, which, I confess, do's not to me, I am for keeping up the *old* House, till I know how to lay the *sure* Foundation of a *new* one.

End of the first Book.

OF

O F

Humane Understanding.

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general and their Original.

I. **B**Efore I enter into the Explanation of this Chapter, it may not be amiss to premise an account of the *Way* by which, 'tis commonly thought, that the Minds of Men come by all their Knowledge; that so we may more easily understand this Author's way, and the Difference between his and the common, or the Defects of either; and, so far as I have been able to observe, most Men believe, that they come by all their Knowledge one of these two *Ways*: Either by the *immediate* Exercise of their own *natural* Powers, in their several manners of Operation about their several Objects: Or, 2. by Testimony *human* or *divine*. The common account of the Original of knowledg.

II. As to the first: We come by the Knowledge of all *external* Objects by the Exercise of that *natural* Faculty which is call'd *Sensation*: that is, the Perception of those Impressions which are made by *external* Objects upon the several Organs of the Body, framed by the wise Author of Nature for that purpose. By the Exercise of that *Faculty*, especially when help'd by our *Reason*, we come to the Knowledge we have of *particular corporeal* Substances, and their several Qualities, Accidents or Properties, by which they are so *modified*, as to become *distinguishable* from one another. Such are *Figure, Bulk, Motion, Rest, Position*; as also of *Light, Heat, Colours, Smells, Tasts, Roughness, Smoothness, Hardness, Softness, &c.* which last sort are nothing else but the Names of several *Qualities* or *Dispositions* in other Bodies, by which they variously operate upon our own: And by how much the *more* or *less* any Person has and can have, with Attention, seen, heard, smelt, tasted or felt, by so much he is the *more* or *less* improved in the Knowledge of such *external* Objects. Sensation:

III. The second *natural* Power is, that which is call'd *Imagination*, or the Power of exciting in our Minds the *Thoughts, Perception* or *Idea* of any sort of Object, which we have either seen our selves before, or has been represented by others, as visible or sensible. And, by the Exercise of this Faculty, we are enabled to *describe* or *represent* to others, in writing or by words spoken, by Scheme or Draught, Countries, Buildings, Places, any sort of Body animate or inanimate, any Battle or other Action, which we have either seen ourselves or described or others; and is of singular use in Oratory, Poetry, Geography, Hydrography, Histories of Nature, or visible Actions; in Painting, Limning, Carvery, Embroidery, Weaving, and such like Arts; which mightily depend on a clear and lively *Imagination*. Imagination: describ'd and

IV. The third *natural* Faculty is, that we call the *Understanding*; which, strictly taken, is only the Power of exciting in our Minds, *Thoughts* of things by *articulate* Sounds, Words *written*, or other *sensible* Marks, which by Custom are the appropriated signs of those things, and by the diligent Exercise of this Faculty we acquire *Wisdom*: For the more we hear of other Mens Speeches, read of their Writings, or observe the Under- standing.
sensible

sensible Marks of Distinction between things, the more we are said to *improve* our Knowledge.

Judging.

V. The fourth is the *natural* Power of *Judging*; which is nothing else, but the *comparing* those Objects which we have *perceiv'd*, *imagin'd*, or *understood*; and, by observing their *Agreement* or *Disagreement* with one another, we come to form Propositions *affirmative*, when they agree; *negative*, when they disagree. And when that Agreement or Disagreement is either *necessary* or *contingent*, we form such Propositions, as by Artists are call'd *modal*; and are generally express'd by *such* Words, added to the *Subject* or *Predicate*, as imply such *Differences* in our Conceptions: Such as, *'tis necessary*, *'tis impossible*, *'tis possible*, *'tis likely*. And if the words of the Proposition signify *single* or *sensible* things, then we form *particular* Propositions; but if the words signify *more* things than one in our Conceptions, whether *positive* or *negative*, we form *general* Propositions.

Reasoning

VI. The fifth *natural* Faculty is that of *Reasoning*; which is nothing but the *inferring* the truth of *one* Proposition from *another*, by observing the *Relation* in which either of the Terms of one Proposition stand to *another*: And if those Terms be signs of *particular* or *sensible* things, as in Figures and Numbers; *such* Exercise of this Faculty is call'd *Demonstration*, or shewing to the Senses; if the Terms are *general*, 'tis call'd, in the *strict* sense of that word, *Reasoning*.

Memory.

VII. The sixth *natural* Faculty is *Memory*; which is nothing else but a *Facility* of thinking of a thing of which we have thought on before. And the *Consciousness* of the several things thus perceiv'd, imagin'd, understood, compar'd, infer'd, or remembred, is that which most Men call *Knowing*, or, in the general Sense of the word, *Understanding*. I have not mention'd the *natural* Faculty, call'd the *Will*; because that is not reckon'd amongst *perceptive* Faculties; only an *instrumental* Power indeed it is to procure Attention, or suspending our Judgment, till the Objects of our Thoughts are consider'd.

VIII. As for *Testimony*. When the Subject or Predicate of one or more Propositions are *such*, that neither by our own *Senses*, nor the Light of our own *Reason*, we *can*, or *have* perceiv'd their Agreement or Disagreement, then all our Knowledge of them is deriv'd from Testimony, *human* or *divine*; and, by how much the Ground of, or Motive to Credibility, comes *nearer* or *farther off* from being as good, as if we had perceiv'd the things with *our own* Senses, or with *our own* Reason; so the Certainty becomes *greater* or *less*, and the Degrees of our Assent more or less *firm*.

This Author's way of coming to all knowledg.

IX. Having premis'd this, it will be easie to understand this Authors Opinion concerning the Way we come by all our Knowledge: which in short is this; "Every Man, he says, being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ'd about being his *Ideas* that are there, 'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds several *Ideas*; that is, in fewer words, every one that thinks thinks of something. And that something, that Object, say I, must be within or without him. If *within*, it must be some Operation of his *own* Mind; if *without* him, it must be *Substance* or *Mode*; for there is nothing else in the whole World. Now the Enquiry being, how the Mind of Man comes by all its Thoughts, or, in his word, *Ideas*, in the *Consciousness* of which Thoughts consists that we call *Knowledge*, he resolves all into *Experience*; and that's gain'd by either *Sensation*, that is, the Impressions which Substances, by their several Dispositions or Powers, make on the Organs of our Body; or by *Reflection*, that is, as he explains it, the *Notice* the Mind takes of its own Operations, or the Manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be *Ideas* of those Operations in the Understanding. Or, as I apprehend his meaning must be, by *Consciousness* of all that it has gain'd by *Sensation*.

tion. For I desire, before we go any farther, that it be consider'd what the *reflecting* of the Mind upon its *own* Operations can signifie to the *increase* of Knowledge, unless we be *improv'd* in our knowledge of those things on which we have thought. What signifies our *Consciousness* that we have perceiv'd, imagin'd, understood, judg'd, affirm'd, deny'd, infer'd, remembred; unless we know thereby *more* of the Objects about which our Minds have been thus employ'd? So that, if all our Knowledge be *originally* from our Senses, *reflecting* upon the bare Operations of the Mind will help little to the *Improvement* of Knowledge, except it be that we have such Powers. If a Man put an hundred Pound into a Bag, of all the several Coins in the Nation, unless the Bag has an *innate* Power of melting, refining, multiplying and magnifying; all the peeping into it, or jumbling the Parts together, will not make the Sum greater. The Application is easie, if the Mind has not *innate* Powers of carrying its Thoughts *farther* than the *Senses*, it will be never the better furnish'd by *reflecting* or *viewing* what it has gain'd thereby. The Operations themselves will not therefore afford a new Sett of *Ideas*, as the Author phrases it, for they are only the *Modes* of *thinking* so named, of which we have no *Ideas* at all, when *abstracted* from the Objects about which they are employ'd. For, I appeal to any Man's own Experience, what *Notion* or *Idea* he has of thinking, or any *Kind* of thinking, without the *Thing* he thinks on. And if this Author mean any thing more by *Reflexion*, then it's the same with that which every body means by *Knowing*; and 'tis very improper to reckon that to be a *Source* of Knowledge, which is *Knowing itself*; and therefore, if it had not been for the Commonness of the Expression, he might as well have said, in *Gassendus's* Words, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*; for it comes all to that, even according to his *own* Principles: for *Embryo's* are, in his Words, no better than *Vegetables*. And therefore what he is pleas'd to call *natural* Powers, must be *acquir'd* (if all Knowledge be) from our *Senses* too. And if that be his Meaning, as I conceive it must be resolv'd into that at last, when put into common and intelligible Expressions, I conceive Sensation an *inadequate* Original of all our Knowledge, as imperfect as it is, for these Reasons.

X. First, Because our *external* Senses do or can give no *true* Account or *near* it, so much as of *corporeal* Substances, or of any one of their *Modes*; but we must be forc'd to resort to our *Reason*, which is a *distinct* Faculty from *Sensation*, to arrive at any *such* Knowledge; especially as to any *general* Knowledge, which is the main Use for which our *rational* Faculties were bestow'd upon us. Not of Substances themselves, because by our Senses we can have no *Notice* of them, but by the *Mediation* of those Powers or Dispositions by which they move or operate upon the Nerves and Spirits, which constitute the Organs of our Bodies. And so it is by *Inference* or *Reason* only, that we can so much as judge there are any such things, as *corporeal* Substances. Because the *naked* Substances produce no *sensible* Effects, it is by Argument from *Effect* to the *Cause*, that we can be convinc'd so much as of their *Existence*. And we fall as much short, by our *Senses* only, of coming near the true Knowledge of any one Mode of *corporeal* Substances; *Motion*, *Rest*, *Figure*, *Bulk* or *Position*, or indeed of any other *Quality* that arises from the various *Modification* of them. As to *Motion*: Some Motions are so very *slow*, tho' *constant*, that we cannot so straiten the Pupil of the Eye, as to discern so short a Line as the Body describes while we look upon it; as in the *Index* of Clocks, Watches, and Growth of Trees, the Motion of the Sun, Moon and Stars. Other Motions again are so *swift*, that we cannot so fix the Extremity of the Line of Vision, as to produce any *distinct* Im-

Sensation, not the Original of all Knowledge.

pression; as appears in many obvious Circular Motions. And as for those Motions which, we commonly *think*, we see *distinctly* enough, our Judgment, even in them, if guided only by our *Senses*, would be very defective; because we cannot, by *them alone*, know the just *Distance* the Eye ought to be from the moving Object; and so it may pass through *more or fewer* Points of Space, in a certain time, than our Senses can rightly inform us. And as for *Rest*; there may be, for all that we know by our Eye, *no Motion* in the Particles of Water or other Liquors, nor especially in *solid Bodies*; yet by the Effect we *rationaly* conclude, there is, even in all Bodies whatever, *some Motion* in its Particles, tho' insensible. The Earth we stand on may move, for all that we know by our Senses to the contrary, tho we may not *feel* it; because our *Bodies*, at the same instant, are Partakers of the *same Circular Motion*. And so for want of Organs *refin'd sufficiently* to the Impressions made on them by Bodies without us, or of *proper Circumstances* to be plac'd in, we can neither make a *true Judgment*, *meerly* by our Senses, either of the *Motion* or *Rest* of other Bodies. As for *Figure, Bulk, and Position*; the Case is the very *same*, and for the *same Reasons*: No Body appears, to the Senses, in its true Dimensions; no Line can be made so strait, but there must be some Crookedness in it; Hills and Dales are in that Superficies, which appears very plain. And, because again the Eye alone can't determine when it is at a *just Distance* from the Object, it can never inform us of the *true Bigness, Figure or Position* of any Object. And 'tis by *Reason* chiefly, that Surveyors of the *Area* of Lands, or of the *Height* of Mountains, or Astronomers make any Judgment of the Magnitude or Distance of the Sun, Moon or Stars, or in any such Matters. And, tho it's true, that by all the Arts that Reason can use, the just Measures of the Figure, Bulk, Position, Motion or Rest of Bodies can't be fix'd; yet, 'tis by all own'd that, by the Help of *Reason*, we come nearer the Truth than meerly by our *Senses*. And if the Case be thus, as to those Qualities which are *inherent* in the Bodies themselves; it must, by a fair Consequence, be the same in all the Qualities that arise from the *Variety* of them; such as *Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes*, and all *tangible Qualities*; which are only the Names of the *several Perceptions* we derive from the *Variety* of Figure, Position, Bulk, Motion and Rest in *external Objects*. 'Tis, it seems, discover'd by Microscopes, that Blood, tho it *appear* all *red*, yet is mix'd with abundance of Particles qualified to make such Impressions upon more refin'd Organs than we have, as would procure the Perception of *other Colours* than our *naked Eyes* can discover. And so, 'tis likely it may be in *all other Bodies* whatever. And, if there could be Instruments *found out* to *improve* the Organs of our *other Senses*; such as Perspieils for the Eye, we should, without doubt, discover the *like Qualifications* in all Bodies (how *homogeneous* so ever they now appear) to affect us *differently* from what they do now. And thus, by Analogy, that is, a *rational Inference* of the *same Effects* from the *same Causes*, we arrive at some better Degrees of *general Knowledge* than we can by our Senses *alone*.

XI. Secondly, If our Senses afford so *imperfect* a Knowledge of *corporeal Substances* and their *several Modes*, they must be infinitely *more defective*, as to *immaterial Substances*; for into them the Senses can give us *no Insight* at all. For, tho we may be *conscious* of a *thinking Substance* within *our selves*, each Man, I mean, within *himself*; yet we can't, by any of our Senses, be made conscious of the *like Substance* in *others*; but only of such *Effects*, as, by our *Reason* we judge, cannot proceed from *unguided* or *unthinking* meer Matter in *them*, no more than the *like Effects* do in *our selves*. So that all the Knowledge we have of them is by Argument from *Effects* to *Causes*, and must be resolv'd at last into
such

such *general* Maxims or Principles, as all Mankind agree in, and not attributable either to *Sensation* or *Reflexion* only.

Thirdly, There are several *general* Propositions as certainly true, as that our Faculties are not deceiv'd, yet we can come at no Knowledge of them *meerly* by our Senses; because *they* cannot reach to all the Particulars included in the Subjects of them. Our *Senses* may inform us, that any *single* Whole is equal to *all* its Parts; but not that all Wholes in the World are so, unless we could suppose, that we had seen or felt them all. The *Connexion*, between the Parts of some *general* Propositions, is so *natural* and *indissoluble*, that we can safely judge them to be *true*, without reasoning or casting about for *other* Objects to make their Evidence clearer. I may need a Foot-Measure to satisfy me, that this Room is of the same Length or Breadth with the next; but I need none to satisfy me, that it is of the same Length or Breadth with itself: because nothing can have so near a *Relation* to a thing as *itself*. And therefore such *general* Propositions are call'd *innate*; because as certainly and self-evidently true, as such Propositions are, whose Subject is a *single* Thing, or discoverable by the *Senses*.

XII. And lastly, There are some Propositions as *certainly true*, as that the Sun is a *luminous* Body; and yet the Terms, which constitute them, can't be understood by the Senses. As, where the Subject is a *negative*; as *Nihili nullæ sunt affectiones*, or, Nothing can't produce an Effect: a Maxim which this Author uses in his Argument for the Existence of *GOD*: but yet, I suppose, no one will say, he has an *Idea* of Nothing by his *Senses*. The Mind indeed has not only a Power to carry its Thoughts from one *real* Object to another, and so form *general* Propositions; but also of considering any Substance or Mode (excepting God) as *not existing actually* at any certain Time; and so of forming such Propositions, where the Subjects are *negative*. But neither of these *natural* Powers, or the Exercise of them, can be deriv'd from the Sensation of *external* Objects. But after all, if this Author means by *Reflexion*, the Exercise of all our *natural* Powers about their *proper* Objects; and if again, by *natural* Powers he does not mean (tho his Principles seem to lead him otherwise) *Abilities* or *Habits* acquir'd *meerly* by the Impression from *external* Objects upon the Organs of Sense; but will own them deriv'd, by insensible Ways, from the *wise* Author of Nature, in the *Constitution* of our Souls, there need to be no Controversie in this Matter. For my part, I can't see but that, it's every whit as *rational* to believe, that these *natural* Powers are *gradually imparted* to the Soul, according to its *successive* Capacities to exercise them; as 'tis to believe, the Soul itself was at first *created* by the same *infinitely wise* Author. Or indeed, that if not *all*, yet *several* of the *most visible* Effects in the World are produc'd by *insensible* Ways or Causes, that we can't by our *Senses* perceive how they operate. And yet the former of these two is own'd by all that acknowledge the Being of *God*; and the latter must be by all the Masters of the mechanical *Hypotheses*. But, if he means by *Sensation*, only the Perception of *external* Objects; by *Reflexion*, only the Mind's taking Notice of what it has gain'd by such *Sensation*; and by *natural* Powers, only *Abilities* acquir'd by the Use of our *Senses*, then I must leave him: for I must confess my self so dull, as not to conceive, either how the World could be *made*, or so much as *order'd* as it is, without such an *infinitely wise* Author and Contriver, as we call *GOD*; nor how the Soul of Man could be made, and act, as it does, without the *constant Assistance* of such a Cause; or we perform such Operations as we are *conscious* of without a Soul *distinct* from our Bodies, and its *natural* Powers deriv'd from a *nobler* Cause than *meer Matter* and *Motion*.

In order to the proving, That all our Knowledge is deriv'd from *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, the Author advances these two Propositions which comprehend

The Authors Arguments to prove all Knowledge deriv'd from the Senses.

comprehend his whole Meaning. 1. That *external* Objects furnish the Mind with *Ideas* of all *external* Objects. 2. That the Mind furnishes the Understanding with *Ideas* of its own Operations. The *first* Proposition is clear enough; but the *second* is not so. By the *Mind*, he must mean the *thinking* Substance; by the *Understanding*, the *perceptive* Faculty; by *Ideas*, *Perceptions*; by *Operations*, the *Actions* and *Passions* of the Mind. Here's then *Reflexion* and *Rereflexion* to some purpose; for his Meaning, in other words, must be express'd thus: The *thinking* Substance within us furnishes the *thinking* Faculty with the Thoughts of its own Thoughts. All this to express no more than this, That the Mind is *conscious* of its own Actions and Passions. However, let his Expressions be as he pleases, his Sense is, that Bodies *without* and the Mind *within* furnish us with all our Knowledge. But if the Mind be an empty Cabinet (as he calls it) it comes all to this, that our Knowledge comes all from *abroad*. But if the Mind can have no *Ideas*, but what are let in at the *Senses*, it will hardly find Materials enough to furnish it; unless it has Powers deriv'd from *another* Source to improve, multiply and magnifie them. 'Tis observable, he says, in Children, that they are by degrees furnish'd with their *Ideas*. Who ever doubted of that? But 'tis as observable, I say, that as the Objects increase upon them in Variety, so the Power of perceiving them does; and that Power has *another* Source than the *Objects* themselves: unless what we call *Perception*, as in the Mind, be nothing but what we call *Motion* in the Object. And tho' 'tis certain again, that, if a Child was brought up in a Place where there is no Object, but what is black or white, it would have no Notion of any more Colours than those two: but that does not prove that the *Power* of Perception comes only from the two Objects; for then a Looking-Glass might have that Power, as well as the Child: for that can *receive* Impressions from Objects successively, and the Child can do no more, if it has not its *Power* from *another* Cause than the Objects. And there's no doubt again, but as Men and Children are more or less furnish'd with *Variety* of Objects, so they increase in the *Number* of *Ideas* or Perceptions. Who questions that? But the Enquiry is, whether the *perceptive* Faculties grow or be multiplied *purely* by the Efficacy of the Objects themselves, or acquir'd only from that Cause, or a superior? Tho' the Brain be the Organ of the Memory, yet it does not *itself* any more remember than the Eye sees; and whatever Motions may precede, accompany or follow Imagination and Reasoning; yet, if there be not some one certain Substance, call it the *Soul*, or what you please, that *perceives* all these various Motions, that *unites* those various Perceptions, that *compares* them upon occasion, that is *conscious* of all these Transactions, they would perish the next moment; and the Mind itself would be no more capable of *Variety* in Knowledge, than a Piece of soft Wax is of *different* Impressions at the *same* Instant.

That the Soul do's not always think consider'd.

XIII. For the better securing the *Hypothesis* the Author had laid down, namely, that all Knowledge comes from *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, he positively affirms, the Soul do's not *always* think; meaning, when the Man is asleep: for fear as it appears afterwards, that if the Soul should think, whilst the Organs of the *external* Senses cease from Exercise, it should steal some *Ideas*, which it had not got in his honest way of *Sensation* only. But if that was all the Plot, he might sleep securely, for no body thinks that Dreams (except by divine Inspiration) furnish the Mind with any *new* Knowledge. If *thinking* be suppos'd an *Action* (as 'tis by all) 'tis hard, I confess, to prove a Man *thinks*, whilst asleep; because there are no constant Effects of it discoverable, by the Man himself, when awake, nor any body else whilst he is asleep. But 'tis as hard, on the other

ther side, to prove the contrary: For, tho I am so far in this Author's Party, that 'tis not fair, first, to suppose, that *thinking* is to the Soul as *extension* is to the Body, that is, *inseparable* from it, and thence prove, that it always thinks; But, on the other side, 'tis as little fair, to suppose, that *thinking* to the Soul is only just like *motion* to the Body; and thence argue, the Soul do's not always *think*, as Body do's not always *move*. And therefore, to go the shortest way I can to set this point right between the two Parties, I shall contract the Strength of all the *Cartesians* Arguments for proving, that *Thinking* includes the *essential* or *distinguishing* Property of a Spirit into one Syllogism.

That with which we may have a clear and distinct Notion of a Spirit, and without which we can have no Notion of it at all, is the essential Property of a Spirit.

But Thinking is that with which we may have a clear and distinct Notion of a Spirit, and without which we can have no Notion of it at all. Ergo.

I must confess, I am not able to find a Reason to deny either of these Propositions. Not the *Major*, because that which affords all the Notion of what a thing is, must, as to us, be reckon'd its *essential* Property: nor the *Minor*, for if we deduct from a Spirit all the *Modes* of Thinking, there will remain nothing to afford us the least Knowledge of it. And I cannot devise any way to *evade* the Force of this Argument, to prove the Soul *thinks*, when the Man is asleep, but by owning one of these Consequences, either, that there is *no Soul* in a Man, when he is in a sound or undreaming sleep, or that the Soul of Man is nothing else but a certain *Modification* of an *human* Body, which it wants when the Organs *cease* from Exercise. The former of these Consequences he seems not to allow; for he is angry with somebody in his X. Sect. for making that Inference as his, that a Thing *is not*, because we are *not sensible* of it in our sleep. For he do's not own, he says, there is *no Soul* in a Man, because he is not then *sensible* of it; but only, that he cannot *think* of any thing sleeping or waking, without being *sensible* of it: Which seems to be granting that very Inference he pretends to dread. For, if the Soul do's not *think*, when the Man is asleep, we can have no reason to say, that it *exists*: because we say that of a thing of which we have no *Notion* at all, we say something of that of which, so far as we know, is *nothing*. And then *nihili nulla sunt affectiones* flies in his face. The second Consequence this Author do's not so much dread; because he allows it's possible (and I doubt it follows necessarily from his Principles) for *Matter*, when *organiz'd* and *modified* into a certain System, to *think*: And, tho he would have us believe, that *Religion* and *Morality* may be easily secur'd, tho it was so; yet others, I find, are not of his Mind. And the late eminently Learned Lord Bishop of *Worcester* was one of them, as appears by the Letters which passed between him and this Author. And, I must confess, that I was always studious to maintain that, the Soul was a *distinct* Substance from the Body. for the better assuring the Interest of *Morality* and *Religion*: and shall offer my Reasons for that Opinion upon other occasions, which frequently occur, better than this; and at present shall only make this Remark, that, tho we *Christians* may have *other* Grounds to believe the Immortality of *human* Souls, namely, *special* Revelations confirm'd by *uncontested* Miracles: yet the *wise* and *virtuous* *Heathen*, such as *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, *Tully*, *Seneca*, *Antoninus*, and others, who speak of that *glorious Truth*, sometimes with a *wonderful* Life, and almost *Christian* Assurance, had no *such* Motives for their Belief; but chiefly rely'd upon Arguments drawn from the *Nature* of the Soul, the *natural* Equity of *divine* Providence; and tho' the Principles of *natural* Philosophy were not refin'd to that height which perhaps they

now are ; yet their manner of Expression plainly shews, that *Nature* has drawn the *main Lines* of that great Truth in the Minds of all unprejudic'd Men ; and *Art* has only drawn the *Colours* to give it Beauty. But to return to the point in hand : So far as I can perceive, none of those Arguments which this Author uses do prove that the Soul of a sleeping Man do's not think. For tho they are drawn out to a great length and spun into very fine threads, yet they amount, in effect, but to these two : 1. That the Man asleep is not *conscious* of his thinking. 2. That the same Man awake *remembers nothing* of it after a sound sleep.

This Author's arguments to prove the Soul do's not always think not conclusive.

XIV. As to *Consciousness* ; 'tis impossible to prove or disprove it directly. *Consciousness*, tho it be a *distinct* Act of the Mind from *Perception* ; yet 'tis not only *inseparable* from it, but it follows so *quick*, that it's very hard for a Man at any time to nick the *Distinction*. If then the Soul be any thing *really distinct* from the Body (which at present I suppose) 'tis hard to conceive how at any time it can be *united* to the Body (tho' that's no harder than to conceive how *Motion* is *united* to all the Parts of a *fluid* Body) and yet not perceive some Impressions that are made upon the *Nerves* that are spread thro' all the Body, and meet in the Brain ; besides all People grant that there are Spirits continually lodg'd in the Brain, *over* and *above* those that are employ'd in *external* Sensation, the *muscular* Motion of the parts of the Body, or the *progressive* Motion of the Blood. And there can be no probable Reason given why the Mind, tho there be a Cessation in the *external* Organs of Sense, may not perceive a *constant* Pleasure in *sound* Sleep, tho it were only from the *perpetual Steam* of Spirits that are rising from the Blood in its Circulation ; especially since that Motion must needs be *even* and *regular*, in a Body that sleeps soundly ; and People *suddenly* awak'd, find a kind of *Reluctancy*, at that instant, to be disturb'd of that *Pleasure*. And tho' we don't find any such uninterrupted Pleasure, meerly from such a *regular* Motion of the Blood, when awake, yet the Reason may be only, because *external* Impressions then may be more *prevalent*. And so it may be in *Embryo's*, if we suppose the Soul a *perceptive* Principle *distinct* from the Body. But, put the case, the Soul was only a knot of Nerves, a *Congeries* of Animal Spirits in one of the Ventricles of the Brain ; yet this pretty System of superfine Matter, if *perceptive*, must be susceptible of the *Impressions* from the *other* Spirits which continually surround it ; and those Impressions being so agreeable to the *natural* Motion and *congenial* Disposition of all the other solid and fluid parts of the Body, may easily have a continually *grateful* Sensation ; and since, in *Sleep*, the Brain may be *softer*, *moister*, and more *movable*, by the great Concourse of Spirits to it at that time ; as it may become *less retentive* of those *faint* Impressions ; so for that very reason it may be also more *tender* and *capable* of Sensation. This I confess cannot be demonstrated ; but much less the contrary : But there is this to be added to the *Probability* of it, that our very Dreams, which we do remember, and the Imagination we often have in them of *visible* Objects, much *clearer* than awake, do manifestly evince that the *perceptive* Principle in us do's not *wholly* depend upon the *external* Senses, for the Exercise of all its *natural* Powers ; but can perform some of them without such a Monitor, especially without being rid with whip and spur by the violence of *external* Objects. And if there be such a *constant* Sense of Pleasure in *sound* Sleep (as there can be no reason to deny) there's a return to that Reflexion which this Author makes upon the Wisdom of our Maker, for bestowing upon us the Faculty of *Thinking*, which comes so near the Excellency of his own Nature, to be so *idly* and *uselessly* employ'd, at least, one fourth of its time. For 'tis not at all unworthy the *wise Contriver* of Nature, to bestow upon us an *innocent* Pleasure, as the Consequence of that

that desire of Sleep, which he himself has made necessary to *preserve* our Lives, and *improve* the Comforts of it. But besides, if that Argument prov'd any thing, it would prove too much (which is a scurvy Fault in an Argument) for it would prove, we never dream. For, I presume, all Mens Dreams are alike incoherent and useless; but such as they are, they are of use to prove we may have *useless* Thoughts, without any Affront to the Majesty of our Creator.

XV. As for his second Argument; That we *don't think* in sound Sleep because we *forget* what we thought on; I do no more wonder at that, than I do that every drop of Dew or Rain don't make Holes or Dents in Clay or Sand; or that the Surface of the Seas and Rivers don't retain the print of every Particle of the water that falls in Showres. Besides, don't we find by Experience, that there are a thousand Thoughts which succeed one another whilst we are awake, of which we retain not the least Memory the next hour; sometimes not the next minute? And if we consider the *Temper* of the Brain, whilst we are fast asleep, partly by the *plentiful* Resort of the Animal Spirits, which used to be otherwise employ'd; partly by the *continual* Recruit which Sleep was design'd to make; it cannot be conceiv'd otherwise, but there must be a very *quick* Succession of Thought, and continual *interfering* and *crossing* of those Spirits in their Motions: and thereby hindring one another from making any *distinct* Impressions in the Brain, which doubtless is the *chief* Organ of Memory. And what the *Variety* of succeeding Objects may do, whilst *awake*, that much more the *various* and *multiform* Motion of the Animal Spirits may do, whilst asleep. The *difference*, without doubt, between the *Temper* of the Brain, in a *sleeping* and *waking* Man, is much greater than the *Variety* of Objects can create, whilst he is all the while *awake*. And yet, we find it hard to make our Thoughts *cohere* for any considerable time together, or to *recollect* them, unless of some more than *common* consequence. But let the *Transactions* of the Mind, in *Conjunction* with the Brain and Spirits, be wrought how they will; the *same* Cause, whatever it is, that makes our Dreams so *incoherent*, may, with more ease, make the *sleeping* Mans Thoughts incoherent with the *same waking* Mans, and so forget them. Let a Man be never so suddenly awak'd, the very *Concussion* of the Nerves (if by *external* Violence) communicated to the Brain, may *shatter*, *confound* and *blot* out, in that moment, all the Impressions which the Thoughts had made before: and if awak'd without any such *foreign* Force, the *sudden* and *hasty* Motion of the Spirits to the *external* Parts may work the *like* Effect. Just as Water in a tipping Vessel, striving to come to a level, may *leave* none of its Parts or Marks behind it. In short, a Man asleep may *perceive* or *think*, and be *conscious* of it at *that* instant, and yet not retain the Thoughts of it when *awake*; and that too, without being, to all effects and purposes, two different Persons for *want* of that Memory. For if the *want* of Memory was a sufficient reason to make *different* Persons, then the *same* Man might be an *hundred* Men in the same day, by *forgetting* his several succeeding Thoughts within that time. Methinks therefore, this Author's Supposition of *Castor's* Soul in *Pollux's* Body, whilst asleep, is a little too Romantick: but 'tis grounded upon and level'd against the Belief of some, that the Soul is a *distinct* Substance from the Body; and therefore, as he infers, may act *apart*. But I can tell him so much, that, as *distinct* as their Substances are, yet there is a *mutual* Communication between the *Thoughts* of the Soul and the *Motions* of the Body, as long as the Man lives: but the Soul of *one* Man can no more be in *another* Mans Body, than one Man can be *conscious* of anothers Thoughts, or feel his Pain with the Gout.

C H A P. II.

Of simple Ideas.

I. **T**HE better to understand, says this Author, the *Nature, Manner,* and *Extent* of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observ'd concerning the *Ideas* we have: and that is, that some of them are *simple*, and others *complex*. And I say, the better to understand that difference, he should have given some Mark or Definition of them, that so we might distinguish them from one another. But we must be content with *Exemplification* instead of *Definition*; which is a *tedious*, and, I doubt, we shall not find it a *safer*, way to Knowledge. At first view I guess'd, that by a *simple Idea* he had meant any Object which the Mind could conceive at *once*, or the Eye at *one* glance; but that, I find, won't do; for a Figure upon a paper, a Triangle for example, is sort'd amongst *complex Ideas*; and, so far as I can perceive, a *simple Line* or a *single Point* of a Line must pass for young *complex Ideas*.

II. By a *simple Idea*, then, this Author means (excepting Space) the same which other Philosophers do by a *single Quality, Property* or *Accident*; or, in one word, a *Mode*, allowing some Latitude for the word *Mode*, so as it may comprehend *inseparable* Attributes, such as Unity, Existence, &c. as well as *separable* Qualities; such are, any particular Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, Roughness, Heat, Cold; such again as Figure, Motion, Rest, Position, Bulk; all the Modes of *thinking* or Operations of the *Mind*, such as, affirming, denying, doubting, remembering, &c. and lastly, such as Unity, Existence, Power, Pain and Pleasure.

Whether the giving these *new* Names to these *Modes* will *increase* our Knowledge, must be examin'd afterwards; but at present, I would have it examin'd, whether we shall change the words *Mode, Quality* or *Property* for this of *simple Idea*, with any *Advantage* or *Propriety*, or not; for I can't see any reason why any of these Objects deserve to be call'd either *Ideas* or *simple Ideas*. For example, all those commonly call'd *sensible Qualities* are nothing else but the Names we give to the several Perceptions which are produc'd in us, by the *various* Motions deriv'd from *external* Objects, and communicated to the several Organs of our Bodies; but in the *Mind itself* there is nothing any more like, or is the Picture of those Qualities, than the Words by which they are express'd are like, or are the Pictures of the Qualities themselves: When in the Mind they are *meer* Perceptions, and those Perceptions have none of the Features of the Qualities themselves, and that this Author himself expressly owns: and therefore cannot, with any Propriety, be call'd *Ideas*, much less *simple Ideas*. Do's any one conceive a Colour, a Sound, a Tast, a Smell, Heat, Affirming, Denying, Doubting, Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest, Unity, Existence, Power, Pleasure, Pain, without the *Subjects* in which they were or are produc'd? Do any of them *hang* in the Air *alone*? Are they not brought to the Organs of Sense by *Motion*? And do's *Motion* come by *itself* without the Body, in gross or in its Particles? And, when they are in the Mind, are they any more than *various* Perceptions? And therefore, as none of these Qualities are their *own Pictures*, when in the Objects or Causes of them; so, when they are in the Mind are the Perceptions themselves the *Resemblances* of them, neither do they ever enter into the Mind *alone*; and so there is no reason to be given why they should be call'd either *Ideas* or *simple Ideas*.

III. I very much question (tho this Author suggest it) whether the *Sight* can take in at once Colour and Motion *distinctly*: for tho the *Succession* in the Acts of Perception are very *quick*, yet I doubt, that, if there were not *distinct* instants, the Perceptions of them could never be so. However this is certain, they can never be perceiv'd *distinctly* from that Body in which they are, and so are *complex Perceptions* or *Ideas*. And, tho' the Mind by its *native* Power can consider of them *separately* from the Subject; yet that Power itself is not borrow'd from the *Senses*, but is deriv'd from some *distinct Cause*; and so our Knowledge gain'd by such Consideration cannot come from *Sensation*.

IV. 'Tis certain enough, as this Author alledges, we can no more invent a *new* Quality than we can *create* a Substance. We can't form a Perception of Taste, Smell, Colour, Sound or other Quality, without a *Cause* to procure it; but 'tis as certain, that the Mind can do something more than *reflect* or *stare* upon these *external* Qualities, when let into it, it can *separate* in its Consideration what enter'd *compounded*, as every Quality do's: It can *compound* again what enter'd *less compounded*: it can *multiply*, *magnifie*, *compare*, *infer*, and so exercise all its *natural* Faculties without the *constant* or *immediate* Use or Assistance of its *external* Senses, and thereby gain and improve its Knowledge.

V. What this Author says is *possible*, seems *certain*, that *superior* intelligent Beings have *other* Organs for Sensations than we have, and for *Memory*, than a *Brain* such as we have: otherwise it would be *naturally* impossible, that Angels and Souls separated from their *present* Bodies should have any Memory of their *past* Actions, or Perceptions of *greater* Pleasure or Pain than we now have. But in the close of the Chapter he gives an hint, that, tho' he has so far condescended to *vulgar talk*, as to reckon but *five* Senses; yet we may justly count *more*. I am not very curious to find *new* Names for the several sorts of Sensation: but I am much afraid, he'll not be able to make me or any body else *more sensible*. But, if he'll set up Hunger and Thirst for two *new sensible* Qualities, and find out the Seat and Original of the Nerves which serve for those Uses peculiarly, I can find Parties enough to own they are very *sensible* Qualities, but, till he do's that, we'll be contented with the old Number.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Sense.

I. **B**Y the *Ideas of one Sense* he means, the Qualities observable in *external* Objects by *one* sort of *Organ*. As by the Eye all sort of Colours, which are nothing but the *Variations* of *Light* by *Reflexion* immediately from the Objects, according to the *various* Texture of their *Superficies*, or *Refraction* according to the *variety* of the *Medium*, through which that *subtil* Matter, which constitutes it, passes. By the Ear all sort of *Noises* or *Sounds*, whether articulate or inarticulate, which are nothing but several Motions in *external* Bodies, made by their *mutual Impulse* or *Collision* communicated to that Organ. By the Palate all sort of *Tastes* and *Relishes*, such as *sweet*, *bitter* and *sharp*, which are nothing but *various Impressions* upon the Nerves inserted in that Organ, agreeable or disagreeable to their *natural* Frame, Figure, Position, Pores and Motions of the Spirits residing in them. By the *Nostrils* all sort of *Smells*, such as

Ideas of
one Sense
only
Modes of
Sensation
from one
sort of Or-
gan.

sweet and *stinking*, which are nothing but *various* kinds of *Motions* in the Particles of those Bodies from which they come, communicated to the Nerves there inserted; which procure the Perception of that we call *sweet*, when their Figures and Motions are *agreeable*, and *stinking* when *disagreeable* to the *natural* Position and Figure of the Pores of those Nerves and the Motions of the Spirits lodged therein. By the *Nerves* spread upon the *Superficies* of the Body, such as Heat and Cold, Roughness, Smoothness, Solidity, Hardness, Softness, &c. which are nothing but several *degrees* or *kinds* of *Motions*, *greater* or *less* Resistances in other Bodies, as they have *different* relations to our own Organs of Sensation.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

This Author's Notion of Solidity.

I. BY Solidity this Author means, that which *hinders* the Approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another from entering into the *same* place; and we gain this *Idea* by the Touch. But, if it be, as he pretends, the *essential* Property of Body, and by which it's *distinguishable* from Spirit, it can't be always so gain'd: for the *least* Particle of Matter is *Body*, as well as the *biggest*; and doubtless there are *some* Particles of Matter so *small*, as well as there are others so *great*, that we cannot perceive them by any of our *Senses*. And he himself owns, in the *same* Paragraph, that our Senses take no *notice* of this Quality (how should they, since they can't?) but in *Masses* of Matter that are of Bulk. But the Mind, having once got this *Idea*, considers it as well as it do's Figure in the *minutest* Particles of Matter which do or can exist; and from thence I infer, this Quality is not known to be in every body meerly by our *Senses*, but by *Reason*, inferring it from what the Senses do but in *part* inform us: and so, that Knowledge is owing to a *Faculty* in the Mind *distinct* from *Sensation*.

The common Notion of Solidity.

II. The word *Solid* has hitherto been used in Contradistinction to *Hollowness*, often used to signify *Consistency*, *Continuity* or mutual *Coherence* of parts, and often for *Hardness*; which is no *positive*, but a *relative* Quality, to the Constitution of our Bodies; and therefore not so fit to be set up for the *essential* Property of a Body, as *Extension*, which of late has had the Name of it.

Extension not the essential Property of Body. Spirits extended.

III. But it must be confess'd, that *Extension* is liable to these two seemingly unanswerable Objections. 1. Because *Spirits* have some kind of *Extension*, and yet are not *Bodies*: for *God* may properly enough be said to be in all places, and the *Souls* of Men in those places in which they operate; and tho they can't be said to be in all those places, to which their Thoughts extend; yet, if they produc'd any *Effects* in those places (as *God* do's one way or other in all places) they might be said to be in them: however for that reason they may be said to be in their *several* *Bodies*, because they do there *operate*.

Space extended.

IV. 2. *Space* is something *real*, and *without* us, is no Creature of the Mind, but is not *Body*, because penetrable, so far as we do or can know to the contrary, and yet is *extended*. And if it be neither Body, nor Mode, Property, Quality or Accident of Body, then here is an *incorporeal* Substance, as well as there is *corporeal* and *cogitative*; and those words *incorporeal* Substance don't imply a Contradiction, as Mr. *Hobbs* and his Followers

lowers so confidently assert. And methinks Mr. *Hobbs's* Definition of *Space* is but very Lame. *Space*, he says, is the *Phantasm* (that is, the Appearance) of something existing, as existing; or, as he farther explains himself, No other Accident of the Thing consider'd, but only that it appears without, or extrinsick to him that do's imagine it. In which Definition there are manifestly these Faults, if not Contradictions: 1. That it's something really existent, extrinsick to the Mind conceiving it; and yet but a *Phantasm* or Appearance. 2. That 'tis consider'd as an Accident, and yet no Substance in which it is; which is contrary to his own Notion of an Accident; namely, that its the Mode by which we conceive Substance. 3. It's impossible to conceive any particular Substance without some Quality or Accident, or any particular Quality or Accident without its Subject or Substance: and a Substance is not the less so, for the fewer Accidents or sensible Effects by which it is distinguish'd from other Substances; but for its real Existence out of the Mind conceiving it, for its not being a Creature of the Imagination: And in that sense *Space* is a Substance, and of which we have as positive a Conception as we have of *Body* itself. But whether it may be call'd properly Substance, must be left to every ones Liberty and Fancy. But if it was call'd an incorporeal Substance, because its Parts are not distinguishable by Figure and Colour, as all Bodies are, or are conceivable to be, and Bodies call'd Substances whose parts are mutually coherent or fill *Space*, and Spirits thinking or cogitative Substances: the Distinction between them might be well enough preserv'd. But to return to my Author.

V. Now let's examine what Pretences this Author makes for Solidity being the essential Property of Body, or that which makes and denominates it Body. And, so far as I can perceive, the whole Dispute between him and the *Cartesians* turns upon the Property of the Word *Solid*. Every thing that is solid is, beyond dispute, Body; but whether every Body be solid, is the whole Question. But, if it be suppos'd that by the Word *Solid*, is meant that in any Body which gives Resistance to the entrance of any other Body into the space it possesses, the case is clear; but then the Question is beg'd, and at that rate any thing else, any other Quality of Body, if you allow it that Signification, will do as well as *solidity*. But all the world, before this Author, meant by *Solid*, that whose parts were continuous and mutually coherent; as manifestly appears by that common Expression, such a Person is one of solid parts, which is certainly a Metaphor taken from Bodies, and implies that the Persons Thoughts, Notions, Discourses hang all together, are consistent and coherent with one another; and is thereby distinguishable from one whose Thoughts, Notions and Discourses cohere only in some few particulars; just as the Parts of an hollow Body do. And therefore the reason commonly given why one Body gives Resistance to another, in taking its Space, is because it fills that Space where it is, or because its parts cohere; and not because 'tis solid. For, tho its Parts were never so fluid or separable, soft or moveable; yet it would hinder another Body from coming into its place, till forc'd out, as well as if it was compacted, hard or solid. And therefore, one would think, there needs no invention of a new Word or Sense of an old one, to distinguish Body, either from Spirit or Space.

VI. I am clearly of his opinion, that Body is distinct from Space, tho it were for no other Reason but this, that we do so naturally and easily conceive a Body moving or leaving its place, without any thought of another coming to possess it, and because the supposal of the Plenitude of all Space brings with it the Necessity of imagining such a Circulation of Motions, as one would not believe, were it not to help out a pre-conceiv'd Hypothesis: But, on the other side, I can't conceive how any particular Body can

The Author's arguments, to prove Solidity the Essence of Bodies, examin'd.

Body distinct from Space.

can *move*, except something else move it ; or indeed how it can rest, except something else keep it in its place. For that's no more than what all Naturalists do and must own, and that brings them into the unavoidable Necessity of owning a *primary Cause* of all *Motion* and *Rest*, and of all other Qualities and Effects arising thence ; and of perceiving the *distinguishing* Excellency of all *Spirits* from all kind of *Bodies*. That *these* are *self-active* and the beginners and enders of *Motion*, but the *others* cannot of *themselves* begin or end the least Motion in the world. And, so far as I could yet learn, all the Experiments, that have been used to prove or disprove an *empty Space*, do only clearly prove that no Bodies can *move*, *rest*, or produce any *sensible Effect*, without the Impulse or Operation of some Cause *distinct* from themselves: but don't reach the Proof, that there are no *void Interstices* between the Particles of the impelling Body. But Spirits we find can begin or stop Motion by *Volition*, by one single Thought.

The Author's Experiment to prove a vacuum from the Pressure of a Globe of Gold by Screws not conclusive

VII. And as for that chargeable Experiment, which this Author has fetch'd from *Florence*, to prove Water as solid as an Adamant, it seems not in the least to his purpose, or indeed to any other; but to convince that which every one own'd before, that all the Force imaginable cannot make a Penetration of Bodies. When the Globe of Gold, fill'd with Water, was press'd by the force of the Screws, some of the subtiler Parts of the Water were separated from the rest, and some of the Pores of the Golden Ball were more open'd than others, and so found Vent; but if this Globe of Gold had been all *solid* and the Parts *continuous*, the effect of the Compressure would have been only the flattening the Globe. And so all the Knowledge we gain by that Experiment is only, that the Parts of Water are not so *coherent* or *inseparable*, as those of Gold, which any one would have confess'd without such a chargeable Rack.

No argument prove to there is or is not a vacuum clearly.

VIII. What this Author says farther in Sect. V. about *Solidity*, namely, that 'tis by *that*, that Bodies *impell* and *resist* and *communicate* Motion, is still going upon the Supposition of the Question, that *Solidity* and *Body* are all one. For the *Cartesians* will own no *difference* between a Foot square of Space that seems *empty*, and another of the same dimension fill'd with Marble; but only that one consists of Particles not distinguishable by the Eye or Touch, but *easily separated*; the other of Particles distinguishable by the Eye or Touch, but *hardly separated*. But *Des Cartes* frankly owns, that the Universe cannot be full of Body, without supposing Matter not only *divisible*, but actually *divided* into such *minute* Particles, as will accommodate themselves to all the conceivable *great* or *small* points of Space: And therefore flies to the infinite Power of God, which can do any thing which we can clearly conceive, without contradiction to his Wisdom. And therefore it must be so. On the other side, the *Vacuumists* can't prove the contrary by sensible Effects: For an empty Space cannot produce them, and all they can say is, that they can clearly conceive *Space* without *Body* to fill it, and therefore it must be so. And therefore both Parties resort at last to the *Power* of God abstracted from his *Wisdom*; of which we can have no Notion but by Effects. And this is not *fair arguing* on either side. But for my own part, I think the Author's Reason for a *Vacuum* very good, namely, because we can so naturally conceive Space without Body: and I wish only he would stick to that Rule, when he speaks of the Distinction of *Body* and *Soul*, and not use it only to serve a present Turn: as he often do's.

The best argument is, that Body and Space may be distinctly conceiv'd.

CHAP. V.

Of simple Ideas of diverse Senses.

BY the *Ideas of diverse Senses*, this Author means any thing of which we can have the Perception by more Organs of Sensation than one: Such he reckons *Space* or *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion* and *Rest*, all which we perceive by the Touch as well as the Eye, and that which needs remark is only, that we don't gain the Knowledge of these *Properties* or *Qualities* in Body, near an *Exactness*, meerly by the Eye or Touch; but by the Exercise of our *Reason*, as I shew'd before, as to *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest* and *Position*. And, if there be any *Space* beyond the Confines of *Body*, we cannot have so much as the *Conception* of it, but only by the Exercise of the *same* Faculty, inferring that there may be such *Space*, because we cannot invent or imagine any *external* Cause that should hinder the infinite *Extension* of the universe. But that's not an *Idea*, but *rational* Inference.

CHAP. VI.

Of simple Ideas of Reflexion.

BY *simple Ideas of Reflexion*, this Author means the Operations of the Mind, such as *Thinking*, and the several Modes of it: but why they should be call'd *Ideas*, or be said to be gain'd by *Reflexion*, is hard to conceive. For the Operations of the Mind are only several *Modes* of *Thinking* with *distinct* Names to them; but neither of *Thinking* in *general*, or any *particular* Mode of it, is there any *Picture* or *Resemblance* in the Mind: neither have we the least *glimmering* of an *Idea* of it, unless we reflect upon the Objects on which we think; and if we so reflect or perceive, then that *Reflexion* or *Perception* is that which every body before this Author call'd *knowing* or *understanding* in general. And to say we gain Knowledge by knowing, sounds very oddly.

All the Operations of the Mind he reduces to these two. 1. *Perception* or *Thinking*. 2. *Willing*. But how *Thinking* comes to be clapt to *Perception* only, needs explication; for when we will love, hate or desire, we *think*, as well as when we understand, imagine or judge.

CHAP. VII.

Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflexion.

BY *simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflexion* he understands such Perceptions or Notions which are produc'd in us both by the *Impressions* upon the Organs of our *Body*, and the *Reflexion* also the *Mind* makes upon its own Actions. And of this sort he reckons *Pleasure* and *Pain*, *Power*, *Existence*, *Unity*: and under the words, *Pleasure* and *Pain*, he comprehends not only such as arises from Impressions on our *Bodies*, but every thing that either molests or delights, tho' it arise from the *Thoughts* themselves: So as to include the Pleasures and Troubles of the *Mind*, as well as those call'd so, of the *Body*, or from the *Body*. And those

those two sorts of Pleasure and Pain ought, I think, to be well distinguish'd; for that sort, which arises meerly from the Body, needs no *reflex act* of the Mind to gain the Knowledge of, but only *Sensation*: for no one thinks himself the more happy or miserable, for what Pleasure or Pain he has formerly perceiv'd from his Body, unless it has left some good or ill Effects in the Body itself. But the Pleasure or Pain that arises from good or ill Actions needs *Reflexion* or *Re-perception* indeed. And when this Author makes a becoming Remark upon the *Wisdom* of our Maker, for annexing *bodily* Pain or Pleasure to all our *external* Sensations and the Degrees of them, it would methinks have been sutable to that *pious* humour to have observ'd the *Justice* and *Goodness* of our Creator also, in annexing *inward* Pleasure to all *good* Actions, and Pain to all *bad* ones in some degree or other. For as the Sense or Expectation of *bodily Pain* or *Pleasure* is the Spring of *bodily* Actions, and keeps us from *Sloth*; so *Reflexion* upon the *good* or *ill* Effects of *Virtue* and *Vice* *spurs* us to do well, or *restrains* us from doing ill.

But now how Pleasure or Pain, Power, Unity or Existence come into the *Classis* of *simple Ideas*, is not easie to imagine. For what Notion can any Man have either of *Pleasure* or *Pain* alone, without considering, I mean, the *Causes* of them, or *Subjects* wherein they are? Or of *Power*, without the *Object* operating or operated upon? or of *Existence* or *Unity*, without the *Thing* existing, or the *Thing* that is One? So that *Pleasure* and *Pain* seem to me only the Names of our Perceptions, *Power*, *Unity* and *Existence* the Names only of the Acts of the Mind itself exercis'd about things operating, existing and being one; and not any abstract *I-deas* or *Objects* of the Mind.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning Simple Ideas.

What this Author means by *I-deas*, are only different Modes of Perception.

No Perceptions from a privative Cause.

I. **W**HATsoever is so constituted in Nature as to be able, by affecting our Senses, to cause any Perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Understanding a *simple Idea*. These are the Author's words; which common People would have been contented to have express'd thus: Whatever can make a *distinct* Impression upon any of the Organs of our Senses, is *perceiv'd*. And, as he rightly observes, we seldom consider so much, what is the Cause of that *Perception*, but only that it is something *really existing* without us, or, in his obscure Language, a *real Idea*: tho' the Cause, he says, may be only a *Privation* in the Subject. Thus we perceive Light and Darkness, Heat and Cold, White and Black, Motion and Rest, without troubling our heads to consider whether Darkness be only a *Privation* of Light, Cold of Heat, Blackness of White, Rest of Motion. But methinks it might have become so great a *Refiner* of new as well as old Philosophy, to have been more accurate than to assign any of these Effects to *Privative* Causes: for, in plain *English*, a *privative* Cause, or the *privation* of a Cause, is *no Cause* at all. And, in the very instance he gives, the Cause is *positive*. All Sensation, he says truly, is produc'd in us by different *Degrees* and *Modes* of Motion in our Animal Spirits. Every *Abatement* therefore of the *Degree* of Motion, or *Alteration* of its kind, is *another* sort of Motion. And so the Perception of *Darkness* is only of a *less degree* or *other sort* of Motion upon the Eye than *Light*; Blackness may be only of the Rays reflected in more *obtuse*, and Whiteness in more *acute* Angles; Coldness, of Motion

Motion determin'd *one* way only; Heat, *several* ways; Rest, of the Particles moving from the Object in one or more *strait* Lines; Motion itself, by their moving in Lines *crossing* one another: But whether it be thus or not, the Cause of all Perceptions is something *real* or *positive*. And he seems again ^{not} more accurate when he says, we have *negative* Names for some Objects or Actions, of which we have no *positive* Ideas; such as the words *Silence*, *Invisible*. For it seems to me that *Silence* and *Invisibility* are as *positive* as *Speaking* and *Visibility*. For *Silence* in the Man that uses it when he can, or it was expected he should speak, requires as much an *Action* of the Mind, an *Action* of the Will, as *Speaking* do's: and that which is *invisible* is so, for as *positive* a Reason as another thing is *visible*. Suppose the *Smallness* of a Body be the reason it cannot be seen, *Smallness* is no more a *Negation* of *Greatness*, than that is of *Smallness*. They are *relatively*, not *negatively* or *privatively* opposite.

All Ideas are positive.

II. In Sect. VII and VIII. he owns, that most of those *Ideas* which we have by Sensation, are no more the *Likeness* of any thing without us, than the *Names* that stand for them are the *Likeness* of the *Ideas*. One would wonder then, he should call them so improperly *Ideas*; but to make amends for that as well as he can, he declares, that what he calls *Sensations* or *Perceptions* in our Understanding, he would be understood to mean *Qualities* in the Objects; And, I must confess, if he had been contented with *those Terms*, as I think he might; if he had been as well pleas'd with *old* ones as with *new* ones, his Essay had been far more *intelligible*, tho it would not have shew'd so fine.

Sensible Ideas own'd not resemblances.

III. Concerning those *Qualities* then in external Objects (for he is contented to be in the old fashion in compliance with the Vulgar) there are of them, he says, *two* sorts: some *primary*, such as *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Motion*, or *Rest*, and *Figure*; and they may be call'd so, 1. Because they are wholly *inseparable* from Body, and such as in all the Alterations it suffers, and notwithstanding all the Force that can be used, it constantly keeps. And this is true indeed of them all, if we allow his own sense of the word *Solid*. 2. Because they are the *original* or rather *immediate* Causes of all other *Qualities*, which therefore he calls *secondary*; such as *Colours*, *Tastes*, *Smells*, *Sounds*, *Heat* and *Cold*, &c. And this Distinction of *Qualities* I like very well, and the rather, because 'tis common for all, that pretend to the *Mechanical* Philosophy, to agree, that all other *Qualities* in Bodies depend upon the *Variety* of the Figure, Motion, Rest, Position, Bulk, Contexture of the Particles wherein they are. But it seems not to look altogether so well in this Author to call any *Qualities* *secondary*; because 'tis his avow'd Principle, that we seldom can know those *primary*, and it sounds strangely to talk of *Seconds* without *Firsts*. Whereas other Naturalists, with consistency enough, may call such *secondary* *Qualities*, because by the help of Reason inferring that the *like* Cause produces the *like* Effect, they fairly conclude, those *secondary* *Qualities* may proceed from such *primary*, tho *insensible*; because they experience they do so in more *bulky* and *sensible* Bodies.

Qualities in Bodies primary or secondary.

IV. That Bodies operate upon one another by *Impulse*, that is, either by immediate Contact or the Motion of some of its Particles, tho *each* of them may singly be *imperceptible*, is certain enough; and 'tis as certain that they produce their *Ideas* or Perceptions in us by the communication of their several Motions to the Nerves and Spirits, which constitute our Organs. But from thence I make these *three* Inferences. 1. That Perceptions are not *Ideas*, because they are no *Resemblances* of the Patterns without us. 2. That *Perception* is not *Motion*, because the Effect has no *Resemblance* of its Cause. 3. That our Knowledge of these *Qualities* is not wholly deriv'd from our *Senses*, because the Operation of one Body upon another

All Bodies operate upon others by immediate contact.

is transacted chiefly by *insensible* Particles coming from the Bodies to our Organs. And therefore there is Use of *Reason*, to make these Inferences: And tho this kind of Knowledge do's not amount to that which my Author calls *intuitive*, yet 'tis ground'd upon such Principles, that all Men venture their Fortunes and Lives too, every time they eat, drink or take Physick, and most other cases. From the *Manner* of the Operation of one Body upon another, and our own, the Author himself makes these two Inferences. 1. That the *Ideas* of *primary* Qualities of Bodies are *Resemblances* of them. 2. That the *Ideas* of *secondary* Qualities have no *Resemblances* of them in the Bodies. As to the first, 'tis certainly true, that those Qualities, such as Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest, Bulk, are *really* in the Bodies, whether we perceive them or *not*; but then whether, when we actually see or feel them, there be any thing more than a *Motion*, deriv'd from the Objects, carried to the Brain, to produce *Sensation*, is not very plain. For when we see a Body of any certain Figure or Bulk, the Image or *Idea* of it goes no farther than the bottom of the Eye. When we feel them, no farther than the Nerves inserted in the Organ, and nothing seems to reach the *Brain* itself, which is the *immediate* Organ of *Sensation*, but the *Motion*. In the Act of *Imagination* indeed, when the Object is not present, there is an *Idea* of the *visible* Object in the *Mind* itself; but whether it be so, when the Object is actually present, is not so evident: because we can't easily distinguish between the Impression, which is properly the Act of the *Object*, and the Perception which is the Act of the *Mind*. But this is certain, that there is at no time an *Idea* or Perception of any of those Qualities, *without* the Subject in which they are; not of Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest, without the thing extended, figured, moved, resting: and so there can be no such things as *simple Ideas*, they are all *compounded*. As to his second Inference, 'tis as certainly true, that the Qualities, commonly call'd *sensible*, such as Heat, Cold, Light, Colours, Sounds, Tasts, Smells, Roughness, Smoothness; they, as in the Objects, are nothing else but *Dispositions*, which he calls *Powers*, in them to produce those *various* Perceptions, in us, which have those distinct Names: which *Dispositions*, as in the Objects, are nothing else but the *various kinds* or *degrees* of Motion, Figure, Bulk, Position, and Contexture of the Parts of that Object which produces them, as it might be explain'd in all the particulars.

All sensible Qualities are only variety of motion, figure, bulk, Position in the Objects.

Arguments to prove it.

V. All this is so very clear, now so universally own'd, that this Author might have spared many of his Arguments to prove it. But, because they are all good, it will be worth the while to contract and to express them in more *common words* than he uses, for the benefit of such Readers as are not used to his *Language*.

1. The *same* Fire at one distance will produce the Sense of *Warmth*, and at another of *Pain*; but there can be no reason assigned, why *Heat* should be more properly said to be inherent in the Fire, than *Pain*: but only a certain *Motion* or *Agitation* of the Particles by which it produces either.

2. *Light* and *Heat* in Fire, *Whiteness* and *Coldness* in Snow, are no more *really inherent* in either of them, than *Sickness* or *Gripings* are in Manna; any otherwise, that is, than as they are the Causes of those Effects in us. Take away the Sensation of those Qualities, and there remains nothing in them, but the *Bulk*, *Position*, *Figure* and *Motions* of their Particles, which dispose them to produce those several Sensations in us; just as the *Contexture* of the parts of Manna produce those Effects of Pain and Griping.

3. *Porphyry* is a Stone *red* in some parts, and *white* in others: Take away the *Light*, by which our Sensation is produc'd, and there will remain nothing

nothing in it, but the *Figure* and *Position* of its Parts, by which it is disposed to make those two *various* Reflexions of Light: And so not the *Colours*, but only the Powers, which arise from the *Figure* and *Position* of its Parts, are *inherent*; which the Absence or Presence of *Light* could not alter in so solid a Body.

4. Pounding of *Almonds* alters their Colour of *white* into *dirty*, their Taste of *sweet* into *oily*; and therefore Colour and Taste in them can be nothing in them but a certain *Contexture* or *Configuration* of their Parts; for their pounding could make no alteration in any thing else.

5. The same thing (*Water* suppose) appears *hot* to one Hand and *cold* to the other; but *Heat* and *Cold*, if Qualities *really inherent* in the Water, if any thing more than *various Motions* in its Parts, in relation to the two Hands, could not be in it at the same moment. Therefore *Heat* in it is nothing else, but the *Motion* of its Parts, exceeding that Motion which is in the parts of *one* Hand; and *Coldness* in it is nothing but the *less degree* of that Motion, in comparison with that which is in the parts of the Hand; that *Excess* of Motion in the parts of the Water making the Motion of the Animal Spirits in the Hand to *spread* every way, and so to produce the sense of *Heat*; that *less degree* of Motion in the parts of the Water checking the Motion of the Spirits in the Hand determines them only one way, that is, inwards, and thereby producing the Sense of *Cold*.

6. The *Sun* produces the sense of *Heat* and *Light*, it melts and blanches Wax, hardens Clay, blackens Faces. But there is no more reason to say that *Heat* and *Light* are in the Sun, than *Softness*, *Whiteness*, *Hardness*, or *Blackness*. Which no body thinks are Qualities *inherent* in the *Sun*; but only such a *Motion* in its parts, by which it produces those Effects, according to the *various* Dispositions of the Bodies on which it operates. This is the Substance of this Author's Arguments to prove that the Qualities, call'd *sensible*, are not *inherent* in the Objects; but only different Figure, Motion, Position and Bulk, by which they are enabled to produce those *various* Sensations in us; to which may be added, that the same Picture, and often other visible Objects, appear of *different* Colours at the very *same* time, only by the *different* Position of the Eye. Which plainly argues, that Colour is not *really inherent* in them; but, as in them, is only a *Disposition* to make a *different* Reflexion of Light to the Eye, which it may do according to the *different* Posture of its parts to different places, and not otherwise. The truth is, every Looking-glass in which we see our Faces, and every Echo that we hear, may convince us that neither Colours or Sounds are *inherent* in the Causes that produce them. If they were, we could neither *see* one, nor *hear* the other; but in the Places where the Objects are that *originally* cause them, those two Cases prove the contrary.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

I. THE word *Perception* is most commonly used in the same sense that the word *Sensation* is, that is, for the Act of the Mind, when employ'd about *external* Objects, their Modes and Qualities; often taken for that *reflex* Act or Acts of the Mind, conversant about the Objects of its *own internal* or *external* Sensations, its own *imagining*, *understanding*, *judging*, *reasoning* or *remembering*: and is that which every body uses to call *Knowing* or *Understanding* in general. But I have not ob-

Percepti-
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Percepti-
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Idea.

Percepti-
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Motion.

serv'd that it's ever used for *thinking* in general, as this Author suggests; because *thinking* comprehends the Acts of the *Will*, as well as the *Under-
standing*. For every one *thinks* when he *desires*, *loves*, *hates*; which are Operations of the *Will*; but the *Will* was never reckon'd amongst the *perceptive* Faculties, tho' it has great Influence in the *Improvement* of them, by making us *attentive*, *considerative*, and *suspending* the Judgment, and the Actions which are consequent upon the Minds passing such Judgment: But take the word *Perception*, in which of the senses you please, it is neither an *Idea* nor *simple Idea*. Not an *Idea*, because no Man has any *Re-
semblance* or *Image* of that Act itself in his Mind, when he perceives; nor *simple Idea*, because he cannot have any manner of *thought* or *conception* of that Act, or any other Act, *abstracted* from the Object or Objects about which it is conversant. No Man imagines, understands, judges, reasons or remembers, without thinking of the *Object*, which he imagines, understands, judges of, reasons about or remembers. But that which I would have chiefly noted is, that *Perception* is an Act of the Mind *distinct* from the *Motion* or *Impression* which precedes it: And that clearly appears from what this Author owns, and we all experience; namely, that we can be and often are so *intent* upon the Thoughts of some particular Objects, as not to perceive such Impressions, which, at other times, would be sufficient to produce a *Perception*. And tho' it's true what he says, that what the Mind perceives it cannot but perceive; yet it has Power *not* to perceive that at some certain times, which at other times it *must* necessarily have perceived. As in intent studying we may not take notice of certain Sounds, which at other times we could not but perceive or take notice of: Which implies, that the Act of *Sensation* or *Perception* do's in a great measure depend on the *Will*. And this has often made me wonder that so accurate a Naturalist, as in many particulars, without doubt, Mr. *Hobbs* was, should take *Perception* to be nothing else, but *Motion*, *Reaction*, *Resistance* or the *Antitupia*, as he calls it, of the Heart or Brain to free itself from the Impression which comes from the *external* Objects. For, I would gladly be inform'd, how, if *Perception* was only such *Reaction*, the Object can seem *without* us; for all the Motion from the Organ to the Heart or Brain, and from thence back again is still *within* us. The Reason indeed he gives is, because the Reaction is *outward*, or, in his own words, the Motion appears *external*. But then I ask, What is that to which the Motion appears *external*? For that can be nothing else but the Mind itself, the *Principle* of the Perception; for the Motion cannot appear *forwards* or *backwards* to or from the Heart to itself. And therefore, tho it was allow'd, that there are such *Motions* from the Object to the *external* Organ of *Sensation*, and from thence to the Heart, and *Reaction* from the Heart outwards; yet the *Sensation* itself must be a *different* Act from any of those Motions, and the *Principle* of Perception, call it the *Soul*, or what you please, must be something *distinct* from either our own or *external* Bodies; our own can only *receive*, other Bodies can only *produce* Motion; but that which perceives this *Variety* of Motion must be something *distinct* from *both*. But by this instance we may see, how the serving that general *Hypothesis*, which he vouch'd, namely, that there is nothing in the world but meer Matter and Motion, can blind an acute Eye. And whether this ingenious Author do's not betray sometimes too great a Fondness for his own avow'd Principle, that all Knowledge is deriv'd from *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, I must leave to the unprejudic'd Reader. And the Inference he makes in Sect. VI. from Childrens having no *Ideas* or *Perceptions* in the Womb, but only perhaps of Hunger and Warmth, that *there are no innate Principles*, smells a little too strong of his own pre-conceiv'd *Hypothesis*. The Reason he gives is, all Perceptions suppose *external* Impressions; and thence he infers, *there can be no innate Principles*,

Principles, because, they being Propositions, consist of such words as signify things as Children can have receiv'd no Impressions from. But, if he had pleas'd to use his Accuracy in finding out, or observing the reason why the Children of some Parents are more subject to the Gout, and several such Diseases than others; why some Dogs will smell the Scent of Hares or Foxes; and Birds take Tunes sooner than others; He might meet with a convincing Reason, that *Nature* contributes something to Knowledge, as well as *Experience* gain'd by *Sensation*. For, in those cases, tho' the Diseases, the Scents, the Tunes cannot be said strictly to be *innate*, yet the Children or those Animals are born with a *natural* Aptness or Facility to acquire them; and so these Principles we call *Innate*, to the Knowledge of the Parts of the Propositions don't come into the Mind, without Impressions from those *Things* which the *Words* signify; yet the Knowledge of the *Cennexion* of them, when they are perceiv'd, may be said properly enough to be *Natural*; because it do's not depend upon the *Accidental* Alteration in our Operation upon the Body (as he intimates) but purely on the Minds *innate* Power of observing the *natural* Coherence between the Parts of those Propositions.

II. In Sect. VIII. He tells us, the *Senses* are often corrected by the *Judgment*, of which there is no doubt; but whether the Instances he gives, because they are so very *refin'd* and *new*, sufficiently prove it, deserves some Consideration. When we see (he says) a round Globe of an uniform colour, *v. gr.* of Gold, Alabaster or Jet, 'tis certain the *Idea* thereby imprinted on our Minds, is of a *flat Circle*, variously shadow'd with several *degrees* of Light; and from thence he argues, that 'tis by *Experience* *correcting* our Senses, that we come to know a *convex* from a *flat Superficies*. Now the Question is, whether there is any need of *Experience*, to know the difference in those two Figures? That the Figures of the *flat* and *convex* Objects at the bottom are round, is certain enough; and 'tis as certain, on the other side, that when the Superficies is *flat*, the Impression upon the *Retina* is on all points *equable*; and that when the Superficies is *convex*, 'tis *unequable*; and that which we call the *Shade* makes a *fainter* Impression, which is indeed *another sort* of Motion, and almost as different from that which comes from the *nearer* and more *illuminated* parts, as that from Light and Darkness. And so the Mind perceiving, according to the *variety* of Impression upon its Organ, the doubt arises, whether in this case it would *naturally* or *without experience*, judge these two Bodies of different Colours or of different Figures; for *some* Difference it must perceive. But I would gladly know, why the Mind may not immediately (*without experience*, I mean) perceive the more *illuminated* parts of the Globe as nearer, and the *shaded* as farther off, than otherwise they would appear; and so its whole Superficies appear, as it really is, *prominent*? For 'tis thus in all other Cases, where any Body is more *white*, or otherwise inabled to *reflect* the Light strongly, the nearer it will appear, and the less luminous the farther off. In Pictures upon a plain 'tis obvious to observe, that the *concave* parts (suppose a Mouth widely open'd) are painted in a *dusky* Colour, and the *protuberant* in a *brighter*, on purpose, I guess, to make the former seem the nearer, and the latter the farther off: And the Reason commonly given is, because in the *natural* Fabrick of the Eye, the Nerves which are used to move and thereby defend it against the more pressing Light, contract it so as it is and must be, to see an Object that is very near: And thence a *luminous* Body seems nearer than otherwise it would. And if it be thus (as 'tis commonly reputed) then there is no need of *Experience* to teach us that *Shade* stands for *Figure*, as this Author suggests; for the parts, from which the shade comes, will by the *natural* Structure of the Eye appear farther off than otherwise they would, and so the whole Superficies

The Senses often corrected by the Judgment, and the Author's Argument explain'd and examin'd.

/of the eye

cies of the Globe appear *protuberant*, as it really is. And for Mr. *Moli-neux's* Problem which is this: Suppose a Man born blind and now adult, and taught by his *touch* to distinguish between a *Cube* and a Sphere of the same Metal, and nighly of the same Bigness, so as to tell which is the Cube, which the Sphere; suppose them then placed on a Table, and the blind Man made to see them. *Quare* whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them he could now distinguish them? He answers, No, for tho' he has obtain'd Experience how a Globe, how a Cube affects his *Touch*, yet he has not yet attain'd the Experience that what affects his *Touch* so or so, must affect his Sight so or so: or that a *protuberant* Angle in the Cube, that press'd his *Hand* unequally, shall appear so in his Eye as it do's in the Cube. And my Author fully agrees with him, because it serves his turn, to prove that Nature do's *less* and Experience *more*, for our gaining Knowledge than we are aware of. But I crave leave to ask, why the blind Man may not as unerringly judge at first view by the Sight, as well as, 'tis suppos'd, he would upon Trial by his Touch? The only Reason here assign'd is, that the blind man just come to his Sight has not learn'd by Experience, that what affects his Touch unequally will affect his Eye so. But the Question is, whether he shall need to learn it, whether by Nature he would not know it? Or in other words, whether there be not constituted in Nature a *necessary* Connexion between a certain *Motion* upon the Organs of *Touch*, and a certain Perception, and a certain Figure at the bottom of the Eye, and that same Perception? Otherwise I doubt there could be no reason given, why we should ever perceive a *solid* Body (as in this case is suppos'd) of the same Figure by the Touch, as we do by the Eye: And so Nature would have founded an unavoidable *Division* between the several Organs of Sensation, which consequence I don't like. Besides, suppose two *orbicular* Bodies, which the blind man had been used to call by the two common names, a *Trencher* and a *Platter*, both of the same Materials, and only discernibly different in *Bigness*, would he not know without Experience, which is lesser, which the bigger; what should be call'd the Trencher, which the Platter? I think there would be no need of Experience. Why might he not then distinguish between a Cube and Sphere? The Eye can measure the distance from the *middle* point in the Cube to the *extremity* of the Angles, as well as to the Circumference of the Orbicular Bodies; the Angles that the Objects would make in the Eye itself, would be as different in one case as in the other; and, if the Author of Nature has annex'd the *same* Mode of Perception to a certain *Motion* upon the Organs of *Touch* as there is a certain *Figure* in the Eye, then one would think the blind man had nothing to learn by Experience, but the *Name* of that Mode of Perception, which in the stated case he is suppos'd to have done by his *Touch*. However, leaving these Conjectures of mine to more curious Enquirers, this is agreed by all that the Senses are *corrected* by the Judgment; as when the *Distance* of visible Objects is too great or little, when the *Light*, the *Medium* or the *Position* are not just, or when there is an unnatural *Distortion* of the Organ. And these Misappearances are rectified by our Reason and Experience.

That
Brutes
perceive
probable
but not
certain.

III. This Faculty of *Perception*, my Author thinks, is that which puts the difference between *Animals* and the *inferior* Parts of Nature. The *Cartesians* carry it only so far as to distinguish between *Men* and *Brutes*. But this is a point that furnishes so much matter for Dispute, that no one would be farther concern'd in it than to preserve the *Distinction* between Men and Brutes intire, as to the main. All that I shall note is, that such as assert the Perception of *Brutes*, have a singular Advantage on their side, because they have all their *known* Actions in *View*, and thence may argue something in them so very like that Perception and Memory which we have,

have, that there may seem nothing wanting to complete the Proof, but only the *Brutes* telling us, they do perceive, which they cannot. And it so lies hard upon the *Cartesians*, to produce Actions in Creatures which are inanimate, like those of *Brutes*, or the like Actions in our selves, which we often perform without being *conscious* of them; and then after all to shew how they may be perform'd by the meer Principles of *Mechanism*: And this seems too hard a task because they cannot so much as solve cleverly, perhaps so much as one *Phenomenon* in Nature, meerly by such *Principles*, without recourse to some *wise* and *superintending* Cause that orders all things by ways which are *unsearchable* by us. All therefore that we need to be concern'd in, for the maintaining that *Distinction*, is, but to observe what we are all *conscious* of; namely, that we have so much Sense, so much Memory and Foresight, that we can *compare* present, past and future Events; that we can *consider* things differently from what they are in Nature, in order to general Knowledge; that we have the Knowledge of *moral* Good and Evil; that we have an *uninfluenc'd* Freedom in many of our Actions, and consequently are capable of *Reward* and *Punishment*, according to the rules of Justice and Equity; that we can *reason* or *infer* one thing from another, and thereby both know more than our *Senses* can inform us, and do vastly more than barely *corporeal* Force could enable us; and therefore that our Souls are capable of an *immortal* and *vaster* Happiness than those of *Brutes* are, if they have any.

IV. I cannot pass by one Argument which this Author uses to prove, *Brutes* have Perception, without a Passion, but such as, I hope, will become any good-natur'd Man; namely, because Men by decrepid old Age may have all the Memory of their past Actions blotted out, and by losing their Sight, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, to a great degree, may be in a condition not above Cockles and Oysters. This methinks smells so strong of a certain Principle, that Man is nothing but an *organiz'd* Body, with the knack of *thinking* tack'd to it at some certain times, that it may be enough to awaken any one that is concern'd for the *Immortality* of *human* Souls, to see the dangerous Consequence of it. But because this Author leaves it to consideration, and do's not positively affirm it, I shall also leave it to be consider'd, whether if *Embryo's* be no other than *Vegetables*, it be not as lawful to procure *Abortions*, as to pluck up young Trees? If *Children* be no better than *Brutes*, it be not as lawful to feed, fat, kill and eat them as Calfs? If *old* People, when decay'd in their Intellectuals, be in no order of Creatures above that of *Cockles* and *Oysters*, it may not be as justifiable by the Laws of Nature to expose or kill them, nay, tho' our own Parents, as to open an Oyster? These are this Author's *Maxims* and *Words*; but, I hope, he will not own these *Consequences*, how fairly soever they are drawn from those Principles; because they don't only undermine the Principles of *natural* Religion, but leave no *rational* ground for even Good-nature, Humility and Compassion: which the wiser *Heathen* abhor'd the thoughts of.

V. What this Author concludes this Chapter with; that *Perception* is the first *Step* and *Degree* towards Knowledge, and the *Inlet* of all the Materials of it, is so far true, that we can come to no acquaintance with *external* Objects without it; and that the fewer and duller the Impressions are which are made by them upon the Organs of our Senses, the duller the Faculties are which are employ'd about them. Tho' by the way it may be noted, that some Men meerly by the strength of *natural* Parts, as they are call'd (and I think properly enough) will infer more or reason better, from what they have learn'd from *Sensation*, than others who have seen, heard or otherwise perceiv'd more: which argues that all Knowledge do's not keep pace with the *Senses*; but may be improv'd by the

The infirmities of old age no good proof that Men may become Brutes.

Perception on the first Step to Knowledge.

Exercise of other Faculties, which may indeed be call'd *acquir'd*, if we take that word *acquir'd* to imply any thing that has a cause *distinct* from the Mind itself ; but if limited only to *external, sensible* Objects, is not true, and will farther appear, I hope, in the sequel of these Notes.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

What Retention is.

I. **B**Y Retention this Author means, not only that Faculty which is commonly call'd *Memory* ; but the Power also of *keeping* our *Ideas* (that is, Thoughts) in the Mind for some time, without the Interposition of other thoughts, which he calls *Contemplation* : tho' that Word again has been used generally in another Sense ; and by *Memory* he means, that which every body else do's, the power of thinking again of any thing after other thoughts have interpos'd ; but whether that Power which he calls, of *Retention*, be any thing more than the Exercise of the *Will* about the Succession of the Thoughts upon the same or different Objects, as it seems to be, it's needless to dispute ; but whether it be a *distinct* power, or only *repeated* and immediately *succeeding* Thoughts, upon the same Subject, wholly depending on the Will, 'tis certainly of singular use for the improving both the Memory and all Knowledge ; and is the *distinguishing* Excellency of one Man, as to Wisdom, from another.

Ideas in the Memory no where.

One thing I can't but remark, that in his account of Memory he owns that our *Ideas* or *Perceptions*, which are only in the *Memory*, are really no where ; but only there is an *Ability* in the Mind, when it will, to *revive* them ; and from thence I infer, that he cannot take it amiss, that some own *innate* Principles, tho' there be not an *actual* Perception of the several parts (commonly call'd *Subject* and *Predicate*) of those Propositions ; only a *natural* Facility or Faculty in the Mind, to apprehend, connect or disjoin them, when occasion offers the Thoughts of them : Just as there is a *Power* in the Load-stone to draw Iron, before it *actually* exerts that Power : for that's all we mean by *natural* or *innate* : besides this Facility.

What do's improve and prejudice Memory.

II. Amongst the Causes that *improve* Memory, he reckons that *Attention*, *Repetition*, the *Pain* and *Pleasure* annex'd to any sort of Sensation, helps it. But this must be understood only in relation to those *particular* things so perceiv'd ; for in *general*, when they become *excessive*, they rather weaken the Memory, and greatly prejudice it, than increase the Knowledge of other matters. But he omits *Method*, by which things, that are akin to one another, may be so plac'd together in our Consideration, as to make our Thoughts *easily* *succeed* one another in train. In consequence of this, he says rightly, the Memory of a thing must be *weak* ; when 'tis but once perceiv'd, or rarely repeated ; when 'tis hindred, by others immediately succeeding, from making any deep Impression, especially by any Disease, Passion or any Disorder in the Blood and Spirits : and from thence gives a good reason why we seldom lose the Knowledge we have once got of *Solidity*, *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*, *Unity*, *Existence*, *Duration* or *Number* ; because the Objects, which occasion these Thoughts, occur *every* moment almost. But then, it must be noted, that our Knowledge of these Properties or Attributes, never comes *alone* or separately from the Subjects wherein they are. For tho they may be *consider'd abstractedly* from any particular Subject, yet as they never were in Nature *alone*, so neither were they *perceiv'd* or are *remembered*, without the Subject of one sort or other, in which they are conceiv'd to be.

III. In *Memory* he allows, the Mind is sometimes more than *passive*, Memory an active power of the mind. he means, when it studiously endeavours to *re-collect* the Name, suppose, of a Person, or some Circumstance of a past Action: but I am apt to think 'tis always *active*, that is, that there is an *Action* requir'd in the Mind, distinct from the *Effect* which the first Impression left; and tho we cannot indeed so well distinguish them, except when we are conscious of a preceding Act of the Will, for the Re-collection; yet since Perception or Sensation itself is *distinct* from the *Motion* which occasions it, tho that's all that comes from the Object, 'tis but reasonable to believe, that the *Act* of Memory is as *distinct* from that which occasions it (let it be the figure of the Pores in the Brain, or what you will) as *Sensation* itself, from the *Motion* which comes from the Object. And when I consider, what a noble and entertaining view the Mind of Man has, by the help of *Memory* and *Imagination*, of the stupendous Scene of Objects and Actions which the Universe affords, I can't forbear my believing, that the Soul of Man is the true, tho *imperfect*, Image of its infinitely wise and *self-active* Author; and that the Effects of *Memory* and *Imagination* are owing to a *diviner* Principle than a few *Tracings*, *Pores* or a pack of *refin'd Particles* of Matter in the Brain.

IV. That Memory in an *Intellectual* Creature is necessary in the next degree to Sensation, he well observes; for, if it were not for that, we could never proceed in Knowledge beyond that of *present* Objects: but it must be observ'd also, that our *other natural* Faculties don't always keep pace with the *Memory*: 'tis no constant Rule, that those persons have the best *Judgment* that have the most tenacious *Memory*, or the most natural *quickness* of re-collecting their former Perceptions. Which argues the Memory do's more immediately depend upon the present *Frame* or *Constitution* of the Body, Brain, Blood and Spirits, than our *other intellectual* Faculties do: and therefore 'tis easie to conceive it possible, as he ingeniously suggests, that *intellectual* Creatures, *superior* to us, may have *larger* Views of their own, and other past Actions than we have; because in all probability the Organs of the Bodies, to which those Spirits are united, depend more upon *free Acts* of their own Wills, than ours at present do.

V. What this Author relates concerning Mr. *Paschal*, that he forgot nothing of what he had done, read or thought on, in any part of his *rational* Age, may very well be reckon'd a Prodigy (especially if these words are taken in the full Latitude) and such an one, I confess, that I can't believe; because there needs such Testimony of it, as no Miracle ever had or can have: except we take his own word for a sufficient Proof.

VI. The Argument which he uses to prove *Brutes*, and particularly singing Birds, have *Memory*, seems to want something of a convincing evidence, that they are *conscious* of what they do. That the singing of some Birds is in a great measure *Mechanical*, is manifest from their singing more briskly in any Room or Place where there is most walking, talking or any other sort of *noisie* Motion. And as for their taking and endeavouring at any time a Tune they have heard, that seems wholly attributable to the *peculiar Frame* of their Brain, and other parts of their bodies; and is no more to be wonder'd at (tho' not necessary for their preservation) than that some Birds are more naturally apt to sing, or Dogs to follow particular Scents, than others; tho neither of them necessary for the Preservation of their Lives.

CHAP. XI.

Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

Discerning
and Judg-
ment
much the
same.

I. **B**Y the Faculty of *Discerning* this Author means the same which others call *Judging*: For as by *Sensation* we come by the Knowledge of particular things; so by comparing those particular things one with another, and observing wherein they *agree* or *disagree*, we form *affirmative* or *negative* Propositions; and the Faculty of doing this is call'd *Judging*. And there is no great difference between this and other Authors, as to *particular* Propositions: but only in the Names, what they call Substances or Modes, and when put into Propositions, *Subject* and *Predicate*, he calls *Ideas*: the main thing wherein they differ is about *general* Propositions. According to his Principle, that all Knowledge is deriv'd from *Sensation* or *Reflexion*, there can, say others, be then no certain Knowledge of the Truth of *general* Propositions, because the Senses can reach no farther than to *particulars*; whereas, if the Connexion or Disjunction be *natural*, or, in other words, the Proposition be either *Identical* or a *Negation* of Identity, as 'tis in all *innate* Principles, there is no need of the Sensation of *all* the Particulars; because the Mind can, by its *native* Power, judge of the truth of them, in *all* the particulars included in the *general* words, as well as it can by the Senses in any *one* particular. For example, as soon as we know what the words *Whole* and *Part* signifie, we can judge that all Wholes are *equal* to all their several Parts, as well as if we had by our Senses (which can never be) perceiv'd all the Wholes and all their Parts in the world. If they be ask'd, how they are assured the Connexion is *natural*? they answer, by the Truth of their Faculties. If he be ask'd, how he is assured the *Ideas* agree? he must answer, by the Truth of his Senses: And so that Controversie, about the *Certainty of the Truth* of Propositions, is turn'd upon that point, whether all the Faculties of the *Mind*, or that of *Sensation*, be the *surer* and only Foundation of Assent.

The excellency of the Judgment chiefly about disagreement

II. This Faculty of *Judging* is not only exercis'd in observing wherein things *agree*, but wherein also they *disagree*: and the *Excellency* of this Faculty consists especially in the latter, because that wherein things *agree* is generally *sensible*, lies at the top, and the Mind need, as it were, but *gently touch* upon their Superficies, to perceive that *Agreement*. But, because the Properties and Qualities, sometimes of external Objects, and the manner of the Operation of our own Minds, and of Bodies upon one another, are *remote* from our Senses and common Observation, 'tis hard to distinguish them; and the harder, because they are so nearly allied, and like one another. Thence it comes to pass, that there needs a kind of *Labour* or great *Attention* in the Mind, to search into those Secrets on which the *true* Nature of things depend, and great *Effects* and the *Success* of Actions turn. And thence this Author ingeniously remarks, that many Men, who have a great deal of *Wit*, lively *Imaginations* and great *Readiness* of Expression, have not always the deepest *Judgment*. And the reason why the Generality of Men are so much pleas'd with Poetry, which paints the obvious likeness of different things; and why common People are more affected with Noises, Tones and Gestures, rather than solid Reason, because, in these cases, the *Senses* can reach the notice of them, without much Attention or elaborate Thoughtfulness.

III. What this Author says in Sect. III. that to the well distinguishing our *Ideas*, it contributes chiefly, that they be *clear* and *determinate*, is certainly true. But, if any one has a mind to observe how this *Ideal Language* will *confound* Discourse and Knowledge, he shall need to go no farther than this Paragraph of the Author's. "A Man in a Fever, he says, "may have from Sugar a *bitter* tast, which another time would produce a "sweet one; so far right: But the *Idea* of *bitter* in that Man's Mind, he says, "would be as clear and distinct from the *Idea* of *sweet*, as if he had tasted "only Gall. Now this is right again, if by the word *Ideas* be understood the *Properties* or *Dispositions* in the Object which produces those *Ideas*. For the *disorder* in the Man's Organ of Sense don't *alter* them in the least. But if he means Perceptions, as he do's in the first Period, then 'tis false: for *bitter* and *sweet*, being only the different Names of different Perceptions, no man can have different or distinct Perceptions, or *Ideas*, in that sense, at the same instant. He can say indeed, This do's, has or will produce the tast of *sweet* or *bitter*, grateful or ungrateful: but he can't perceive, or have an *Idea* in his Mind, of either, but at that instant when he actually perceives one or t'other. But he goes on to prove it; "Nor do's it make any more Confusion between the two *Ideas* (there he means the *Dispositions* in the Objects that produce the *Ideas*) of *sweet* and *bitter*, that the same sort of Body produces at one time one, and another time another *Idea* (there he must mean *Perceptions*) than it makes of the two *Ideas* (there *Perceptions* again) of White and Sweet, or White and Round, that the same piece of Sugar produces them both at the same time. Now, I say, 'tis not true, that the Mind do's, at the same time, perceive those two Qualities in the Sugar; 'tis at different times, as much as if they had been in two different Bodies, tho they are in the same piece of Sugar. All that this Author means, and might have said in other and fewer words, is true enough, that the different *Disposition* of the Organ of Sense may occasion different *Perceptions* in different Persons at the same time, or in the same Person at different times, (just as the same visible Object may appear in different Colours and Shapes, in different Postures of the Eye) and I only note it, that his Reader may see the Necessity of having *two* Keys at least, to open his way into his Sense, when he mentions *Ideas*, sometimes *Perceptions*; at other times, even in the same Period, the *Dispositions* or *Qualities* in the Object which produces those Perceptions.

This Author's confusion in the Sense of the word *Ideas*.

IV. Comparing one thing with another, he says, in respect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, and other Circumstances, is another Operation of the Mind about it's *Ideas*, and upon that depends the tribe of *Ideas* comprehended under *Relation*. Others reckon this Act of the Mind only the exercising the Faculty of *Judging*; because there is hardly any thing in the world, but may be consider'd in *comparison* to some thing or other distinct from itself, either in respect of *Quantity*, *Quality*, *Power*, *Operation*, *Situation*, *Time*, or such like Circumstance: and therefore, by thus comparing them, we gain all the Notions we have of *Cause* and *Effect*, *Substance* and *Mode*, *Subject* and *Adjunct*, *Whole* and *Parts*, *great* and *small*, *equal* and *unequal*, and all other *Denominations*, which we judge one thing deserves, by its respect or relation to another. This Faculty my Author allows to Brutes (tho' not in so great a degree) excepting only as to *general Ideas*, and I am afraid that when those Terms of Art, *general Ideas*, are melted down into plain *English*, he will leave us no Privilege above Brutes, but the benefit of *Words* or *Language*. For, I suppose, he do's not think, no more than others do, that there are really any *general Substances* or *Modes*, and consequently any *Ideas* of general things; because there is nothing properly *general*, but *Words* or *Names*, and they are given indeed to several Things. Yet the reason is, because the Mind observes those several things

The power of comparing, only judging.

No general Ideas:

things to agree in that which is the Reason or Foundation of that *common* or *general* Name. If therefore Brutes can *compare* particular things, they want nothing but the Use of *Language* to convince us they are as *wise* and *good* as we are; or would be so, if they were educated in *seeing*, *smelling*, *tasting*, *hearing* and *feeling*, as well as we are.

The
Powers of
compoun-
ding and
enlarging
exercis'd
only about
complex
Notions.

V. Another Faculty of the Mind, he says, is *Compounding*; whereby it puts together several of the *simple Ideas* which it has got by Sensation and Reflexion. But, I doubt, there will be but little work for the Mind, of that kind, except in *Words* and *Sentences*: for it finds no Substances or Modes of them *single*, but ready *united* by Nature, and considers them so: And all Compositions, except by Poetical Fiction, are the work of Nature, unless it be in *artificial* Contrivances, and those are *complex Ideas* or *Substances*. Under the same head he comprizes the Faculty of *enlarging*; which, in his language, is putting together *Ideas* of the same kind, which others call *repeating* the same Act of the Mind or Body; as in *numbering* and *measuring*. But no body, I think, has the *Idea* in his Mind of Number or Measure *abstracted* from the thing number'd or measur'd; except he mean of the *Figure*, by which the Number is express'd, and that's but the *Name* or *Sign* of the Number; or of the words, for example, *Inch* or *Foot*, which are but the *Names* of the kind of Measure: but of Number or Measure we have no *Ideas* in the Mind, except we include the things number'd, measuring or measured. He is so favourable to *Mankind*, as to give them the Privilege of *compounding Ideas* better by far than *Brutes*. He instances in Dogs; they may, he thinks, have *simple Ideas* of their Masters *Voice*, *Shape* and *Smell*; he might have added their *Tread*: but that they never of themselves *compound* them into *complex Ideas*. The Mystery of that I can't apprehend; for if they have the *Shape* of their Masters body in their Eye, of the *Sound* of his Voice and Tread in their Ears, the *Smell* of his Perspirations in their Nostrils, one would be apt to think (if they have Perception, which he allows) they can hardly avoid the having the *Idea* or *Image* of him in their Brains; and that's a *compound Idea*. But, if that be true (which is likely enough) what he has been told, that Bitches will nourish young Foxes, if they do but suck them till their Milk runs thro' them; and that Brutes, which have a numerous brood of young ones at the same time, such as Hens, Bitches and Sows, don't number their young ones, as appears by their not missing one or more of them, when taken away out of their sight or hearing; these two Instances have some appearance of an Argument, that they don't either *perceive* or *remember*; for perceiving or remembering, without distinction, is not perceiving or remembering at all, or at least of no use.

Names
not always
the signs
of Ideas.

VI. As for *Naming*, he says, that *Names* are the Signs of *Ideas*. That they are the signs of our *Conceptions*, or of the *Mode* of our Conceptions, is sure enough; but there are Names or Signs of our *Modes* of Conception, of which we have no *Ideas*. The word *Nothing* is the Sign that our Mind conceives a thing as not existing, or of the *Negation* of Existence: but we have no *Idea* of *Nothing*, nor of that Act of the Mind, by which we consider a thing as not existing. There are also *general* Names, suppose the word *White*; but we have no *Idea* of Whiteness in general, or *abstracted* from some particular Subject or other. We neither see or imagine it hanging in the Air or in pure Space, but always as *united* to some Body or other. Those words which are call'd *Particles* of Speech do signify the *succession* of our Thoughts, or the *Connexion* of our several Thoughts, with one another in writing or speaking: But we have no *Ideas* or *Images* in our Minds of those Thoughts which have so *succeeded*, without the things thought on, or are so *connected* with one another.

VII. As to the *abstracting* Faculty of the Mind, he gives us the Notion of it right, if I may have the liberty of expressing it in other words than *Ideas*. Since *individual Substances* and their *Modes* are almost infinite, if there was a *distinct* Name for every particular, Names would be numberless and Discourse endless. To prevent that, the Mind of Man comparing these things together, and finding, for example, many of these Substances agree in having the same Properties and Qualities, it gives the same Name to those Substances which agree in those Properties and Qualities. And thus the word *Man, Horse, Stone, &c.* become the common Names for several substances. Finding again, that several of these Properties and Qualities are the same (in us) because they proceed from the same Cause, or because they produce much the same Effects, or for some such reason, the words *white, round, sweet, rough, &c.* become general Names. And observing also, that these several Substances and Modes operate upon one another, and have *Relations* to each other, the relative Names of *Cause, Effect, Subject, Adjunct, Whole, Part, equal, unequal, great, small*, become common Names or Signs of our Conceptions of such Relation. And the Power in the Mind, of making these *Observations* and *Comparisons*, may be call'd its *abstracting* Faculty. The main difference between this and other Authors, in this particular, is, that he is for calling all our Conceptions about Substances and their Modes, *Ideas*, against which there are manifestly these Exceptions. 1. That there can be no *Ideas* or *Resemblances* of general things; because really there are no such general things, either Substances or Modes, in the world; but Thoughts, Notions or Conceptions there may. 2. If all Knowledge comes by our *Senses* or *Reflexion*, which is his Maxim, then there can be no certain Knowledge of the Truth of any general Proposition whatever; because our Senses can reach but to *particulars*, and Reflexion no farther. 3. There can be no Knowledge at all of *Substances*, not so much as of their *Existence*; because nothing can be known, according to that Principle, but what affects our *Senses*, and Substances, to be sure, don't; but only their Modes, Properties and Qualities. And tho this *abstracting* Faculty be the peculiar Privilege which he intirely reserves for *Mankind* above *Brutes*, yet at long run this amounts to no more than the Faculty of *speaking* or *using Signs* of their Conceptions: for, he says expressly, that if Brutes perceive (which he allows) then they do *Reason*; which in effect seems to fling up the bar between Men and Beasts. For if Men, according to his avow'd Principle, do never exercise their *rational* Faculties by inferring any thing from general Maxims, tho own'd by all Mankind, but only by Induction, Exemplification or Enumeration of *particulars*, there will remain nothing to distinguish Men from Brutes, but only the Faculty of *speaking* in most Men, or of making *artificial Signs* of Conceptions, as in Mutes, so all our Advantages come at last to be nothing but the Knowledge of some more *particulars*, which by our Senses and Experience we have gain'd more than they have, and the Art of using *Words* or other *Signs*.

The abstracting Faculty is only the power of comparing and giving general Names.

The word *Idea* no adequate Object of thoughts.

VIII. As to *Idiots* and *Mad-men*, my Author seems to distinguish them rightly enough. *Idiots*, he says, thro' the Defect of their Brains, Organs of Sense or Speech, *Reason* but very little: and tis no wonder; for their Intellectuals do, as in other Men, depend much upon the frame of their Bodies, and Experience. But for all that, according to the common Sense of all Mankind, they perceive, imagine, remember, understand so much as to be reckon'd Parts of the *rational* world, as appears by this, that, according to the Laws (I suppose) of all civiliz'd Countries, killing them is reckon'd *Murther*: which argues that such Laws are founded in Nature. *Mad-men*, by a kind of *Disease* or *Distemper* in their Blood and Spirits, have a *turbulent* and *incoherent* Succession of Thoughts; and, by

The difference between Idiots and mad-men.

Ideas not
the Foun-
dation of
certainty
or true
Knowledg.

by the *prevalency* of some Impressions on their Brains, more than others (as it may happen to Men in a Fever) form strange Imaginations; but nevertheless (as this Author properly expresses it) seem to *argue* rightly upon wrong Principles. As in the two instances he gives: He that imagines himself a Prince, will affect State, as if he was so; and he that imagines his body Glass, will be as tender and careful of it, as if it was really such. All the Note I can make of this is, Suppose then that *Ideas*, call them *clear*, if you please, be the only Foundation and Rule of *certain* Knowledge, how shall a *sober* Man judge, he himself is not *mad*? For Mad-mens and sober Mens *Ideas* are equally *true Ideas*; and if there be no *Rule* founded in *Nature* to distinguish them, it will be convenient to use his friends and interest to keep himself out of *Bedlam*. If the *general* Consent of Mankind be not a *sufficient* Rule to try and examine, whether a Proposition or Principle be founded in *Nature*, I would be glad to know what is? For the raving Mad-man is as confident as the other can be that he is in the right. His *Ideas* are as clear to *him*, as the others are to *him*; and all that he can do is, but to appeal to the common Maxims of all mankind; that the Mad-mens *Ideas* are the Effect of his *Disease*, and his of the God of *Nature*, which cannot *deceive* him, and all the rest of the world.

Knowledg
not gain'd
by the con-
templation
of simple
Ideas.

IX. In the close of this Chapter the Author gives these three Reasons why he treated of *simple Ideas*, and the Operations of the Mind in this *Method*. 1. Because these several Faculties, being exercis'd principally about *simple Ideas*, we might by following *Nature*, discover them in their Rise, Progress and Improvements. But, till he has shew'd us how *Nature* impresses the sense of *corporeal* Qualities, without the Bodies in which they are, he'll follow *Natures* steps but very slowly. For there would be but indifferent entertainment for the minds either of Children or Men, if *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*, *Colours*, &c. hung in the Air unsupported by *Substances*: but so they must be, if any *Ideas* come *simple* or *singly* into the Mind. 2. That, by observing how these Faculties operate about *simple Ideas*, we may learn how it do's *complex*: But I am afraid they would operate but lamely, if the kind Author of *Nature* had not inlaid us with an *abstracting* Faculty, in order to *general* Knowledge, that so we may consider things otherwise than they are *united* in *Nature*. 3. Because these Operations of the Mind, when reflected on, are another sett of *Ideas*. But, if those Operations be consider'd *alone*, they'll make, I doubt, but lean *Ideas*; but if in *Conjunction* with the Objects about which they are employ'd, and those Objects again be only *external* or *sensible*, Reflexion will afford no *new* sett of *Ideas*, but the *old* ones only: and *Reflexion* will be but second-hand *Sensation*.

CH A P. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

This Au-
thor's con-
fusion
concern-
ing com-
plex *Ideas*.

I. **C**omplex *Ideas*, to be sure, in this Author's Language, are such as are made up of *simple* ones; and these are very numerous, because the Mind has *Powers* (tho he do's not tell us how it comes by those Powers, which is the main thing) of repeating, joyning, varying, multiplying and magnifying the *simple Ideas*, which it has got by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*. Instances of *complex Ideas* are such as these; Man, Stone, Beauty, Gratitude, Theft, Triangle, Inch, Year, a Dozen, Procession, Army, Universe. But as numerous as they are, instead of *ten* (call'd *Predicaments* in old Logicks, and *two* in the new, call'd *Substance* and *Mode*) he reduces

reduces them all to these *three* Classes. 1. *Mode*. 2. *Substance*. 3. *Relation*. But we must not expect Definitions of these, because consisting of *several Ideas* repeated or compounded, they can't be defin'd without an Enumeration of all the *simple Ideas* or Parts of which they consist. And so we must be contented to gain the Knowledge of his meaning by Exemplification only: and the rather because *Genfus*, *Species* and *Differentia* which used to constitute Definitions, are, by this Scheme and Method, to be laid aside as improper and useless words. Tho, 'tis easie to observe, that he cannot attempt a Definition, without words *equivalent* to the old and receiv'd Sense of those very words. But, to speak the truth, there are many of those things which used to be called *simple Themes* or *simple Apprehensions*, to distinguish them from Propositions which are call'd *complex*, which can't be refer'd to any *one* Predicament; as the word Theft, which implies not only a Quality or Habit, but a *Complication* of several Actions. But then whether a Man will understand more of its Nature by calling it a *complex Idea*, or a Quality or Habit, is much to be question'd.

II. By the word *Mode* he means (in his own words) such *complex Ideas*, or Notions, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by *themselves*, but are consider'd as *dependences* on or *affections* of Substances. This Definition, I guess, will make no Man the wiser; however, by the examples he gives, we may perceive what he means. Such are Triangle, Gratitude, Murther, a dozen, &c. But at this rate *Tomthom*, or any other word, would do as well; provided the Reader will be so kind as not to suppose him a certain Magistrate amongst the *Pygmies*, but any thing which I please to call so, for one word is as proper as another, if *common Use* has not appropriated it to a particular Signification. Now the word *Mode* has, in Philosophical Treatises of late, been used for any Property, Quality, Affection of a Substance, by which it is either distinguish'd from other Substances or from *itself* at *different* times; and why it might not still have continued that sense, I have not yet met with a wise Reason. For all that he comprehends under that head are only Modes of *Substances*, Modes of our *Conceptions*, or various *Complications* of such Modes. However that's not my business to defend others, but to explain his Expressions as well as I can: Of these *Modes*, in his Sense, there are to be two sorts. The first are nothing but a Variation or Combination of the same *simple Idea*, without the mixture of any other: Tho by the way it seems odd, that a thing should be call'd a *complex Idea* without any mixture; but it must go so. Such are a Dozen, a Score, a Million, because they are *compositions* or *repetitions* only of Unity. The second sort are compounded of *Ideas*, that is, Actions, Qualities or Modes of different kinds, such as Beauty, being a *combination* of Figure, Colour and Proportion; such are Murther, Theft, Gratitude, Procession, Triumph, &c. All which are *combinations* of various Qualities, Actions and their Circumstances.

III. By *Substances* he means such a *combination* of *simple Ideas* (which others call *Modes*) as represent such distinct particular things as are taken to subsist by themselves: Tho, by the way, Substances might as well have been left out; for, according to his Principles, all Knowledge is by *Sensation* or *Reflexion*; but by neither of those ways can we have any *Ideas* of *Substances*, but only of their Properties, Qualities or Modes. However of these Substances there must be two sorts. The first *single*, such are a Man, a Sheep, a Cow or Stone. The second *collective*, such as a Troop, Army, Flock, Herd or Heap.

IV. *Relations* are such Notions as we form by *comparing* one thing with another; such are Cause, Effect, Subject, Adjunct, Whole, Part, equal, unequal, great, small, &c. and if we trace the progress of our Minds (he says) we shall find all the most *abstruse*, the most *abstract* Notions they have,

The word
Mode ill
defin'd by
this Au-
thor.

Substances
obscurely
defin'd by
this Au-
thor
What he
calls sub-
stances are
not Sub-
stances,
only the
common
Names of
Substances

Relations
not Ideas
but Modes
of Con-
ception
with their
to Names.

to arise from the Multiplication, Addition, Subtraction and Variation which the *other Faculties* make of those *simple Ideas* which they gain by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*. By the most *abstruse* Notions, he means, such as those of Eternity, Immensity and Infinity. And this is all certainly true, but is no more than what every body else do's and did always believe; provided he mean by those words, *other Faculties*, those *natural Powers* which are deriv'd from a superior Cause, distinct from *external Objects*, and by *simple Ideas* he means the *single Modes* of Substances. For all the world believes that we come by all our Knowledge by the exercise of those *Powers* which are deriv'd from the Author of Nature: And then here is nothing new, but the manner of Expression. But how this can consist with my Author's Method, of coming to all our Knowledge by *Sensation*, I can't devise: for, in consistency with that Principle, those very *natural Powers* themselves before mention'd, as well as the occasional Exercise of them, must be acquir'd by the Efficacy only of *external Objects* or Motion upon the Organs of Sense: for *Reflexion* will help us to no Knowledge at all without *Reason* (which is one of those *natural Powers*) to infer from thence what other Agents are, by that which we are conscious of in our selves. What signifies (excepting that) my *Reflexion* upon my own Thoughts or Operations of my Mind, unless I be withal *conscious* of or *perceive* what I think on? And, if the word *Reflexion* be taken in that latitude of sense, as to comprehend the *Objects*, about which my thoughts are employ'd; then that's it which all the world means by *knowing itself*; the source of which is the matter of Enquiry. But if this Author will allow, that there are other *natural* or *unacquir'd* Faculties of the Mind, besides *Sensation*, then they'll come in for their shares in improving our Knowledge, as well as that. And so all Knowledge will not be deriv'd from *Sensation* and *Reflexion* only, as he pretends.

CH A P. XIII.

Of simple Modes, and first of the simple Modes of Space.

Simple Modes very confusedly described by this Author.

I. **S**imple Modes, in the Author's sense, are a sort of *Complex Ideas*, tho' they be only various Modifications of a *simple Idea*. Thus tho' Time, Space and Number be *simple Ideas* themselves, yet the Parts or Modes of them are *complex Ideas*; such are the words, *Year*, *Foot*, *Inch*, *Twenty*, a *Million*. How proper it is to call the Part of a thing *complex*, and the Whole a *simple Idea*, I leave to others to examine; but that which I want is, a good reason why these Modes of Space, Time or Number should be call'd *Ideas*. When a Man hears any of these words, an *Inch*, a *Year*, *Twenty*, is there any *Idea* or Resemblance in his Mind, except of the Words, Letters or Figures? And those are not *Ideas* or Notions either; but only the Signs or Names of them. And therefore these things, above all others, should rather be call'd *Notions*, *Conceptions*, *Modes* of thinking, any thing rather than *Ideas*. But one thing I can't forbear remarking, that in Sect. I. he owns these Modifications of *simple Ideas* to be such as the Mind either *finds* in things existing, or is able to *make* within itself, without the help of any *extrinsick* Object or any *foreign* Suggestion. For that seems a little too much for one to own in such express words, who has undertaken to make it appear, that all our Notions or Knowledge is deriv'd from *Sensation* or *Reflexion*. For, it seems then, the Mind has some *innate Powers*, which it do's not gain or exercise from the Impression of *external Objects*. For *Reflexion* cannot create any *new* thoughts, but only views what is let into the *dark room*, as he elsewhere calls the *Mind*, at the windows of its *external Senses*.

II. The Notion of *Space* is gain'd, he says, by our Eye and Touch; and, when 'tis consider'd between two beings in Length only, 'tis call'd *Distance*; when in all the dimensions of Length, Breadth and Thickness, without any Body filling it, then it may be call'd *Capacity*; when consider'd between the Extremity of such matter, as fills that *Capacity*, which is solid, tangible or moveable, it may be call'd *Extension*. His sense may be made, I think, a little plainer thus: *Space*, when it is consider'd as measured or mensurable in Length only, is *Distance*; when in all the dimensions only (as in a Room or Vessel or Place seemingly empty) then *Capacity*; when as occupied by a sensible Body, *Extension*. The Notion of *Space* in all the Senses in which that word is commonly taken in any Circumstance, being thus clearly stated, it seems evident enough, without any other arguments, to be distinct from that we call *Body*: For it sounds strangely that there be no real Difference between a foot-square of *Space*, fill'd with Marble, for example; and the same *Space* in dimensions seemingly empty; but only that the former is filled with Body whose parts firmly *cohere*, are at mutual rest, and the other with Body whose parts are in *motion* and easily separated. And therefore I always suspected that the conceit of the world and all its parts being equally fill'd with Body, was set up, by the late Masters of the *Mechanick Hypothesis*, only to serve a turn to help them to explain, in their own way, Gravitation, Magnetism, and many other *Phænomena*, which could never be so cleverly accounted for, without supposing all *Space* fill'd with an infinite variety of insensible Particles, to work the several Feats observable in the Universe, so that *Space* seems to be the general Name of what immediately affects our Senses only with Extension; *Body*, the general Name of what affects our senses with either Figure, Motion or Rest, besides Extension.

The Author's notion of Space explain'd.

III. In order to the explaining the *Modes* of *Space*, my Author in Sect. IV. expresses himself thus, "Each different Distance is a different Modification of *Space*, and each Idea of any different distance or *Space* is a simple Mode of this Idea. The Sense of which I take to be this, Each different *Measure* of Distance is a different *Modification* of *Space*, and each such different *Measure* is a simple *Mode* of *Space*: and thus it fits all the instances he gives; Inch, Foot, Yard, Fathom, Mile, Diameter of the earth. All which are the Names of *Measure*, and signify the different *Modes* of *Space*. And from hence he infers, that when these *Measures* are made familiar to Men, they can in their own minds repeat them as often as they please, and so form the *Idea* or Notion of *Immensity*; which is very true; but then that Notion of *Immensity*, such as it is, cannot be from our *Senses*, because the power of making such *Addition* of one determinate *Measure* of *Space* to another, and the *Consciousness* that we can always make farther *Addition*, can't be deriv'd from *sensible* Objects: for they furnish us with no more than what we can see or feel; and the power of doing more must come from another Cause, or be the exercise of some Faculty in the Mind distinct from *Sensation*.

Farther explain'd.

And how we form the notion of Immensity.

IV. The Notion of *Figure* my Author, to keep up the credit of the *Ideal* Language, seems to make more intricate than it is: For every one may plainly perceive *Figure* to be nothing but the Determination of *Space* or *Body*; for as *Points* are the Determination of *Lines*, so *Lines* are of a *Superficies*, and a *Superficies* of *Bodies*; and as these *Lines* may almost infinitely vary in their Lengths, Continuation or Inflexion, so *Figures* of *Space* or *Body* may be imagin'd infinitely various: And on this *real* or *imaginary* Variety of *Lines* and *Figures* depend those numerous Demonstrations which abstract Mathematicks afford; and on the like Variety of *Figures*, in *Bodies* and their insensible Particles, depends chiefly the Solution of all the *Phænomena* in the Universe, which the Masters of the *Corpuscularian Hypothesis* pretend to give us.

Figure Explain'd.

Place ex-
Plain'd.

V. Concerning *Place* (of which the Author treats next) just as *Time* and *Magnitude*, we can, as it seems to me, have no Notion *singly* or *absolutely*, without Relation, I mean, to something else: of *Time*, without something either really or conceiv'd as *existing*; of the *Magnitude* of any thing, without something else with which to *compare* it; nor of the *Place* of any one thing, without considering something else from which it keeps, or is conceiv'd as keeping or changing its *Distance*. And this seems the reason we can have no Notion of *Time*, before either the world really had, or is conceiv'd at least as having had *Existence*: nor of the *Magnitude* of the whole world, or its *Place*, because we want something with which to *compare* its Bulk or *Situation*: So these three seem to be *relative* Notions. *Place* then can be nothing else but the Distance of one thing from another; but now because any one Substance or Mode of it stands related, as to its distance, to more things than one; so, if respect be had to more things than one, it may on that account be said to keep and change its Distance at the same time, which is a Contradiction; therefore to avoid that, for the determining the *Place* of any one thing, it is necessary to conceive some *other* one thing, either as resting (whether it really do so or not) or as having the nearest Relation to it by mutual communication: but, if either of those two be consider'd, then the *Place* of any one thing may be clearly determin'd. Thus a River or Current (tho not the same Individual Particles of Water) may be said always to be in the *same* Place, because the concave Superficies, on which the Water runs, keeps the same distance from the banks, which we conceive as resting: Thus a Ship at anchor (tho it must have chang'd its distance to the ambient Air and Water) may be said to be in the *same* Place, because it keeps the *same* Distance to the Shoar or Land, which we conceive, *resting*. Thus the *Soul*, of any particular Man whilst alive, may be said to be all the while in the *same* Place, because it keeps the same Distance, from that Body to which it is conceiv'd united, by mutual Communication or Operation (tho both the Soul and Body too may have chang'd their Relation to or Distance from other Bodies.) Thus again a Man sitting in his Chair or lying on his Bed in a ship, may be said to be in the *same* Place, because he may keep the same Distance from his Chair, his Bed, the sides of the Ship, all which we conceive as resting, tho really they may all have moved. But now if *Place* be taken absolutely (as it sometimes is in *common* Discourse) for the Space any Body fills, the Notion of it must needs be very confus'd, as my Author well observes; because then it would be in the *same* place, tho it has moved; in regard, either moving or resting, it fills the same Points of Space; or, if there was but the least Addition to or Diminution of its Quantity, it must be said to change its *Place*, tho it has really *rested*: both which are Contradictions. But if *Place* be reckon'd (as really it is) a *relative* Notion, and that *Relation* be only consider'd which it has to one other Body, which is conceiv'd as *resting*, or to which it is conceiv'd the most nearly related by mutual Communication or customary Use, then the Notion of it is clear'd from all difficulties, and fitted to all the cases in which any Substance or Mode of it may be said to keep or alter Place.

The dispute about
a Vacuum ends
less.

VI. In Sect. XI. this Author runs into the Dispute, whether Extension or Solidity be the essential, or distinguishing Character of Body; or, which is the same in sense, whether *Extension* or *Solidity* be all one with *Body*? But, so far as I am able to perceive, the dispute is but plucking for the sense of the words, *Body*, *Extension*, *Solidity*. Do but allow, that *Body* is that which fills *Space*, that *Extension* is that by which the Parts of a thing *cohere*, but are mutually *separable*; that *Solidity* is that which keeps another thing of the same kind out of the same Points of *Space* at the same

same time, and they are all good friends; *Body*, *Extension* and *Solidity* are all one: and the difference is only about the Signification of the words. For my part I think, the Controversie about a *Vacuum* can't be directly ended, unless it could be proved either, that there is no *Space*, but where there is such a *Body* in it, as do's produce some *sensible* Effect; or that there is some *Space* where there is no *Body* that can affect our Senses; both which are equally impossible to be proved. The former can't be proved, because there may be such *Space* beyond the confines of *sensible* Matter; nor the latter, because, tho' tis manifest, that there is some *Space*, which has not *Body* in it, which actually affects our Senses, else indeed there could be no dispute about *Vacuum*; but then the same Question returns, why there may not be such *refin'd* Matter as that tho' it do's not, yet is *capable* of affecting our senses? for that's the only reason we can give why we call a *Space* void; and since a void *Space* can't produce a *sensible* Effect, the controversie is just where it was; and when the Appeal is to Experiments, none, that I have yet met with, prove directly any thing more than that no *Body* can move or produce any *sensible* Effect, without the *Impulse* of some other *Body*; but not that there are no *void* Interstices in the *Body* impelling or impelled, or that there are any such. But methinks my Author's Thoughts are spun a little too fine, when he says, that *Space* can neither be *really* or *mentally* divided; for he owns, it may be consider'd *partially* (as, to be sure it may, for an Inch or Foot-square of *Space* may be consider'd, without any more) and a *partial* Consideration without a *mental* Division seems a little too nice a Distinction. And again, when he says, its Continuity can't be separated; for what Notion can any Man have of the difference between *continuous* and *contiguous*, but only that the parts of a body touch one another in *more* points when *continuous*, and in *fewer* when *contiguous*? And why again should he say, the Parts of *Space* are *immoveable*? For I have no Notion, or any body, I suppose, of *Immobility*, but only that the Parts of a *Body* being intimately united cohere together in all the conceivable points of it. And therefore denying the *Divisibility* or *Mobility* of the Parts of *Space*, so much as in our manner of Conception, when we own they are *mensurable* and *distinguishable*, is beyond my Comprehension.

VII. The Dilemma commonly used by the *Cartesians*, to prove *Space* *Body*, stands thus. The *Space*, seemingly empty, between two *Bodies* is either Something or Nothing; if Nothing be between them, then they *touch*: if Something, then 'tis either *Body*, *Spirit* or *Accident*. He will not own 'tis *Spirit*; for then he would have none of his Mind; and besides it would follow, that *Spirit* was something really *distinct* from *Body*, which may go against the grain: Not *Accident*, because all agree that *Accidents* cannot exist *alone*, without their Substance; and thence they conclude such *Space* is really *Body*. Now, if I was in my Author's case, before I would be so dilemma'd into a corner, I should own *Space* was a *Substance*, tho' neither *material* nor *cogitative*. For I should, under the Protection of his Principle, that Substance is only *something*, or we know not what, think my self safe enough; for there are several honest Men may be found, who will at a pinch swear *Space* is *something*, and that too *distinct* from or *without* the Mind of him that thinks on it, and that they both saw and touch'd it too; and that's evidence enough in any Court. But, I perceive, that rather than he'll be hector'd out of his new way of *Ideas* by old doting Logicians, he falls into a great Passion against the words *Substance* and *Accident*. *Substance*, he says, is only a word of two Syllables, the sense of which we don't know; and *Accidents*, we must all confess, beg their subsistence from that of which we know nothing. And rather than that the word *Substance* should keep up its credit, he brings

The Cartesian Dilemma avoidable only by owning *Space* to be Substance tho' not *Body* as before explain'd.

GOD upon the stage, with this Reason, because then GOD must be no more a Substance than a Tree or Pebble. But stop there; may not GOD be call'd a *Substance*, because a Tree or Pebble is so too? that's a little too far at one step. And, if the Argument was good, it would prove too much. Is not GOD something? Is he not a *real* Being? Or is it unworthy the Majesty of his Nature to be reckon'd such, because he has made a Tree or Pebble *something* also? Is it below the Grandeur of the Original Author of all things, to allow a Name (tho it implies *Perfection*) to some things, because he has it himself in the highest degree? Have a little Patience, for perhaps, when the Passion against *old* words is over, it may appear we have as clear a Notion, tho not by the way of *Ideas*, of *Substance*, either in general or particular, as we have of any thing else he can name.

Two arguments for a vacuum not conclusive without supposing the question.

VIII. But when the Passion is over, I find my Author is contented to condescend to two *old* Arguments to prove a *Vacuum*. If a Man, he asks, was plac'd (and for the greater *Solemnity* of the Argument) by *God* at the extremity of all *corporeal* Beings, could he not stretch out his hand beyond it? I answer, Yes. But then he begs the Question, by supposing there is *Space* which is not *Body*. But, if he don't beg the Question, then I answer, No; except there come so much Matter from beyond the Confines, as to fill that *Space* which the hand left. And so we are just where we were before. His second Argument; If *God* should *annihilate* any Particle of Matter, would there not then be a *Vacuum*, unless at the same instant he created another to fill the same *Space*? I answer, Yes. But I ask again, how he came by a wise reason to suppose that *possible*, of which there has not been, and, so far as we can conceive, can there be any Effect which will discover a Power in *God* to do and undo? For, tho 'tis honourable to suppose our Maker has or can do infinitely more things than we know he has done; but not to suppose, he can unmake that which, in his own Wisdom, he has thought fit to make. For wise people don't care for considering *one* Perfection in Divine Nature, as acting without *another*. And therefore those two Suppositions are too *extravagant*, unless there were some better reasons for the making either of them.

Motion do's not prove a Vacuum without begging the question.

IX. His Argument, against the Plenitude of the world from Motion, looks well and learnedly; but the Experiment, I doubt, is either impracticable, or that he must beg the question again at last. But let's go as far as we can. But I am only for trying it at *Florence* in the Globe of Gold he mentions in another place. Suppose then that Globe of Gold melted into a *fluid*; for that must be done, before its parts can move freely any way; and some of its parts as big as a mustard-seed, but round, and all the rest so small as to be fitted to the least imaginable point of *Space*; and then all these parts great and small inclosed in another Globe, whose Concavity will just receive and hold them. Now, if he'll find Gold and Motion, I'll find room for all the Particles. What then, I ask, will hinder any one of these *Globuli* of Gold from moving East, West, North or South: but he must expect that each one shall move no more than one way at any one instant? Will any one hinder another, allow one or t'other more motion; for that must be to keep it *fluid*; and that new Motion will cost him nothing, and will alone fill up none of my *Space*? What now, I ask the *Ingenioso*, will hinder any one of the *Globuli* from moving any one way, since there is another next it on all sides to give or take place, and so in the whole Circle, and there are other Particles ready to accommodate themselves to all the imaginable small points of *Space* which may be in danger of being left void? Nothing but want of *Fluidity*; give them more Motion again. For there is no Difference between *solid* and *fluid* Bodies, but that the parts of one *cohere*, the other *move*. Ay, but then that

that *new* Motion can't be let in without *new* Matter; and then the Mass of Gold can't be contain'd within the compass of the same *Superficies*. That's it I suspected all the while; and therefore there was no need of a *void* Space, tho it was no bigger than the least of my Particles, as the Author would have it, but of *Motion*; and tho' that alone will fill no place, yet the substance on which it must hang will; and therefore either the Question must be beg'd, or the Proposal or Experiment be utterly impracticable: but not for want of a *void* Space, but for want of *Motion* to make a body *fluid* which was *solid*. As in Ice dissolved into Water, there must be the access of some new sort of subtil Water, which could not get into the Pores of the Ice, as it may of the Water; and so the bulk will be swell'd, tho only in proportion to the bulk of that new matter. But no need of *Vacuities*.

X. When all is done my Author I doubt, must sit down contented with that Argument which seems sufficient to me to prove *Space* is not *Body*; namely, we can and do clearly conceive *Space* as something *real* and *distinct* from our selves, either within or without the *corporeal* world; and which Conception do's not imply or include the necessity of its being filled with such a Substance whose parts are coherent, or really distinguishable as those of *Body* are. And tho Extension is inseparable from all visible and tangible Bodies; yet that do's no more prove that *Space* is *Body*, than it do's that Shadows, Darkness, or a Mans Face in the Glass are Bodies, because they are *extended*.

The best argument to prove a Vacuum.

XI. My Author concludes this Chapter with this comfortable Acknowledgment, that Mankind differ little in *simple Ideas*, and that the main Difference is about *complex Ideas*; and that's occasion'd, he says, by the *different* Sense of the words, which the several Schools and Sects have forg'd. And I am of his opinion, that there is not very much Difference (tho some there is) about *simple Ideas*, as he calls them; but the reason, I judge, of their Agreement about them is not, because they are *simple* (for I own none such, they are all *complex*) but because they are *sensible*, and that the Author of Nature has form'd all Mens Organs of Sense so like one another, that what appears *green*, for example, to one mans Eye, do's so to all others in the *same* Medium, Posture and natural temper of the Organ. And that the Difference about *complex Ideas* is not wholly about Words, but about the Conceptions which those Words signifie; and that's occasion'd, not so much by the Contrivance of *bookish* and *designing* Men; for they can't alter the *Nature* of Things, or their own or other Mens Conceptions, by words, to any great degree; but by the Number of Thoughts requir'd to form *complex Ideas*: And, because the distinct Properties, in the same Substances, are often so nearly allied, that it requires some *Labour* of *Thought* to observe that Distinction; so the want of Natural Capacity in some, Application in others, worldly Affairs, Interests, Passions, in most, make their Conceptions *incomplete*, *disfigur'd*, *blended*, and thereby *different* from one another; especially when Propositions are form'd about them.

The reason why most Men agree in single apprehensions but not in complex.

CH A P. XIV.

Of Duration and its simple Modes.

I. THE Notions of *Duration* and *Time* are set by this Author with such a singular Accuracy, that (excepting the Measures of them) the main Service I can do his Reader, is to express the same in *other words*, which I hope may be more intelligible to that Size of Readers for which my Notes are intended.

The Notions of Duration and Time and their Measures.
I.

1. It's obvious that *Time* and *Duration* are not things existing either within us or without us, *distinct* from the things themselves, or from our selves: For tho' we commonly say, the Times are alter'd, or Time will discover more; yet our real Sense is, that the Scene of the Intellectual or Corporeal world has or will be alter'd.

2. 'Tis equally obvious, that we can have no Notion of *Time* or *Duration* absolutely, but we must, at the same instant we think of either, conceive something as actually existing, tho it be not really. This is the same tho in other words with the former, or follows directly from it; else we could have no Notion, but of *present* Existence.

3. We can come to no *Measure* of this Duration or Time, without comparing our own or the Existence of other things with something else which has, or we think has, certain Periods of *Succession*; and this *Succession* again must be from a Cause *within* us or *without* us. If *within* us, it must be our own *Thoughts*; if *without*, it can be nothing but Motion. For as no Alteration in things without us can be made without *Motion*; so that *Alteration* can't be taken notice of by our *Senses*, without some sort of *Motion* or other upon their Organs. So the only Question is, whether the *Measure* of that Succession in the Existence of things, which we call *Time*, be our own Thoughts or the Motion of other Bodies *distinct* from our own. And this Author resolves that the *Measure* of Duration is our own *Thoughts*, or, in his own Phrase, the *Succession of Ideas*, and not Motion. And so far he is certainly in the right, that we might have a Notion of *Duration* or *Time* meerly by our own Thoughts. If a Man was always deaf and dumb, or always in a Dungeon, where he neither heard a word spoke, saw the Sun, Moon or Stars, he might have some Notion of *Duration* or *Time*, meerly from the Consciousness of the *Succession* of his own Thoughts: But whether he could thereby come near any *true* or *certain Measure* of that Duration or Time, is very doubtful. For we all experience that the very kind of Thoughts we have quite alter that Measure, and make the Duration or Time appear longer or shorter: if we be sensible of Pain, it seems longer; if of Pleasure, shorter. When we are upon the road, where we meet with *diverting* Objects, with good Company, our Horse or Coach carries us easily; the Time seems *shorter*. If just contrary, then *longer*, which makes it manifest to me, that *Number* or *Succession* of Thoughts can't come near the being an *adequate Measure* of Time, unless they be ascertain'd by something of *Alteration* or *Motion* in our own or other Bodies, or the Effects of it, which is more mensurable than our own Thoughts are. When a Man thinks, he must think of *something*; and, as that Object affords more or less Pleasure or Trouble, it will influence the *Measure* he takes of his *own*, or the Existence of *other* things.

Time or Duration not mensurable exactly by the Succession of Thoughts.

II. The two first Arguments by which this Author endeavours to prove, that we gain the Notions of *Time* or *Duration* from the *Reflexion* upon the Train of our *Ideas*, or, in other words, the Succession of our Thoughts, are these. 1. When that *Succession* of Thoughts ceases, our Notion of *Time* or *Duration* is lost. As when a Man is fast asleep, the Notion of *Time* is lost; for 'tis all one whether he sleep an Hour, Day, or Month: But I conceive, this only proves, that the Notion of *past Time* depends upon the Memory or Consciousness of *past Thoughts*, and not only upon the *Succession* of Thoughts: for a Man may have *Succession* of Thoughts when *asleep*, for all that any one can prove to the contrary. For our *forgetting* them is no Proof at all. Whilst we are *awake*, there is a continual Succession of Thoughts, yet often we don't remember them; and 'tis the want of that Memory of them which makes the Time seem *shorter*. Ask a Day-labourer, if a day do's not seem *longer* to him, when he is at hard work, and

and every minutes Action makes and leaves an Impression, than when he is idle or diverted by Recreations, and he'll presently resolve that Question. For the Question is not, whether a Man can have a Notion of *Time*, or indeed of any thing else, when he don't think ; but whether the meer *Number* or *Succession* of Thoughts, abstracted from the Effect of them, be the *Measure* of that Time. For, as that Effect makes and leaves more or less Impression, that *Measure* will alter, and the Time past seem longer or shorter. Excels in Pain or Pleasure, but especially of Pain, will make an Hour seem a Day. His second Argument is ; that when a Man is intent in Study, suppose of a Mathematical Demonstration, the Time seems *shorter* : This is true ; but, I think, it directly proves what I said before, that 'tis not barely the *Succession* of Thought (for that we must allow the Studious Man, in Mathematicks especially) but the *Kind* of Thought that gives the *Measure* of Time. And, the Mathematician's Thoughts being rather delightful than troublesome, the Time seems *shorter* to him.

III. After this the Author attempts to prove, that *Succession* of Thoughts, not *Motion* (which is the common Opinion) is the *Measure* of Time, by this Argument ; namely, because the Notion or Perception of *Motion* itself is gain'd or lost by the Succession of *Ideas* or Thoughts ; and this he reckons clearly prov'd by these three Instances. The first is, of a Man in a becalm'd Ship, where he may see the Sun, the Water and the Ship, all *seemingly* without Motion, (tho *really* they all move) but he shall have no *Idea* of the Motion of the Ship, till he find himself nearer or farther off from the Land ; and then he will, because that will excite a *new Idea*. The second Instance is, of the Motion of the *Index* of a Clock or Watch ; where, tho there is really a constant Motion, yet the Spectator shall have no *Idea* of it, because 'tis so slow, as not to answer the quickness of his succeeding Thoughts. The third is, of a Man sitting in a room thro' which passes a Cannon-Bullet, and takes away part of his Limb : Here is a successive Motion, to be sure, thro' both sides of the room, and the different parts of his Limb ; but no Perception of that successive Motion, because that's too quick for the Succession of *Ideas*. But now I submit it to the judicious, whether these instances be not made more obscure by my Masters *Ideal* Language, than otherwise they need to be, in plain *English*. In the first case, the reason the Man in the becalm'd Ship has no Perception of its Motion, is not for want of succeeding *Ideas* ; but because 'tis impossible to perceive *Motion* at any time, without seeing something as *resting*, or consider'd as such, with which he may compare or measure the Alteration of Distance. In the second case, he shall not see the *Indexes* move, because his Eye is not acute enough to discern so short a line as they make, whilst he looks upon them. In the third, he will not perceive the successive Motions ; because, all *feeling* and *hearing* being by Motion, the Motions of the Bullet are *quicker* than those are which produce those *Sensations* : they being much duller than our Eye-sight, and therefore may easily be so, than the Motion of the Bullet. But if we put my Author's Reasons for our not perceiving the Motions in these three Instances into plain *English*, they come all to this one. We don't perceive them, because we don't perceive them ; for having no *Ideas*, in English, is having no *Perception*, for the *Succession* or *not Succession* of such Thoughts as have no Connexion at all with the particular Object (which in these three Instances is Motion) makes nothing at all one way or t'other to the *Perception* or *not Perception* of that Object. Do we say, that a blind Man do's not perceive Light, because he is thinking of other things ? No, but for want of Organs for that purpose. So in these instances, the Motions are not perceiv'd, not for a Mans having other succeeding thoughts, as in the second, or for want of them, as in the first and third ; but because he

The Author's Argument to prove succession of Ideas the measure of time not motion explain'd and examin'd:

can't perceive them, for the reasons related which are very obvious. And tho I verily believe that Duration need not always to be measur'd by Motion; yet whether these instances clearly argue, that Motion is measur'd by the Succession of *Ideas* only, is not so clear to me.

Succession
of thou ht
no true
measure of
Duration.

IV. However my Author infers from hence, or rather indeed (to help his way to express all things by *Ideas*, or his new Notion of the Measure of Time by them) he would have it suppos'd, that there is a certain Degree of Quickness in the Succession of *Ideas*; and therefore, compares it to the Succession of Images within-side of a Lantern turn'd about by the Heat of a Candle, I must confess my self wholly a stranger to any such artificial Lantern (if he means such) but of these two things I am pretty sure. 1. That no Heat of a Candle, or of any thing else, can be exactly *regular* or *uniform*; because that will *vary* as the Cause or Temper of the *Pabulum* do's. 2. That Thoughts can't be measur'd in Length any more than they can be describ'd by Figures or Colours; so that measuring Duration by *them*, seems just like measuring Pain by the Inch or Foot. At least I am too dull to set up for a Thought-surveyor. And therefore, tho we may have some Notion of Duration or Time by our *consciousness* meerly of the Succession of our Thoughts; yet they can't come near the being a *proper* Standard or *adequate* Measure of it.

Farther
proved.

V. I am clearly of my Author's Opinion, that the Mind cannot fix long upon one *invariable Idea*; but then it is with limitation to such cases, wherein 'tis *free* from strong impressions from the Distempers of its own Body, or Violence from without; for in such cases, Perception or *Idea* of Pain, tho but of one sort, would make Time seem *long*, as of Pleasure (in comparison with Pain) would make it *shorter*. And therefore, tho Succession of Thoughts might, at a pinch, serve well enough to make a single Person guess how time pass'd, yet the Objects or Causes of the thought, varying so much every moment, would so vary the seeming Lengths of Duration, that it would be but an *uncertain* Measure to that single person, but much less a *common* Standard. And if the Merchants at *Strasburg* should change their celebrated Clock for any such, tho new deviz'd, Art of knowing the time of the day, their Folly would be more wonder'd at, than the Wit and Contrivance of that Clock-maker.

Thoughts
are not
Motion.

VI. I am again of his Opinion, that, tho' the Succession of *Ideas* may in a great measure depend upon Motion from without or within the Body, yet they don't include the least Notion of *Motion*; and that if we had not otherwise the Notion of *Motion*, we should never have it, barely from the *consciousness* of our own Thoughts; and thence 'tis rational to conclude, they proceed from another sort of Cause than Motion do's. For we have no way to conceive that things *are* the same or different, or *proceed* from the same or different Causes, but by the Connexion or Disjunction they have in our own Thoughts, when we attended to them.

Periodical
motions
the com-
mon mea-
sure of
Time.

VII. In conclusion, *Time* is only *Duration* measur'd; and nothing can be fit to be a *Measure* of Time, but what has, or is conceiv'd to have the whole length of its own Duration divisible into apparently equal Portions, by constantly repeated Periods. And for this reason this Author wisely complies with the common Consent of Mankind (so far as we know it) in owning the *diurnal* and *annual* Revolutions of the Sun to be the best *Measures* of Duration; because, as he expresses it, they have been, from the beginning of Nature, *constant*, *regular* and *universally* observable. Tho, by the way, I would be glad to be inform'd so well in History, as to know how the Inhabitants of *Nova Zembla* and *Greenland*, or about the South Pole (if there be any so near that, as the others are to the North) can divide Time into such Parts, as Minutes, Hours and Days, as we do? Since they have the Sun so many Months together a-
bove,

bove, and as many below, the Horizon. For, I doubt, they are hardly such Artists as to have invented proper Instruments to take the Altitudes of the Sun, when above, or of the Stars when the Sun is below the Horizon, so as to make exact distinction of their Differences; or have such Clocks, Watches or Hour-glasses as we have. And therefore, I doubt, the periodical returns of Hunger and Thirst, of Sleeping and Waking, with a little help from the Succession of Thoughts, are their best *Measures* of Time. 'Tis very likely however, as my Author judges, that the Distinction of Days and Years by *Motion* gave occasion for that common mistake, that Motion and Duration were the only *Measures* of each other. For when people hear but the mention of *Time* or *Duration*, presently their Thoughts run upon the words *Minute, Hour, Day, Year* or *Century*: Because these are the Portions of time set out by the Motion of the *heavenly* Bodies, and from thence easily slip into the conceipt, that Time must be measur'd by *Motion* only. Whereas 'tis very apparent, that if any thing else had certain Periods, it would do as well to measure Time, as the Motion of the *Sun* or any *Star*. 'Tis likely, that if the fits of an Ague, of Hunger, of Sleep, the blossoming of a Tree, were regular, in their periods of returning, they would serve to measure Time as well as the *Motions* of the Sun itself. And, as great Astronomers as the *Ægyptians* were, 'tis likely the common People knew the time of the year by the Rise and Fall of the *Nile* better than by the Sign in the *Zodiack*; as my Author relates some people in *America* know the time of the Year by the return of some Birds; much, I suppose, as we do of Swallows. And if it be true which that great improver of Natural History and Navigation, Mr. *Dampier* tells us, that the Breezes or Winds, under and near the Line, come and go at certain times, 'tis likely those people *measure* Time, or can *know* the time of the Day or Night by *them*, as well as they do by the *Sun's* Motions. And, I suppose the Watermen in the *Thames* know the times of the Day and Night by the *Tides*, near as well as by the height of the *Sun* or *Stars*. And, if it be true again, what my Author suggests, from that incomparable Naturalist Dr. *Burnet*, that the Motion of the Sun, before the Flood, was always in the *Æquator*; that they did not reckon Years by 360 diurnal Revolutions of the *Sun*, but by some *periodical* Appearances, which might serve the turn as well as they, if they were as punctually observ'd.

VIII. But on the other side, when my Author puts that material Question, how without some *regular* Motions, such as that of the *Sun*, it could be known that any Periods were *equidistant*, such as of Tides, Breezes, coming of Birds, budding of certain Trees, returns of fits of Agues, Hunger and Sleep, I must leave him to justify his own Answer, namely by the train of *Ideas*. For, tho the annual Motions of the Sun must be admitted *unequal*, yet the Variation of *Ideas* depending upon far more *variable* Causes than that of the Motion of the Sun or Earth do, would make the *Measure* of Time far more *uncertain*. If we should suppose the Sun a Globe of Fire, as the Observation of the *Macula* about it, and their Increase and Decrease, by Telescopes make it probable it is; nay, if the various Temper and Plenty of its *Pabulum*, of that matter which it is continually receiving at its *Axis*, and spending in its *Circumference*, was such that all the *Variety* we have of Winds, Tides, Weathers, Tempests and Earthquakes depended thereon; yet it would very little influence the *Slowness* or *Quickness* of the Motion of such *vast* Bodies as the Sun itself is, or the Earth: much less would it produce such *various* degrees of Motion in either, as our Minds are subject to every moment, from the *various* Impressions made on our Bodies. And yet every one of them, as they produce *Variety* of Pleasure or Pain, would make our estimate of the same lengths

The regular Motions of the Sun, a more certain measure of time than the succession of Ideas.

lengths of time seem different: meer *Succession* of Thoughts might enable us to judge of the Duration of the single swing of a *Pendulum* in a Watch or Clock; yet what would that signifie for the measuring such parts of Time as an Hour, Day or Month? And, whatever may be alledg'd from the Cause of the Motion of the *Pendulum*, or the difference of the *Medium*, to alter the *equal* Duration of each Swing, may be return'd upon the altering the *seeming* Length of our Thoughts or *Succession* of Ideas: For every thing that makes our Thoughts *pleasing* or *displeasing* alters our estimate of the *Length* of Time. And, if we had not *standing* Measures to preserve or recover the Calculation of Time, other than the *Succession* of our Thoughts, we should not only lose all that which is spent in *Sleep*, but that also which is spent upon such Objects as leave no Impression upon our *Memory*. All which makes *Succession* of Thoughts an *incompetent* Measure of Time so much as to him that is *conscious* of those thoughts, much less to be a Rule for *others*: unless we could suppose every Mans Thoughts the *same*.

Duration is measurable without the actual existence of the things by whose Motion it is measur'd

IX. But, notwithstanding all this Uncertainty in the Measure of Duration by the *Succession* of Thoughts; yet this is certain, as my Author suggests, that having thereby gain'd the Notion of the *Parts* of *Duration*, which we call *Time*, (such as, of Minutes, Hours, Days, Years and Centuries) we can apply this Notion to *Duration*, even before the *Existence* or *Motion* of the *Sun* itself, just as well as we can apply the Notion of twenty Yards, for example, to *Space*, beyond the confines of all *Body*; and, by multiplying these *Parts* of Duration, as often as we please, form the Notion of *Eternity*, for, as all the world do's agree and must own, that either *Body* or *Space* is *infinite* in Expansion; so they must own something, either *God* or the material *World* must have been existent from *Eternity*. Suppose the *World* to be a million of miles in Diameter; yet beyond that there must be something, either *Body* or *Space*, still and still, and so without end. And so, suppose the *World* to be only 5700 year old, or, as old as the *Chinese* fondly believe it, five millions of years old; yet there must be *something* existing before that time; for, if *Nothing*, then there could have been nothing produc'd. And therefore, as there must be something *immense* or *infinite* in Extension, so there must be something *eternal* or *infinite* in Duration. From all which I crave leave to make these three Inferences to my purpose, tho different from my Author's.

Hence it may be concluded all Knowledge is not from Sensation.

X. 1. Since *Duration* and *Time* are neither Substances or Modes of any thing without us, but are meerly the Modes of our Conception of things that are, have or will exist, that these Conceptions can't be deriv'd from our *Senses* only. For our Sensation is only of things *present*, Perception, by our Organs of Sense, is only of *actual* Existence, Memory of what is *past*, Foresight or Imagination of what is *to come* is a Perception of that thing we remember or fore-see, as if it was then *actually existent*, tho it really be not. Things *past* are as really *nothing* now, as things *to come* are *nothing* now; but in our Mode of Conception. And therefore the Power in the Mind, to represent to itself any thing as *existing* which is *not existing*, cannot be deriv'd from our *Senses* only. For we can *hear*, *smell*, *tast*, *see* or *feel* nothing but what is *actually present*, when our senses are so exercis'd. 2. Tho the *periodical* Motions of the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*, or other equidistant Appearances, which are the *Measures* of Time, be sensible Objects; yet the Power in the Mind of so applying them, as to make them the *Measures* of the Duration of other things, cannot be from our *Senses*; because those *Motions*, or *periodical* Appearances, have no sensible Connexion with those other things of whose Duration we make them, in our Conceptions, the *Measure*: And therefore the Act of the Mind, so applying, is not an Act of *Sensation*; but an Act of *Imagination* and

and Reasoning. 3. The Power of *adding* these Parts of Duration one to another, as often as we please, by which we form the Notion of Eternity, cannot be deriv'd from our *Senses* only, for they can reach to nothing but what is actually *present* or *existing*. But, since we are conscious, that we have a Power of conceiving a thing as *existing*, which do's not exist, so far as that Conception extends beyond the *present* time, so far it is the Effect of a Cause different from the *external* Objects themselves. For they can operate upon the Mind no otherwise than by *present* Impression, and so the Knowledge or Notion we have of *Duration*, *Time* and *Eternity* is gain'd by the exercise of our *natural* Faculties of *Imagining* and *Reasoning*, and not by our *Sensation* only.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion consider'd together.

I. **D**uration and Space (which this Author now calls *Expansion*) do, ^{In what} as he has with great Exactness observ'd, agree in these particu- ^{Duration} lars; which I shall only contract and endeavour to explain in my own ^{and Space} Words, tho in his Sense. ^{agree.}

1. We have equally *clear* and *distinct* Notions of *both*: We can as well conceive the difference between an Hour and a Day, which are the Parts of *Duration*, as we can of an Inch and Foot which are Parts of *Space* or *Expansion*, and *vice versa*.

2. As *Space* or *Expansion* is not limited by *Matter* (supposing here that *Space* is not *Body*) so *Duration* is not limited by *Motion* (that is) as we can conceive something *real*, or without the Mind, beyond the bounds of all such *Matter*, whose several Parts are distinguishable by Figure, Bulk, Colour, &c. and, by *multiplying* a pre-conceiv'd Measure, suppose a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, as often as we please, so form the Notion of *Immensity* or *endless* Space; just so we can by adding an Hour, Day, Year or Century, as often as we please, form the Notion of *Eternity* or *endless* Duration. And the reason, he thinks, why we are more apt to admit of *infinite* Duration than of *infinite* Space, is, because we cannot but own *infinite* Duration to be the Attribute of G O D; and consequently, that something has been and must be from and to all Eternity: but are not so forward to own, that Space is *infinite*, because we have not been so much used to attribute *Extension* to G O D, but to *Body* only; and thereby have unawares slipp'd into a doubt about the *Infinity* of Space. Whether his guess concerning this Difference in Opinion be right or not, I leave to others to dispute; but I always thought that such as have any thing like a *perfect* Notion of G O D, had attributed *Ubiquity* to him, with the same readiness they did *Eternity*; and that there was no more reason to limit the Existence of G O D to *Body*, exclusive of *Space* beyond it (if there be any) than to *Duration*, limited with the actual Existence of other Beings distinct from himself. Both Limitations seem equally unreasonable.

3. As Time is to *Duration*, so Place is to *Expansion* or *Space*: as Time is *Duration* measured, so Place is *Distance* measured. As *Duration* is infinite, *à parte ante* and *à parte post*, in the common Phrase, that is, forward and backward; so *Space* is infinite every way, in our Conception at least. Any *Part* of that *infinite* Duration set out by Periods, is *Time*; any *Part* of *infinite* Space set out by the different measures of the distance of one Body from others, is the *Place* of that Body. As the word *Time*,
Y taken

taken in its *limited* sense, signifies only the Duration of things co-existing with the Motions of the Sun, Moon and Stars, or other equidistant appearances, which are the common Measures of their Duration, and taken in the *large* Sense, signifies the Duration of things before or after the actual *Existence* of those things, by which it was mensurable; just so *Place*, taken in the *limited* sense, signifies the Distance, measur'd or mensurable, of one body from another, in the *large* Sense. It signifies also the Distance, measured or mensurable, of one point of Space from another; tho there be really no Body in it, by which or from which to measure that Space. Hence it is that we speak properly and intelligibly enough, when we say the *Chaos* or *Angels* were created so long or so long before the Sun, Moon or Stars, or other sensible appearances; or when we apply the measures of a Yard, a Mile, or Diameter of the Earth, to points of Space *beyond* the Limits of the *corporeal* World. All we mean by such Phrases implying no more than that the Time, the *Chaos* or *Angels* existed, before the Creation of the *material* World, is equal to so many *diurnal* or *annual* Revolutions of the Sun, or returns of such Periods: and the Space we speak of *beyond* the corporeal World, is equal to such or so many certain *Measures* of Body, when they were or could be taken within the confines of the world.

4. *Place* and *Time* equally belong to all beings. Infinite *Place* (taking that word *Place* for *Space* or *Expansion*) belongs to *God*, Infinite *Time* (taking that word *Time* for *Duration*,) belongs to *God* also, *Place* (now taking it for a particular mensurable Distance) belongs to all Spirits, Bodies and their Modes. *Time* (taken for a measured part of *Duration*) is attributable to them all in like manner: that is, as all Bodies and Spirits are in a certain Space which they fill or operate in, so they exist in several *Moments* or *Parts* of *Duration*, or have equally a relation to Space and to Time.

5. As all the *Parts* of *Duration* are each of them *Duration*, so all the *Parts* of *Extension*, whether of Body or Space, are *Extension*: that is, divide *Duration* into as many *Parts* as you can, Hours into Minutes, Minutes into Seconds, and so on; each Minute or Second will be *Duration* still. So divide Space or Body into as many *Parts* as you can, yet each Particle will be imaginably divisible again, and not properly an *Atom*; as the *present* moment, be it as short as it will, must look backward and forward to the *past* and *future* time: so each *Particle* of Body or *Point* of Space can't look all one way, but must look East, West, North and South. But then it must be observ'd, that the Power in the Mind, of imagining Space and Time thus *divisible*, can't be from the *Senses*; for the Eye can no more see a Body when it is so *little* as it may be imagin'd possible to be, than it can see a Body or Space so *large* as it may be imagin'd. And the like for *Time*; as we can't imagine any *Duration* so short, but it may be shorter; so none so long, but it may be imagin'd longer still: only in this Comparison, I think, there is some difference; for, tho' I can imagine a point of *Matter* less than that I can see, yet I can't imagine or have any Notion of *Time* less than of that which one *singl^e* thought requires. For tho the *Imagination*, which is the Act of the Mind, may exceed that of *Sensation*, which depends, in this case, on the Eye; yet one Act of *Imagination* cannot exceed another the like Act of the Mind. The smallest part of *Duration* he calls a *Moment*; the common name and the smallest part of a *Body* or *Space* he calls by the new name of a *sensible Point*: and he is so very accurate as to tell us, that the least Particle of Body that an ordinary Eye sees is a Minute, and the sharpest Eye not less than thirty seconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Centre. Every Circle is suppos'd to consist of 360 parts, each which part is call'd a Degree, and each such Degree consists of 60 parts, each which
sixtieth

sixtieth part is call'd a Minute, and the half of such minute a second. But what *Proportion* the smallest Object the Eye ordinarily sees has to a Circle (unless he had told us the Diameter of it) of which the Eye is the Centre, is beyond my comprehension. That the ability of seeing a small Object depends upon the just *Proportion* of the convex Superficies of the Eye, is certain enough; because, I suppose, Spectacles are used by old People to compensate for the flatness or defect of that Convexity, and to help Nature to bring the Rays from the Object to their *Focus*, or place of meeting, sooner than they would otherwise be at the bottom of such an Eye. But for the Computation of a Minute or thirty Seconds of a Circle, every one that intends to be the wiser for it must apply himself to a better Commentator than I am.

6. As the Parts of *Duration* are inseparable, so are the Parts of *Space*; that is, as we can't conceive one Minute of time separable from that before and after it; so we can't conceive one Point of Space without those Points that are next it on all sides. Tho' we can consider the Existence of particular things measured by certain parts of *Duration*, as Minutes, Hours and Days; yet the parts of *Duration* itself, in the *abstract* or *general*, will be inseparably annex'd to one another. In like manner, tho we can consider of the Space of an Inch, Foot or Yard, in one Body or part of Space, without considering the next Body or parts of Space; yet the Space of that Body will be inseparably annex'd to the adjoining Space. As Space and *Duration* agree in the particulars preceding, so they differ in these two following.

II. First, *Space* is Distance *tripled*, or mensurable in *Length, Breadth, Depth*; *Time* is Distance only in *Length*. And thereby it comes to pass that all Beings, whilst they exist, *equally* exist; but the *Space* of one body is or may be *unequal* to that of another. Whether Angels or Spirits have any Expansion or Space, he owns, is beyond his comprehension; and yet, in the same Paragraph, owns that 'tis in a manner as hard to conceive any real thing existing without some sort of Expansion, as with a negation of all manner of *Duration*. Whether this kind of Expression be design'd only as a modest acknowledgement of his *Ignorance* concerning the *Extension* of Angels or Spirits, or a civil sort of *Denial* of the real *Existence* of any such Substances, distinct from Body, he is fittest to be his own Interpreter. But, let his meaning be what he pleases, I think, that I may say without reproach to Modesty, that I have as clear a Notion of the *Existence* and *Extension* of GOD, Angels and the Souls of Men, as I have of *Motion*; I mean, of the *vis movens* (for that we commonly call so: *Translation* is properly the Effect of *Motion*, not *Motion* itself) 'tis every whit as easie to conceive how a Spirit, such as God is, may be in all Places, as how *Motion* more or less may be in all Bodies great and small in the Universe. And 'tis as easie to conceive how Angels or the Souls of Men may be in some determinate Space, or sometimes in one place, at other times in another, as how *Motion* may be so, and transfer'd from one Body to another. 'Tis as easie to conceive the *Union* and *Communication* between a Spirit and Body, without such Contact as there is between two Bodies, as how *Motion* inheres in a Body without Hooks or Hinges; or how it's transfer'd or communicated to another Body, without some Substance or Body to go along with it, and to which it's united or inherent. And therefore, till some great Wit can work the Miracle of persuading me, by these or other difficulties in the conceiving *Motion*, that there is no such thing as *Motion* in the world, I will retain my old opinion, that GOD is the original *Author* and self-moving *Principle* of the Universe and of all the necessary Effects therein; and that Angels and the Souls of Men have, together with their other *native* Powers, deriv'd that of moving their

In what
Duration
and Space
disagree.

Extension
of Spirits
is as con-
ceivable
as of Mo-
tion.

their own Bodies and others within certain limits from that *original Cause* of all Motion and of the various Effects arising thence ; and are thereby distinguishable Substances from all the rest of the material world, as we know *God* is. 2. *Duration* differs from *Expansion* or *Space* ; that none of the *Parts* of *Duration*, no two Moments *co-exist* ; but the parts of *Space* and *Body* *co-exist*. However, as my Author right well observes, there is a manifest difference in our Conception of the manner of *God's Duration* from that of all *finite Beings* ; because, tho we cannot conceive *Duration* without *Succession*, or two moments *co-existing*, yet considering *God* as having the power of existing always within himself, and as knowing all things every moment as well as he did and will, when they actually did or actually shall exist, we can easily conceive the manner of his *Duration* to be as widely different from that of *finite Beings*, as his *Knowledge* is from theirs. For they, having had their *past Existence*, and being to have their *future Existence* depending upon his free pleasure (unless limited by his own wise constitution of their Natures or other special declarations of his Will to the contrary) neither their *Knowledge* of what is past or to come, nor their Mode of *Existence* for the time past or to come, can be comparable to that of the Deity : Because, as there is no comparison between finite and infinite *Knowledge* or *Power*, so there must, for that very reason, be none between finite and infinite *Duration*. As the *Knowledge* of an *hundred* or *thousand* particulars is not to be compar'd with the *Knowledge* of *all things*, but is no more in effect than of *one thing* ; so the *Existence* or *Duration* of any *finite Being*, for an *hundred* or *thousand years*, in comparison with *Duration* without *Beginning* or *End*, is but as a *Moment*. To these *two* particulars, wherein *Space* and *Duration* differ, I would add this *third*, which is the main one, that *Space* is something *real* and *Distinct* from the *Mind* conceiving it ; but *Duration* is only a *Mode* of the *Minds Conception* concerning the *Existence* of itself and other things.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

Number
what : not
an Idea.

I. **H**OW *Number* comes to be accounted amongst *Ideas*, is hard to understand. For when any one hears or reads the word *twenty*, for example, or the name of any particular Number, I would be glad to know what kind of *Idea* he has in his mind at that instant. He may have the Perception of the Sound which the Word pronounc'd has made in his Ear, or of the Impression which the Letters or Figures has made in his Eye ; but neither of these are the *Idea* of the Number itself, but of the Signs or Tokens of it. *Number*, abstracted from the Thing number'd and from the Names and Figures by which it is express'd, is nothing but a Thought or Mode of Conception. And, as to ask what *Idea* a Man has of a Thought, is to make Enquiries endless, so to call that Thought an *Idea*, is to make Discourse unintelligible. *Unity* then, abstracted from the Thing said to be one, and the Name or Figure, is only *one* Thought, and *Number* only the *Repetition* of that Thought. And therefore, to say (which is my Author's style) every Object brings along with it the *Idea* of *Unity*, or that *Unity* is the most universal *Idea*, or *Number* applies itself to all things, Men, Angels, Thoughts, &c. every thing that do's or can be imagin'd, is in plain words that every thing may be thought on *once*, and that thought repeated as often as we please ; and those thoughts so repeated may be express'd or mark'd with one or more distinct Names or Figures.

II.

II. When we number, we do but add one thought or the suppos'd *Collection* of more thoughts to one other or more, and give that *Collection* of Unities a distinct Name or Figure. And thence it comes to pass, that each Number must needs be clear and distinct; not only because it has a distinct Name or other Mark, but chiefly because every single thought has a distinct Time for its Conception: And thence it is that Demonstration in Numbers may be more exact than in Space, Body, Lines, Figures and Angles. For tho we cannot, for want of *Acuteness* in the Organs of Sense, distinguish exactly the Bulk of one Body, or *Extent* of a certain conceiv'd measure of Space, of the *Length* of a Line, the *Breadth* of a Superficies or *Bigness* of an Angle from others, tho they may be really distinct; yet we can easily tell, especially when our Memory is assisted with a different Name or other mark, whether we think once, twice, thrice, and so on; because these are meer Acts of the *Mind*, of which every one is conscious, and have no dependence upon the Exactness of our outward Senses.

Why Demonstration in number more exact than in Figures.

III. *Numbering* is properly nothing but a *Repetition* of single thoughts, it's saying within our selves one, one, one, and so on; but, because we can't long remember how often we have repeted the thought which that word *One* expresses, it's absolutely necessary to have distinct Names or other Marks for each such *Repetition*. And the reason why Children are not so forward in *Numbering*, as they are in conceiving clear thoughts of Heat, Cold, Hunger, Thirst, &c. is not, as my Author suggests, for want of a stock of *Ideas*; for there is no need of them in *abstract* Numbering, and they can repete their thoughts and the words *one, twenty, hundred*, as often as the best Arithmetician; but because they don't know or cannot remember the distinct Names for each Number, as they follow in order. They can tell *two* Apples from *one*, and choose two rather than one, before they can tell perhaps the Names of the Numbers. Nature has taught them so much Arithmetick, without the help of *Ideas*; by *Experience* they may learn the Names, when concern'dness of mind for the things number'd has impress'd the Memory of them; but they understand *two* is more than *one*, or the Whole is more than a Part, without any store of *Ideas*.

Why distinct Names necessary to numbering.

IV. My Author observes, that for the Improvement of the Art of *Numbering*, it would be better to have distinct Names for each Repetition of the word *Million*, than to repete the word often, instead of saying, *Million of Million of Million*, &c. to say, *Billion* or *Twillion*, *Trillion* or *Thrillion*, *Quatrillion* or *Fourillion*, and so in *Latin* or *English*. And the reason is the same which makes it necessary to have distinct Names for each Number; namely, for a Mark to help Memory in the *Repetition*.

Distinct names for numbers very proper.

V. 'Tis farther, he says, observable in *Number*, that it measures all things by us mensurable, which are chiefly *Expansion* and *Duration*, in so much that our *Ideas* of Immensity and Eternity are nothing but the *Additions* of Number *infinitely* to certain Measures of Space and Time. Which, in plain Sense, is no more than this: Whatever we can think on (suppose in this case often, a Yard or Mile, an Hour or Year) we can repete that one thought as oft as we please, and from the consciousness we have that we can always think again and again, form the Notions of Eternity or Immensity.

Number measures all things.

Z

CHAP.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Infinity.

I. **T**O know what kind of *Idea* or Notion it is to which we give the name of *Infinity*, my Author proposes it as the best Method to consider, what that is to which *Infinity* is by the Mind immediately attributed; and then how it frames it. But whether this be the proper Method the Mind takes in its acquiring Knowledge, or indeed agreeable to my Author's own Principles, is very Questionable; for most Men think they ought, for example, to know first what Power, Wisdom, Justice, Eternity and Immensity were, before they attribute those Perfections to God or any thing else. Otherwise they attribute that of which they have no Notion, or in other words, say they know not what; or to speak in my Author's Phrase, they first form *complex*, and thence *simple Ideas*, which is just contrary to his own Principles. However it seems evidently to follow, that our Notions or Knowledge of particular things without us do not enter into the Mind by *simple Ideas*, but *complicated*; as, I must confess, I always thought they did; and that we could not know what Power, Wisdom, Justice, Immensity, Eternity, Figure, Extension, Colour, were, without knowing at the same time, what those things are to which we attribute them; and that it was purely the Act of the Mind to *abstract* them, or consider them *separately* from their Subjects, and not to *compound* them; for that's done by Nature, antecedently to our Knowledge of them.

What the words Finite and Infinite signify originally.

II. The words *Finite* and *Infinite*, my Author thinks, were in their *primary* designation attributed only to *Quantity*, or such things as have *Parts*, and are capable of Increase or Diminution; such as *Space*, *Duration* and *Number*; which may be admitted true, provided he mean by having *Parts*, the being *conceiv'd* by us as having *Parts*; because neither *Space* has really distinct *Parts*, in regard those *Parts* have not a distinct *Superficies*, nor *Duration* or *Number*, but only in our manner of *conceiving* them. Tho, by the way, it must be noted, that 'tis not so easie, nor perhaps so material, for the improvement of Knowledge to determine what was the *original* Signification of words, because many of them are adapted to *sensible* Objects, such as the words *Understanding*, *Substance*, *Subject*, *Substratum*, *Suppositum*, or my Author's new word *Reflexion*. For if we were now confin'd to use them for standing under, lying, casting, putting under, or bending back, we should be cruelly at a pinch for words to express those things which they now do, or have *gross* and *imperfect* Conceptions of them.

Infinity as proper to Gods Wisdom and Power as to his Duration or Ubiquity,

III. However, admitting that to have been the primary Sense of the word *Infinite*, my Author seems to intimate, that it's now not so properly given to God, on the account of his Perfections in Wisdom, Power and Goodness, as his *Eternity*, or infinite Duration, and his *Ubiquity*, or infinite Expansion. But in this particular I am not convinc'd by the reason he suggests; for it seems to me equally essential to the *Divine Perfection*, that he be infinitely *powerful*, *wise* and *good*, as to have existed and to exist at *all times* and in *all places*: And I can find no more reason to limit those Perfections to the *number* of Acts or Effects which demonstrate such Perfection, and which we know, than we have to limit his Duration or Expansion only to the actual Existence or Extent of the corporeal world.

The way we form the Notion of Infinity.

IV. The way we come by the Notion of *Finite*, is obvious enough to be from our Observation of the *limited* portions of Extension, either of Lines, Superficies, Space or Body; but the way of coming to the Notion of *Infinite*, my Author reckons, is thus, Every one has the *Idea* of some

some stated Measure or Length of *Space*, suppose a Foot, Mile, Diameter of the Earth; and from the Consciousness that he can *double* or *multiply* these or any of them, as often as he will, he forms the *Idea* or Notion of *infinite Space*. In like manner, having the *Idea* of some fix'd Measure of *Time*, as of an Hour, Day, Year or Century, and from the Consciousness he has that he can everlastingly *add* to or *multiply* any of these Measures of *Time*, he frames the *Idea* or Notion of *Eternity*. Now, it must be own'd, this is a clever way to form any of these Notions of *Infinity*, as applicable to Space or Duration; but whether all men or any man ever went by these steps or abstracted Measures to form his Notion, such as it is, of *Infinity*, deserves to be consider'd. For I always thought it was thus: For *Space*, at the first step we go as far as we can see, and then employing our Imagination and Reason, infer there must be something (either Space or Body) beyond that we see, and so on without any stop; and thence conclude something must be *infinitely* expanded. For tho we have not so *distinct* a Notion of what that is, which is beyond, as we have of that we see, yet finding we can still and ever *add*, and have no more reason to stop at the second, than at the third Addition, and so on, we rationally infer, there is no End of *Body* or *Space*: And thence form our Notion of *infinite Space* or Expansion. In like manner about *Eternity*, at first step we Christians consider the birth of Christ, the Flood, the Creation of the world, and others the Siege of *Troy*, the Expedition of *Theseus*, the Building their City, the Foundation of their Commonwealth, the Birth of *Alexander* the Great, or some such Period of *Time*, mark'd with some notable Occurrence or Revolution; now let these Periods of *Time* be never so distant, yet we and they cannot forbear imagining, there must have been something or other, God, Angel, the corporeal World or *Chaos* before that Period; and so from our Consciousness that we can still and still *add* to our Conception of something or other existing, we form our Notion of *Eternity à parte ante*; and in like manner by *adding* in our Imagination these or the like Periods of *Time* to one another and finding we can everlastingly *add*, we rationally infer something at least must be for ever, and so form the Notion of *infinite Duration à parte post*. But whether any Mans thoughts are so fine as to *abstract* Duration from something really, or conceiv'd as if it was really existing, or Expansion without Body, or conceiv'd mensurable as Body is, every one must judge for himself. But, I shrewdly suspect, that most Men, when they set their Thoughts at work to go as far as they can towards the comprehending the *Infinity* of Duration or Space, don't do it by Days, Years, Centuries, Yards, Miles or Diameters of the Earth, or any such *abstract* Measures; but have in their Minds the *complex Idea*, or rather *complicated Notions*, of something as really existing; such as those I mention'd, tho' indeed for the *explaining* what they mean, by those great Measures of *Time* and *Space*, to others, they may use those or some such stated Measures, as my Author mentions.

V. However, let people gain their Notion or Knowledge of *Infinity* how they will, it plainly appears it cannot be from their *Senses* wholly, but is owing to that continual *Addition* we make of one thought to another, which is the Exercise of our *natural* Faculties of *imagining* and *reasoning*. And this I may now be the bolder to affirm, because this Author himself owns expressly, that there is something in our Notion of *Infinity*, and that *clear* too, more than our Senses do or can reach. And if something can't be produc'd by nothing, then an Effect must have an *adequate Cause*, otherwise so much of the Effect as is above the Cause must be from nothing. Therefore our Senses cannot help us to that *Idea*, as he calls it, of *Infinity*, because it contains more than we can see

The power of forming any Notion of Infinity not deriv'd from the Senses.

or feel. Tho, the truth is, we have no *Idea* at all of *Infinity*; 'tis only a *Mode* of *Thought* form'd in our Minds by or from the Consciousness we have of an *innate* Power of *thinking* and *repeting* the thoughts we have of any Object (which in these cases are stated measures of Time set out by remarkable Actions, or of Space by the Eye) as often as we please without limitation. But if this Author will say, this Notion of *Infinity* is gain'd by *Reflexion*, 'tis fit he should have the liberty of using his own words; but if by *Reflexion* he means no more than the Minds taking notice of what is let into it by the *Senses*, he must give others liberty to think, that will afford no Notion of *Infinity* farther than we can *see* or *feel*; and what there is *more* must be by the Exercise of other *natural* Faculties of the Mind, and which are not *acquir'd* by the Impression of *external* bodies upon its Organs of Sensation.

Why we don't attribute Infinity to sensible Qualities as we do to Space, Duration and Number.

VI. The reason the Author gives why we don't attribute *Infinity* to other *Ideas* (as he calls them) such as *Whiteness* or *Sweetness*, as we do to those of *Space*, *Duration* or *Number*, seems hugely obscur'd by his *Ideal* Phrase; namely because these latter have Parts (I add, in our manner of Conception) the others only Degrees, which are finite or limitable. But I should rather have given this reason, or express'd it thus: we don't attribute *Infinity* to our Perceptions of those Qualities, because they arise from a certain *Contexture* of the Parts of those Objects from which they are deriv'd, which the Mind can no more *alter*, than it can create new Bodies or new Modes of them: but, when the Mind considers of *Space*, *Duration* or *Number*, it has nothing to do but to *repete* its own Thoughts, its own Modes of thinking, which lie always in its own *native* Power, without any *new* or *repeted* Impressions from external Objects.

Infinity of Space and Space Infinite a very nice distinction, and needless. Infinity is no Idea, but rational Deduction.

VII. So again, his zeal to keep up the *Ideal* Style has brought upon him the necessity of framing a very nice distinction, namely, between *Infinity* of *Space*, and *Space Infinite*, which needs a sharp Eye to see. For tho' all he means, if he would have been contented with ordinary folks language, is both true and plain enough, that tho we cannot have an adequate *Idea* of *Infinite* Space, yet we can rationally infer that it is Infinite. However, to make out his Nicism, he says, *Infinity* is a *growing Idea*, and 'tis as unfit to joyn *Infinity* to a *determinate* Quantity, as to adjust a *standing* Measure to a *growing* Bulk, or, according to our Country Proverb, to make one shoo fit every foot. And on this account it is very improper to talk of *Infinity*, which we do not comprehend, just as we do of other *Measures* which we do comprehend; and from thence we may learn (as I guess the Author meant) the folly of such kind of arguings as these about the *Infinity* of Space, of Duration, and the *Divisibility* of Matter. If *Space* be every way *infinitely* extended, then the Man that stands a yard to the West more than I do is as near the East as I am; because the line from me is infinite, and that from him can be no more, and therefore both equal. And so for *Duration*; if *God*, or any thing else, has had an *infinite* Duration, then *God*, or that thing, had existed yesterday as long as it has this day; because no Duration can be greater than *infinite*. The like again for the *Divisibility* of Matter; if Matter be divisible infinitely, then a Mile has as many parts, and consequently is as big as the whole Earth; for nothing can have more parts or can be more extended than that which has an infinite number of parts, each of which are extended. All which kind of arguings are grounded upon the false Supposition, that we comprehend *Infinity* full as well as we do *finite* Quantity; or, in my Author's Phrase, had an *adequate Idea* of both: But all this, I doubt, do's not ease him of his nice Distinction, for the *Idea* of *Infinity* is still an *Infinite Idea*; which, we all agree, is impossible to form; and the only remedy that I can invent to avoid these *absurd* Consequences, and prevent

vent these *inextricable* Perplexities, is to own, as common people do, that *Infinity* is no *Idea* at all, but a *Mode* of Thought or Conception form'd in the Mind by Reason or Inference from the Nature of that thing or otherwise to which it is applied: and then the whole matter is plain. For 'tis one thing to have Thoughts or Conceptions of a thing which by Arguments may be prov'd to be *Infinite*, and another thing to have an *adequate* Conception of that thing. The former we can rationally affirm concerning G O D and *Space*, the latter no Man in his wits will pretend possible for him to have. All this Obscurity seems to arise from the making and calling all Knowledge, tho gain'd by rational Inference, *Ideas*: for every *Idea*, to be sure, is *finite* or *limited*, and therefore to say the *Idea* of Infinity is *limited*, is a flat Contradiction: and to say that it's a continually *growing Idea*, do's not mend the matter in the least. A person of sixteen year old is a *growing Person*, but the *Number* is not so, for that will be immutably the same; and the attributing that to the Number which is a fix'd, limited Mode of our Conception, which is proper only to the thing number'd, creates all the Confusion.

VIII. From Sect. VIII. of this Chapter to the end my Author is wholly intent to prove, that we have no *Idea* of *Infinite*, which is certainly true, if he means only no *complete* or *adequate Idea*: for we cannot imagine any Line so long, but we can *add* another Point to it, and so on; nor any Body so big, or so little, but we can conceive it greater or less; or any Number so great, but it may be capable of Addition; or any certain Duration so long, but it may be longer. All which argues that the Notion we have of any Quality, or of any thing that we conceive as having Parts, is but *comparative*, not *absolute*; no Body is absolutely great or small, only in comparison is such. And on this account our Thoughts or Notions of *Infinity* can never be *complete* or *adequate*, because they are always enlarging and perpetually capable of new Additions. But this, on the other side, do's not prove (which he seems to aim at) that our Notion or Knowledge of *Infinity* is not *positive*: For we may have a *positive* Notion, or rationally grounded Knowledge, of that which we don't comprehend. As I may positively, or with good reason, say, when I see a magnificent and well-contriv'd Building, that he which made the Model of it, has far more skill in Architecture than I have, tho I don't comprehend his Skill. And in that very apt instance which my Author himself gives, when a Mariner has let down his Plummets into the Ocean, and finds no bottom, he can as positively, and with as good reason, say it is deeper (tho he can't tell how much) as he can, that it is so deep as he, by the number of the Fathoms of his line, has felt it is: but, notwithstanding his not feeling a bottom, he will not say the Ocean is bottomless; because he may have positive reasons to believe just contrary, tho not borrow'd from his own Senses. In like manner, tho we cannot have an *Idea* or Notion of an *infinite* Succession of Moments, or of an *infinite* Number of certain measures of Space; yet we may *positively*, or with good reason, say that God is *Infinite* in Duration or Space in Extension, tho we don't comprehend that *Infinity*. All which farther evinces, that the Notion we have of *Infinity* is not deriv'd wholly from our *Senses*, but from the exercise of that *innate* Power the Mind has of *repeating* its own thoughts or Acts, as often as it pleases. For that *Consciousness* the Mind has, that its Power of perpetually *repeating* its own Acts, is that very Notion or Knowledge which it has of *Infinity*, when applied to God or Space. But that Knowledge or Consciousness, being not deriv'd from the *sensible* Effects of those Objects, but from the Exercise of our *Reason* about their Natures, which are otherwise discoverable, makes it clear, that it's not acquir'd only by our *senses*. When we say therefore Space is *infinite*, we

Tho' we can have no positive Idea of Infinity, yet may have a positive reason to believe a thing is Infinite.

don't only mean that it is extended beyond what we see, but also beyond what we can never conceive is visible; and when we say *Gods* Duration and other Perfections are *infinite*, we don't mean only that they are extended beyond those *Measures* of Duration, or the *Effects* of Power, Wisdom and Goodness which we *know*, but beyond what we *can* ever *know* or *comprehend*. 'Tis a Contradiction to say, we *comprehend* that which is incomprehensible; but 'tis none to say, we have a positive reason to *believe* that which is incomprehensible. *Infinite* Duration is *comprehensible*, but yet all the world, even Atheists themselves, agree something has and will be to all Eternity; and tho we have not this Knowledge from our Senses, yet we have it from such Maxims as are as certainly true as our Senses; such as this, *Nihili nulla sunt affectiones*, or, Nothing cannot have produc'd something; or, Nothing cannot destroy what is.

No negative Ideas.

IX. But after all, my Author, rather than part with his beloved word *Idea*, will set up a *negative Idea*, as blind and obscure as it is; and this makes two of his three Assertions in Sect. XV. very confus'd. 1. The *Idea* of so much Space (as is, by certain measures set out, he means) is clear and positive. 2. The *Idea* of greater (that is, in comparison with that which is so set out) is also clear, but is but comparative: But the Notion, I say, nevertheless may be positive also, otherwise it could not be clear; for no one can know any thing clearly without a positive Cause or Reason of his Knowledge. 3. The *Idea* of so much greater as cannot be comprehended is *negative*. Now what a *negative Idea* is, or how part of an *Idea* can be said to be *negative* is to me unintelligible: I understand well enough what a *negative Proposition* is; *An Horse is not a Stone*, is such; but I have no *Idea*, I confess, of what is *not a Stone*. But yet I have positive reason, as I suppose every body else has, to believe that Proposition is very true. To these extremities the making all Knowledge, *Ideas*, drives one. Now all the Author means would be, in other words, both true and plain; which is only this, that all which is in any Object, more than we actually think of, is not *comprehended*. And all the real Difference between others and himself is only in this; that common People think they may have positive reason to assert a thing is *Infinite*, suppose Expansion, when applied to *Space*, Duration when to *God*, tho they don't *comprehend* that *Infinity*. But his Principles will not allow him to own any thing is *Infinite*, unless we have an *Idea* of that *Infinity*. For if he should allow that, his whole Scheme of *Ideas*, and all sort of Knowledge, which is nothing but *Ideas* gain'd by the *Senses* and *Reflexion* upon them, would be quite ruin'd. And therefore, rather than quit his word *Idea*, he'll set up *negative Ideas*, which, according to his own Principles, as well as other Peoples, is very obscure, unlimited, or rather no *Idea* at all. And all this to avoid that which I think is unavoidable, that all our Knowledge, and particularly this of *Infinity*, is not gain'd by our *Senses*; tho he himself owns 'tis got by a Faculty of repeating our *sensible Ideas*. But after all, if that Faculty, whatever it is, or the Consciousness that we have it, be *natural* and not *acquir'd* by our *Senses*, the matter is not at all mended. Our Knowledge of Infinity, and of many more things, as imperfect as it is, cannot be *acquir'd* only by *Sensation*; but by the Exercise also of other *natural Powers* we have.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other simple Modes.

I. **S**imple Modes, in my Author's account, are such as others call *Variations* of the same Qualities which the Mind takes notice of either in itself or external Objects which are not mix'd with any other. Such as these :

First, *Modes of Motion*, such as sliding, rolling, tumbling, walking, creeping, running, dancing, leaping or skipping ; which are indeed only different Modifications or Variations of the *single Quality* of Motion in *human Bodies* : To which might be added all the sorts of Motion, either in *natural* or *artificial* Bodies, which are of as many sorts as there can be of Lines which they describe, but most of them want *Names*. But why these should be call'd *simple Modes of simple Ideas*, is still a great Question : For I could never yet see any of these Modes of Motion *singly* or *separately* from the Subjects wherein they are, nor ever conceive the least Thought of any of them, without the Conception at the same instant of the Substance in which they inhere or are the Qualities of. Tho, after they are taken notice of by the Mind, they may be consider'd *abstractedly* from any particular Substance or *distinctly* from any other Quality. *Swiftness* or *Slowness* are also by him observ'd to be Modes of Motion, but not *simple* Modes of it, but *mix'd* ; because they imply the Consideration of Time and Space, which are two different things from Motion, *Swiftness* being the passing thro' many Points of Space in a few Moments, and *Slowness* just contrary, and so are *comparative* Notions ; no Motion being consider'd *absolutely* *swift* or *slow*, but only in comparison to greater or less degrees of it in the same body at different times, or of other bodies at the same time. But, let them be call'd *simple* or *mix'd* Modes, or by what name any one please, the Mind seems to form those Notions as quickly, or without any sensible succession of such comparative Thoughts, as it do's of rolling or any other, tho' call'd *simple* Modes of Motion : And therefore, if we may name or judge of things by the *manner* of our Conception (and I suppose we have no other way) are as little mix'd as any other Modes of Motion, notwithstanding the customary difference in their names ; however it must go so to keep up the distinction of simple and mix'd Modes.

II. Secondly, *Modes of Sounds* ; such are all *articulate* Sounds, as Words, which are only different Modifications of Sounds ; such also are the Cries or Noises of Birds and Beasts, which are, as it were, their *natural* Language ; because much the same in all that are of the same kind, in all Places and Countries. And the word *Tune*, he observes, signifies the *complex Idea* of various kinds of Sounds, and which, he says, a Musician may have in his *Mind*, when he hears or makes no Sounds at all, by reflecting on the *Ideas* of those various Sounds. But I would gladly meet with any such Musician that has any *Idea* of a Sound, except at that instant in which he hears it ; for I always thought *Sound* only the Name of an *actual* Perception of that Motion upon the Ear, we call by that Name. He may have an *Idea* indeed of the Motion or Stroke of the Hand, Finger or other Instrument, of the Aperture of the Mouth, or of the Motion of the Lips, or any such visible circumstance of the Sound ; but not of the Sound itself ; unless he be much happier than I pretend to be, except at that instant he *actually* hears it.

III. Thirdly, *Modes of Colours* : But these, he says, are only different *degrees* or *shades* of the same Colour. Whether the Variation of Colours, that

that have the same name, be not rather *Mixtures* of different Colours, especially White and Black, I must leave to the curious in those matters: But, I have been told, there are sixty or seventy sorts of colours call'd *Green*, and of which, 'tis likely, those that are concern'd may have different Names from the several Objects; in which generally those different kinds or degrees are. And so perhaps there may be other colours between White and Black. Of these Colours indeed there are properly *Ideas* in the Mind, when the Object is *absent*, but not then or any other time *without* the Object wherein they are: And therefore, neither *simple Ideas* or Modes of *simple Ideas*. *Beauty* and *Rainbow* he gives for Instances of *mix'd* Modes, because Figure is consider'd as well as Colour, which is true; but, I doubt, a *Rainbow* has something more than a *mix'd* Mode, and that there is something, which old-fashion'd Logicians call *Substances* requir'd to make them up. And so for *Beauty* too, else I shall never love it; and no Man, I think, has the *Idea* of either, without Substance.

IV. Fourthly, *Modes* of *Smells* and *Tasts*: These, he says, are also Modes made up of the *simple Ideas* of those two Senses. But the Variations of these want different Names, Sweet, Bitter and Sharp, ~~Sweet~~ and Stinking being almost all the Names of *Tasts* and *Smells*, except when describ'd as often they are, by the annex'd Names of the several Objects which generally produce those various Sensations. And the reason why they and other Qualities and Substances too often want Names, is, because Names are suited to the Conveniencies of Life; and most Men, not having any great Concern'dness for many particular things, regard not the making distinct Names. Tho, at the same time, those that are concern'd do give Names: as Dyers to Colours, Musicians to Sounds, &c. just as Jockies do to their Horses and Huntsmen to their Hounds.

None of these Modes are simple Ideas.

V. But that which I would have chiefly noted is this, that all those Qualities, commonly call'd *sensible*, are none of them (except Colours) properly *Ideas*, but only the Names of the various *actual* Perceptions of the Mind; because, if they were *Ideas* they might be in the Mind when the Objects are *absent*; and I could like the word *Idea* wonderfully well, if I could have the grateful Sensation of Musick, of Tasts and Smells, and of other *sensible* Qualities, without the presence or charges of the *Substances* in which they were. But I doubt I must be contented to call them *Perceptions* not *Ideas*.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

The Modes of Thinking are not simple Ideas.

I. **W**HAT this Author calls the *Modes* of Thinking are only the several *Operations* of the Mind, according to the *Variety* of the Objects, or the *manner* of its being employ'd about them. But the reason why they should be reckon'd the Modes of *simple Ideas*, I am still to seek: For I suppose, no Man has any *Ideas* of all or any of these Operations, *abstracted* from the Objects of them. Not of *Sensation*, without the sensible Object; of *Remembrance*, without the *thing* remember'd; and so of all the rest, which are enumerated in this Chapter, and by him briefly explain'd in words to this effect.

What Sensation.

Sensation is the Perception or Thought which actually accompanies or rather immediately follows any Impression made on the Body by the Motion of *external* Objects.

Remembrance.

Remembrance is the Perception of any Object when it *returns*, without the actual Impression or Presence of the Object itself.

Re-collection

Re-collection is Remembrance too, but only different from it by the kind of *Pain* or *Labour* of the Mind to produce that Re-perception. Recol-
lection.

Contemplation is the Minds keeping or retaining the same Object under its Consideration for some time. Contem-
plation.

Revery, a *French* word, he interprets the *rambling* of the Mind, upon several succeeding Objects, without any *special* regard to any one or more. Revery.

Attention just contrary is the Minds regarding its thoughts upon any Objects, with purpose to remember them. Attention.

Intention, or *Study*, is the Minds *earnest* Application to the Thoughts of any particular Object, without regarding the Solicitation or Divertisement of other Objects. Intention.

Dreaming is the Perception of several Objects (whilst the outward Senses are stop'd) without the Choice of the Will or Conduct of the Understanding. Of the other *Modes* of *thinking*, such as, affirming, denying, doubting, willing, judging, assenting, he reserves for particular Consideration upon other occasions. Dreaming.

II. The *Ideas* of all these *Modes* of *Thinking*, he reckons, we get by Reflexion: or, in the common Phrase, all these are Operations of the Mind which we are *conscious* of, or know, without being told so of others. For I have not yet gain'd any *distinct* Sense of that word *Reflexion*, from *Consciousness*, *knowing*, or *inward* Perception. None of
these Mo-
des of
thinking
gain'd by
Reflexion.

III. From the different *degrees* of Intensity or Remissness in thinking, which every one experiences in his own Mind, this Author would have us infer, that *Thinking* is not the *Essence*, but only the *Action* of the Soul: giving this reason, because the *Essence* of things seems not capable of differing *degrees*: but *Action* is, as we experience, *Motion*, which is the Action of Body, is capable of being *swifter*, *slower* and *quicker* in Succession. But, I doubt, such an Opinion is neither *safe*, nor the Reason given for it *well-grounded*. For, if Thinking be not the *Essence*, and is only the *Action* of the Mind, I would be glad to know what is. For when the Mind ceases *thinking* (as this Author seems to be of opinion it do's, when a Man is fast asleep) so far as we can conceive, it ceases to be any thing at all: For we have no Conception of naked Substance. And therefore, there must be *no Soul* in a Man, when he is fast asleep, and a *new* one every time he dreams or awakes. And therefore, I cannot reckon that Principle *safe*; for tho perhaps some might judge that Cessation of thinking would no more destroy the *Soul*, than of *Motion* do's the Substance of a *Body*; but it ought to be seriously consider'd, that the Difference in the case is vastly wide; for, when *Motion* in a Body ceases, there are other *Modes* remain to preserve our distinct Conceptions of it; but in this case there would be none. Neither am I satisfied that the reason given will hold. For, suppose the *Essence* of any Substance be taken (as I think it ought to be) for the *Combination* of all the Properties and Qualities by which that thing is distinguish'd from another; then I can't see but that it may be capable of *degrees*, taking that word in its full Latitude. Put the case, Extension, Solidity or filling Space be the *Essence* of a Body; tho one body is as well extended, as well solid, fills Space as well as another, yet one Body may have *more* of that Extension, *more* of that Solidity, fill *more* Space than another. Therefore, instead of that, I would have it seriously consider'd whether *Self-Activity*, which includes both *Thinking* and *Motion* too, be not the true *Character* or *Essence* of a Spirit, or that which distinguishes it from Body or Space. For, as we all know that *Spirits* think, and meer *Matter* don't, so we do that we can begin, continue, determine, stop the Motion of Body within certain bounds; but that no one *meer* Body whatever can do that, but that all its Motion is begun, continued, determin'd and stop'd by *other* Bodies distinct from

itself. If a Body be *mov'd*, it will move eternally, except something without it stop it; or, if at *rest*, it will eternally be so, unless some other distinct from itself give it Motion. And thence it seems highly probable, that the Eternal and ever-blessed Spirit, whom we call G O D, and who was the original Author of all Substances and their Actions, has communicated this Excellency, with the rest of our *natural* Powers, to all *Spirits*, and the Souls of *Men* particularly, to be *self-active*: and thereby are the *true* and *only* Images of their Maker, who is the original Author and inexhaustible Fountain of all Beings whatever, and the continual Preserver of all Substances, and of all their actions, whether of thinking or moving. And as, on that account, he is deservedly intitled to every *wise, good and perfect* Action, so he will be distinguish'd from all the Bodies or Matter in the Universe, and Spirits, and the Souls of Men in like manner, tho in infinitely less proportion, the self-Active principles or Authors of their voluntary Actions, and distinct from Body. And thus it will be easie to account how, tho' the Souls of Men are *self-active*, yet their Actions of *thinking* and *moving* Body may be capable of *degrees*, of being increas'd or diminish'd, according to the various states and circumstances in which they shall be, for the exercise of that and other *natural* Powers. But this I propose only as matter for Consideration.

C H A P. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

Pleasure
and Pain
not Ideas,
only Mo-
des of Sen-
sation.

I. **P**leasure and Pain this Author reckons amongst *simple Ideas* receiv'd both by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, the better to comprehend *mental* as well as *corporeal* Pleasure and Pain. Others call them *grateful* or *ungrateful* Sensations; if from the Body, *outward*, if from the Thoughts of the Mind, *inward* Sensations or Perceptions. And, if any one has a Notion of either *abstracted* from the Causes which produce them, or Subjects in which they are, they may call them *simple Ideas*, if they think fit. Most people, whose Conceptions are not so refin'd, call them by the old word *Perceptions*, or *Modes of Sensation*.

Good and
Evil,
What.

II. *Good* and *Evil* he defines thus. *Good* we call, he says, that which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure or diminish Pain, or else to procure any other Good, or the absence of any Evil; *Evil* we call that which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure, or procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. But if these be design'd for *complete Definitions* of Good or Evil, they are liable to these obvious Exceptions.

Excepti-
onable.

1. They seem to *confound* Cause and Effect; for we call Effects *good* as well as Causes. Honour, Health and Wisdom are by all reckon'd *good*, as well as those Means or Causes which *procure* them. 2. The matter seems not mended by the latter part of the Definitions. Good is that which *procures* us any Good, Evil is that which *procures* us any Evil; for that seems to be a Tautology; for the Enquiry was, what is *Good* and what is *Evil*? And 'tis no great satisfaction to be told, Good is what *procures* Good, and Evil is what *procures* Evil. For tho, it may be said indeed, that Honour, Health and Wisdom are, for that reason, call'd *Good*, because they are useful to procure us farther Pleasure; yet most men, I doubt, desire them and account them Good, without that regard to Futurities. 3. It ought to be consider'd, whether these Definitions keep up the Distinction as they ought, between *moral* and *physical* Good and Evil? For if all be call'd deservedly *good* which *procures* Pleasure, then there is

no distinction between *real* and *apparent* Good. Drunkenness is as *real* a Good, if it procure Pleasure, as Sobriety; for that can do no more. Therefore, most Men define *moral* Good to be that which procures us the most *real* and *lasting* Happiness; *moral* Evil, that which procures us the most *real* and *lasting* Misery. And the reason, they thus define them, is, because they think there are some Actions *good* or *evil* by an *immutable* Constitution of the wise Author of Nature; and that they don't depend upon the *variable* Opinions of men to make them *otherwise*, whatever they may call them. However, if any one has a mind to call that *Happiness*, which is the natural result of Wisdom and Virtue, by the name of *Pleasure*; or that Misery which is the natural effect of Folly and Vice, by the name of *Pain*; provided he keep the *distinction* between *moral* Good and Evil intire, and include the Pleasures and Pains of the *Mind* as well as the *Body*; I have nothing to say against it; 'tis but quarrelling about Names. The rest of this Chapter I pass by, because there is nothing *difficult* or *singular* in his Definition of the Passions, but that he makes them all turn upon Pleasure and Pain, which others call *Physical* or *natural* Good and Evil.

CH A P. XIX.

Of Power.

I. **P**ower has been generally thought the name only of *Substances*, given them on the account of some *one* or the Combination of *more* Properties, Qualities or Accidents in them, which are necessary to produce some effect: and no ways differing from that we call a *Cause*, but that *Power* relates to an Effect *before*, and *Cause* to an Effect *after* it is actually produc'd. Thus Fire is said to have the *power* of *heating*, in regard to that intestine Agitation of its Particles, which is necessary to produce in us, upon occasion, the Sensation of that we call *Heat*. The Sun has the *Powers* of enlightning, warming, melting, hardning, whitening; because it has the property of moving some sort of subtil matter, as will, by an Impression on the Eye, produce in us the sense of that we call *Light*; and has all the properties necessary to produce all those Effects before named, according to the variety of the matter which it has occasion to operate upon. Thus again the Mind has the *Power* we call the *Will*, because it has the property which is necessary for the procuring the Motion or the Cessation of it, in its own and other Bodies, within certain bounds, and for exciting in itself the thoughts or consideration of this or that Object, as occasion offers, and of producing such other Effects ascrib'd to it; and likewise the *power* of Understanding, for its having the property of exciting thoughts in itself upon several Objects, upon the hearing or reading words, or the sight of the usual signs of its own Conceptions, &c. And thus it appears that neither Power, Cause or Effect are *Ideas* or any thing distinct from the Properties, Qualities or Accidents of the Objects themselves, but are purely the *Names* we give those Modes of Conceptions, which are form'd in our Minds, upon our Observation of the mutual *relation* of Substances to one another, and the *manner* of their operating upon one another. And, when these *powers* in Substances are so far extended as neither to be impell'd to, or restrain'd from their Operations by other external Agents, then they are said to be *free* Agents: but if so impell'd or restrain'd by other Agents, as not to produce them of themselves, then they are said to be *necessary* Agents; not free, or at liberty. And therein, it's conceiv'd, consists *Liberty* and *Necessity*; Liberty in being free from

The signification of the word Power. But is not an Idea.

Liberty and necessity what.

from such external impulse and restraint, Necessity in being liable to both.

This I thought fit to premise, both for the easie understanding this Author's Notion of Power, and the rectifying some Inferences which he has made from it.

The way
we come
to know
the powers
of Sub-
stances.

Powers
nothing
but the
Properties
in Sub-
stances.

Active
power
properly
only in
Spirits.

II. The way we come by this Mode of Conception we call *Power*, is much the same which this Author means in his *Ideal* Phrase, and is thus represented in other words. Observing the Qualities in Bodies and the Thoughts of our own Minds frequently altering, we infer, that what has produc'd those Alterations will do so again upon the like occasions offer'd; especially when we find, that both the Substance which produc'd them, and that in which they were formerly produc'd, retains the *same* Properties, Qualities and Accidents they had before. For as any Effect once produc'd convinces us the Effect is *possible*; so when 'tis constantly produc'd by the same Cause, it argues that Substance to have that which we call the *Power, Ability, Faculty*, of producing the like Effect again upon the like occasion. And as those Effects are more or less constantly produc'd by the same Substance, so the *Powers* of that Substance are said to be more or less *natural*. And, when the Effects depend upon the concurrence of several Causes, which we can't foresee, then they are commonly call'd *contingent, accidental* or *fortuitous* Effects: But when produc'd by a Substance uninfluenc'd by other Causes, then *voluntary*. And the *Combination* of Properties in any Substance, necessary to fit it to produce an Effect, are the Ground or Reason of its being call'd *active* Power; and the *Qualities* in any other Substance, to have any effect produc'd in it, its *passive* Power. But in all cases these *active* or *passive* Powers (if these last may properly be call'd *Powers*) are only the Properties or Qualities of that Substance, and have the denomination of *Powers* only from the Mode of our consideration of their *mutual* Relation or Operations upon one another.

III. This Author rightly observes, that we can have no Conception or a very obscure one of *active* Power, from *meer* Bodies, but of *passive* Power only; and therefore have the Notion of that from the observation of our own Minds or other Spirits. All *Action* whatever is either Motion or Thinking; as for *Thinking*, we can have no Notion of that from *meer Matter*, to be sure; and as for *Motion*, we can indeed have from *Bodies* the Notion of *Translation*; but that's but the *effect* of Motion, is not the *vis movens*, the Power of moving. When three Marbles, which were resting, are set in a strait Line and put into Motion, the first moves the second, the second the third; but the second has no more Motion than what was communicated to it by the first, nor the third more than it receiv'd from the first: All this is *passive* Power. But what gave the power of moving to the first? And so *in infinitum*, unless you stop at some Spirit or some *self-moving, self-active* Substance. My fingers now move my Pen, what moves my fingers? my *animal* Spirits: but what moves them? nothing surely, but that in me, which I call my *Soul*, a *self-active* Substance. But this Power in me is *self-active*; for if any *external* Agent gave me that Power of *moving*, surely I should feel it, but I feel none, nor am conscious of any thing, but of my own act of *Thinking*, we call *Willing* or *Volition*. And therefore, if I should say that any thing distinct from my self procur'd that *Volition*, I should say that without having any reason for it, for I feel no *external* Cause operating upon me. The Sun bids the fairest of any *meer Body* in the Universe for a *self-moving* Body; but if it be a Globe of Fire, as 'tis highly probable, whence has that Globe its Motion? For no Fire upon earth has any, but what it has from other Bodies; and I can no more conceive why it should turn about its Centre, than any common Globe should about its Axis, with-
out

out a Finger, or some such extrinſick Agent communicating that Motion to it. Whence then has it its Motion? do's that matter which is continually entering in at all its Poles, to ſupply the place of that which is continually going out in its Circumference; do's that *Pabulum* of that vaſt Globe of Fire act juſt as Bellows do, to give it that Motion? the Queſtion then returns, what gives that *Pabulum* that Motion? and ſo *in infinitum*, unleſs we come at laſt to that Spirit, that *original* Cauſe of all Motion, and which ſtill preſerves it, and every thing elſe by its Almighty *Self-activity*, and which ever keeps that vaſt Globe of Fire in its due bounds, which otherwiſe by its irrefiſtible force would ſoon over-ſpread this part of the Univerſe.

IV. The *Will* he defines thus. The *Power* the Mind has to order (or prefer) the conſideration of any *Idea* (or Object) or the forbearance of ſuch conſideration, or to prefer the *Motion* of any part of the Body to its *Reſt*, and *vice verſa* in ſeveral inſtances. To which I add, for the Explication of that Definition, Whereas the Mind has not in many inſtances the power to prefer one thought to another (as in violent Pains and Paſſions) much leſs of moving or ſtopping the Motion of its Body, or any part of it (as in ſome Diſeaſes, Infirmities and Falls;) the Actions of the Mind in ſuch caſes are not *Volitions* or *Preferences*, being not the conſequences or effects of that *Power* we call the *Will*; but the Mind in ſuch caſes is a neceſſary Agent. The *actual* Exerciſe of this Power in the Mind, by directing or preferring any particular action, or its forbearance, is call'd *Willing* or *Volition*; the forbearance or performance conſequent upon ſuch action *voluntary*; and any action whatſoever, without ſuch Thought or Preference, *involuntary*.

V. The *Understanding*, which is another *Power* of the Mind, he defines thus, by three of its Actions. 1. The *Power* the Mind has of *perceiving* its own *Ideas*. 2. Of the *ſignification* of Signs (that is, of *words* ſpoken or written and other *marks* of Conceptions.) 3. Of the *agreement* or *disagreement* between thoſe *Ideas*. But the firſt of theſe three is by others only call'd *thinking*, *knowing* or *conſciouſneſs*; for to perceive our own *Ideas* is perceiving our own *Thoughts*, and that's *thinking*; the third of theſe is more than a *ſingle* Act of the Mind or *ſimple* Apprehenſion, and is therefore by others reduc'd to *comparing* or *judging*: ſo the ſecond is properly *Understanding*. Theſe two *Powers*, the *Will* and the *Understanding*, are often call'd *Faculties*, which is proper enough; but when they are ſpoke of as *diſtinct* Agents, it cauſes great confuſion, as he well obſerves.

VI. *Liberty* he defines thus, A *Power* in any Agent to *do* or *forbear* any action, according to the thought or determination of that Agent, where- by either of them (that is, the *doing* or *forbearing*) is prefer'd to the other. *Necceſſity* is where either of them (that is, the *doing* or *forbearing*) is not in the Power of the Agent to be produc'd according to its Volition. Now here I ſtop, and make exception to the Definition he gives of *Liberty*; but, to prevent my being miſunderſtood, I own that any Agent that has that Power, as it is by him deſcrib'd, is in thoſe caſes a *free* Agent; and that ſuch Agent, which wants ſuch Power, is in thoſe caſes a *neceſſary* Agent; but I deny that *Liberty* is any ſuch Power. *Liberty* is not a power to do or forbear any particular Action which the Agent prefers or chuſes; neither is it indeed any Power at all; it is only the De- ſect, the Abſence or Suſpenſion at leaſt of a power in any Agent diſtinct from that which has the power of preferring or chooſing. And ſo it only ſignifies the *Extent* or *Mode* of the Minds Power we call the *Will*; and not a *diſtinct* power itſelf from the *Will*. And, if any one think otherwiſe, I deſire him only to reſolve me, what are the *Actions* of that power *diſtinct* from the *Will* itſelf? *Volition* is the Action of the *Will*;

C c

Perception

Liberty
only the
Suspension
of power,
not a
power it-
self.

Liberty of
the Will
not deroga-
tory to
the Omnipotence
of
God.

The occasion
of the
mistake
that the
Will not
free.

Perception is the Action of the Understanding, and so every Power has some peculiar Action. Now what is the Action of Liberty? Besides there are always some one or more Properties or Qualities inherent in a Substance, that makes us give it the name of *Power* or to say it has a Power: now I only ask, what is the Property, Quality, Accident, or, rather than stand out, the *Idea* in the Mind itself, that gives it the name of this Power they call *Liberty*? I declare that I know of none, except I confound it with that power I call the *Will*. The Power of *Willing*, the Power of *Understanding* is very proper Sense; but the Power of *Liberty*, the Power of *Freedom* is staring Non-sense. And therefore, I take Liberty to be the Want or Suspension of Power in all Agents whatever distinct from the Will either of impelling it or restraining it from any of its own proper Actions; and therefore I appeal to any one that ever rationally own'd the Liberty of the Will, whether he ever meant by it any more than this, That no Agent whatever, either God, Angels, whether good or bad, or any natural Cause whatever, do's irresistibly impell or mechanically force his Will to any *good* Action or restrain it from any *evil*; but that the only Reason of his preferring a *good* Action to an *evil* one, and *vice-versa*, was from himself. And all this, I am sure, implies no more than the Want, Absence or Suspension of Power in those Agents, distinct from the Mind, to procure the doing of any action, or the forbearance thereof. I am, very sensible that the Hobbists and absolute Reprobatists (tho from quite different Principles) agree in this Objection against the Liberty of the Will, that the Suspension of such Power in God to operate necessarily upon our Wills is derogatory to the *Omnipotence* and *Omniscience* of God, which are *Perfections* in the Divine Nature, all Men ought to have as tender a regard to, as any other *Perfections* in the Majesty of Heaven and Earth: And the main of what we say comes to this, that we dare not consider the Infinite *Power* of God abstracted from his *Wisdom*, any more than we do his *Goodness*; and we take it to be no more a *Diminution* of his Power to be limited by his own infinite *Wisdom*, than it is to his *Goodness* to be limited by his own eternal and immutable Reason. And since we find that he has been pleas'd to limit his own *Goodness*, so far as not to make all Men equally happy, or all Angels, we do on that or the like ground believe, 'tis no *disparagement* to his Infinite Power to govern and preserve us in that *order* and *state* of rational Creatures, which his own *Wisdom* has placed us in. And as for the divine *Omniscience*, of which all Prophecies, which depend on voluntary Actions, do sufficiently convince us, our owning Gods Fore-knowledge of all effects whatever, not excepting such as are voluntary, is so far from being *derogatory* to the Divine Nature, that it is the *proper* and most *distinguishing* Excellency of Knowledge, the Glory and highest Perfection of it. But I am apt to believe that, that which has very much contributed to obscure this great truth, has been that most Persons, that have written and spoken against it, did not rightly distinguish between the Person and the Power. The *Person* in many cases may be *compell'd* to do that which is contrary to his Will, or to that which he would not otherwise prefer; or *restrain'd* from doing that which he would otherwise choose: but these are the *personal* Acts. For, notwithstanding such *impulse* or *restraint*, all his voluntary Actions may be *free*; for they could not be said to be voluntary, if they were not. A Prison may be a restraint or limitation of his Power to act as he wishes; but what he wishes, what he prefers, what he chooses, to that he is not impell'd or forc'd. There may be lock'd doors, walls or shackles to hinder him from doing as he would, but all this while what he wills, prefers, chooses, that he wills, prefers, chooses *freely*, without Impulse or Restraint; there is no Impulse to what he voluntarily do's, or Restraint from that which he voluntarily forbears.

I might heap up Arguments, as others have done, to confirm this Truth; but instead thereof shall confine my self to the Examination of this Author's Arguments against it, which will do better than a Volume: but shall only premise this. When the ingenious *Des Cartes*, in order to lay the surer Foundation (as he thought) of his Scheme of Philosophy, try'd to doubt of every thing, even to the *Existence* of God and every thing without him, he at the same time own'd the *Liberty* of the *Will*, as a sure Maxim of Truth; and good reason he had for it, because he could not doubt of it without doubting whether he could doubt or not of other things; because his very doubting demonstrated that Liberty to suspend his Judgment, which is one main Instance of that Liberty I am now speaking of.

VII. But now, to obviate as many Objections as I can, and to make that plainer which I mean, I do declare that I own, 1. Such an Agent, as we call a *free Agent*, is only such as has Thought and Volition, and no other. 2. That such an Agent may in several of its Actions be forcibly *impell'd* or *restrain'd* by external Causes. 3. Therefore that all I mean, in asserting the Liberty of the Will; is contain'd in this short and plain Proposition. Every voluntary Act of a Man, or Volition is *free*: that is, no cause without the Man compells him to do what he wills, either forcibly impells him to that he willingly do's, or restrains him from that which he willingly forbears. Beginning then from Sect. IX. of this Chapter I shall endeavour to clear this Truth from the Author's Arguments and instances against it.

The case about the Liberty of the Will stated.

1. A Tennis-ball, he says, whether in Motion by the stroke of the Racket, or lying still, is no free Agent; true: but not only for want of thinking, or of preference of Motion to Rest, and *vice versa* (tho those are Reasons also) but because an *external* Agent forces it either to Rest or Motion, and that *external* Cause not suspending its power upon it, but impelling it, it becomes a *necessary* Agent.

Vindicated from all this Author's Objections. Three sorts of Objections answer'd.

2. A Man in Convulsion-fits beats himself, strikes his Friend, and therefore is not a free Agent; right: in that case, therefore he is neither a voluntary nor free Agent. He do's not prefer the striking himself or Friend, to not striking the cause of his Disease; or, to speak more properly, the Disease itself; the disorder and violent Fermentation of his Blood and Spirits impells him to do what he do's, and therefore is not at Liberty.

3. A third Instance he has very ingeniously fram'd; suppose a Man asleep carried into a Room, and then the Door fast lock'd upon him, and when he awakes finds himself in the Company of a beloved Friend. He asks then, Whether his staying be a *voluntary* Action or not? I answer, Yes, and a *free* Action too, unless his Love to his Friend's Company be forc'd, which is contrary to the Supposition. Ay, but he is not at liberty to go away, the Doors are fast lock'd; true: but what's that to the purpose? We are not speaking of the *Liberty* of the *Person*, but of the *voluntary* Act: if the locking the Door had been with his consent, that would have been a free consent, but that's contrary again to the Supposition. I don't pretend that Liberty is a power in the Person to do or not to do; the Person is restrain'd against his will, or without any previous thought of his. If his restraint had been *voluntary*, that would have been *free* too; but that is a Contradiction. Liberty to act or forbear do's not extend so far as the Persons power to prefer Action or Forbearance do's; but so far only as the power of other Agents do's, and the power of other Agents not extending in this case to force him to love his Friends company, that Act only is free, because that's the only voluntary Act. What he will'd or prefer'd that he freely will'd or prefer'd.

A fourth
sort of
Objections
answer'd.

4. A fourth sort of Instances are such as these. The Heart beats, the Blood circulates, neither of these are in a Mans Power, meerly by Thought or Volition, to stop: Convulsive Fits agitate his legs, as in the odd dancing disease call'd *Chorea Sti-Viti*: The *Palsie*, the Stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his Mind. *Answer.* In none of these cases the Actions are voluntary, and therefore nothing to the purpose; for the enquiry is only, whether they, the voluntary acts, be free or not? Causes without the Mind may without doubt restrain it from doing what it would otherwise, or force it to do what it would forbear, if it was not impell'd or restrain'd: There is no question in such cases; but when the Powers of those causes without are limited or suspended, then it is that it acts voluntarily, and those Volitions or Preferences are free.

A fifth sort
of Objections
answer'd.

He says further, as it is in the Motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of the Mind: a waking Man is under the necessity of having some *Ideas* in the Mind (that is, of thinking of one thing or another:) He is not at Liberty to think or not to think, any more than he is whether his Body shall touch any other Body at all or no; but, whether he will remove his Contemplation from one *Idea* to another (that is, Object) is many times in his Power or Choice; and then he is in respect of his *Ideas* (that is, Thoughts) as much at liberty as he is, whether he shall rest his own body on this or that other body. Now to this and infinitely more Instances, that might be fram'd of that kind, this one general Answer will serve, in all such cases where the Mind, by the Constitution of natural Causes, is restrain'd or limited by external Agents, therein its Will is not concern'd. The Man is a *necessary* Agent (as in its thinking or not thinking at all, its body touching no other body at all) but in all such cases where the Mind is not overpower'd, that is, impell'd or restrain'd by causes distinct from it, there the Will is concern'd; as in thinking of this or that Object, moving this or that part of its Body or resting it, in suspending its judgment in many instances. In these cases the Actions of the Mind are voluntary and free, but if the Man act contrary to his own Choice or preference, as when he perceives violent pains or boisterous impressions from the Body, or said to be in violent passion: From a Rack, from a fit of the Gout or any vehement Passion, which is a temporary Disease indeed, in all such cases, as the acts are not voluntary, are not Volitions, so no body pretends to liberty in them, they are not free acts. But where there is Thought and Volition, there is Freedom or Liberty, and in no other case. Freedom of the Mind is not, as my Author supposes, its power to do or forbear, according to its Volition or Preference; but Liberty from the *impulse* or *restraint* of other Causes distinct from itself; that's the true measure of its freedom. Where that Power in other Agents is wanting or suspended, there 'tis free; where that power operates upon it, there it's a necessary Agent. That's the condition by the present Constitution of Nature, of its Union or Alliance with its Body. And therefore, to make the matter of the dispute lie in as little compass as is possible, I own that Proposition to be true, on which all my Author's Arguments are grounded. Where Thought is wanting (as in all Mechanical Agents) or the Power to act according to the direction of Thought (that is, Volition) there (in a great measure at least) Necessity takes place, as in all cases where there is a Perception of violent Pains or in boisterous Passions. But neither of these cases comes near the point; not the first, because there is no Thought in the Agents, but *impulse* or *restraint* from other Agents; nor the second, because no Volition. The Pain or the Passion, which I call the *Disease* of the Body, are the Causes *without* the Mind, which impell it to act otherwise than it wills, than it prefers to act. From this mistaken Notion of *Liberty* (as

I humbly conceive, but submit to better judgments) my Author fancy'd he should put an end to the long agitated Question, whether a Man's Will be free or not ? I have great reason not to charge this Author with the ill consequences of the Necessity of the Will; for, the truth is, by owning as he do's expressly, that Man is a free Agent, he seems to have made a Controversie almost about meer words. And therefore, if he can go so far as to satisfie the Hobbists and Absolutists to acknowledge, that Man is a free Agent, he will do great service to a Cause on which depends the Distinction between *moral* Good and Evil, the Justice or Equity of Rewards and Punishments, which are the main Springs of genuine Virtue and Religion. Mr. Hobbs, in his tract *de civitate* Cap. 21. Sect. II. says, *Liberum Arbitrium non voluntatis libertas, sed volentis est* ; which exactly agrees with the words of my Author (tho upon different Principles) Liberty belongs not to the Will, but the Agent. Which is true enough, if we suppose Liberty to be a Power; for every power is the power of a Substance, and cannot be the power of another power, tho it may be the *Mode* or *Extent* of an Agents power : much after the way we say Figure is not Extension, but only the *Mode* of it. But Mr. Hobbs downright owns in the next Section but one, that the direct Consequence of denying the Liberty of the Will is, that *God* must be the Author of sinful Acts, which most people would call *Blasphemy*, because nothing more unworthy the Glory of the Divine Nature: However this is absolutely necessary to own, in consistency with the avow'd Principles of his Scheme; for if there be nothing in the world but Body, no Action but Motion, all the Operations of the Mind (as we call them) only sorts of Motion in a Body organiz'd fitly for that purpose, thence it must follow that all Effects, not excepting *voluntary* Actions must be the *necessary* Effects of Body observing the necessary Laws of Motion establish'd by the Author of Nature and of all Motion. The *dangerous* Consequence of these Principles shall not need to be expos'd, they are notorious enough; nor shall I need to digress so far as to attempt the Refutation of them, because done effectually to the satisfaction of the Learned World by many eminent Authors already, and particularly by no less Person than the present Lord Arch-Bishop of *Canterbury*, tho in a little Tract written by him many years since, upon an unhappy occurrence in the University; and more at large by Dr. *Cumberland* now Lord Bishop of *Peterborough*, and that as to the main upon the same Mechanical *Hypothesis* which Mr. Hobbs himself went upon. But my Author goes upon clear other Principles; for he owns *God* to be a *Spirit*, a Substance distinct from Body: That *Thinking* is the peculiar Action of *Spirit* (tho not clearly of a Substance distinct from Body:) That we can have no Notion of *Thinking* from *Motion*: That we can have no Conception or a very obscure one of *active power* (either Motion itself, much less Thinking) from meer *Body*: That our *Souls* (Men at least) have power in many cases to begin, continue, determine, stop Motion, meerly by *Thought*; and in a word, that Man is a *free Agent* (and that not at the rate Mr. Hobbs do's; for his Notion of *Liberty* is, only Freedom from *impediment* by other bodies; and so the Air, and the Water running down the River without stop, are as free Agents as Men in their best Estate) but because they have power to deliberate, to suspend their Judgment, and determine their own Thoughts in many cases. And thus he is fairly dischargeable from making *God* the Author of Sin, or of Mens Misery, without their own fault, their wilful Abuse of their natural Liberty. As for the true Disciples of Mr. Hobbs, it cannot be presumed they deny the Liberty of the Will out of any Honourable regard to the Omnipotence or Omniscience of *GOD*: those are such Arguments as we call *ad hominem*, *ad captandum vulgus*, only words

Man is
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Not by
Mr. Hobbs

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Liberty of
the Will
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flung in the teeth of such as they call *ignorant* People, to stop their Mouths from crying out *Atheism*. And 'tis to as little purpose to use Arguments to such artificial Machines, as by their own Principles they account themselves, as to persuade a Clock, which is out of order, to go well, without taking it in pieces. But as for those Absolutists that pretend to deny the Liberty of the Will out of a *serious regard* to the Divine Omnipotence or Goodness, I will step so far from my Author's track as to desire them to consider, whether it is not more rational and safe to conceive all the Perfections of the Divine Nature as equally essential, and as they are, all united in the Majesty of Heaven and Earth, rather than to form *abstract Ideas* of his Power, as separated from his Goodness, and his Goodness separated from his Wisdom; and if they think so, they may readily perceive, that 'tis no more Diminution to his *Power*, to suppose ourselves such free Agents as he has in his own infinite Wisdom made us; than it is to his *Goodness*, that he don't make us happy without our own consent, or has not made us all Angels. And by thus considering all the Perfections of GOD, as *essentially united*, they will secure themselves against the dismal consequence of making *God* the Author of *Sin*, and of the endless *Misery* of numberless Souls, without their own faults; and yet ever find sufficient reason to adore his *Goodness* for giving us so many noble and gracious Encouragements to pursue our own Happiness in the paths of Virtue and Piety; and his *Power* in governing us as *free* Agents, and according to that *rational* Nature (as he do's the rest of his Creatures suitably to *theirs*) which he in his own Wisdom has bestow'd upon us and them.

Liberty
not right-
ly stated
by this
Author.

VIII. But to return to my Author, he seems to think the Question about the Liberty of the Will should be stated thus, Whether a Man be free to will or not? That is, as he explains it afterwards, when it comes to Action, whether it be free to think or not to think, to move its Body or not to move it; which is, I think, call'd a Liberty of Contradiction; but surely no body pretends to a Liberty of such extent; but every one must speak for himself, I pretend to no such Liberty. I must either think or not think, move any part of my Body or not move it; and, if I should prefer not thinking to thinking, my very *endeavouring* not to think would be *thinking*; but I pretend to a liberty at some times to think of *this* rather than of any *other* Object, to *suspend* my judgment or *deliberate* in some Cases, to move my *whole* or some *particular* part of my Body; I am now sitting to write, I don't pretend to a liberty to sit or not to sit; I must do one or t'other; but I pretend at this and some other times, to prefer sitting to standing, and *vice versa*: neither do I pretend at this time to a liberty to think of that which I am writing about and not thinking of any thing at all. I must, whilst awake at least, think of that or something else; but I pretend to a liberty to think of that at this time, rather than any other particular subject. And herein consists the liberty I pretend to, that whereas meer Bodies move or rest, do one or other by the *impulse* or *restraint* of other Bodies, my Mind in all its voluntary acts has no external cause *impelling* it to that which it chooses to do, or *restraining* it from that which it willingly forbears; because external Agents don't operate upon my Mind in such cases, as they do upon Bodies in all cases.

A Questi-
on not
fairly
worded by
this Au-
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IX. In Sect. XXV. he proposes a Question in these words, Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases Motion or Rest? And then reckons the *Absurdity* of the Question to be a *Demonstration* that Liberty belongs not to the Will in any case; because, it seems, it's as absurd as if one should ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will what he wills, as to will what he pleases? Thence I argue, there is a trick in wording the Question; for it should have been only thus: Is a Man at liberty to will Motion or Rest, speaking or being silent, sup-
pose

pose in a particular case? For the words *which of the two he pleases* is a Tautology, for to be *pleas'd* with this or that, is the same with *willing* this or that. For no Man is at liberty to act or not to act; he must do one or t'other, because there is no *medium*, but he may be at liberty to act this or the contrary to that. To make it the plainer I'll suppose this Case, I come to a Lawyer to ask him, whether he be at liberty to speak in my cause? My meaning is not, whether he be at liberty either to speak or not to speak at all? I know he must either speak or not speak; but, whether he be at liberty to speak either in *my* Cause or in my *Adversary's*: there he is at liberty, if he be not retain'd. There is a *Medium*, a Third; for he may speak in my Cause or my Adversary's or not speak in either, which is call'd, I think, Liberty of Contrariety. But if the Question had been worded at it should, the Answer would be very easie; the Man is always at liberty to *will*, that is, to prefer *Motion* to *Rest*, or *Rest* to *Motion*; but in many cases he is not at liberty to act according to that Preference, because external Causes may hinder the execution of that which he prefers to do or forbear. So if you put into the Question the word *please* instead of *will*, He is always at liberty to please himself with either Motion or Rest, but he is in many cases not at liberty to *act* according to his Pleasure, so that Liberty or Freedom in the Person do's not consist in a Power to act or not to act, to move his Body or not to move it, he is not at liberty to do either of them; for no one pretends to any such Power or Liberty. Neither do's the Liberty of the Will consist in a power to act or forbear according to the preference of the Mind; but in a Freedom from the Impulse or Restraint of *external* Causes in that act of preference? Which manifestly appears in the two instances my Author mentions. A Man standing on a clift is at Liberty (or has a Power rather) to leap twenty yards *downwards* into the Sea (tho by the way that's not all *leaping* but *falling*) but not to leap (at once that is) twenty Yards *upwards*, for that he cannot do: in both these cases his Will is equally free; he can prefer leaping *upwards* to *downwards*, and *vice versa*; but his Power to act, according to that preference, is more restrain'd in one than in the other. The Gravitation of his Body restrains him from leaping so much *upward*, and the same Cause helps him, after he has leap'd from the Land, to fall so many yards *downward*. Again, a Man is a Prisoner in a room twenty Foot square; being at the Northside of his Chamber, he is at liberty to walk twenty Foot Southward, but not to walk twenty Foot more Northward. In this case the Man is at liberty to prefer the walking twenty Foot Northward, as well as so many Foot Southward; and 'tis the *external* cause that hinders him from acting as he would. But neither that or any other Cause impell'd him to prefer or wish for more liberty. And therefore, neither in this or any other case that can be framed, do's the Liberty of the Will consist in a *power* or *ability* to act or not to act according to the *choice* or *preference* of the Mind; but in the removal of those *external* Causes which are apt to impell or restrain its acting according to that Preference, Choice or Volition.

X The next Enquiry my Author sets upon, is, What determines the Will? Or, in other words, what is the Reason or Motive that determines the Will to prefer any action to its *forbearance*, and *vice versa*? And he resolves, that 'tis not the greater *real* or *appearing* Good (which is the common opinion,) but Uneasiness, or the Desire of being free'd from a present Evil. And in order to the clearer stating the case, he finds it's necessary to acquaint us, that Desire is distinct from the Will; of which there is no doubt; but that's not all, he must have Desire distinct from Volition too; because the acts of the Will (such as the word *Volition* implies) are all terminated in the Mind itself, that is, are Actions in its own

What determines the Will.

Desire differs from the Will, but not so plainly from the act of the Will.

Desire not rightly defin'd by this Author.

Cautions against making uneasiness the sole Motive to voluntary Actions.

own power only : but *Desire* is carried to things out of the Minds Power. This seems to me to be too nice a Distinction ; for, tho 'tis certain enough that often Desire is carried to things out of our own power to procure, so methinks the acts of the Will are also : When we desire any thing, it's the Apprehension the Mind has of some Good in the thing desired which is the cause of that Desire ; and that same Apprehension may determine the Will to *prefer* or *choose* it. However, to support this Distinction, he has fram'd two pretty cases. 1. A Man by his Friends Importunity or Authority is prevail'd with to speak in his behalf to a third Person for a favour ; tho' at the same time he speaks, he wishes his speaking may not have effect. He *wills* the speaking, the act in his own power ; he *desires* his words may not have effect for the procuring the favour which lies in the third Persons power. And so the Will and Desire run counter, but that I can't see. He *will'd* the speaking and *desir'd* it too. He *desires* the favour may not be granted and he *wills* it too. For he prefers his words not having effect to their having effect. And all this only proves that a Man may have *different* Reasons for the *different* Objects of his Will and Desire : or, that there may be *different degrees* of Volition or Desiring ; which no body ever doubted. His second Instance is ; A person that feels a Doziness in his Head and want of Appetite remov'd by the Pain in his Foot or Hand in a fit of the Gout. In this case he thinks the Desire runs counter to the Will. He *desires* to be rid of his Pain ; but he don't *will* or *prefer* it, for fear that by the removal of the Pain, the Doziness and want of Appetite should return. Neither, say I, do's he *desire* it ; because the *absent* Good, which in this case is Indolence, do's not appear to him so great, as to counter-balance his *present* fears of the return of the more dangerous Symptoms. He *desires* to be rid his of Pain, and so far he prefers Indolence to Pain, or *wills* that Indolence ; but, when it comes in Competition with greater evils, he neither desires nor wills it. A Man is willing and desirous to save the cutting off his Leg ; but, when 'tis to save his Life, he neither wills it nor desires it. However upon this presumption, that there is a difference between acts of the *Will* and *Desire*, he builds his *Hypothesis*, that the Will is not determin'd in its choice by the view of Good ; because Good, tho never so great or confessedly great, if *absent*, do's not move so much as *present* Evil, tho never so little or confessedly little : and therefore defines *Desire* thus ; an Uneasiness of the Mind upon the *Absence* of any thing whose *present* enjoyment carries the *Idea* of Delight with it. Now I take this to be a scanty Definition of *Desire* : for a Man may desire a thing which lies so much in his own power to obtain, that he shall feel no *Uneasiness* at all ; and that makes me apt to think, that all the *Uneasiness* men experience in that Passion, arises from the difficulty, the hazard of success in the means to obtain the thing desired : But, abstracted from those evils, Desire is rather a Pleasure than a Trouble, and the Uneasiness rises and falls as the Difficulties, Troubles and Hazard of the means increase or abate. Insomuch, that the Delight, which the Mind proposes to itself in the enjoyment, very often extinguishes all kind of Sense of that Uneasiness ; and nothing then is the motive to the Will, but the propos'd Good. However, if any one has a mind to examine particularly the reasons for this new word, I will only to avoid that trouble my self, by way of caution, propose these Considerations.

XI. First, Whether, if *Uneasiness*, which is a Trouble, a kind of Pain, a natural Evil, be the Motive of the Will ; it be not rather the Motive of the Wills only of the *worst* or *meanest* of Men ? Just as Fear of Evil is the Motive to the *vilest* People ; but Love to do, as well as receive, Good, is the Motive of the *noblest* Spirits. That

That *Uneasiness* is not only the Spring of *ill* Actions, such as proceed from Hatred, Revenge, Envy, Covetousness, Lust, &c. but eating, drinking, sleeping, and most of the *common* Actions of life; there is no manner of doubt. But whether it be of Charity, Piety, Mercy, &c. or other Actions properly *praiseworthy*, which are the grounds and reason of singular Rewards, I very much question. Surely those Heroical acts of Valour which History affords us, by which persons expose their Health, Life, their All to hazards, for their Religion and Countries Good, proceeded from a more *generous* Principle than the sense of that *Uneasiness* they felt in their Minds. I always thought the Happiness they had in prospect was the Spring of their Actions, and inspir'd them with a noble *Patience* under the Torments and Hardships they underwent; and that, by how much the *Pleasures* they had in view were the *greater*, by so much the *Uneasiness* relating to the means was just so much the *less*. And so the *Desire* do's not keep pace with or is measur'd by the *Uneasiness*, but by the *expected* Good or Happiness.

2. It ought to be consider'd, whether if that Principle was admitted to be the *Motive* to the Will, the Minds of *Men* would not be too much humbled, to have all their Actions govern'd by the same Principle that those of *Brutes* are; which to be sure are carried by Hunger and Thirst, and the *Uneasiness* they feel from *natural* Inclinations, to all their Actions. And therefore, to keep the Distinction intire between *Men* and *Brutes*, it seems safer and more honourable to presume that Actions properly good, *morally* good, proceed from a *diviner* Principle.

3. It becomes us to be cautious, that *humane* Nature be not by that Principle debas'd to that degree, as to come too near *Mechanism*. If our Minds be acted by such kind of arguments only, which are like the Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, &c. I should be scurvily afraid, they might be too nearly allied to *Body*: For, I doubt, the causes of Hunger and Thirst, and such like natural *Uneasinesses* act upon our Bodies and consequently our Minds, at their proper seasons, almost as necessarily as Weights do upon Clocks, to make them strike at their due times. However, if his Reader can master these Objections and be fond of a new word for the *Motive* of *humane* voluntary Actions, I'll promise him that my Author's arguments for it are set out with all the Beauty that Words and well-turn'd Periods can give it: but for my own part I think still, that *Mens* not governing all their Actions by the view of *eternal* Happiness, and so in proportion to the true value of the Good they aim at, may be as well accounted for by the old as this new coined Word; as well from the want of a due consideration of the *Nature* of that Happiness, and the *Certainty* of it, and the diverting and more present Pleasures they meet with, as from the Sense of a present *Uneasiness*. For, as the due consideration of the *Nature* and *Certainty* of that Happiness raises the Mind to its just height of *Desire* and *Preference*: so the *Uneasiness*, that comes from the Means only, wears off and becomes no Motive at all to the Wills of good Men. And therefore, this new *Hypothesis*, I doubt, will chiefly serve to solve the *Phænomena* of *bad*, *natural*, and the *common* Actions of mankind, rather than those which are properly *moral* good Actions.

XII. I must not omit one very good, tho' common, Observation which my Author has made; namely, that to be determin'd by our own Judgment, after a mature Examination of the Arguments for or against any Action, is no *Abridgment* of Liberty, but is rather the proper *Use*, the *Design*, the *Perfection* of Liberty. The reason of which is very obvious, according to the common Notion of Liberty, as I explain'd it; namely, because such Consideration abates the present *force* and *power* of Passions, which often impell and hurry men to ill Actions; and thereby sets the Good we naturally aim at in its due Posture and Light, and raises our Desires of it in proportion to its real value. So that *Consideration* to the Mind is just like *Telescopes* to the Eye, helps to represent *remote* Objects in their just Magnitude; and thereby makes the *Uneasiness*, which would otherwise rise from the Means to obtain it, quite vanish and disappear; and thereby we become, in a great measure, like the Angels in Heaven, partakers of their *divine* Freedom from all Obstacles

Obstacles in the pursuit of our true Happiness: And as it is in Actions, so 'tis in our Judgment of the truth of Propositions. We don't assent to them the *less*, but the more *freely*, for the *Clearness* of their Evidence. Because when the Evidence is resolv'd into the common Maxims of Reason, our *natural* Inclination to believe them over-powers all *other* Causes which would otherwise obstruct the Liberty of our Assent.

Reasons of
wrong judgment.

XIII. His next Enquiry is, what are the Reasons of *wrong* Judgment? But he do's not mean, how it comes to pass that one man differs from another in Judgment concerning Happiness; because all men agree naturally and necessarily in their desire of Happiness; and every one knows what pleases him and displeases, or what is good and evil to himself; and in that Sense no man is in the wrong, no man can be mistaken in his judgment: And therefore, he reckons the Enquiry of the old Heathen Moralist to have been very trifling about the *summum bonum*, because the Mind has as different Relishes as the Palate. Learning, Wisdom, Honour, Power, Riches may be *Venison* to one, which may be but *coarse* Meat to others. And therefore, he confines his Enquiry to this particular only, what are the Reasons that makes a Man form such a *wrong* judgment as he himself confesses is *wrong*? But I must note, that then I doubt he might have saved that Enquiry; for no man reckons his own judgment Erroneous. 'Tis a contradiction to say otherwise. But let that pass; for, I suppose, he means what makes a man act contrary to his own judgment: for he reckons Pain from the Rack one reason of *false* Judgment; but I never heard that the Rack ever *wrong'd* any man's Judgment, but only put an almost invincible force upon him to act contrary to his Judgment. But to go on in his Method. His Enquiry is first, how persons come to mistake in reckoning any thing less *good* that is *pleasant*, and any thing less *evil* that is *painful*, than it ought to be? For he calls that which others count *natural good* pleasant, and that which others call *natural evil* he calls painful. And so perfect Happiness is unmix'd *Pleasure*, and perfect Misery unmix'd *Pain*. 2. He enquires how any thing, consider'd as a Means, comes to be reckon'd less *good*, that is, less conducive to the procuring Pleasure or preventing Pain; or any thing less *evil*, that is, less productive of Pain; or less Preventive of Pleasure than it ought to be. The sense of these two Enquiries I construe thus; what makes men mistake in *natural* Good or Evil and

The Author's
true meaning
in this enquiry
explain'd.

The causes of
Mens misjudgments concern-
ing natural Evil.

in *moral* Good or Evil. As to *natural* Good, the mistakes about that arise from the want of comparing *present* Good or Evil with *future*, that is, by judging that which is *present*, whether *good* or *evil*, greater than it is (just as we do Objects, too near the Eye, *greater* than really they are) and *future* too little (just as we do remote Objects *less* than really they are.) And, if it be true, which I take to be the common opinion, that if an Object be above two hundred Foot distant from the Eye, the Angle the Object makes in it never becomes greater when out of that distance; and so 'tis by Reason helping our Judgment, that we judge them greater than they appear (not by the Angle) but in proportion to their known distance. The like may be true also in the Minds judging of *future* natural Good. If it be out of the reach of our Sense or Experience, 'tis by the help of Reason only that we esteem it such as comes nearer to its just valuableness: and so 'tis for want of that Reason that men often mistake in their judgments concerning that we call *natural* Good or Evil; and that happens, as my Author rightly observes, from the *weakness* of Human Nature, we being able to have no more Perceptions at once than *one*: that *one* so takes up our Thoughts as to leave no room for *other* Considerations. If we be in Pain, we consider no more than how to get rid of that: if we find our selves perceiving Pleasure, tho' never so little, we are apt to be content and take up with that, without projecting for greater and more lasting. Especially when the *absent* Good or Pleasure is such as we have never felt or experienc'd: it's never able to over-balance any present Pleasure on one side, or Uneasiness on the other. The Sense of all which amounts to this, that the true Reason men mistake in their Judgments concerning *natural* Good, is the want of Wit to understand what is the most *solid* and *lasting* Happiness, or to consider the Evidence for the *certainty* of

of those Consequences which are the *Rewards* of their good, or *Punishments* of their evil Actions.

As to *moral* Good, my Author reduces the Reason of mens *mistakes* about that, to these three. 1. Ignorance. 2. Precipitancy or Hastiness in judging before due examination. 3. The not making that an *essential* part of a mans Happiness which really ought to be counted so. But I must leave the curious Reader to cut the hair; for these three Reasons, tho spun very finely, seem to me to come all to this one: that Men mistake about *moral* Good and Evil for want of having so much as *one* Reason for their judging as they do. For Ignorance, Inadvertency or Precipitancy, want of due Consideration of what is a mans *true* Interest, are but *Folly* in different shapes and colours. But I cannot pass by (without a remark) the clear reason my Author gives of those mens Folly who pursue the *Pleasures* (such as they are) of an *immoral* life, rather than those that attend a *virtuous* life; or avoid the *Troubles* of a *virtuous* life (such as they are) rather than them which attend a *vitious* life. This reason he has displaid in all the colours that the Art of Rhetorick can give it, which I shall endeavour to contract and set, if I can, in a Light more obvious to *common* Eyes. Every man must own, unless he be so mad as to count himself *omniscient*, that it's at least *possible*, there may be a *future* Estate of Pleasure and Pain, of Happiness and Misery. He must admit again, that there is no Proportion, no Comparison between a *finite* life, tho it was of an hundred, two hundred or more years, and *Eternity*. He must also own, that if there be such a *future* State of Happiness and Misery, that a *virtuous* Life is the sure method to obtain that *Happiness*; and a *vitious* Life the ready way to plunge himself into that *Misery*; because the very *natural* Tendency (without a Miracle, I mean) of *Virtue* is to make every man as *happy*, as a *wise* man, that understands his own interest, can well wish himself to be: and the very *natural* Tendency of every *Vice* is to make him as *miserable*, as the most *malitious* Spirit can wish him to be. And therefore, if a man prefers a *vitious* Life to a *virtuous*, he is such a Fool as a man would be that should suffer a Lot to be cast when he may avoid it (tho it were but one in a thousand or ten thousand) for his utter Ruin; because the melancholy Thought of that *one*, in regard that's possible, would spoil all the other Comforts of his whole Life. And this at least is the *immoral* mans case, even in his own Confession; for the very best Lot he can hope for is but Annihilation, which at the worst will be the *virtuous* mans: For, if there be no such State in reversion, he can but be annihilated; but, if there be such a *future* State, the *immoral* man will approve himself a Fool in grain, according to the Proverb, that would run the hazard, in hopes of the *vanishing* Pleasures of short-liv'd Vice, and in fears of the *perishing* Troubles of a short-liv'd Virtue: to which if a man add the unexceptionable Evidence which the Christian Religion affords, a wise man has no greater strain of Almighty Power to wish for towards the completing his Happiness, than what the least Miracle that Christ or his Apostles wrought upon humane Bodies did plainly demonstrate; nay, for all that I or any one else can tell, not greater than is manifested every moment in fitting up a suitable Body in the common course of Providence for the Reception of an human Soul. And therefore, an *immoral* Christian at least must be a Monster of *Fools*, according to the Maxims of *Prudence* which every one allows and governs himself by even in *temporal* Affairs.

XIV. My Author concludes this Chapter with telling us, that he has now given us a view of our *Original Ideas*; and that, if he would consider them as a Philosopher, and examine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made, might be reduc'd to these few, 1. *Extension*, 2. *Solidity*, 3. *Mobility*, 4. *Thinking* and Power of *Moving*, 5. *Existence*, *Duration*, and *Number*: Which I interpret and explain thus. Suppose a Person upon enquiry after *Truth*, what is it he would know of any thing he enquires after, Is it its *Existence*, be it Substance or any one of its Modes? there is an *Idea* (as he calls it) for that on purpose. Is it how *long* it has or will exist? there's *Duration* for that. Is it how *many* of its sort? there's *Number* to answer that enquiry. Is it *Space*? there's *Extension* for that. Is it *Figure*, *Magnitude*?

The causes of Mens mis-judgment concerning moral Good and Evil.

The Author's review of original Ideas explain'd.

nitide? there's *Extension*, for they are but the Modes of Extension; Is it its *Smell*, *Tast*, *Colour*, *Sound*, *Hardness*, &c. there's *Mobility*, which includes Rest as well as actual Motion, with the help of Figure, to give an account of all those Qualities; for they are but the names of our Perceptions that are produc'd by the variety of Motion, Rest, and Figures in the Particles of the Bodies in which they are said to be. Is it *Body*? there's *Solidity* ready cut and dry to stand for its essential Property. Is it a *Spirit*? there's *Thinking* and Power of *moving* to answer for all the Operations of the Mind, whether of understanding, willing, remembering, judging, doubting, &c. which are but various Modes of *Thinking*. These he reckons the *Ideas* into which all the *Ideas* we have may be ultimately resolv'd. But with his leave there is *one* Mode left out which I can't readily reduce to any of those heads, and that's *Position* or *Distance*; for 'tis demonstrably plain, that as the same Body is in differing *Postures* and *Distances*, it may produce differing *Perceptions*, as of Colours, Magnitude and Figure; and that not only in *artificial* things, such as Pictures and other Draughts, but in *natural* things, Meadows, Corn-fields, Mountains, &c. which according to merely the various *Position* and *Distance* of the Eye will appear of different Colours, Magnitude and Figure. But let that pass as he would have it; supposing all this true, I would then gladly be inform'd what need there was of the new Names of *Ideas* and the Sur-names he has given them? For the words *Substance* and *Mode* will answer all these. *Existence*, *Duration* and *Number* are nothing but the Names of our Modes of Conception; *Extension* is the Mode of *Space*; *Figure* and *Magnitude* the Modes of that we call *Body*; all *sensible Qualities* the Names of different *Sensations* deriv'd from the different Motion, Rest, Figure, Position, Bulk of the Particles of the Object; all the *Operations* of the *Mind*, but the different Modifications of *thinking*, which is its Property. This was the State and Language of the Philosophick World, before he attempted to reform it: And therefore, if he has not given us the Solution of any *Phænomenon* in the intellectual or corporeal World; if he has not improv'd the History of Nature, as one of his own Faculty, the singularly Learned and equally pious Dr. *Woodyard*, has done and promis'd more, what helps will the Learned world have gain'd by having *new Names* only for those *Things* they knew *before*, and so far as I have yet seen, those *more* confounding and *less* intelligible than the *old* ones? Besides, I doubt, no Man ever did or can possibly gain the Knowledge of the Nature of any *one Substance*, by forming *Ideas* abstracted from the Substances themselves, and then tacking them together to make up the *complex Idea* of them, but rather just contrary, first observ'd by his own Experience, that there were Substances with such and such Properties and Operations united in them, and then used his Reason in considering them, as if they were separable, and thence form'd the Knowledge of their Natures, and Names for them, in order to further and more general Improvement. But, to do my Author right, he has made several ingenious Efforts to explain some *natural Effects* both in Bodies and Spirits; and tho' he is pleas'd to call them *Digressions*, yet I meet with some that reckon them the Flowers of his Essay, and who own they are very entertaining, especially in his polite dress, and wonderfully grateful to Philosophick Senses and without the alloy of any Offensiveness.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Mixt Modes.

What mixt modes are and how the Notion of them is gain'd.

I. **T**HAT which my Author calls *mixt Modes*, is the same which is commonly reckon'd, a Composition of several *differing Qualities* or *Actions* and the *Circumstances* of them express'd by one Word or Name, which may be easily understood by the Examples: Such are, Beauty, Triumph, Apotheosis, Canonizing, Lye, Obligation, Murder, Sacrilege, Parricide, Rebellion, Ostracism, Proscription,

scription, Proclamation, and infinite more; any *one* of which Words implies the Conception of *all* the Qualities, Actions and their Modes, which are, as it were, the Ingredients of that Composition. And this Conception is gain'd, as all others are, of things without us, either by our own Observation; or by the Improvement of that Observation; or by having all those Qualities, Actions and their Circumstances enumerated and represented to us by such as have seen or observ'd them. And there is no difference between him and others under this Head, but in these obvious Particulars. 1. What he calls different *simple Ideas* they call different *single Qualities, Actions* or the *Circumstances* and *Modes* of those Actions. 2. Whereas he says these *Ideas* have their *original* and *constant* Existence no where but in the Minds of Men, and therefore allows they may be call'd *Notions*, They think that they had their Original and Existence as really in the Substances in which those Qualities were, or are, as any other *perishing* Qualities and succeeding *transient* Actions have or had; and that it was as impossible to frame those Notions without observing the real Qualities, Actions and Modes of them, either in themselves or other Substances or Agents, as 'tis for a blind Man to have the Notion of Colours: for example, the very Instance he gives, Hypocrisie, no Man could have conceiv'd that Notion, but either from the Consciousness that he had or could pretend to better Qualities than he had, or by his Observation that others had. 3. That Words or Names do no more tye together or unite these Conceptions, as he suggests, than other Words do. The bare Word, *Gold*, for example, does not tye together the Properties in that Substance, but the Substance itself does it; and that 'tis the Mind only that unites these Qualities and Actions, as it does when it conceives any particular Substance, only with this difference, that as in Substances the Qualities *coexist*; in these Notions the Mind forms them successively, as the Actions and their Modes really succeeded one another, and then retains them united; of which Union the *Name* is the *Sign* only and not the *Cause*. The Mind has as clear and distinct a Notion of the several Actions concurring to the Murder of a young or old Man, of breaking into a Barn, as it has of killing ones Father or breaking into a Dwelling-House; tho the two former are only call'd by the general Name of *Murder*, and the other by the general Name of *Theft*, the Words *Parricide* and *Burglary* not in the least helping to the forming the distinct *Notions*, but only to distinguish the *Facts*; the others being as clear and distinct without particular Names.

The difference between this Author's notion and others about mixt Actions.

II. 4. Tho he says, *Motion, Thinking* and *Power* have been the most modified of all *simple Ideas*, yet others think *Number* has been as much modified, or at least is as capable of being so, and having distinct Names too as *Motion* or *Thinking*. But as for *Power*, they never saw any Modifications of that, but only of several *Qualities* or *Properties* which give that Name to Substances: And 'tis as improper to talk of the Modification of *Power*, distinct from those Properties and Qualities, as 'tis of the Modification of *Causes* and *Effects*, which are the meer Names of *Substances*; given them on the account of their mutual Operations, as that of *Power* is.

Number as capable of modification as motion or thinking.

Modification of Power improper.

III. 5. Whereas he says, that several Words seem to signify Action, they really don't signify the *Modus operandi*, only the Cause or Subject; mentioning Annihilation, Creation and Freezing. Now to support that Observation he should have named some other words which signify a single Action, which do also imply the *Modus* of that Action, else the Observation is trifling. *Thinking* and *Moving* are supposed generally to comprehend all Action; but we don't conceive the *Modus* of either of those Actions by either of those Words; tho, by the way, it must be noted, that *Rest* (whether we call it a *positive* or *privative* Quality) does contribute as much towards the producing any Effect as *Motion* itself. For I cannot conceive *Motion* without the Body in which it is, and I cannot conceive how a Body by its *Motion* should do any Feats without the Cohesion of its parts.

Words don't signify the modes of operation in any case.

What he observes of the *Names* of Actions used in several Places or Countries, such as Ostracism at *Athens* (that is, condemning Persons by writing their Names in a Shell) Proscription at *Rome* (that is, proclaiming Persons to be outlaw'd and their

Estates confiscated) being peculiar to those places, is certainly right; for as all Countries have their peculiar *Substances*, *Actions* and *Modes* of them, so they have or ought to have *Names* sutable to them.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

Substance.
What.

I. **T**His Name of *Substance* we give to any thing whose Existence we conceive independent upon every thing else, and in which several Properties or Qualities are united or combined. And this, as old as it is, is taken to be a perfect Definition of *Substance* in general: because hereby the Mode of its Existence is distinguishable from that of *Qualities* or *Properties*: namely, its Existence does not depend upon any other created Substance or any *Quality* or *Property*. Whereas Qualities or Properties do depend upon one Substance or other, and have no Qualities united in them. Thus *Spirit* is distinguish'd from *Perception* and *Willing*, *Body* is distinguish'd from *Figure* and *Motion*; and so of the rest of the Qualities of either of those two sorts of Substances.

The philosophick sense of the words Essence and Nature.

II. But to clear this old Notion of *Substances* from the new Difficulties with which my Author has obscur'd it, when he treats of the *Nature* and *Essence* of Substances in general or of pure Substance, it will be proper, first to enquire and settle what we mean by those two words *Nature* and *Essence*: in which, I doubt, several great Authors have fumbled as in the dark, by not understanding one anothers meaning of those two common words. In order to that I must presume, because it seems agreed on all sides, 1. That *Nature* and *Essence* don't signifie any Principles, or any thing else, really distinct from that of which they are said to be the *Nature* or *Essence*: 2. That there is nothing general but *Names*; Every Substance is a *particular* Substance, and every *Quality* is a *particular* *Quality*. And if this be allow'd, then in Propriety of Speech, the *Nature* or *Essence* of every particular thing can be that only by which it is distinguish'd from every thing else; the *Nature* or *Essence* of every Substance as distinguishable from every *Quality* is, that its manner of existence is *independent*; and, that it has several Qualities *united* in it; and the *Nature* or *Essence* of every *Quality*, as distinguishable from every Substance, is, that its manner of existence is *dependent*, and that it has *no* Qualities *united* in it. Again, the *Nature* or *Essence* of any *particular* Substance, as distinguishable from all other particular Substances, is the *Combination* of those Properties or Qualities which it has and others want; and the *Nature* or *Essence* of any *particular* *Quality* is that particular Modification of a Substance which another has not, and by which it affects us.

Substance as well conceiv'd as mode, either in general or particular.

III. And now I am ready to answer all my Author's Queries. Have we any Notion of *Substance* in general? Yes, as before defined, and that as distinct as *Qualities* in general, or *Ideas* either, if he mean by the word *Ideas* that which is in the Object of which he is said to have an *Idea*. Have we any Notion of a *particular* Substance? Yes, and that as clear (tho not so full or adequate) as of any *one* *Quality* whatsoever. Will not this content? What would he have more? He would have a clear Notion of *pure Substance* (that is) abstracted from all Properties or Qualities whatever. I answer, there is no such Substance in the whole World. Every Substance has some Qualities or other: A *Spirit* its Thinking, *Space* its Expansion, *Body* its Solidity. And then how can any Man have a distinct Notion of that, from which you suppose all its Properties (by which it should be distinguish'd) separated or abstracted. However thus far I can go, if that will gratifie him, every Man has as clear a Notion of *pure Substance*, abstracted from all its *Qualities*, as he can of *Qualities* in general abstracted from every Substance. Let any Man tell me what a kind of thing, or what is the *Nature* or *Essence* of Motion,

tion, Rest, Figure, Colour, Thinking, *abstracted* from every *Substance* moving, resting, figured, colour'd and thinking; and I'll be bound to tell him what kind of thing, or what is the *Essence* or *Nature* of Spirit or Body separated from all its Qualities or Properties. No, no, there is really no such Substance in the World abstracted from all Qualities, nor no Quality abstracted from all Substances. And so we are even. We have as clear a Notion of Substance in *general*, or of any *particular* Substance as we have of Quality in *general* or any *particular* Quality. And therefore 'tis not fair, first, to require us to abstract every Property and Quality which constitutes the *Essence* or *Nature* of it; and then ask us, what it is? That's as impertinent as to ask, what a Man's Estate is, after we have stripp'd him of every Foot of Land, House, and all his Goods wherein Estate consists. But still there will be enough left for our Conception of the Difference between *Substance* and *Quality*, there will remain more than bare something, for Quality is something as well as Substance; but Qualities cannot exist independent upon Substance, nor cannot have other Qualities united in them; but the Existence of Substance is independent, and can have several sorts of Qualities united in it.

IV. But that which creates all this Prejudice in my Author about *Substances*, is this, that by our Senses we know there are *Qualities* in *Substances*; but 'tis by reason that we know there are *Substances* to support these *Qualities*: and herein the Interest of his Scheme about all Knowledge coming from *Sensation* and *Reflexion* lies at stake; and it must be own'd, that our Knowledge of the Existence or the Mode of Existence of *Substances* is not deriv'd merely from our Senses, but Reason: but notwithstanding that, the Certainty of our Reason and Senses, in one as well as the other case, must be resolv'd at last into the same common Maxim of Truth. Why does any one think that there are any such *Qualities* as Motion and Figure, for example, in Objects without him? He must answer, because 'tis impossible there should be any Perceptions of such things without an *external* Cause apt to produce them in him. So, I say, 'tis impossible to conceive such Qualities without something to support them, and *nihili nulla sunt affectiones* is equally our last Result and the Ground of our Certainty as well as to *Qualities* as to *Substances*. And tho there be no *Idea* of *pure Substances* derived from our Senses only; yet there is a Notion, there is a Knowledge of their *Existence* and the *Mode* of that Existence different from one another, and that, as to Certainty, as well grounded: and therefore my Author's Expressions, that the *Idea* of Substance is but a suppos'd, he knows not what, Support of Accidents, and the pleasant Stories of the *Indians* Tortoise, and the Child's Muff might have been as well saved, because, tho the words *Support*, *Substance*, *Substratum*, and *Suppositum* are but metaphorical, for want of proper words; yet the Notion we have of that which those words are intended to signify, is as *positive* and *clear* as of Motion or Figure, or any other Quality. But if he expects we should answer what a *Substance* is, 'tis not kindly done to suppose, first, the Question is unanswerable, as it is, if we strip it of all its Properties and Qualities, and then ask us, what it is? If we should serve him so with any one of his *Qualities*, suppose Whiteness, *separate* from all sort of Bodies, I doubt he would be at a Loss for some Substance to *reflect* the Light, else his View would be but thin and airy Entertainment.

V. That every *particular Substance* is nothing else but that in which distinct Properties and Qualities are *united*, needs not to be proved, much less repeated so often as 'tis by my Author; for all People now adays agree that Gold, a Diamond, a Loadstone, and so all *Bodies* Names, are but the Names of *Substances* in which the Properties which constitute those particular Bodies *meet*, and thereby *distinguish* one from the other. Again, that *Powers*, that is, the *Properties* and *Qualities* which gain a Substance that Name, go a great way towards the forming the *complex Idea* of any particular Substance, is beyond all Dispute; for the Sense of that amounts but to this obvious Truth, that every *particular Substance* is that which it is by its *distinct* Qualities, Properties and Operations.

The existence of Substance as clearly known by reason, as of Qualities by sensation.

Particular Substances distinguish'd only by their Properties.

The Nature of Substances only their Properties, tho we have no Ideas of some of them.

Primary properties don't constitute complex Ideas, because rarely known.

Secondary qualities. What.

This third sort of Ideas the same with one or t'other of the former two.

The sensible Qualities of Bodies would appear other than they do if our Organs of Sense were more acute than they are.

VI. For the clearer stating the Nature of *corporeal Substances* my Author thinks it necessary to tell us, Sect IX. that there are three sorts of *Ideas* go to the making up their *complex Ideas*. 1. The *Ideas* of their *primary* Qualities, and which are in them even when we perceive them not: Such are Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation; to which he should have added Motion and Rest, at least Motion. But here I must note, that those Qualities can't be said, in my Author's sense, to go towards the making up the *complex Ideas* of any particular Substances which are not perceiv'd in them. For tho we can by our *Senses* discover indeed, that in the general there are such Qualities, as Motion, Figure, Bulk, Position; yet we can't reckon them to go towards the making up the *Ideas* of particular Bodies, where we don't perceive them. And 'tis as certain that we can rarely by our *Senses* discover the Figure, Situation, Number, Motion of the *minute* Particles of particular Bodies; and therefore what Knowledge we have of them is by Analogy, by reason inferring the like *Effect* from the like *Cause*, and not by *Sensation*. Nay, he owns expressly, in the Section before, that our *Senses* fail us therein from the *Defect* of the Organs of Sense. And therefore, how those Qualities can go to the making up the *complex Ideas* of those particular Substances, is beyond my Comprehension; except by the help of *Reason*, which is no work of the *Senses*. 2. The sensible *secondary* Qualities which depend on those *primary*, such as, Colours, Tasts, Smells, Sounds, Hardness, Softness, and other *tangible* Qualities, which he calls *Powers*: which, tho a new word in that sense, is yet proper enough; because those Qualities, consider'd as in the Objects, are only the *various* Contexture of Bodies, or the *Variety* of Figure, Bulk, Situation and Motion of their minute Particles by which they are enabled to produce those several Sensations in us. 3. The *Aptness* we consider in Substance to give and receive those *Alterations* in the *primary* Qualities. The Sense and Sum of all which may, I think, be thus exprest more intelligibly. That the *Combination* of all the Properties or Qualities, which are in any *corporeal* Substance, distinguishes it from all other Substances; because that *Combination* gives it the Name of a *Power* or *Ability* either to procure in us *various* kinds of *Sensations*, and to produce in other Bodies *various* Qualities, or to have other Qualities produc'd in them. Thus, for example, 'tis the peculiar Qualities or Properties in a Loadstone that enable it to reflect Light in such a manner as to produce in us the Sensation of such Colours as it has, that fits it to draw Iron; and 'tis the peculiar Qualities united in Iron that give it the power to affect our *Sight* with such Colours, as it has, and our *feeling* with that Weight and Hardness it has, and to be drawn by a Loadstone; and so of all other Bodies. And these *Properties* that produce these *Effects* arise from the *various* Contexture of their Particles, which Contexture is nothing else but the *Variety* in the Figure, Bulk, Position, Number, Motion or Rest of its *minute* Parts which are generally *insensible* by our Organs. And thus I conceive my Author's Scheme is made more intelligible and agreeable to the common Principles of other Philosophers.

VII. The now *secondary* Qualities of Bodies would disappear, he says, if we could by our *Senses* discover the *primary* ones of their *minute* parts; which is certainly thus far true (and is all, I suppose, which he means) that they would appear *other* than they now do, if the Organs of our *Senses* were sufficiently *acute*; as is manifest in the Experiments made by Microscopes, some of which he mentions: Sand and pounded Glass, which appear opaque and white to the naked Eye, are pellucid, when seen through the Microscope; and so a Hair loses the Colour it has to the naked Eye, and appears pellucid and sparkling, almost like a Diamond; and Blood, which appears all red to the naked Eye, through those Glasses shews only some red *Globuli* swimming in a pellucid Liquor: for 'tis certain, I suppose, those Glasses don't represent *more* or *other* Particles in Objects than really there are, but only *helps* Nature to perceive them, and such as they *really* are. For whereas *naturally* we can't see Objects distinctly, when plac'd much less than half a foot from the Eye, those Glasses, by representing the Objects farther off than they really are, make them seem *bigger*, and their Images *larger* at the bottom

bottom of the Eye, than they would be if seen in their *true* Distance: and then by gathering together all or most of the Rays, which come from every single point, gives them so contracted a Power, which otherwise they would not have, to make a *sensible* Impression. And from hence my Author takes a proper and just occasion to magnifie the Wisdom of our Maker in adapting the *natural* State of our Organs to the Conveniencies of Life: Just as he has done in making the Eyes of *Fish* and *Birds* different from *ours*; insomuch, as he rightly observes, that if we should naturally see so distinctly as we can through Microscopes, it would be worse for us; for then we should see things distinctly only at a *less* Distance than now we do, and *fewer* Parts of the Object at once than now we can; and the Organs besides would, in all probability, be too tender to bear long the Light of the Sun. And so, all things consider'd, tho we might discover other Qualities in Objects than we do now, yet such *Acuteness* in the Organs would do us more harm than good. And from thence again he makes a very curious and highly probable Inference, that *superior Spirits*, such as Angels, may have far more *refin'd* Organs of Sense than we have, and having their whole Bodies and all their Parts more perfectly at their Command than we have, may see and observe Objects as they themselves please to dispose their Organs to all emergent Occasions.

VIII. After this, tho my Author will not allow that we have any *abstract Idea* of *Substance*, neither indeed do I believe that any Body will (except as to the Mode of its Existence) because there is none such in the whole World; yet he does own that we have as clear an *Idea* of a *Spiritual*, as of a *material* Substance; that is, that we have as *positive* a Notion and of as many of the Properties of a *Spirit*, as we have of *Body*; such as thinking, understanding, Power of beginning, stopping, determining Motion, affirming, denying, doubting, deliberating, judging, &c. all which we do as clearly understand to be the Properties of a *Spirit*, as we do Extension, Figure, Bulk, Power of being mov'd, and communicating Motion, to be the Properties of *Body*. And, tho this is no *new* Notion, 'tis as *old* at least as *Descartes*, yet it must be said for the Honour of my Author, that he has explain'd and clear'd that great Truth with singular Elegancy, by comparing the Notion of *Spirit* as distinct from *Body* in all the Properties or *primary* Qualities of each of those two sorts of *Substances*.

IX. Now the *primary* Qualities of *Body*, as distinct from *Spirit*, are the Cohesion of *solid* Parts, and its Power to communicate *Motion* by *Impulse*. And these are every whit (as to Cause or Mode of them) as unintelligible, as the Properties of *Spirit*, such as thinking and willing, or the power of perceiving, and putting Bodies into Motion by Thought, and consequently Liberty.

X. First, as to *Cohesion* of *Parts*, which makes Extension, he argues, tho in other words, to this effect. If any one says, he knows not what that *Substance* is which *thinks* in him, no more does he (says my Author) what the *Substance* is which is *extended* or *solid*; namely, because nothing can be known but by its Properties, which discover themselves to us. If he says, that he knows not how he *thinks*, nor does he how *Body* is *extended*: so far then they stand upon even ground. The Existence of *Spirit* is as unquestionable as that of *Body*: The Mode of the Operation in *Spirit* as difficult to be understood as the Mode or Cause of the Cohesion of the Parts of *Body*. For, tho the Pressure of the Air may look like a sufficient Reason for the *Cohesion* of the Parts of *Body* grosser than the Air; yet the Question still returns, What is the Cause of the *Cohesion* of the Parts of the Air itself? If the *Æther*, What, again, is the Reason of the *Cohesion* of the Particles of that *Æther*? And so, unless we suppose the Question, as the *Epicureans* do, when they beg their *Hypothesis* of Atoms of different Figures, Weight and Bulk, the *primary* Cause of the *Cohesion* of the Parts of *Bodies* is altogether inexplicable, without recourse to a first Cause which gave them those Figures.

XI. But in reality, my A. says, the Pressure of any ambient *fluid* Body can be no intelligible Cause of the *Cohesion* of the *solid* Parts of Matter. For, tho it might serve to hinder the Avulsion of two polish'd *Superficies* in a line perpendicular to them,

Our Notion of a spiritual Substance as clear as of a corporeal.

This proved by this Author in all the primary Properties of Spirits and Bodies compared.

The Mode or Cause of Cohesion in Bodies as unintelligible as the mode or cause of thinking.

Pressure of the ambient fluid not a sufficient cause of Cohesion, explain'd.

as in the Experiment of two polish'd Marbles (I guess he means that mention'd by Mr. *Hobbs* in his Letter to K. *Charles II.* about a *vacuum*) yet it cannot in the least hinder their Separation by a Motion in a Line parallel to those Superficies. But here, I doubt, my Philosopher is mistaken; not, I mean, in thinking the Pressure of the Air an *insufficient* Cause of *Cohesion*; for therein he is certainly right; but, because I doubt if it be admitted sufficient to hinder the Avulsion in the Posture perpendicular to the Horizon, it will, for the like reason, in the Parallel. For, according to that *Hypothesis*, the ambient Air will not give place, except the Column of Air which reaches thence to the Extremity of the *Vortex* or *Atmosphere* be press'd to that Extremity, so as to bring other Particles to succeed in the place which it leaves; and being there are such imaginable Columns to the East, West, North and South, and all Points parallel to the Horizon, as well as to the Zenith, the case will be the same in every imaginary plain Parallel, as well as Perpendicular to the Horizon. And there I must leave my Author; but in lieu thereof shall propose another Question, which will answer his design as well. How comes this Column of Air to have power to compress such an heavy Body? Oh 'tis because that Column, in which the Marble is, has less power to recede from the Centre, than the Column has which has no such Body in it; and it cannot actually recede without bringing other Particles to take the Place which the heavy Body must leave, and so forces it downward. Now here is a scurvy fault in this Solution, because it runs upon a Supposition, that the World is full, which can never be proved, and is only made on purpose to help at such dead Lifts. But I pass by that, and ask again, how comes this Air to have a power more to recede from its Centre than so many Points of Matter in the heavy Body as are equal in number to them? And there we must stick; for, admitting *Gravitation* to be nothing but *less Levitation*; yet the *original* Cause of that Levitation is as inexplicable as that: Levitation is receding from the Centre indeed; but how comes it so to recede? And so at last we must resort to a Cause distinct from *Matter* for the Solution of that, and I believe of every other *Phenomenon* in Nature. For the *Motion* of every Body must have a Cause distinct from the Body itself, as well as the *Cohesion* or *Rest* of its Parts. The Cause of both equally inexplicable.

Farther explain'd.

For the farther Illustration of this, my Author asks two very pertinent Questions: How comes Gold, which was just before fluid by Fusion, and had its Parts as loose from one another, as the Sands in an Hour-Glass, in a few minutes to be so closely united, that the utmost Force of Mens bare Hands can hardly separate them; and the like in a great measure in Water by being frozen? He does not indeed offer the *common* Solution, but the *Unsatisfactoriness* of the Answer clears this matter. 'Tis said therefore the cold Gold becomes hard, because the Particles of Fire which kept its Parts in Motion are evaporated; and the Water hard when frozen, because the ambient Air, having its Motion determin'd all one way, has driven out the subtil Matter interspersed between the globular Parts of the Water which kept it in the state of Fluidity. But after all, none of these or the like Solutions are any more than *negative*, which are as good as none at all. For the Enquiry is, What is the Cause of that *Hardness* in the Gold and Ice? To say, the Cause of Fluidity is *remov'd*, does but remove the Enquiry from the Cause of *Fluidity*, to the Cause of *Hardness*; and to say, the mutual Rest or Contact of the Particles is the Cause of that *Hardness*, is but bringing about the same Question, after all the Answers, where it was at first: For there must be an *external* Cause of that *Rest* in any Body, as there must of its *Motion* in the whole or its Parts. And thus the Cause of the *Cohesion* of the Parts of any Body, which is the ground of its Extension in *Bodies*, is as unintelligible as the Cause or Mode of Thinking in *Spirits*.

Communication of motion as unconceivable in Bodies as by Thought or Volition.

XII. 2. As to Communication of Motion by *Impulse*, the other *primary* Quality of *Body*, as distinct from *Spirit*, that is every whit, as to the Mode of it, as inexplicable as the Communication of Motion by *Thought* or an Act of the *Will*.
That

That our Minds can and do communicate Motion to some Parts or their whole Bodies at some times, meerly by *Volition*, is as certain as that one Body moves another by *Contact*; but the Mode of both is equally unintelligible; or of the two, *Motivitiy*, as my Author calls it, the *vis movendi* in Spirit is clearer perceiv'd than that of Body. If two Bodies lie together at rest, we cannot conceive how one should move the other, except a third gives Motion to one of them; and that third can communicate no more than it receiv'd from a fourth, and so on: but if I be now sitting, I can readily conceive how, meerly by the *Act* of my *Mind*, I can walk without any such Motion *communicated* to me by any foreign Body. And so my own Mind is the *beginning Cause* of that Motion. And as for *Contact*, by which one Body transfers Motion to another, that *Contact*, consider'd alone, should be the Reason why two Bodies should *rest*, rather than *move*. For *Hardness* in Bodies, so far as we can conceive, is but *mutual Contact* and *Rest* of the Particles of that Body which is hard. Besides, when one Body *transfers* the Motion it has to another, how does it effect it? Is the Motion of one, for any instant of time, *separated* from both Bodies? That is impossible to conceive, how Motion should exist *separated* from all body. Do some *Effluvia*'s pass from one to the other? That is still as unconceivable as the other: for then the new *moved* Body would become *bigger*, and the *moving* Body *less*. But, suppose it should be so, tho' insensible, yet still I ask, what keeps those *Effluvia*'s there? What Hooks retain them? For the same Pores that let them in will be rather more open to let them out, and so it would be never the nearer to Motion by their Access. And therefore the Mode of Communication of Motion by *Impulse*, is as hard to be understood as by *Thought*.

XIII. My Author can't forbear closing this, as he does most Chapters, with this Inference, that all our *complex Ideas* of Substances are made up of *simple ones*; and now particularly, that the *Idea* of GOD is made up of the *simple Ideas* of Existence, Duration, Knowledge, Power and Happiness; and then enlarging these, as well as we can, with the *Idea* we have of Infinity, we form the *complex Idea* of GOD. Now, to reply once for all, I propose it to be consider'd, whether we don't gain all the Knowledge we have of all Substances, and particularly of GOD, just in the contrary Method. 'Tis true we have the *Ideas*, or rather Notion, of *Existence*, but not without the Knowledge, at the same instant, of our selves or something else *existing*; of *Duration*, but not without our own or other Substance *continuing* in Existence; of *Knowledge*, but not without the Substance *knowing* or thing *known*; of *Power*, but not without the Substance in which those *Properties* are to which we give the name of *Power*; of *Pleasure* or *Happiness*, but not without the *Subject* in which that Happiness is, or the *Cause* that procures it. And so all these *Properties* and *Perfections* enter into the Mind *complicated*, not *single*. And for this Reason I am apt to think, that every Man gains all his Knowledge of Substances and their Modes, not by forming first *simple* or *abstract Ideas*, and then uniting them; but by finding them united in *Nature*, ready combin'd to his hand; and then by his *abstracting* Faculty, or the Power of *considering* any of these *Properties* *separately* from their Substances, and employing his other natural Faculties of *comparing*, *judging*, *inferring* and *reasoning*, he improves himself in general Knowledge. For example, when a man sees a piece of Gold, finding 'tis yellow, hard, heavy, malleable and soluble, he has the *Idea* or Knowledge of that Substance. If he has never seen any himself, but has it represented to him by another, the man tells him 'tis a *yellow* Substance, presently his Mind runs to the Thoughts of Brass perhaps, to know what yellow is; then 'tis *hard*, then perhaps he thinks of a Stone; 'tis *heavy*, then of Lead; 'tis *malleable*, then of Iron; that 'tis *meltable*, then he thinks perhaps of Wax: but if he had never seen any of those Substances in which these Qualities were united, he would, I doubt, be never a dram the wiser: And thus, I suppose, every man forms his Notion of GOD. For, if we should not know our own *Existence*; some Effects within or without us, that argued *Wisdom* or *Contrivance*; some Properties in Substances, by which they exerted their

That all our Knowledge of Substances are gain'd by the minds uniting simple Ideas, no good Inference from the Premises but rather just contrary.

Powers;

Powers; some things *continuing* in being for a long time; others *expanded* beyond all we can see or imagine; the Enumeration of these *abstract* Properties would no more *alone* enter into our Minds, than the *Idea* of Colours into a blind man's. Thus all *Ideas* or Notions of Substances seem to enter into the Mind *complicated*, and after they are there, are consider'd *abstractedly*, and compar'd, in order to *general* Knowledge.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

Collective Ideas what, and how form'd.

I. **W**Hat he calls so are nothing else but *different* Substances, which in the Constitution of Nature are really *distinct*, but are by the Mind, on the account of their mutual Relation, consider'd as *united*; and are express'd by *one* Word, which is the Sign of the Minds Conception of them so *united*. Such are the Words, *Universe* or *World*, *Army*, *Troop*, *Fleet*, *Heap*, *Herd*, *Flock*: Also all Names of such *artificial* things as consist of *heterogeneous* parts, such as *Clock*, *House*, *Book*, &c. and I meet with nothing in this Chapter singular but this, That he seems to intimate that these *Ideas* of several Substances are form'd by the Mind just after the same Method that *complex Ideas* of *single* Substances are, namely by its *compounding* several distinct Substances, and so *uniting* them for the forming these *Collective Ideas*, as it does several *simple Ideas* for the making *complex Ideas* of single Substances: Whereas 'tis really just contrary. In the forming the Conceptions of *single* Substances the Mind considers those Properties and Qualities *united*, as it finds them in Nature, and then by its *abstracting* Power upon occasion considers *them separated* which were really *united*. But in these *Collective* Notions the Mind *compounds* the Substances or considers *them united* which were in Nature *separated*: the first is called *Analytical*, the other *Synthetical Method* by old Logicians.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

Relation what, and the several sorts.

I. **R**elation is nothing else but the Comparison of one thing to another, either on the account of some one or more Properties by which they mutually communicate, operate or depend one on the other; or else in such Qualities only, by which there is no such mutual Communication, Operation or Dependence. The former sort of Relation is express'd by such Words as these, *Prince*, *Subject*; *Father*, *Son*; *Husband*, *Wife*; *Friend*, *Enemy*, &c. the other by such as these, *Great*, *Small*; *Equal*, *Unequal*; *Old*, *Young*; *Strong*, *Weak*; *Learned*, *Unlearned*; *Perfect*, *Imperfect*. Any such one thing or Name of thing as cannot be understood without comparing it to another is a *Relative*, and that to which it is compar'd is call'd the *Correlate*. But note also, that the *Names* of Things as well as *Things* themselves, are call'd *Relate* and *Correlate*: Such as *Cause*, *Effect*; *Agent*, *Patient*; *Subject*, *Adjunct*; *Whole*, *Part*. Concerning *Relation* my Author has made several good Observations, but being very obvious, when express'd in the usual Language, I shall need only to mention:

Observables in Relation.

II. 1. Tho things are really related, yet if there wants a *Name* for the *Correlate*, such Relation is less taken notice of; the Instance he gives is the Word *Concubine*, which having no Name that answers to it, as *Husband* does to *Wife*, its less taken notice of than the other Relation. Such are the Words also of *Dictator*, *Constable*,

stable, &c. which wanting a *correlate* Name, the Relation is not so observable.

2. Some seemingly *absolute* terms are really *Relative*, such as Young, old, Great, small, Weak, strong, Swift, slow, Handsome, ugly, which cannot be understood *without Comparison*; and therefore are *relate*.

3. Tho' men may often agree in those things which are the Ground or Reason of *Relation*, yet they may disagree in their Conceptions of the Nature of the things consider'd *absolutely*: As they do in that which is the reason of the Relation of *Father* to *Son*; yet they may disagree in their Conceptions about the Nature of *Man*; some placing it in the Power of *Reasoning*, others only in the *Figure* and *Shape* of Body.

4. Change of *Relation* may be, where there is no Change in the *Relate*; as a man may cease to be a *Father* upon the death of his only *Child*, without any Alteration in his own *Person*.

5. A word may be an *absolute* or *positive* term; yet, when the parts of the thing are compar'd to one another, it may be consider'd as *relative*: as the words *Triangle* and *Family* are *absolute* terms, but when the parts are compar'd to each other, it may be consider'd as *Relative*.

6. There is no one thing, whether *simple* or *compound*, which is not capable of almost Infinite Relations. As the same Man may be Father, Son, Uncle, Nephew, Friend, Enemy, General, Judge, Patron, Client, Old, Young, &c. namely, according to the several *Persons* to which the Mind compares him.

7. The *Ideas* or Conceptions of the *reason* of a Relation is clearer than the *Nature* of the things themselves consider'd *absolutely*. The reason is, because there shall need to go to the constituting the *Relation*, but one perhaps sensible Quality or Operation; but there must be a consideration of a great *many* to form the Notion of that thing consider'd *absolutely*. A Mountain is easily compar'd with another in Magnitude, and thence denominated Great or Little; but the Properties of that Mountain, as to the inward parts of it, are latent, and not so easily known without search: and so of all Relations.

8. All Relations terminate in *simple Ideas*, that is, in single Properties, Qualities or Actions.

9. Any word leading the Mind to consider of more things than one, or the same thing at different times, is *Relative*. Merry, Black, White are *positive absolute* terms; but Merrier, Blacker, Whiter are *Relatives*, because they carry the Mind to consider of other things or the same thing at different times.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

I. **T**Hese names of *Cause* and *Effect* are given to Substances on the account of their mutual Operation and Dependence upon each other. That which has the *active* Properties, or *operates*, is call'd the *Cause*: That which has the *passive* Properties, or is *operated upon*, the *Effect*. That which is commonly call'd the *Final Cause*, being only in *intelligent Agents*, cannot therefore be any thing more than *modally distinct* from the *Efficient*, (just as Thought is from a thinking Substance, or Action from Agent) because the *Efficient* has in it those thoughts or considerations which are the *Causes*, *Reasons*, *Arguments* (metaphorically often call'd the *Motives*) which induce it to operate. And that which is commonly call'd the *material Cause*, being only in *corporeal Substances*, cannot be any thing really distinct from the *Effect*; because the *Effect* is that Substance which is operated upon, and the new Quality or Modification of it gains it the name of *Effect*. And that again which is commonly call'd the *formal Cause* cannot be any thing really distinct from the *Efficient* and *Effect*; but is only the *Combination* of those Properties and Qualities

Cause and Effect what, final, efficient, material formal causes, what properly.

Cause and Effect, only names of Substances given them on the account of properties.

by which the *active* Substance do's or has power to operate, or the *passive* Substance do's or has power to receive any new Modification. For Examples; Fire, when it *produces* Fluidity in Wax, gains the name of *Cause*; Wax, when it has Fluidity *produc'd* in it, gains the name of *Effect*. For, tho' in common Phrase we say, the Heat of the Fire is the cause, yet really it is not so; 'tis the Fire that is the Cause. 'Tis the Fire in which that certain Motion or Agitation of Particles is, and some of them must be emitted and mixt with, or communicate by Impulse some of their Motion to the Particles of Wax, before the Fluidity is produc'd. And so again, we call Fluidity the *Effect*, but really it is not so; the Substance of the Wax is the *Effect*, and must receive some of the Particles of the Fire, or must have some of their Motion communicated to it before Fluidity can be produc'd: So that Heat and Fluidity are not properly, one the Cause, the other Effect, but only the Qualities from which the several Substances gain the names of Cause and Effect. Thus again *artificial* Effects being suppos'd to be wrought by an *intelligent* Being; The Uses, Conveniencies and Advantages thought upon or consider'd by the Efficient are the *final* Cause of the Effect; the Materials of which the Effect itself consists, the *material* Cause; the Qualities and Properties united in the Efficient are that which denominate him the *Maker*, and, consider'd only as the Maker, are *his formal* Cause; and those superinduc'd Qualities and Modifications of the Effect, the *formal* Cause of that Effect. Thus, in a Watch; the Conveniencies of knowing the hour and minute of the Day or Night, the day or night of the year, consider'd or thought on by an Artist, are its *final* Cause; the Brass, Silver, Iron and other things are its *material* Cause; the Powers or Qualities and Properties acquir'd and exercis'd by the Artist denominate him the *Efficient*; the new Modification superinduc'd in the Materials, when fitly put together, are its *formal* Cause: so the *Efficient* and *final*, the *material* and *formal* Causes and Effect are only the names of some Substance or other given them on the account of their *active* or *passive* Qualities and Powers.

Simple Ideas or Qualities, neither Causes or Effects.

All this was necessary for the clear stating the Notions of Causes and Effects, which my Author omitted, and to rectifie a mistake of his: for he says (tho inconsistently with his own Principles) the *simple Idea* of Heat is the Cause, and the *simple Idea* of Fluidity in Wax is the Effect; whereas he owns, in another place, Heat not to be *in* the Fire itself, but only is the name of our *Perception* of a certain Motion in its Particles, and therefore to be sure cannot be the Cause of an Effect in another Substance; neither can the *simple Idea* or single Quality be the Effect, because it can't be produc'd alone, but must be only the Modification of the Substance of Wax: and therefore properly Cause and Effect are only names of Substances given them for *active* or *passive* Qualities in one or the other.

Creation, Generation, Vegetation, making, altering, how distinguish'd.

II. From hence 'tis easie to form distinct Notions of Creation, Generation, Vegetation, making and altering. When a thing is wholly made new, so that *no* part thereof existed *before*, then the *Production* of that Effect is call'd *Creation*, and it seems as easie to conceive *that Production*, as any *other* single Production. For tho we cannot conceive how *Nothing* can become a *Substance*, yet we can conceive it as well as how *no Motion* should become *Motion*, or *no Thought* become *Thought*. The Cause and Effect are equally intelligible in all three cases, but the *manner* of the Production of Thought, Motion and Substance equally unintelligible. 2. When a new Substance is produc'd made up of Particles which did all of them *exist before*, tho' not so combin'd and modified; and when the Production is wrought in the *Course of Nature*, by an internal Principle of Life operating by insensible ways, 'tis call'd *Generation*, such as of the Bodies of Men and Animals. 3. When a Substance is produc'd by an insensible Apposition and Union of *congeneal* Parts, that is, of the same or not much differing Figure, Motion and Position, then 'tis call'd *Growth* or *Vegetation*; as in the Bodies of Men, Brutes, Minerals and Plants. 4. When the Apposition is sensible, and the parts sensibly distinguishable, or Heterogeneous, then such Production is call'd *making* or *forming*, as in all *artificial* Bodies. 5. When a single Quality is produc'd in a Substance, whose parts were sensibly united, and that

that Substance distinguishable from other substances by Properties or Qualities before, then such Production is call'd only *Alteration*; tho by the way it must be noted, that a new Substance is then as much produc'd in that which is commonly call'd *Alteration*, as in *Generation*, *Vegetation* or *Making*; only with this difference, that in those three Productions the *Alteration* in the Substances is *greater*, that is, in more Properties and Qualities than *one*: but in this, call'd *Alteration*, 'tis only in *one* Quality, or perhaps in the degree or Modification of *one* Quality. But in all of them the Cause and the Effect are properly Substances; because no one or more Qualities, Properties or Powers can produce Effects, except they be united to Substances; nor no single Quality or Power can be effected or produc'd separate from that Substance of which it's a Mode, as before explain'd.

III. My Author well observes, that *Time*, *Place* and *Magnitude* are capable of manifold Relations, and the Answers to the Questions, *How long? When? Where? How big?* are always *relative*. Suppose one ask, *how long* a Prince reign'd, and the Answer be, twenty Years; that Answer is *relative*, tho I think not for the reason as he expresses it, because twenty years is equal to twenty Revolutions of the Sun; for that's but interpreting what is meant by the words *twenty Years* (for tho Equality is generally a mark of Relation, yet in that 'tis not; for 'tis no more than saying twenty Years is twenty such Revolutions) but because twenty years, in the Mind of him that uses those words, are compar'd to a greater or lesser Duration, and that is the *Comparison* that makes the *Relation*, and not the other. So again when 'tis ask'd *when* such a thing was done, the answer be, twenty years since, that's *Relative* for the same reason, as my Author rightly expresses it, because the Answer implies a *Comparison* to a greater or less Duration; and from hence it is that we don't say the Sun, the Stars, a Diamond or a Ruby are *old*, because we can't readily conceive any Duration exceeding theirs; but if we could, then they might be said to be *young* in Comparison with that whose Duration has been longer. Tho' *Young* and *Old* are Relatives generally, when the things we call so are compar'd with things of their own kind, as appears manifestly when we say, a Man is old at Seventy, and a Dog at Seven years, and so of all other particulars. Thus again the Answer to the Question, *where* a person or thing is, is *relative*: for suppose the Answer be, *above* or *below*, on the *left* Hand or the *right*, in *London* or *York*, no Man will be the wiser, unless he can compare the place to some other place, to which the Answer is related. In like manner, as to *Magnitude*. If the Question be, *how big* a thing is, the Answer will be insignificant, to say it's great or small, unless we compare it, if great, with something less; if small, with something bigger: so in short, when any one or more words cannot be understood (how positive soever they seem) without *comparing* the thing they signify with something else, then that word or words are *Relative*, and that *one* mark duly observ'd to understand *Relation* is as good as an hundred.

Time, Place, Magnitude capable of relation, tho the words seem positive that express them, as appears by the answers of questions about them.

How to know what relative.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

I. THE kind of Relation which my Author is now for stating is, What it is that makes or denominates any thing the *same* with or *diverse* from itself at several times. But in order to the clearer understanding what that sort of *Relation*, Identity and Diversity is, and what his Notion of them is, and to obviate or answer the false, and, as I conceive, very dangerous Inferences which may be drawn from his Principles, it will be proper to premise the common, and, so far as I have learnt, the *true*, state of this *Relation*. But because the word *same* is used and attributed to things with great Latitude, and as the things themselves are different, so they are said to be the same with themselves at several times, for different reasons,

What kind of Relation is here enquired into.

reasons, it will be absolutely necessary to go over all the particular sorts of things, and assign the several reasons of that Denomination; which I shall but just mention, because the farther Explication and Proof thereof will occur in the examination of my Author's Notion, and Inferences from them.

The several reasons why one thing is said to be the same with itself at different times.

II. First then, 'tis commonly suppos'd (but whether truly or not is not very material in this enquiry) that there are but two sorts of things in the world; *Substances* and their *Modes*, and of Substances again but two sorts, *Spiritual* or *Immaterial*, *Corporeal* or *Material*. And of the Modes of *spiritual* Substances they may be all reduc'd to that of *Thinking*, because all the Operations of Intellectual Agents seem to be but several Modifications of *Thinking*. And all the Modes of *corporeal* Substances may be reduc'd to these four; *Motion*, or the absence of it, *Figure*, *Bulk*, and *Position*. For all other Qualities by which Bodies are distinguish'd from one another, such as Hardness, Softness, Colours, Smells, Tastes, Sounds, seem to arise only from the Variety of those four or five (if we count *Rest* positive, as I see no reason to count otherwise.)

Why God the same always.

1. Then GOD is commonly and by all agreed to be the *same* with himself at all times; because all the Perfections of his Nature are always the same, and there is no room for a dispute about that.

Why intelligent substances the same at different times.

2. Particular finite Intelligent Substances are reckon'd commonly the *same* with themselves at different times; because all their Intellectual Operations proceed from the same Principle, or beginning Cause of those Operations.

Why single corporeal substances the same.

3. Single corporeal Substances are call'd the *same* at different times, when all the Properties and Qualities are combin'd which make and denominate them what they are, or distinguish them from all other particular Substances. Thus a piece of Wax is said to be the same piece at different times, if there be no Augmentation or Diminution of its Quantity; if it retain all the Properties and Qualities which made and denominated it Wax: tho it may be alter'd in its figure by different Impressions, in its Hardness or its Place; because none of those alter the Reason of its Name or Properties by which it's denominated Wax.

Why Modes the same.

4. The particular Mode of a thinking Substance is commonly said to be the *same* with itself at different times, when 'tis the Action of the same Intelligent Substance, and proceeds from the same Cause or Reason; so I may be said to have the same thoughts of a man or any thing else to day which I had yesterday, if my Mind, the thinking Substance in me, be the same, and nothing has occur'd to alter my thoughts in the Object, but rather to continue them. The *particular Mode* of a single Substance is the *same*, when there is no sensible Alteration of it in that Substance: The *Magnitude* the *same*, when no sensible Augmentation or Diminution of its quantity: The *Figure* the *same*, if all its parts keep the same Distance from each other: The *Position* the *same*, if all its parts have the same Relation to and Distance from such other Body, which is look'd upon as quiescent: Its *Motion* the *same*, if it have the same degree of Velocity, if it describe the same Line, if the external Cause of it be the same.

Why artificial things the same at different times.

5. As to *artificial* things, this word *same* is used with great Latitude; but always for some notable and leading reason. An House, a Block, a Ship are said to be the *same*, each with itself, at different times, tho there be an Alteration of most, nay, some times of all the Materials. Suppose an House consist of twenty several Apartments; if these be all pull'd down and rebuilt at twenty several times with new Materials, it will nevertheless be call'd all the while and at last the *same* House. And the like for a Clock, it will be call'd the same if all the Materials were chang'd from what they were at first. The Ship preserv'd at *Athens* famous for *Theseus* Expedition, was call'd the *same* Ship, tho all the Materials were new, not so much as one old board left. But the reason of this was, because the Alteration was made insensibly, almost gradually, successively; by which means it came to pass that there was no reason to alter the name at one time more than another; each new Addition perhaps being not comparable to what remain'd of the old, and that which was at first new was reckon'd part of the old, so all kept the same name.

6. The reason of the *Identity* of Vegetables is much the same. An Oak is said to be the *same* when just sprouted, as 'tis when an hundred, nay, some Woodmen say, a thousand year old; because they will be so long growing and so long decaying in some soils. For tho there is not perhaps so much as one Particle the same at last, as there was at first, yet because the *Contexture* or *Configuration* of the new and old is much the same, and the Apposition of new and Diminution of the old Particles is *insensible*, it will retain the same name. Identity of Vegetables.

7. The *Identity* of *Animals* seems grounded upon another and that widely different reason; namely upon the same inward Principle of Life and Actions; because we find by Experience, that *Nature*, with all the helps of *Human Arts*, can't make a new Ear, Leg or any *organical* part of an Animal, tho it may and do's in Vegetables. Identity of Animals.

8. *Human Identity* is preserv'd by the same Principle of *vital* and *intellectual* Operations, and the same body, notwithstanding all the gradual successive and often insensible Alteration of it in growing and decaying. Human Identity.

9. *Personal Identity* also in the same Principle of *intellectual* Actions and Operations. Personal.

All these particulars, but especially the two last, will be farther explain'd and prov'd in the Examination of our Author's Notion of them, which is quite different; which I should now enter upon, but that I find it necessary, for the obviating Objections or abbreviating my Answers, to give an account of the Grounds we go upon, in making *Suppositions* of Effects, as *possible*. And first, I conceive, we never suppose any Effect *possible*, but in these three cases. 1. When the like Effect has been wrought. 2. When an Effect, tho not of the same, yet of another kind, has been wrought, which requir'd as much Power to produce, as that we suppose. 3. When the certainty of a particular future Effect, is discover'd to us by special Revelation. Upon these three Grounds we reckon the Resurrection *possible*: and tho we commonly say indeed, G O D can do any thing which do's not imply a *Contradiction*; yet, if he has neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily discover'd to us that such or such an Effect is possible, how shall we do to know whether it imply a *Contradiction* or not, except he has done the like in the common course of his Providence; or especially reveal'd it to us that he will? For that's abstracting the Divine Power from his *Wisdom*, and making any thing possible which we in our own fancies can suppose. And this Caution his Reader will find proper to be arm'd with, to defend himself from those Inferences which may be drawn from his extravagant Suppositions; and which, if I be not more scar'd than hurt, may wound him in the grand Articles both of Natural and Christian Religion. And I had rather be too cautious than too credulous in such cases. And now I come to examine my Author's Notions of *Identity* and *Diversity*. Why we say effects are possible.

III. First then, I own the Truth of my Author's own words in the first Section: That when the *Ideas* (that is the Properties or Qualities of any thing, consider'd as in the Object) don't vary at all from what they were, when we consider'd its former Existence, and compare with the present, then that thing may be call'd the *same*: and from thence I infer, that he has made a blunder in placing the *Principium Individuationis* meerly in *Existence*. For, tho' it were admitted (tho that can hardly be) that bare *Existence* determins a thing to a certain Time and Place, because no two Bodies can be at the same in one Place, any more than one can be in two places at the same time; yet the bare *Existence* can't be the *Principium Individuationis*, or make it that individual thing that it is; because no man can have any *Idea* or Conception at all of a thing barely as *existent*; and therefore, can't say 'tis the same with itself at different times; or that its *Idea* has not varied from its bare *Existence*, of which he can have no *Idea*. To judge that a thing is the same with itself at different times, a man must have some Conception of what that is at one time, that he may compare it with itself at another: but that he can't possibly have, that has no Object for his thoughts, but bare *Existence*. And the very Instance he has fram'd plainly discovers, he could not prove *Existence*. This Author's Notions of the several sorts of Identity examin'd.
Meer existence not the Principium Individuationis.

istence the *Principium Individuationis* without making an impossible Supposition to help him out. Suppose, says he, an Atome, that is a continued body with an *immutable Superficies*. Now how can any man suppose it possible for a body to have an *immutable Superficies*, unless he had divine Revelation for it, (unless this be the same Atome now more at liberty which having got into a corner in his argument for *Gods Existence*, made it confess it was not *God* tho it be :) for an Adamant or Ruby, as lasting as they are, can't be suppos'd to have an *immutable Superficies*. For doubtless there is some Alteration in their *minute* parts, how gradual or insensible soever, else they would be everlasting ; which no body can believe, without supposing the same causes, which concur'd to the gradual forming them, have not the same efficacy to dissolve them : besides the bare *Existence* of the Atome could not make it the same with itself at different times, but the Figure of it ; and if we suppose *that* the same *immutably*, we don't only suppose an Impossibility, which is a small matter with my Author, but suppose that very thing it was to prove. For, if it be immutable, it must be the same, without all question ; besides the very Alteration of its Position to the Eye, might produce a different Sensation of colour, or in his Language, a different *Idea* : and at that rate it would be the same, and yet a different Atome at the same time. And thence I conclude that the *Principium Individuationis* in any Body is its *Figure, Position, Bulk, Motion* or *Rest* of all its Particles, and not its bare *Existence*. Those combin'd make it what it is at any one time, and make it the same with itself at other times.

Identity of vegetables do's not require a common Principle of life.

2. The *Identity* of *Vegetables* he prettily indeed describes thus ; That a Plant is the same at one time with itself that it was at another, by the Organization of its parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common life, tho' that life be communicated to Particles of matter virally united to it in a like Organization. Now I doubt that it's insinuated here, that Vegetables have a *common life*, on purpose to make them the nearer akin to Animals ; and those again to have the like *common life* (with *Perception* into the bargain) to make them Cozen-Germans to Men ; and so by an handsom insensible Confusion Men shall be only Vegetables a little more conveniently organiz'd ; which he himself tho' in finer words do's in effect own, when he makes *Embryos* to be Vegetables, and *Infants* Brutes. And therefore, I conceive, that a particular Vegetable may properly be said the same with itself at different times, without a *common life*. For, I presume, it is now commonly agreed that Stones, Coals, Gold and Silver and other Minerals were not created just such as they are found in the Mines, but grow by degrees under ground as Plants above. Else the *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*, and the *Dutch* at *Borneo* in the *East-Indies* have been very impolitick in letting their Mines of Silver and Gold grow by degrees, and be concocted into greater Perfection and unmix'd Purity, as we do our Oak-Saplins to their strength and firmness ; and therefore, I suppose, the *continual successive*, tho' *insensible*, Apposition and Union of new Particles of the same Contexture and Configuration, help'd by the *solar* and *central* Heat, is sufficient for Plants being call'd the *same* young and old, without a common Principle of Life, as well as it do's of Minerals.

Identity of Animals require a common Principle of life.

3. The *Identity* of meer *Animals* he reckons is preserv'd the same way, (that is) by the Organization of their Parts in one coherent Body, all partaking of the same *common life* ; which I should rather, for a reason afterwards given, have express'd thus : That a particular Animal was the same at different times, an Horse, suppose, young and old, fat and lean, by having its parts *united* to the same *inward* Principle or Cause of life. But he endeavours to make good this Notion by comparing Animals to *Machines*, particularly to a Watch, which with great formality he defines thus : 'Tis nothing but a fit Organization or Construction of Parts to a certain End, which, when sufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to obtain. Now this Definition will full as well fit a Wheel barrow, or any Engine, as well as a Watch. But let that pass ; for what it wants in the Definition he makes it amends for, by Supposition ; and that is, if this Watch or Wheel-barrow had all its parts repair'd, increas'd and diminish'd, by a constant Addition or Separation

on of insensible parts with one *common Life*, we should have some thing very like the body of an Animal; and he is right in that, it would really be a *living* Watch or Wheel-barrow. But I ask, how comes he to make that Supposition *possible*? Did he ever hear of any such living Engine, or is it reveal'd to him that there can be such an one? I have that 'tis ordinary at *Grand Cairo* in *Ægypt*, and at the *Brill* in *Holland* (and, for all that I know, may be commonly practis'd in other places) by an artificial Oven to supply Incubation in the hatching Chickens; but I never heard of an Art to make Eggs. I have seen a Bitch well and lively, which, I was told by them that were Eye-witnesses, had its Spleen taken out a year before; but I never heard it was possible by Art or Nature to produce a *new* Spleen to partake of *common Life*. And therefore, tho the comparing Animals to Machines may pass for a good Similitude, as it do's of silly men to Asses, yet it's no proof that it's possible to be such. Animals therefore, I think, may be suppos'd to have an *inward* and *incommunicable* Principle of Life, that denominates them the same; and in that respect are different from Plants whose Parts, in the common course of Nature, can grow again when lopp'd off.

But, 4. from thence he thinks it may be safely infer'd that the *Identity of Man* is nothing else but a Participation of the same *common Life* by constantly fleeting Particles of matter in succession vitally united to the same organiz'd Body. And thus, without any violence to his true meaning, Man is only a certain organiz'd Machin with a *common Life*, such as Brutes and Vegetables have; but with this Excellency above them, that by the *curious* frame of his Organs, he can generally attain the Art of prating, walking and talking, and thereby can attain to more Knowledge by Education, than Horses, Trees and Wheel-barrowes can, for want of such *curious Organization*. And he is so confident, this is the true Notion of *Human Identity*, that any one, he says, that offers to state it otherwise will find it *hard* (he means *impossible*) to make an *Embryo* one of years, mad and sober the same man, by any Supposition that will not make it *possible* (in his own words) for *Seth*, *Ismael*, *Socrates*, *Pilate*, *St. Austin* and *Cesar Borgia* to be the same man. And this, I confess, would be a scurvy Inconvenience. And he endeavours to confirm it with this reason, because there can be nothing in the Nature of *Matter* to hinder the same Individual Spirit to be united to different Bodies in the different Ages in which these persons were suppos'd to live: but here I set my finger and stop. I say, the *Identity of man* consists in the same Individual Spirit united to the same Body, however the several *parts* of that Body may have insensibly *chang'd* in the several successive moments and states of Life. And, tho it were allow'd possible, that none of the same Particles, which compose the body when *old*, were the very same of which it consisted when *young* or an *Embryo*; yet by being *united* to the same Soul, performing much the same Functions, and having its parts insensibly increas'd or diminish'd, 'tis the same Body to all the main Effects, Uses and Purposes that a body can serve for; and may, with far more propriety of Speech, be so call'd, than any particular Animal, Tree or River is call'd the same Animal, Tree or River, notwithstanding the Alteration of some or perhaps all its parts. And yet all this will not involve me in the necessity of owning that two men in different ages should for the like reason be the same man. And the difference in the two cases is manifestly this: A man is the same in the different Moments, States and Circumstances of his life, because in each of them he is the same Soul; and we find it certain in matter of fact, that the same Soul may be united to *different* Particles of *Matter* successively, gradually, as the Body grows or decays; but we never yet heard of *one* Soul united to *two* complete Bodies of human shape, neither was it ever reveal'd to us by any person that could prove his Inspiration by altering the course of Nature. Therefore, tho we have Reason grounded on Experience in the course of Nature for one, yet we have none for the other; and therefore must look upon the Supposition of its *Possibility* to be *fictionous* and very *unphilosophical*. For, tho' it do's not become us by our own Fancies to limit Almighty Power, by saying this or that thing is impossible (as in this case, that a Soul can-

Identity of Man something more than matter organiz'd in the same manner.

It consists in the same principle of intellectual Actions.

and this Author's Objection answer'd.

The Objection grounded up n an imaginary Supposition.

not

not be united to *several Bodies* in human Shape) yet 'tis Madness for us to suppose, *God* can do every thing which *Power* unassisted or unguided by *Wisdom* might otherwise extend to : because thereby we abstract infinite *Power* from infinite *Wisdom*, we make that possible, which *God* neither has given us any Evidence to believe is so, by what he *has* done, or reveal'd to us he ever *will* ; and we have no Measure of *Possibility*. but that. For we can no more tell what is consistent with *infinite Wisdom* to do, without pretending to it ourselves, than we can the extent of *infinite Power*, without being infinitely powerful ourselves. As to the particular now under Consideration, we are sufficiently satisfied by the *common* Course of Nature, that 'tis possible for *one* Soul or Spirit to be united to *several* Particles of Matter, gradually, successively, insensibly increas'd or diminish'd : but for *one* Soul to be at several times united to *two* or *more* intirely organiz'd Bodies, is a matter of Fact which is quite out of our element to judge whether possible or not ; for we dare not presume to be wiser than *God* has made us, or believe more than what he has, in that state wherein we are, given us Reason or Revelation for.

Another Objection of this Author's answer'd, because grounded on an imaginary supposition.

However to run down and trample under foot the old and honest Definition of *Man* ; A reasoning Animal ; to make the way clearer to his own new one that he is only a *finely organiz'd* and well shap'd *Machin*, he tells us that whosoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, tho it had no more reason all its life than a Cat or Parrot, would call him still a *Man*. Or whosoever should hear a Cat or Parrot discourse, reason or Philosophize (to use his own very words) he would still call them by those names ; *Ergo* Reasoning is no part of the Definition of *Man*, but Shape only. But if there be any such Ideots, Cats or Parrots, they must be of his own acquaintance in the unknown parts of *America* ; and till he produce some such for Sights, we must take them for Creatures of his *own*, and not the Author of *Natures* ; And therefore Inferences, grounded upon such Suppositions, meer *Romance*.

Personal Identity not merely consciousness proved, and objections answer'd.

IV. Fifthly, as for *Personal Identity* : Whereas most men judge, that one Person is the same with himself at different times, only from the same Individual Principle of all his Intellectual Operations, my Author judges 'tis only from *Consciousness* : and in order to the making that out the better he frames a Definition to fit his own turn. A *Person*, he says, is a *thinking intelligent* Being, that has Reason and Reflexion, and can consider himself as himself, the same *thinking thing* in different times and places. To which I have nothing to except, but that it's too long, and seems too much swell'd, on purpose to answer his *Idea*. For those words, *An intelligent Being, that can reason and reflect*, are big enough to contain all the rest. But, instead of following all his turnings, I shall take this plain Method.

1. I will endeavour to prove that *Consciousness* alone do's not constitute *personal Identity* ; and subjoin the *ill consequences* of his manner of placing it in *Consciousness* only.

2. To answer all the Objections he has framed against the common Notion, and the Arguments he brings to confirm his new one.

First argument.

1. *Consciousness* is nothing else but *knowing our own Actions*, and is only different from *Remembrance* in this Circumstance, that whereas *Remembrance* is the minds taking notice or knowing its own Actions after the interruption of other thoughts, *Consciousness* is the Minds taking notice or knowing its own acts without the interposal of other thoughts. And if it be so, as I think all the world agrees it is, then *Consciousness* can be only a Power, or the repeted acts of a Power ; but neither Power or repeted acts of a Power can be the Thing or Substance itself that has that Power or exerts those Operations ; and consequently can't be that from which a Person is denominated the same with himself at different times, unless we could suppose the Power to be the *Substance* of which it is a Power, or an Action to be the *Agent* itself ; which is impossible.

Second argument.

2. We cannot be *conscious* without a previous act of which the Mind is said to be conscious. 'Tis as impossible to imagine *Consciousness* without something to be conscious of, as 'tis to conceive a line of *Reflexion* without a line of *Incidence*, a Ball's rebounding without its falling. And if so, then *Consciousness* alone cannot constitute

stitute the Person the same with himself, because at least that antecedent *Act* of Sensation or Perception must be allow'd to have a share in that Composition of the Intelligent Being.

3. *Consciousness* alone can't unite the several Acts of an Intelligent Being, with-
out the *Substance* of which it is only the Mode or Power. My Author has witi-
tily ridiculed those Quacks in Physick and Ethicks who have spoke of *Faculties*,
as if they were distinct *Agents*; and we hoped he would not have fallen into the
like Disease in representing *Consciousness* as an *Agent*, which is only the Mode or
Faculty of the *Mind*, which is really the *Agent*. *Consciousness* is only the repe-
ted and successive *Acts* of the *Mind*, by which it takes notice of its own former
and successive *Actions*: but *Actions* can't unite themselves; it must be the *Agent*
that must do that: Just in that respect as 'tis in Bodies. There may be Moti-
ons of different *degrees* of Velocity, and in differing *Lines* in the same Body at
several times; but these Motions can't unite themselves; it must be the Body in
which they are or can be united. So in this case, there may be several Intelle-
ctual Operations or Thoughts, but it must be the *Substance*, the Spirit of which
those Operations are the Modes, that must unite them. As no Body can be in
two places (as quick as the Motion may be) at the same time, or can describe
two Lines contrary ways at the same instant, so no *finite* Spirit (so far as we can
conceive) as quick as its Thoughts succeed each other, can think of two things,
remember or be conscious of them in the same moment. And therefore that which
must make these distinct and successive Acts of *Consciousness* to be the *Actions*
of one Being, must be something distinct from the *Actions* themselves: And that
must and can be nothing else but the *Mind* itself. And therefore 'tis *that* deno-
minates the Person the same with himself at different times.

Third Argument.

But here I am stop't with two puzzling Questions, and, as my Author thinks, Two puzzling
unanswerable, and on which all the rest of his Arguments turn, for *Consciousness* Questions of
being that alone which constitutes *Personal Identity*; 1. Whether if the same *Substance* the Authors
be changed, it can be the same *Person*? and 2. If it remain the same, it can be diffe- answer'd.
rent *Persons*? To which I make these two plain Answers: To the *first*, that if the
Thinking Substance, the Principle of the Intellectual Operations, be changed, it can't
be the same Person. To the *second*, that, if it be not changed, 'tis the same Person.

To which first Question he frames two Answers, according to the two different
Opinions which People may have concerning the Nature of a *thinking Substance*. His own An-
As for them that place *Thinking* in a purely material Animal Constitution void of swers retorted.
Spirit, he reckons them sure of his side, that *Consciousness* only makes *Personal I-*
identity: and I know nothing to the contrary but they may be very firm to him;
for he may be more conscious of their Thoughts and Vote, than I can pretend to
be. But I can tell him, that if the fleeting Animal Spirits, be the *Soul*; the Intel-
ligent Being; there will be as many *Persons* as there are distinct Animal Spirits or
Particles of *refin'd* Matter. For with all their jostling one another they can ne-
ver make each other *conscious* of their several Motions or Actions: and so for
one *Person* we may have such a *numerous* Club of them as all the Ventracles of
the Brain can hold; and as often as they *change*, which 'tis likely is almost e-
very Moment of Life, at least as often as the man takes a Nod, there may be
Persons enough to people the world, in every single Body, without going to
the Moon or the rest of the Planets for Inhabitants. But as for those that place
Thinking in an *immaterial* Substance only, he says, before they can deal with
those *Materialists*, they must shew why *Personal Identity* cannot be preserv'd in *va-*
riety of Spirits as well as *Animal Identity* is in *variety* of material Substan-
ces. And there's Work enough cut out for the *Immaterialists*. But I shall only tell
him for the present, that, if that be all, not so much as *Animal Identity* is pre-
serv'd in the change of *material* Substances, except that change be *gradual* and *in-*
sensibly successive in the Course of Nature: For in this part of the Country we
have not learnt the Art of setting on a Dogs Ears again, if they be cut off; and
therefore, for want of Skill in imitating Nature in that *mechanical* Manufacture,

we call the Dogs, when five year old, by the same Name they had when Puppies. Tho I doubt, if their Ears should grow again, we should be cruelly tempted to think them *other* Dogs and call them by *new* Names. And therefore, till he improves the world in that Art, and can tell us too how *Immaterial* Substances grow by degrees in all their Dimensions, we hope he will not expect we should tell him how *Personal Identity* is preserv'd in the change of *immaterial* Substances all at once. But, if he can do those Feats (tho that will be work enough) we shall still retain as good reason to call that growing *immaterial* Substance the *same*, as we have to call *Animals* the *same*, notwithstanding that gradual Growth of their Bodies.

The two conditions which this Auth. proposes for the resolving this Question unreasonable, and the dangerous consequences explain'd.

V. However, he declares, Sect. XV. that it cannot be resolv'd, whether if the *thinking* Substance be changed, it be the same Person, unless we could tell what kind of Substances those are that *think*, and whether the *Consciousness* of past Actions can't be *transfer'd* from one thinking Substance to another. As to the former part of this Condition, I presume no body pretends to know what kind of Substances those are which *think*; because, if *thinking* of all sort be abstracted, there remains nothing in any Intelligent Being, which we can conceive, and because there is no such sort of Substance in the world: and in this they agree with my Authors own Sentiments; and therefore that must continue irresoluble. And as to the latter part of the Condition, he declares and endeavours to prove by *Dreams*, that it's possible for *Consciousness* of past Actions to be annex'd to different Persons: And thence it fairly follows, that, according to his Principles of *Philosophy*, it cannot be resolv'd; but that a person (tho never so good) may be everlastingly *miserable* for another persons faults, by having the *Consciousness* of those faulty Actions annex'd to his Soul; or that a person (tho never so bad) may be everlastingly *happy*, by having the *Consciousness* of another persons *virtuous* Actions tack'd to his Soul. I shall not need to explain the venomous Influence of such Doctrines upon the Vitals of Religion and Morality; but shall not here insist upon that sort of Argument, because ineffectual with those that are unconcern'd for Religion or Morality, as they relate to another Life; and therefore at present only ask such, whether if *Consciousness* be only a Power or *repeated* Acts of *knowing*, they can conceive it without a Substance or something, call it Soul or Body, what they please, wherein that Power is, or of which that *Consciousness* is the *successive* and *repeated* Action? 2. Whether they are or can be *conscious* of that which they never did, or judge they did that, of which they never thought of doing? and 3. Whether they can imagine *Thought* without a *Substance*, any more than they can *Motion* or *Figure* without a *Body* moving or figured? And, if it be so, as I take it to be the sense of all the world, then *Consciousness* neither can constitute the *Person*, nor can be *transfer'd* from one Soul to another, any more than one mans *Pain* in his Foot, Tooth or Head can be *transfer'd* to anothers. But I must do my Author so much right as to own, he has attempted to find a *Salvo* for one of the two Consequences at least before-mention'd, for he seem'd aware of them: namely, by telling us, the *Goodness* of GOD is the only Security we can have against such fatal Errors. But I crave leave to tell him, that Plaister is not broad nor effectual enough to cover and cure that *Wound*; for wise men don't care for abstracting the *Goodness* of GOD from his *Wisdom*, any more than they do his *Power* from his *Goodness*. For, if they offer the *former*, all men whatever may reasonably hope to be equally *happy*; and if the *latter*, all men may fear to be equally *miserable*: and tho his *Salvo* was admitted to give some Ease to good mens *Fears*, it will also give Life to bad mens *Hopes*; and therefore they choose rather to consider the *divine* Perfections as *equally essential* and all *united*, and thereby endeavour to form Thoughts *worthy* of a GOD, and *sutable* to the Declaration he has made of his own Nature by the light of Reason and Revelation also. And to this again I must add one Corollary which may abate the good mans *Hopes*, according to this Scheme, that, if all Matter be *equally capable* in its own Nature to be transform'd into any Mould, Figure and Bulk (as he elsewhere owns) then by considering the *Goodness* and *Power* of GOD, abstracted from *Wisdom*, no good man will have better reason to believe

The Author's Salvo for those consequences insufficient.

believe or hope, he himself shall be eternally happy, than his Horse or Pump; for when *they* have attain'd that Figure and Motion of their parts, with a parcel of moveable *Consciousness* tack'd to them, they may be as happy as the best Soul in the world. And therefore if his Principles of *Philosophy* will fairly admit of such Inferences in *Divinity*, they ought to be reputed *dangerous*, and I hope will appear to be such and *false* too, even in *civil*, as well as relating to matters meerly *Religious*, upon these following Considerations.

VI. 1. If *Consciousness* only make a person the *same*, and the want of it *different* at several times, then no Parents have a wise reason to own their Children; when *Infants*, they can't be *conscious* of what they perceiv'd when *Embryo's*; when one and twenty, what they did when *Infants*; and consequently cannot with any *Consistency* with this Principle, be the *same* persons for want of *Consciousness*, and so every unnatural Parent will have a clever and Philosophical Reason for disowning his own Child.

Arguments that consciousness alone does not make the same person or want of it different persons.

2. If *Consciousness* only make a Person the *same*, and the want of it a *different* Person, then no Courts of *Humane* Judicature can be justly establish'd. For how can any Judge or Jury be certain, that a man (during the Commission of any Fact, or entring into any Covenants) was sleepy or broad awake, sober or mad, sedate or passionate (for other Passions besides Anger, such as Envy, &c. are kinds of Madnesses for the present) sober or drunk, tenacious or forgetful? For any of these two Circumstances may so alter the State of the Case, as to denominate him a *different* person; if the want of *Consciousness* can make him so. I have nothing to say against that good-natured Maxim, *Ampliandi sunt favores*, when a mans Life is concern'd. But if these proverbial Speeches which my Author mentions, that the man was *besides himself*, he was *not himself*, were so stretch'd as to be taken in their full *Latitude*, I can't see that, with another pull, any sort of Crime is justly punishable: for *Virtus*, says old *Tully*, is deriv'd from *Vir*; and a man is *not himself*, acts *below himself*, and the *dignity* of his Nature, when he do's an ill thing; and therefore a Drunkard and a Murderer can't be *himself*, when he becomes guilty of such Facts. And I have been told by an Ingenious Gentleman and great Philosopher too, that in *Portugal* a man who has been once found drunk is, for some such reason, never admitted to be a Witness in any Court of Judicature.

3. Suppose a person be decay'd in his Memory and Intellectuals, shall he not be reputed the *same* person for defect of *Consciousness*? Shall such a person be reckon'd no better than a Cockle or an Oyster? (my Author's own Phrase in another place.) And if the Laws of the Land had not secured them, would the Laws of Nature allow us to deal with them accordingly, tho' our own Parents? If you'll leave, Sir, no rational Ground for *Religion*, leave us however a little Room for Good-Nature and Humanity. Honest *Solon*, who was counted no Fool in his age, thought it needless to make a Law against Parricide; because *Nature* had sufficiently guarded Parents against that; and has *Philosophy*, tho' refin'd by the best-natur'd Institutions which Heaven could afford, by the Teachings of the most Glorious Person that ever appear'd upon Earth, no less than the Eternal Son of Love made it necessary now to make Laws against Parricide and Senescide? I have of *three* Persons in this Age, that have been the Honours of it, who, before they went off, were much decay'd in their Memory and Intellectuals; whom I should not name, but out of a singular Honour to their Memory; and the Truth is, it would be impertinent to my purpose, if they had not been extraordinary, Dr. *Henry More*, Dr. *John Person* Bishop of *Chester*, Dr. *Seth Ward* Bishop of *Salisbury*; this Triumvirate, which all the learned world admir'd for their incomparable Learning, Wisdom and Piety, were not very far above the state of Children before they died: Were they not therefore the *same* Persons? Surely the *same* divine Soul which acted their Bodies, as awkward as they were, the *same* Principle of all their Intellectual Operations was enough to denominate them *such*? Surely they had nothing to wish for, but such glorious Bodies as all good men hope for, to make

heard

make them not only the *same Persons*, but more *perfect Images* of their Maker. And, if it cannot be proved by Principles of Philosophy, they were, whilst alive, the *same Persons*, I wish it could; for I am more ambitious of the Honour of being a Fool for thinking they were so, and honouring them accordingly, than a Philosophical Contemner of their Persons.

4. If the Laws of the Land had not, it seems, hamper'd us, according to this Scheme of Philosophy, we might as wisely bury our Friends when fast *asleep*, as when they are *dead*. For when they are fast *asleep*, they are no *thinking Substances*, they are not *conscious* of their waking Thoughts, they are not the *same Persons*. 'Tis Charity and Generosity in their Friends to hope they will get *new Souls*, but no Injustice to drown or bury their *old Bodies*.

And now I am ready with my Endeavours to answer all the Arguments which this Author has framed, either against the *Identity of Persons* consisting in the being the same Spirit or Principle of Intellectual Operations, or for the proving *Consciousness* the sole Reason of that *Identity*.

The Author's
Arguments
retorted.

VII. The first I meet with is in Sect. XI. where for the proving every man is himself by *Consciousness* only, he alleges, that a Limb, whilst vitally united to the Body, is a part of our *conscious selves*; but after 'tis cut off, 'tis no more so than any other matter with which we have no Communication. But I answer, that, whilst it was vitally united to the rest of the Body, it was no more a part of our *conscious selves*, than our Blood is. No Part, nor indeed the *whole Body*, is any more then, than the Soul's Instrument in its Operations, does not *think*, is not *conscious* of any of its Actions; the Eye does not see, nor the Ear hear, they are but *Natures Spectacles*, Microscopes, Telescopes or Otacousticon's, if I may be allow'd the Freedom of a Metaphor. And, if my Author had not been too quick for me, I shoud have made this rather an Argument to prove that *animus cuiusque est is quisque*, because the Man is the same after his Limb's cut off, than the contrary.

The second is, that in a Dream a man *thinks* he did a good or an ill Action, which he never did: and therefore *Consciousness* is annexable to other Agents than the real one. *Ans^r*. 'Tis true a man may be deceiv'd at present in a Dream, but I never heard that any Man ever dream'd, that he did that which at the same instant he thought another person did, or that he thought he did that which he did not think he did; I mean, was conscious of that which he did not think he did; and so he was not deceiv'd in his *Consciousness* in the reflex Act; he did not applaud or accuse himself in that which he did not think he did. And therefore, unless it be suppos'd possible to be in an everlasting Dream (which no body will offer to suppose, except such an incomparable Supposer as my Author) there will be no possibility of being made everlastingly *miserable* or *happy*, by such an *erroneous* and *misguided* *Consciousness*.

Thirdly, Those that hold the Pre-existence of Souls do in effect own that *one* Immaterial Spirit may make *more Persons* than *one*, by being united to several Bodies, since its Creation, which they think was coeval with the rest of the Creation, which was finish'd in seven days. And he tells us, he met with one that was a Person of Quality, and that has shew'd himself one of Parts and Learning, that believ'd himself the Soul of *Socrates*; and thence he answers to his own second puzzling Question, that there wanted nothing but a little *Consciousness* of some of *Socrates's* Actions to have made him the *same Person*. And truly I am of his mind, that there wanted nothing but a little of that same, which was impossible to have. But till I hear he had some of that *Consciousness*, I shall reckon that 'tis full out as impossible for *one Soul* to be in *several Bodies* in different Ages, as for two Persons, who coexist, to feel each others Pains or Pleasures; or for another man to write these *same* individual Letters which I have written. And few men I doubt now adays talk of the *Platonical* Pre-existence or the *Pythagorean Metempsychosis*, but only to divert others with the oddness of the Opinions; and the greatest Kindness my Author can do to his Friend's Memory is to think he discours'd of
it

it only to make a little sport with him. For by that means he'll save him from being recorded (if the world knew his Name) for a Fool, which my Author was so wise and kind as not to tell.

5. He thinks it can be *Consciousness* only that can make it easie to conceive the *Resurrection* of the same Person, tho not in a *Body* exactly of the same Make and Parts that he had here ; but I am much afraid, that if there was not the *same* Soul, the *same* Principle of *intellectual* Operations (which he thinks altogether needless,) that tho possibly there might be a new Creation, yet there could not be a *Resurrection*. That *Consciousness* or *Memory*, however impair'd, or in a manner lost, by fits of Sickneſs, may possibly be recover'd we have frequent Demonstrations of ; but we never yet heard of any so happy or unhappy as to gain the *Consciousness* or *Memory* of what they never did, either good or ill ; and therefore that *Consciousness* should be tack'd to a System of Particles without the same *thinking* Substance, we can no more conceive possible ; than how two men should feel the same Pleasure or Pain in one anothers Foot. And therefore we are better contented with the Assurance of a *Resurrection*, which our own Reason and Revelation gives us, than please our selves with an *imaginary* and more than *miraculous* Creation. He often noses us with saying, no man is concern'd for the same Substance, whether Material or Immaterial ; only that he be himself, that shall feel the pleasure ; that's true indeed, but the Question is, how that appears possible to be had without the same Substance ? If he had a thousand pound due to him, he would not be very solicitous indeed, whether it was paid him in Gold or Silver ; but if the man who was to pay it should bring him only a thousand Half-pence, and tell him, that it was but *calling* them *Guineas*, and there's the just Sum. Now that's our case, we don't care for being flamm'd with the *Name* of *Consciousness* tack'd to a System of Pores and Particles ; for we can't conceive it possible they should continue the same conscious intelligent Beings for many hours together ; and therefore rather than run the risque of an *unconceivable* Omnipotence, we'll content our selves with being such as *God* has made us, and his Wisdom and Goodness have already assured us, by Reason and Revelation, that we shall ever continue to be.

6. In this *Consciousness* is founded, he says, all the Right and Justice of Punishment and Reward ; Happiness and Misery being that only for which every man is concern'd, not mattering what becomes of any Substance that has not *Consciousness* joyn'd to it ; and to illustrate this, he says, if all the *Consciousness* that a Person has of all his Actions, was transferr'd to his Finger, and then that Finger was Cut off, the rest of the Body might shift for itself. *Answer.* There is no manner of doubt, but that every *distinct* Soul shall in the future estate be made *conscious* of its *ill*, and every other Soul of its *good* Actions ; else indeed *one* could not be miserable or the *other* happy ; there is, I say, no doubt of that : but the grand Question is, whether this be possible, if the same Soul was *annihilated* ? 'Tis an idle thing to hope for that which *Almighty Wisdom* has given us no sort of Evidence, that 'tis so much as *possible*, any more than he has, that all the Soul, all its Sensations and other Operations can be epitomiz'd in a *Finger*. We believe the Soul is not, or ever will be, limited to the same *individual* Particles of Matter that we have daily *Specimens* of ; no, we hope for *better* Bodies than (so far as we can conceive) this earthly Clay can be form'd into : but we cannot rationally hope, that our little Finger, or a *Compages* of such Matter, shall be *ourselves*, our All ; that would be to put our selves out of the Protection of a *God*, and make our own Fancies not only Idols, but our own Almighty Creators too.

I have not I think escap'd one Period which has the face of an Argument, but only avoided his manifold Repetitions and such Exemplifications which are to the same purpose. The sum of all is this, the Mind or Soul of *Man*, with all its natural Powers united to the same Body, however various that may be in the several Moments and Conditions of life, is that which denominates him the *same Man*, whether an *Embryo* or *Infant*, young or old, sick or healthy, good or bad, wise or unwise, sober or drunk, sleeping or waking, sedate or passionate ; these Variations

ons not creating any more reason why he should be reputed a *different* or *not* the *same* Man, than it do's why a particular Animal, whose Principle of Life is united to different parts of Matter in its several states of Growth and Decay, should be reckon'd a *different* or *not* the *same* Animal. An *intelligent finite* Being (of which only we are supposed to treat) is the *same* person, at different times, by its being or having the *same inward* and *incommunicable* Principle of all its *intellectual* Operations ; but the Variety in *kind* or *degree* of these Operations do's no more alter the reason of its being the *same* at different times than a Loadstone is for its actual drawing Iron oftner or seldomer, more or less ; or a piece of Wax for its actually having had various Impressions upon it : because the *Power* or *Capacity*, the Loadstone or the Wax has, makes it to be what it is ; not the *actual* Exercise of that Power. And as for *Consciousness*, we reckon it nothing else but the *repeted Acts* of the Mind, by which it takes notice of its own and other Operations, its own Sensations, Affirmations, Denials, Doubtings, Meditations, &c. But because the Mind cannot take that notice of such *different* Actions all at *once*, but must do it *successively*, therefore we conceive such Acts of Reflexion need to be *united*, as well as other *different* Operations. For I can no more at once in *one moment* remember or be conscious that I affirm'd this, deny'd that, doubted of a third Proposition, than I could affirm, deny or doubt, all at once. That Substance then, in which these Operations are united, is that we call our *Minds* or *Souls* ; but *Consciousness* is no more that *Mind* or *Soul*, than any other Actions are : no more than Motion, however modified, is the *moving* Body ; only there is this difference indeed, that the *same Motion* is *communicable* to other Bodies, but the *same Thought* or *Action* of the Mind is not. One *Body* may have the *same Motion* now which another had the last moment, but no *Mind* can feel the *same Pain* or *Pleasure*, that I now have, the next moment. Thought, or Consciousness of a Thought, are inseparable and incommunicable.

The Author's
acknowledge-
ment of extra-
vagant Suppo-
sitions.

Towards the conclusion of this Chapter my Author seems to be sensible, that he had made many strange Suppositions ; and it would have been stranger, if he had not thought so : For, if he'll give me leave to make Suppositions, as he has, I can do one feat that will equal, if not exceed, all his : and that is, to make a Pen with a Foot-ball. And I'll desire but liberty of making one Supposition, and that is, that the Foot-ball be as sharp as a Pen-knife ; and, as ridiculous as this is, 'tis but the same Card he has plaid his game with. Here is an *Atome* with an *immutable Superficies* (which it can't have) suppos'd for the proving that bare Existence is the *principium Individuationis* : Here is *Consciousness*, tho' all the world owns, 'tis but the Act or Acts of the Mind, suppos'd *removeable* from one Substance to another, as a Mountebank do's from place to place ; on purpose to prove, that it alone constitutes *personal Identity* : Here is an *Idiot* of twenty year old, suppos'd no wiser than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, and here's a *Cat* or a *Parrot* reasoning and Philosophizing, on purpose to prove that *Man* is not a *reasoning* Animal ; but only the Master-ship of *Mechanism* : Here is a single Finger suppos'd to have all the Actions of the Mind crowded into it, to help the proving that *Consciousness* is all in all, makes *personal Identity* : Here's a Friend of his made the *same* Soul with *Socrates's*, on purpose to prove the *same* Soul may be united to *different whole organiz'd* Bodies upon earth. And all his Excuse for these *Suppositions* was, he says, because he was forc'd to it for want of Understanding what kind of thing a *Thinking* Substance is, which nobody in the world suppos'd was *possible*, if *thinking*, which makes it what it is, be *abstracted*, which he himself supposes. And therefore if he was sensible he could not prove his Propositions without supposing things other than they are, he should have suffer'd us to continue in Ignorance of them : For we think it hard to set up new Doctrines, without supposing the whole Frame of the *natural* and *intellectual* world alter'd. But it seems he could not afford to set up for a *complete* Philosopher, unless we would allow him to be a *new* Creator, and that is a little too hard a Condition to be granted.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of Relations.

I. **A**LL Relation is between *Substances* or their *Modes*. And as one Substance may be compar'd with another or itself at different times; so, according to the difference of the things in which the *Comparison* is, there arise *different sorts* and *denominations* of *Relation*; particularly those that follow. The several sorts of Relation.

1. When the *Comparison* is between them on the account of some *single Quality* or *Mode*, the Relation is call'd *accidental* or *modal*; such as any one of these words and many others imply: *Sweeter, Whiter, Bigger, Equal, unequal, Like, unlike, More, or fewer*, &c. which signifie the Substances agree or disagree in those *single Qualities* of Smell, Taſt, Colour, Bulk, Figure, Number. This ſort of *Relation* my Author calls *Proportional*; tho I think that word has been uſually limited to ſignifie things agreeing or disagreeing only in *Quantity*, ſuch as Bulk and Number, and not any other *Quality* or *Mode*. Modal Relation.

2. When two or more Substances, agreeing in ſuch Properties or Qualities as denominate them of the ſame kind, are compar'd with one another in the *Mode* or *Circumſtance* of their *Original*, the Relation is call'd *natural* and *unalterable*; becauſe founded in Nature, ſuch as *Father, Son, Brothers, Couſen-Germans, Uncles, Aunts, Country-men*, &c. any of which words imply the perſons not only agree in *kind* or *ſort*, but in the *Mode* or *Circumſtance* of their *Origin*, as to community of Blood, Family, Place of Birth. But if the Substances compar'd are not of the ſame *Species* or ſort, the Relation is not call'd *Natural*; tho they do agree in having had their Exiſtence, Birth or Original in the ſame Place. Tho, as my Author obſerves, the Relation between all ſort of *Animals*, of the ſame Race or Off-ſpring, is founded in Nature, as well as that of *Mankind*: but nevertheleſs that Relation is not ſo much taken notice of, as to have diſtinct *Names* for the ſeveral *degrees* of that Relation; becauſe we are not ſo much concern'd therein, as in the degrees of Relation between one another, becauſe on the Relation of *Perſons* to *Perſons* depend many Obligations, Duties, Rights and Privileges: and *Names* being deſign'd, in all Languages and Countries, for marks of *Diſtinction*, when there is a ſignal Convenience in the preſerving ſuch *Diſtinction*, there *Names* are invented and kept up; but where there is no ſuch remarkable Convenience accruing, there the *Diſtinction* by *Names* is altogether neglected. Natural Relation.

3. When Substances, how *different* ſoever in Nature, agree in having the ſame *Owner*, on which is founded Property, that Relation is alſo call'd *accidental*; becauſe alterable: Such as is imply'd in theſe words, *mine, yours, this* or *that mans*. By Propriety.

4. When Intelligent Beings are compar'd on the account of ſome one or more Acts, from which ariſes a mutual Communication, a moral Right, Power or Obligation to do ſomething, ſuch Relation is call'd *Inſtituted* or *Artificial*; being founded in and depending upon the *voluntary* Agreement of perſons in Society: ſuch as the Words, *Dictator, Emperor, Prince, Magiſtrate, General, Judge, Army, Maſter, Servant, Advocate, Client, Citizen*, ſome of which Relations are ſeparable at pleaſure, others not. Artificial or by institution.

5. When Substances are compar'd one to another, on the account of ſome one or more *voluntary* Acts, then ariſes the Relation of *moral Good* and *Evil*: For a Law being only the *Will* or *Voluntary* Act of an *intelligent* and *powerful* Being, declar'd by Words ſpoken or written, or other ſenſible Signs, the Agreement of the *voluntary* Act of one intelligent Being with the *voluntary* Act of another ſo declar'd, is call'd *moral Good*, or Diſagreement *moral Evil*. For, as to the making any Proposition properly a *Law*, it's neceſſary, 1. That it be the Act of an *intelligent* Being, 2. That it be the Act of ſuch a Being as has *Power* to annex ſome *natural* Good or Evil, commonly call'd *Reward* and *Puniſhment*, to the Obſervance or Neglect of his Will: Otherwiſe

therwise 'tis but *Advice* not a *Command*. 3. That it be made *manifest*, *publish'd* or *promulgated*: just so, for the making any Action *morally good* or *evil*, it's necessary, that, 1. It be the Action of an *intelligent Being*. 2. That it be *voluntary*; for, if it want either of those conditions, 'tis properly no more commendable or discommendable than a Clock for going well or ill. 3. That the Will of the Law-giver be *made known* to him, else it can't *operate* or *oblige*.

Divine Hu-
mane Laws.

Now as the *Intelligent Beings* that can give *Law* to Mankind are different, so the *Laws* have different *denominations*. The *Laws* of God, or *divine Laws*, are either such as by the Light of *natural Reason* God has made known to all Mankind, and are commonly call'd, the *Laws of Nature*; or by *special Revelation*, signify'd generally by the persons having a power to alter the *common* course of Nature, or by the *Prophecy* of future Events which depend upon the voluntary Acts of men. And *human Laws* are such Declarations of persons Wills as have power to annex some *present natural* Good or Evil to the Observance or Neglect of it. But as for the *Law of Reputation*, as my Author calls it, 'tis wholly new and of his own *Invention*; but yet he reckons it of that force, as to give the name of *virtuous* and *vitious* to Actions agreeable or disagreeable to it.

No reason for
the new name
of a law of Re-
putation, and
the Conse-
quence thereof.

Now if every thing may be call'd a *Law* which is a *leading Reason* for a mans Actions, then Profit (money or money-worth, I mean) Health, Pleasure of any sort may as well pass for *Laws*, as the Esteem of his Sect, Club, and Familiars: for *these* operate as constantly and powerfully as *that* do's; and so there may be *infinite* Laws in force, and those *contradictory* too to each other. And tho' wise and generous men value Honour as highly as they do their Money, Health or Pleasure, or higher; yet 'tis always in consistency with the Laws of God and their Country, and don't depend upon the *variable* humour of private persons: because the Laws of God immutably dictate what is for the *general* Good of Mankind and the *whole* Creation; and the Laws of the Country, when they are properly *Laws* or *obligatory*, constantly tend to the Benefit of that *particular* Kingdom or Common-wealth, of which he is a member, and carry all the united force with them which can be deriv'd from the consideration of *Life* and all the Comforts of it. But that's not all; If every Action agreeable to the Opinion of a mans Familiars or Acquaintants, may be honour'd with the sacred name of *Virtue*, then no Barbarity, Roguery or Villany whatever, but if it can find persons to recommend it (as 'tis a thousand to one it may) may be term'd *virtuous*. If a pack of Highway-men murder a whole Coachful of Men and Women for their Mony; or a Crew of *Bucaneers* turn over-board a whole Shipful of people to make their Prize the surer, they may be baptiz'd *virtuous* and *heroical* too with the Consent and Applause of *their* whole Society. But my Author seems to intimate in his Preface, that his meaning was not to make *Virtue*, *Vice*: I hope so; but how comes this *Philosophical* Law to be clap'd in just after *Di-*

Virtue and
Vice not meer
names but re-
solvable into
immutable re-
lations.

Praise not the
same with vir-
tue, only the
presumed Ef-
fect of it.

vine and *Human Laws*? Is there any comparison in their force? Yes, he tells us, more than in either of the other two, upon most men. Why was *Virgil*, *Tully*, and the inspir'd Philosopher *St. Paul*, brought in to prove that *Virtue* and *Praise* are all one? Surely he do's but jeer them, he is not in earnest, why do's he pervert their sense? For he knows that they intended only that *Virtue* was so agreeable to the *natural* Sense of Mankind, that they reckon'd Honour and Dignity the *general* Reward of it, not *Virtue* itself: and that *Tully* calls it *Decus*, *Honestas*, *Laus* and *Dignitas*, for no other reason, and upon that very presumption only. But if he had quoted *Tully*, where he designedly *defines* *Virtue*, he had set the Sentiments of that Great Heathen in truer Light; for he tells us expressly, *Tusc. lib. 4. that Virtus est affectio animi constans conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos in quibus est, separata etiam utilitate laudabilis*: However I should have readily taken his own Word for his own Sense, and the more willingly have counted all the Objection impertinent and mistaken; but that I am much afraid this *Philosophical* Law is an *Unison* with his own grand Principle, "That all Knowledge of *moral Good* and *Evil*, as well as of "Truth and *Falshood* in Propositions, was deriv'd only from our Senses and every "mans own Experience: and then it will be but consonant that *Virtue* and *Vice* should

should be the Names only of Actions futable or unfutable to the Fashion and Humour of our Familiars; especially since, according to his Principle, the Author of our Natures, antecedent to that Knowledge, has made no better Establishment of their Boundaries or Natures, but what's built upon the slippery and uncertain Foundation of arbitrary Opinions. And at that rate, since all the Laws of the Gospel (excepting the two Holy Rites instituted by our Saviour) are but the Perfections of the Laws of Nature and resolvable into them, every man will carry *Law* and *Gospel* too in his own Pocket, because he can choose what Familiars he please, and can set what value he thinks best upon their several Opinions; and in consequence of this the only *Law* will be, that no man has any *Law* at all. I always thought that the *Laws* of Nature, the Rules of *Virtue* and *Vice* (and which is almost equivalent, *Duty* and *Sin*) were as immutable as the surest Maxims of *Truth* and *Falshood*; that it was as impossible for the murder of an innocent person, the breaking of a lawful Contract should become virtuous, as that *Two* and *Two* should make *Five*, or the Part be equal to the Whole; That Honouring God, our Parents and Benefactors, relieving the Poor, could no more be vicious than that a Circle was a Triangle, a Stone was in two places at the same instant, could be made true Propositions. And, when my Author has clear'd this one point, I shall be easily satisfied, that according to his Principles, that *Vice* is no more than a scurvy and unfashionable Name. He concludes this Chapter with shewing how all Relation may be melted down into simple Ideas; which is so far true, that after a man has gain'd, by his Senses, the Knowledge of any Substances, he may abstractedly consider of any Quality, Property or Mode of them, in order to the improving himself in general Knowledge, and, by the help of his Reason, form general Propositions from his Observation of the Agreement or Disagreement of those Substances in their Modes. But I utterly deny, that any man compounds Notions out of such simple ones, without the Substances of which the Modes are compar'd. To give instances in each particular; Can any man conceive the Notion of *Sweeter*, or any other accidental Relation without considering, at the same instant, the Substance from which he has that Sensation? of Generation, or that Action which is the foundation of a natural Relation, without the Persons, Horses or Dogs, that are the Relate and Correlate, tho sometimes the Correlate has not a distinct name? or of Ownership, on which Propriety is founded, without the Ideas of the Persons or Goods? of Government, or other sort of Communication, in Action, Power, Right or Obligation, without Persons? of moral Good or Evil, without comparing the Action of some Agent or other with the Action of some Agent or other? For tho' we often talk of a *Law*, meaning only perhaps the Words spoken or written, without regarding the precise Name of the Person, or Persons Names that made it, yet if any one can have the Idea or Notion of a Law in force, without the Supposition of some Intelligent Being that had and has, either in his own Person or Representative by succession, the Power of rewarding or punishing the Observance or Neglect of it, he has more refin'd Thoughts than I dare pretend to.

Virtue and Vice not meer arbitrary names

The Knowledge of Relation, not gain'd by compounding simple Ideas, but comparing Substances in their Modes, Actions, or Properties.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct, and Confus'd Ideas.

I. FOR the easier understanding what this Author or any other means by the word *Ideas*, it will not be amiss once for all to set down the common words or Phrases by which the same thing they mean, is or may be express'd in more proper or less ambiguous words. Thus then, when a single thing is offer'd to the Mind, that single thing, consider'd as in the Object, is call'd the *Quality*, *Property* or *Mode* of that Substance in which it is; when in the Mind, 'tis call'd a simple *Perception*, *Apprehension*, *Notion* or *Thought*; such are *Figure*, *Bulk*, *Colour*, *Position*, *Motion*

How all that is meant by Ideas may be better express'd.

on, Rest, in *material* Substances: when in *immaterial* Substances, such as *affirming, denying, doubting, remembring, loving, hating, fearing, willing, nilling*, they are call'd *Modes* of such *thinking* or *immaterial* Substances. When any particular Substance is offer'd to the Mind, 'tis so call'd when *out* of the Mind, because conceiv'd as independent for its Existence upon any other finite Substance, or any particular Quality or Mode; when *in* the Mind, 'tis call'd a *complicated* Apprehension, Conception, Notion or Thought. When the thing that is thought on is neither a *Substance*, nor conceiv'd as *inherent* any ways in it, as a Quality is, then 'tis call'd a *Mode* of Conception, Apprehension or Thought: such as Existence, Duration, Time or Number. When the thing thought on is a *complication* of Actions, their Circumstances and Modes, then 'tis call'd by a *name* which signifies such a Complication of several different Actions and their Circumstances without us; but when consider'd as in the Mind, 'tis call'd a *complicated* Notion, Apprehension, Conception or Thought: such are a Triumph, a Procession, a Battle, Lord-Mayors-show, Murder, Theft, Liberality, Justice and all moral Virtues and Vices. And so the word *Idea* is never properly used but when it signifies an Object, as in the Mind, whereof there is a Picture, Image or Resemblance of it, as in the Mind itself, when the Object is both *visible* and *absent*. And whenever 'tis used for any other sort of Object, 'tis *metaphorical* and *ambiguous*: when any of these Substances or Modes are mutually compar'd, and any thing affirm'd or deny'd, conjoin'd or disjoin'd, 'tis call'd a *complex* Theme, Apprehension, Notion, as *in* the Mind; *out* of the Mind, a Proposition, Enunciation, or by the like equivalent Name.

Now it will be easie to understand, what a *clear* and *obscure*, a *distinct* and *confus'd* *Idea* is; and that, as my Author well observes, may be by comparing an *Idea*, as in the Mind, to a *visible* Object without it, which he do's not so fully explain, as I think it may be, by that Similitude.

What a clear
Idea is, ex-
plain'd by a si-
militude.

II. For the *clear* Sight of a *visible* Object there seem these Conditions necessary.

1. That the Organ of Sense be in *due* Order.
2. That there be a *proper* Medium.
3. A *just* Distance.
4. A *due* Light.
5. A *right* Position of the Object.

Just thus, to form a *clear* *Idea* or Notion in the Mind, It's requisite there be, 1. A *natural* Capacity. 2. That the Mind be *free* from Prejudice and Passion, which do like a Mist or colour'd Glass refract the Light, the *Information* which is brought to the Mind, and make it seem otherwise than it is. 3. That the Object propos'd be within the *proper* Sphere of the Minds Capacity, not too near or too far off. 4. That the Mind have *right* Information. 5. That the Information be made at a *proper* Time and other *fit* Circumstances: for no man is always in the same Temper or Posture of Mind to be dispos'd for Attention. A more particular Application of this is easie and obvious: Only these two things are proper to be noted. 1. That these words *clear* and *obscure*, *distinct* and *confus'd*, when used for *Ideas* or Notions, may be *Relative*. For I may have a *clear* and *distinct* *Idea* of the Sun, Moon and Stars; so as to *distinguish* one from the other; but they may be *obscure* and *confused*, if compar'd with the *Idea* that I have of the Earth or any nearer Object. 2. It must be observ'd also, as my Author has, that all *Obscurity* or *Confusion* about *Ideas* or Notions arises from Words or Signs of those *Ideas*, when put into Propositions. For all *Ideas* or simple Apprehensions, absolutely consider'd, are *equally* *clear* and *distinct*. When I see a man in a Mist, or at a great distance, if I take it or judge it to be a Bush, then I make a *false* Proposition in my Mind, by giving it that Name; but the *Idea*, the simple Apprehension, was right enough: the Object appear'd to the Eye just as it ought to do in that Circumstance.

No Object
properly ob-
scure.

III. To explain farther when an *Idea* is commonly call'd *confused*, my Author has hit upon a very apt Comparison of it to certain Pictures upon a *plain* Superficies, which are reckon'd surprizing Pieces of Art, and were reported (how truly I can't say) to have been invented or improved by one Mr. *Matthews*, Fellow of *Sidney* College in *Cambridge*: The Picture upon the *flat* seems so *confused*, that one can make neither Hog nor Dog of it; but by placing a Steel-cylinder (which my Author calls a *Mirror*) in a certain place Perpendicular to the Plain, we may in that Cy-
linder,

linder, as in a Looking-glass, see the Face of a Prince in one of the Pictures, a Skeleton in another, and so abundance of other Objects, as the Pictures are various. In this case the Object upon the *flat* may be call'd *confused*, because we have no *distinct* Name for any thing it represents, but it is not really *confused* or *obscure*, because it appears what it really is, and nothing else. Since then all Confusion is in giving Names, that is, making Propositions in our Minds; the Causes or Reasons of that *Confusion* must only be in *mental* or *verbal* Affirmations or Negations, of which these that follow are reckon'd by my Author several Instances.

IV. 1. When we give the Name of one Substance to another, which agrees with it only in some *one* or more Qualities, without considering the rest. As when we call a Beast a *Leopard*, which is a *Panther* or *Lynx*, because it agrees with them only in being *Spotted*, as they are.

How Notions become obscure.

2. When we give a name to a thing, or affirm it to be such a thing, which it is not, only for its *present appearance* to be in some respect a little like it, as in the instance before of a Picture upon a *flat*. If I call it the Picture of an open'd Oyster or a *Spider*; because, at first view it's the most like them, of any thing I know, but in the Cylinder appears to be the Picture of a mans Face or Skeleton.

3. When we give the Name of a thing of which a *certain* and *fix'd* Notion may be had, without having any such *fix'd* and *complete* Notion of it in our own Minds, in our discourse. As when we call that Atheism, Idolatry, Faith, Superstition or Church, without having a sufficiently *particular* Notion of them.

V. When from our finding that we have *clear* Notions of things in *some* respects or in *one* or more parts, we conclude thence we have so in *all* respects or in *all* parts; of which my Author gives these three instances: the first of a *Chiliaedron*, or Figure of a thousand sides; If a man should think, he had a *clear* and *distinct* Idea of that Figure, because he has perhaps of a Line of an Angle, and of the Number *thousand*. The second is *Eternity*; if a man should conclude, he had a *clear* and *distinct* Notion of it, because he has of Existence, Time and Duration. The third is, *Divisibility* of matter in *infinitum*: if one, from his finding that his Notions of Matter and *Divisibility* are clear enough, should thence infer, that he can with the like Clearness discourse of its *Divisibility* in *infinitum*: In such cases arises *Obscurity* and *Confusion* in our Discourses with other men, and in our *Reasonings* in our own Minds. But all this while every *simple Idea* or Notion, till we come to affirming or denying is clear, and one *Idea* or Notion alone is distinguishable from any other.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

I. **R** *Real* Ideas are such as are conformable things in *Nature*, to things *within* our own Minds, or *without* them. *Fantastical* or *Chimerical* are such as are not conformable to any thing in *Nature*, but are the *Creatures* of the *Mind* itself, made by its putting things together in the *Imagination*, which were never united in *Nature*; such as Centaurs or men with Horse-like Tails, which my Author meets with in Travellers Relations.

What real, what fantastical Ideas are.

II. Of the former sort my Author reckons all *simple Ideas*; because, tho' they are not always the Images or Resemblances of things without us, yet there is something *real* in the Objects themselves, which produce those different Sensations in us: Tho' there may not be *Whiteness* in Snow, just as there is *Figure* in its Particles, yet there is a *real* Contexture in its parts different from what is of another colour, that is the cause of that Sensation. And so the Perception is *real* not *imaginary*, because it proceeds from as *real* a Cause, as the Pain in us do's which comes from a Pin pricking us.

All simple Ideas real.

Complex Ideas
not less real,
but less perfect.

III. 2. As for *complex Ideas*; such, suppose, as of Gold, of Justice, &c. In these he thinks the Mind takes more liberty in combining *simple Ideas* to make them *complex*. And therefore he seems to allow these to be less *real*, otherwise one mans *Idea* of Gold or Justice could not be different from anothers, as we find it is. But I conceive this not to be a sufficient reason, to say these *Ideas* are less *real*, only that one mans is more perfect or adequate than anothers. I call *Over-reaching* another in a bargain *Injustice*, another would not say so. However both our *Ideas* were *real*, as to *Justice* and *Over-reaching*; but not both adequate or perfect: And we differ only in calling that Act by different Names. But the *simple Ideas* or *Notions* consider'd without Affirmation or Negation were equally *real*; neither of them in any respect *fantastical*.

The Notion of
mixt actions as
real, as of sin-
gle Qualities
tho not in all
men equally
perfect.

IV. 3. As to *mixt Modes*, as he calls them, such as *Courage*, *Justice* or any *moral Virtue* or *Vice*: These he reckons indeed amongst *real Ideas*, not because they are conformable to any thing in *Nature*, but because they agree with their *Original* or *Archetypes*, that is, every mans own *Notions* agree with themselves: or in other words, the *Original* and the *Copy* are all one. Herein again he is singular; for most men think they could have no *Notions* of any *moral Virtues* or *Vices*, without deriving them from *real Actions*, either in their own Minds or the sensible *Actions* of others; and as every mans *Notion* more or less agrees with that which is founded in *Nature*, so they are more or less *perfect*, but not more or less *real*. If one man calls *Undisturbedness* of Mind in Danger, without previous Consideration, *Courage*, another calls it *Fool-hardiness*, this or that man may have made a *false Proposition* in his Mind; but the *Notion* of one as well as the others was *real*, not *imaginary* or *fantastical*. So that no *Ideas* or *Notions* seem to be *Archetypes* or *Originals*; they are all, when in the mind, *Types* or *Copies* deriv'd from *real Actions* in *Nature*, that is, either in the mans own mind or sensible *Actions* of other persons; Else *Virtue* and *Vice* are *arbitrary* *Notions*, made at every mans pleasure, and according to every single mans *Fancy*. And yet, as odd as this may seem, 'tis but the natural Consequence of my Author's Principles, if I don't mistake them, in this and many other places, tho in different colours.

How Ideas of
Substances
may become
fantastical.

V. 4. *Ideas* of Substances, he judges no farther *real* than as they are Combinations of such *single Ideas* as are really united and coexist: which is so far true, that if we put in any Quality into the *Idea* of any Substance, which is really not in it (suppose, as light as a Feather, into the *Idea* of Gold) then 'tis *fantastical*: but if we leave out any Quality which is in it, the *Idea* is not said to be *fantastical* but *inadequate*. The sum is: every *Idea* or *Notion*, consider'd absolutely as in the mind, is a *real Idea*; but when we come to form Propositions, then they appear to be *real*, when agreeable to *Nature*; and *fantastical*, when disagreeable. The *Idea* of a Centaur is not *fantastical*, till we affirm, there is such an Animal. But as for all others, how *imperfect* or *inadequate* soever, they are *real*, and are never properly call'd *fantastical*, till something is affirm'd or deny'd. When any thing is added which should not, then they are *fantastical*; when any thing left out which should be put in, they are *inadequate*, but yet *real*.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate or Inadequate Ideas.

What ade-
quate, and
what inade-
quate Ideas.

I. **A** Adequate are such as perfectly represent the Originals (which my Author calls *Archetypes*) from which the Mind takes them: *Inadequate* are such as but partially or imperfectly represent their Originals.

Of the former sort he judges all *simple Ideas*; because, to express it in his own words, they being only the Effects of certain Powers in things fitted or ordain'd by God to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent to those

those Powers. Which is thus far true, that there is such a Connexion, establish'd by the Author of Nature, between the Operation of things without us and our Minds, that such or such Effects, in such and such cases, are produc'd in our Minds by those Operations: But whether those Causes be adequate to the Effects in any case, is very questionable upon these two accounts.

I. Because there is no *natural* Connexion between those Qualities, when consider'd as in the Object, and the Effect of them, when consider'd as in the Mind. *Motion*, so far as we can conceive, is the only Quality immediately operating in Bodies, by which they produce any Sensations in us; but there is no *natural* Connexion between Motion and Thought, or the Perception of any Colour, Smell, Taste, Sound, &c. And therefore since *Equality* and *Inequality* are properly measurable only by things that have some Connexion one with another, it seems as improper to say our *Ideas* are adequate to their Causes, as to say this Body's Motion is equal to that Body's Magnitude, or the Smell of a Rose is equal to the Sound of a Bell. 2. Because we have more Knowledge (I don't say *Ideas*) of all the sorts of single *Qualities* or *Modes* of particular Substances than we could derive from the things consider'd in themselves. We can make a better Estimate of the Light, Heat, Figure, Motion, Extent, Distance, Magnitude and other Qualities in particular Substances, than we could gain merely by our Senses of those Particulars; and therein our Knowledge is rather more than less, or equal to our Sensations; and this Knowledge we gain by our Reason comparing things together, and then making Inferences from such Comparisons. And therefore, on both those accounts, it seems improper to say, our *simple Ideas* are all adequate. On the first, because the Effect is so widely different from and *incommensurate* by the Cause; and the latter, because the Effects do so vastly exceed their original *simple Causes*.

Simple Ideas are inadequate as well as complex, tho not so much.

III. 2. As to our *complex Ideas* of Modes (he says) they are also adequate; because they have no Standard to be measur'd by; but only the Combination of *simple Ideas*, which is voluntarily made by every single Person; and therefore they must be adequate, because every thing is equal to itself. Now this sounds oddly; for this is making Archetype and Type, Original and Copy all one. Now I thought it otherwise: Take the Examples he mentions, *Triangle* for the instance of a *single Mode*, and *Courage* of the *complex*. The *Idea* of a Triangle, I thought, might have been (in my Authors way I mean) said to be adequate, because it fits all the Triangles a man can see: and the *Idea* of Courage adequate, when it implies Steadiness of Mind in foreseen or unforeseen Dangers in a good Cause; and thereby fits a mans own or any other mans Demeanour in such cases. But if every mans *Idea* is said to be adequate, only, because it's like itself in each mans mind, then at that rate all mens *Ideas* are equally adequate; there's no difference between *Courage*, *Fool-hardiness* or *Comardice*, if a man be but always in the same mind with himself. But I agree with him in this, that a mans *Idea* may be said to be inadequate, when it is compar'd with the *Idea* that other men may have; because 'tis no single mans *Idea* is the Standard by which all others are to be measur'd; and thence arise all the Disputes about *Justice*, *Injustice*, *Courage*, *Comardice*, all moral Virtues and Vices; because mens Passions, Prejudices and Interests incline them to lengthen or shorten the true Measure. But it does not thence follow, there are no fix'd Rules for these Virtues and Vices, and that they are as variable as mens Humors and Opinions. The general Consent of Mankind has come nearer at least to fix the Measures of Virtue and Vice, of moral Good and Evil, than it has in the names of Pints, Quarts and Bushels: and that Consent we owe to the Author of our Natures.

The Notion of mixt Modes not adequate for the reason the Author gives, but because not conformable to the Standard.

IV. 3. *Ideas* of Substances, as refer'd to real Essences, are not (he says) adequate. Now under this Head, methinks my Author has used more Words and occasion'd more Confusion, than the matter needs: For, by the word *Essence*, when used in Philosophical Discourses as relating to Substances, I thought every one had meant, such a Combination of Properties, Qualities and Powers, by which any particular

Ideas of Substances never refer'd to real Essences, and thence this Author has made that obscure Substance which is plain,

Substance might be distinguish'd from all others; at that rate we may come to so much Knowledge as will serve all the Conveniencies of Life. But I never met with any one before, that by the Word *Essence* comprehended all the Properties, Qualities, Powers *active* and *passive*, which are or possibly may be in any Substance; at that rate indeed we can neither know the *Essence* of any Substance nor any one Quality in the world. And, the truth is, it would be of no use to us if we could; unless we had occasion to make a new world, which few men have. And therefore most men are contented to reckon themselves knowing of the *Essence* of any thing, which they can sufficiently *distinguish* from every thing else. I reckon myself to understand the *Essence* of *Gold*, by knowing its Colour and Weight, its Malleableness, its Fixtness; and I don't desire to know any more, till I set up for a Philosophers Stone-maker. I doubt not but all those Properties in *Gold* depend upon the Figure, Position, Bulk and Cohesion of its parts; but, because 'tis impossible to know the *Exactness* of every one of those Qualities which Nature has united in it, I satisfy my self with so much, by which I can *distinguish* it from any other Substance that I know of. And I doubt that's as much as any man knows of any one Quality or Property in the world. We all know indeed the *difference* of the Bulk, Figure, and of all Colours one from another, if they are not very near one another; but I doubt no man knows the *exact* Bulk, Position and Figure of the Particles of a *white* Body from a *black*; much less of the *intermediate* Colours. I can distinguish as well one Substance from another as I can the exact Figure, Bulk, Position, Motion of the parts of that Substance; and so my *Idea* of one or t'other is equally *adequate* or *inadequate*. Take the word *Essence* for that only by which a thing is *distinguish'd* from every thing else, and then I can have an *adequate Idea* of any Substance, as easily as I can of any Quality in it; but take the word *Essence* in my Authors new sense of *real* Constitution, then again I can have as *adequate* an *Idea* of that; as I can of the precise Figure, Bigness, Position, Cohesion or Motion of its Particles; that is to say, no *adequate Idea* at all of any Substance, or of any one Mode of it whatever. And tho' Telescopes and Microscopes may help, yet they can never satisfy me, but that others may magnifie and multiply still, and so can come to no Adjustment. However, what help they may afford for the understanding the *precise* Figure, Bulk and Position of any Substance, the same will make my *Idea* of its *real Essence* the more *adequate*; and therefore our Knowledge both of *simple* and *complex Ideas* of Substances will keep pace with one another; both *equally adequate* or *inadequate*.

CHAP. XXXII.

True and False Ideas.

Truth or falsehood only belongs to Propositions tacitly form'd in the mind, or put into words.

I. **T** *Truth* and *Falseness* are proper only to Propositions *mental* or *verbal*; and, when applied to *Ideas*, always suppose a *tacit* Affirmation or Negation. Therefore, till in our Minds, or by Words or other Signs we *affirm* or *deny* something of those things of which we are said to have an *Idea* or simple Apprehension, the *Idea* itself cannot be properly said to be *true* or *false*. That which is call'd *metaphysically true* is nothing but Existence; and in that sense all *Ideas* that are in the mind, how extravagant soever, are *equally true*. If I have the *Idea* of a Horse with a Mans Head, or of a Man with a Horses Tail, the *Idea* is existent in my Mind. But if I offer to say, in my Thoughts or by Words, there is such an Animal, then 'tis a *false* affirmative Proposition; unless my Authors Travellers can discover there are such Animals. But the *Idea* itself was nevertheless *existent* in my Mind, was *metaphysically true*.

Metaphysical Truth is only Existence.

Ideas

Ideas therefore, or Conceptions, can be said to be *true* or *false* only these three ways.

II. 1. When the Mind supposes its *own* Conceptions agreeable to the Conceptions that are in *other* mens Minds. In this way, *simple* Conceptions can rarely be false, except for Defect of *Language*, or Inadvertency in giving the *Names* of them. For a thing that *appears* green, red or white, bitter or sweet, hard or soft to one, does so to another, except by an Indisposition or Difference in the Organ of Sense: and where there is any such Difference, yet that which all men *mean* by those Words is the *same*, and 'tis the giving the Names to this or that which makes all the Difference. Neither again are our *Ideas* of Substances much liable to be *true* or *false* in that way, because men seldom (except again through Inadvertency in discourse) call common sort of Substances, such as Man, Horse, Stone, or Tree, by any other Names, if they use the same Language. And therefore, Misunderstandings seldom arise that way. The only *Ideas* or Notions liable to be much mistaken in that way, are such as we call *compound mixt Actions*, or, as our Author, *mixt Modes*; and such especially are the most liable, which are the nearest to one another. I may call that *Cruelty*, which another does *Justice*; that *Prodigality*, which another does *Liberality*; that *Covetousness*, which another calls by a softer word, *Frugality*; and the like may happen in infinite more words; such as Religion, Faith, Grace, and all moral Virtues and Vices. But then the *simple* Apprehensions are made *complex*, or made Propositions.

Simple Apprehensions become true or false only when put into Propositions.

2. *Ideas* may be *true* or *false*, when suppos'd to be conformable to some *real* Existence in Nature; and in this way *simple Ideas* cannot be *false*, in regard there is something in Nature which is the *external* Cause or Occasion of them. The *Ideas* of *Substances* may be *true* or *false*. 1. When we leave out some Property which should be included. 2. When we put in some Property which it has not; which makes the *Idea* not only imperfect, but fantastical. 3. When we compound Substances of Parts which do not coexist in Nature; such as the *Idea* of *Centaurs* is suppos'd to be.

As for *mixt Modes*, as our Author calls them, he reckons they are the Creatures of every mans own Understanding, and are therefore neither *true* nor *false*; such are the *Ideas* of all *moral* Virtues and Vices. And herein he is singular; for all the world, I think, believe they are founded in Nature, being agreeable or disagreeable to the Laws of Nature, which the Author of it has in some measure form'd in the Minds of all *rational* Creatures; and Mr. *Hobbs* himself owns some such; and that they do eternally oblige in *Foro interno*, as he calls Conscience. But this Gentleman seems to own none such; for tho he often mentions Laws of Nature, yet he means only such Rules as every man comes to the Knowledge of by his own Senses and Experience, which must be govern'd by the Custom and Fashion of every ones Familiars and Acquaintants. And so every one may call that *Religion* and *Virtue* which he pleases: There is no Standard by which we can measure them.

Notions of mixt actions may be true or false as they agree to or disagree with a Rule; and that rule is as fixt as that for the names of Substances.

III. 3. The *Idea* of a *Substance* may be call'd *true* or *false*, (says this Author) when the Mind refers any *Idea* it has, to that *real* Constitution or Essence of any thing, whereon all its Properties, Qualities and Powers depend. But in this sense, I know of none that ever used the word *Essence* intelligibly. For I don't understand, I confess, *substantial* Forms. For my own part, when I say, of any particular Substance, 'tis this or that, I mean no more than that it has such Properties, by which it may be *distinguish'd* from any thing else that I know of. For Example; when I say of a piece, 'tis *Gold*, I mean no more than that it has those Properties by which upon tryal it may be found *distinct* from every thing else; 'Tis *malleable*, to distinguish it from *Glass*; 'tis *yellow*, to distinguish it from *Silver*, *Lead*, *Tin*, *Iron*, &c. 'tis *heavier* Bulk for Bulk than any thing else; 'tis *fix'd*, or will lose nothing sensibly of its Quantity, when melted; and by these Properties it may be distinguish'd from all other Bodies whatever. As for the particular *Chink*, or the minute Exactness of its Colour, I doubt not but Artists may

Every mans Idea of Substances is conformable to his own experience, and so far true.

may thereby make a near Guess; but I know of none in Commission to be the unappealable Judges in those cases; and I was not such a Fool as to expect all the Chymists in the world should pass their learned Judgment upon it, after their tryal of it, and their experiments of some new Powers and Qualities; and I guess most men are so far in my mind, when they talk of the *Essence* of particular Substances; and that they have not learnt either the *real* Essence in my Author's sense, of any one, nor any one Quality whatever. Nor don't expect it in this world, except my Author's Project should take effect, which he proposes in the next Book; to which I refer the Reader for a farther Explication of some particulars, to prevent Repetitions: especially, as it relates to *Substances* and *mixt Modes*, which are made very *obscure* by this Author, but I hope to make *plain* in another place.

End of the Second Book.

OF

O F

Humane Understanding.

BOOK III. CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language.

TH O what this Author hath said, in treating of *Words* and *Language*, if true, is very common, when express'd plainly; Yet, because there are many things that are both hard to understand, by such as are not acquainted with his Language, and more such as may be interpreted to have an ill Influence, not only to confound that little Knowledge we have in Philosophy, but on the Principles of *natural* Religion and Morality; I shall endeavour to make his Notions more intelligible, and, if not to secure his Reader from any dangerous Impressions, yet at least to arm him with such Cautions, as may put him upon seeking better Assistance from others, which will answer my main Design as well.

I. Words are nothing but *articulate Sounds*, which the infinitely kind and wise Author of the Constitution of our Bodies has inabled us to make, for the Communication of our Thoughts to each other, in order to the Improvement of our Knowledge, and all the Comforts of Life, which depend on Society. For *Words* are nothing but the Signs of our inward Actions and Conceptions, the Benefit of which to others would be quite lost, if we could not communicate them by *Words* or other Signs; and that Benefit again would be much lessen'd, if we had *Words* only for *particular* Things; because they would be so *numerous* that our Memories could not retain them; or if they could, Discourse would take up so much time to enumerate the Particulars, that there would be more spent in *Talking* than *Action*. The several Sorts of *Words* we use are therefore the Signs to others of the several Conceptions we have, either of the *real* Existence of things, or the *Negation* or *Privation* of that Existence; or of Coherence or Incoherence of the Conceptions themselves.

What is the use of Words.

II. My Author observes that most Words are deriv'd from *sensible* things: He instances in the Words *Imagine*, *Apprehend*, *Comprehend*, *Conceive*, *Instill*, *Disturbance*, *Tranquillity*, *Spirit*, *Angel*; and he might have added *Understanding*, *Affirming*, *Doubting*; and because these Words are now used for Things and Actions that are not sensible, he would infer, that all our Knowledge is gain'd from our Senses, which Inference I take to be too general: For every Man, whether there were any Words or articulate Sounds used or not, would understand his own Thoughts; and the Difference between *them* and the Use of such Words, argues no more that we have all our Knowledge from our *Senses*, than it does that our Thoughts are visible or audible; and if they were, there would be no need of *Words* for the Communication of them. The using such Words therefore to express insensible things, argues only the Defect in Language, but not our Want of Knowledge of such things, unless we could suppose such as are deaf and dumb have no Thoughts or Consciousness of the Actions of their own Minds; or that there is a natural Connexion between the Sounds and the Thoughts themselves; both which are demonstrably false.

The Original of Words no Proof that they signifie nothing else.

C H A P. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

No Word signifies naturally.

I. IF there was any natural Connexion between any articulate Sound or Word written, and the Thought it excites, then all Men would speak or understand the same Language; but we finding it otherwise, are thereby assured Words are nothing but the arbitrary and customary Signs of every Man's Conceptions that uses them: For tho a Child indeed that reads out of a Book to others, may have no Conceptions of those things which the Words signify, yet he that indited the Book had, if he understood what he wrote; and therefore Words are nothing but Significations of the Conceptions of them that write or speak them. Words are generally reckon'd the Signs of things, and so they are indeed. For that is the main Use of them, to excite the Thoughts of them in a manner as well as if the things themselves were present. But then all Words are not Signs of things; some are of our Conceptions of the Negation or Want of real Things, as the Words *Nothing, Impossible, Ignorance, Barrenness, &c.* And others are only Marks of the Coherence or Incoherence of our own Conceptions concerning those things; as all those are, commonly call'd *Particles* of Speech; others are general Words which signify only our Conceptions of the Agreement of things: But in the general, all Words are Signs of the Conceptions of him that uses them; and he that uses them to any other Purposes, does only as Children do, when they read out of a Book; they tell us the Conceptions of others, not their own. But it must be noted, there are other Signs of Conceptions besides Words, such as holding up the Finger, nodding with the Head, the going off of a Gun, the particular Beat of a Drum, or the Sound of a Trumpet, Sighs, Groans, Tears, laughing, smiling, frowning, champing between the Teeth, putting a Cup to the Mouth, and several others, some of which have a little Affinity with the thing signified. But the Signs of Conceptions of most general Use are Words spoken or written.

C H A P. III.

Of General Words.

Most of our Words are general, but can't be avoided.

I. THO all things that exist are Particulars, yet we find most of our Words are general, and do not signify particular things. But this could not be avoided; because if every particular thing should have a distinct Name, Names would be infinite, and no one Man's Memory could retain them. And besides, if it were possible, yet it would not answer the great Design of Language; for that being to communicate our Thoughts to one another, those Words or Names would be useless Sounds, unless we could suppose others to understand the Distinction as well as our selves. Tho every Crow, Sheep, Leaf on a Tree, Hair of our Head, Sand on the Shoar, be really distinct from each other; yet if each had a distinct Name, the using that distinct Name would not communicate our Thoughts to others, unless they knew that individual thing, as well as our selves. And therefore we find, that tho Jockeys may have Names for their Horses, and Shepherds for some of their Sheep, yet they can't treat with others about them, meerly by their Names, but must either shew them, if present, or describe them by distinct Marks, if absent; and this being impracticable in all individuals, distinct Names, if

if they could be made or remembred, would be of no use in Conversation: And therefore Proper Names are seldom given, but to such *things* as Mankind are concern'd to maintain a distinct Knowledge of; such are, Persons, Countries, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, Towns and Villages: But as for other individual things, tho really as distinct in nature and sometimes more, have not proper Names, but have a general Name; and if that general Name be not understood by them we converse with, we are forc'd to set it forth by its peculiar Qualities, as Marks of Distinction.

II. Thus far my Author's Notions are common with other Peoples: But when he comes to assign the Use of general Words, then he differs from the Sense (at least in manner of Expression) of most others. His Fancy is, *That Words become general by being made the Signs of general or abstract Ideas*: But for the clearing this Matter, I shall endeavour, 1. to explain what an *abstract Idea* is. 2. To shew there are no *general or abstract Ideas*, in his Sense. 3. What a *general Word* signifies.

General words not signs of general-abstract Ideas.

III. 1. I conceive that properly an *abstract Idea* is nothing else but the Representation, Image, Picture or Resemblance in the Mind of a single or particular visible Object, when the Object itself is not present, does not actually affect the Eye. Thus in the Night, a Man may be properly said to have the *abstract Idea* of the Sun in his Mind: So again one Man may have the *abstract Idea* of another Man's Face, of a particular Country, City, House, River, Rainbow, or of any particular Substance that is visible, tho at a distance, tho absent, because whilst he thinks of them, there is a perfect Picture or Image of them in the Mind. And these are properly call'd *abstract Ideas*; because the Objects are at that time abstracted or separated from the Mind that conceives them.

What an abstract Idea is properly.

IV. 2. I say there can be no *general or abstract Ideas* in my Author's Sense; because no Man can possibly think of more than one thing at one Instant; and therefore cannot form a *general or abstract Idea*; as will clearly appear to any one that will but reflect upon the Actions of his own Mind. When he hears the Word *Man*, has he any Idea but of the sensible Properties of some single Person? When he hears the Word *White*, does not his Mind fix upon Milk, Snow, Paper, which he conceives as in one certain Place? And the like of Sweetness in Taste or Smell, of Sounds and all tangible Qualities, if he does not fix his Mind upon some particular Object that may produce them? And the case is the same as to *Figure, Motion, Rest, and Bulk*, when any Man thinks of them he does either only rumble over the Word in his Mind, or fixes it upon some visible Body that has that Motion, Figure, Rest or Bulk. And the like for *Murder, Procession, Triumph*; if he thinks on Murder, his Mind runs upon the Actions of stabbing, shooting, flashing of some particular Person, and in some particular Place. And so for all other mix'd Modes, the Mind has no *Idea* at all but of what is visible, or only ruminates the Words. Thus I find it with my self, and appeal to every other Man's Sense.

No general abstract Ideas.

V. 3. It remains then only to be consider'd, what these general Words are the Signs of: for they cannot be of *general or abstract Ideas*; there are no such. They are all of particular, and only visible Objects, at a distance from the Mind. Now I cannot apprehend that general Words are any thing more than the Signs of the Mind's having observ'd that several particular things agree; and those Words when used intelligibly by any Person, imply no more than that he has observ'd such an Agreement. When I say, *This Paper is white*, I don't compare it with any *Idea* that I have in my Mind of Whiteness abstracted from particular Bodies (for I have no such *Idea*, or can form any) but with Snow, Milk, or some Wall that uses to affect my Sight in the same manner, and so give it that Name of *white*, because it agrees with one or other of them in producing the like Effect. When I give the Name *Man* to this particular Person, 'tis only because he has all the visible Properties which I have observ'd in other individual Persons. I give the general Name of Words to this or that Sound, because it affects my Ears as other Words do. I call *Stabbing Murder*, because 'tis contrary to the Laws of Nature and my Country; and so for all sort of Actions and the Modes of them, which my Author calls

What general Words are the signs of.

ons not creating any more reason why he should be reputed a *different* or *not* the *same* Man, than it do's why a particular Animal, whose Principle of Life is united to different parts of Matter in its several states of Growth and Decay, should be reckon'd a *different* or *not* the *same* Animal. An *intelligent finite* Being (of which only we are supposed to treat) is the *same* person, at different times, by its being or having the *same inward* and *incommunicable* Principle of all its *intellectual* Operations ; but the Variety in *kind* or *degree* of these Operations do's no more alter the reason of its being the *same* at different times than a Loadstone is for its actual drawing Iron oftner or seldomer, more or less ; or a piece of Wax for its actually having had various Impressions upon it : because the *Power* or *Capacity*, the Loadstone or the Wax has, makes it to be what it is ; not the *actual* Exercise of that Power. And as for *Consciousness*, we reckon it nothing else but the *repeated Acts* of the Mind, by which it takes notice of its own and other Operations, its own Sensations, Affirmations, Denials, Doubtings, Meditations, &c. But because the Mind cannot take that notice of such *different* Actions all at *once*, but must do it *successively*, therefore we conceive such Acts of Reflexion need to be *united*, as well as other *different* Operations. For I can no more at once in *one moment* remember or be conscious that I affirm'd this, deny'd that, doubted of a third Proposition, than I could affirm, deny or doubt, all at once. That Substance then, in which these Operations are united, is that we call our *Minds* or *Souls* ; but *Consciousness* is no more that *Mind* or *Soul*, than any other Actions are : no more than Motion, however modified, is the *moving* Body ; only there is this difference indeed, that the *same Motion* is *communicable* to other Bodies, but the *same Thought* or *Action* of the Mind is not. One *Body* may have the *same Motion* now which another had the last moment, but no *Mind* can feel the *same Pain* or *Pleasure*, that I now have, the next moment. Thought, or Consciousness of a Thought, are inseparable and incommunicable.

The Author's
acknowledgement of extravagant
Suppositions.

Towards the conclusion of this Chapter my Author seems to be sensible, that he had made many strange Suppositions ; and it would have been stranger, if he had not thought so : For, if he'll give me leave to make Suppositions, as he has, I can do one feat that will equal, if not exceed, all his : and that is, to make a Pen with a Foot-ball. And I'll desire but liberty of making one Supposition, and that is, that the Foot-ball be as sharp as a Pen-knife ; and, as ridiculous as this is, 'tis but the same Card he has plaid his game with. Here is an *Atome* with an *immutable Superficies* (which it can't have) suppos'd for the proving that bare Existence is the *principium Individuationis* : Here is *Consciousness*, tho' all the world owns, 'tis but the Act or Acts of the Mind, suppos'd *removeable* from one Substance to another, as a Mountebank do's from place to place ; on purpose to prove, that it alone constitutes *personal Identity* : Here is an *Idiot* of twenty year old, suppos'd no wiser than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, and here's a *Cat* or a *Parrot* reasoning and Philosophizing, on purpose to prove that *Man* is not a *reasoning* Animal ; but only the Master-ship of *Mechanism* : Here is a single Finger suppos'd to have all the Actions of the Mind crowded into it, to help the proving that *Consciousness* is all in all, makes *personal Identity* : Here's a Friend of his made the *same* Soul with *Socrates's*, on purpose to prove the *same* Soul may be united to *different whole organiz'd* Bodies upon earth. And all his Excuse for these *Suppositions* was, he says, because he was forc'd to it for want of Understanding what kind of thing a *Thinking* Substance is, which no body in the world suppos'd was *possible*, if *thinking*, which makes it what it is, be *abstracted*, which he himself supposes. And therefore if he was sensible he could not prove his Propositions without supposing things other than they are, he should have suffer'd us to continue in Ignorance of them : For we think it hard to set up new Doctrines, without supposing the whole Frame of the *natural* and *intellectual* world alter'd. But it seems he could not afford to set up for a *complete* Philosopher, unless we would allow him to be a *new* Creator, and that is a little too hard a Condition to be granted.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Relations.

I. **A**LL Relation is between *Substances* or their *Modes*. And as one Substance may be compar'd with another or itself at different times; so, according to the difference of the things in which the *Comparison* is, there arise *different sorts* and *denominations* of *Relation*; particularly those that follow. The several sorts of Relation.

1. When the Comparison is between them on the account of some *single Quality* or *Mode*, the Relation is call'd *accidental* or *modal*; such as any one of these words and many others imply: *Sweeter, Whiter, Bigger, Equal, unequal, Like, unlike, More, or fewer, &c.* which signifie the Substances agree or disagree in those *single Qualities* of Smell, Taſt, Colour, Bulk, Figure, Number. This ſort of *Relation* my Author calls *Proportional*; tho I think that word has been uſually limited to ſignifie things agreeing or disagreeing only in *Quantity*, ſuch as Bulk and Number, and not any other *Quality* or *Mode*. Modal Relation.

2. When two or more Subſtances, agreeing in ſuch Properties or Qualities as denominate them of the ſame kind, are compar'd with one another in the *Mode* or *Circumſtance* of their *Original*, the Relation is call'd *natural* and *unalterable*; becauſe founded in Nature, ſuch as *Father, Son, Brothers, Couſen-Germans, Uncles, Aunts, Country-men, &c.* any of which words imply the perſons not only agree in *kind* or *ſort*, but in the *Mode* or *Circumſtance* of their *Origin*, as to community of Blood, Family, Place of Birth. But if the Subſtances compar'd are not of the ſame *Species* or ſort, the Relation is not call'd *Natural*; tho they do agree in having had their Exiſtence, Birth or Original in the ſame Place. Tho, as my Author obſerves, the Relation between all ſort of *Animals*, of the ſame Race or Off-ſpring, is founded in Nature, as well as that of *Mankind*: but nevertheleſs that Relation is not ſo much taken notice of, as to have diſtinct *Names* for the ſeveral *degrees* of that Relation; becauſe we are not ſo much concern'd therein, as in the degrees of Relation between one another, becauſe on the Relation of *Perſons* to *Perſons* depend many Obligations, Duties, Rights and Privileges: and *Names* being deſign'd, in all Languages and Countries, for marks of *Diſtinction*, when there is a ſignal Convenience in the preſerving ſuch *Diſtinction*, there *Names* are invented and kept up; but where there is no ſuch remarkable Convenience accruing, there the *Diſtinction* by *Names* is altogether neglected. Natural Relation.

3. When Subſtances, how *different* ſoever in Nature, agree in having the ſame *Owner*, on which is founded Property, that Relation is alſo call'd *accidental*; becauſe alterable: Such as is imply'd in theſe words, *mine, yours, this* or *that mans*. By Propriety.

4. When Intelligent Beings are compar'd on the account of ſome one or more Acts, from which ariſes a mutual Communication, a moral Right, Power or Obligation to do ſomething, ſuch Relation is call'd *Inſtituted* or *Artificial*; being founded in and depending upon the *voluntary* Agreement of perſons in Society: ſuch as the Words, *Dictator, Emperor, Prince, Magiſtrate, General, Judge, Army, Maſter, Servant, Advocate, Client, Citizen*, ſome of which Relations are *ſeparable* at pleaſure, others not. Artificial or by institution.

5. When Subſtances are compar'd one to another, on the account of ſome one or more *voluntary* Acts, then ariſes the Relation of *moral Good* and *Evil*: For a Law being only the *Will* or *Voluntary* Act of an *intelligent* and *powerful* Being, declar'd by Words ſpoken or written, or other ſenſible Signs, the Agreement of the *voluntary* Act of one intelligent Being with the *voluntary* Act of another ſo declar'd, is call'd *moral Good*, or Diſagreement *moral Evil*. For, as to the making any Proposition properly a *Law*, it's neceſſary, 1. That it be the Act of an *intelligent* Being, 2. That it be the Act of ſuch a Being as has *Power* to annex ſome *natural* Good or Evil, commonly call'd *Reward* and *Puniſhment*, to the Obſervance or Neglect of his Will: Otherwiſe

calls mix'd Modes ; they are only general Words, because the several Actions and Modes agree in those Particulars which intitle them unto that common Name. Tho Stabbing and Shooting be different Actions, as much as Hog and Dog are different Substances ; yet I give them the common Name of Murder, because they agree in being equally contrary to Law ; just as I do in those two sort of Substances, tho they differ in Shape and other Qualities, yet because they agree in having Life and all the Signs of Sense, I call them both Animals.

Genus and
Species what
they are.

The common
Sense of the
word Essence.

VI. As for *Genus* and *Species* (Words my Author does not like) I have no other Notion of them but this. When I meet with a particular thing, and find it agree with several individual things which I met with before, then I give it the Name which other individuals have with which it agrees. For Example ; I have a particular *Guinea* offer'd to my Sight ; if I find it agree with other individuals in Weight, Colour and Figure, then I give it that common Name, or say it is of the same Species or Essence. If again I find it to have all those sensible Qualities by which I distinguish Gold from all other Metals and Bodies whatever, such suppose, as Weight, Colour, Malleableness, Fixedness, then I give it the common Name of Gold, or say it is of that Kind or *Genus*, for I make no Distinction between *Species* and *Genus*, but that one is a more general Word or Name than the other ; or may be given to more individuals ; and those Properties in which any thing agrees with other individuals, or by which it may be distinguish'd from other individuals, I call its *Essence* ; and so the Essence of this particular *Guinea*, or that which makes it a *Guinea*, is its Weight, Figure, Stamp and Colour ; and the Essence of it, or that which makes it to be Gold, so far as I know, is its Colour, its Weight above other Bodies of the same Bulk, Malleableness and Fixedness. If a Person of Credit tell me that Gold has another Property besides all them, that it is soluble in *Aqua Regia*, I thank him for his Notion, because he has made me wiser than I was before. But in this Instance and all others, whether relating to particular Substances or Properties, I don't compare it with any abstract *Idea* that I have of either ; for I have and can form none such, but only with some one or more individual that I have met with before. And that in which it agrees, or by which it may be distinguish'd from other things, I call its Essence or Species ; and the common Name is the Sign or Mark of my observing such Agreement or Disagreement. But now if any ask me what Properties or precise Number of them are required to make two or more individuals of the same Kind, Species or Essence, I can only tell him those I know of, and I can tell him them as well as he can tell me what his abstract *Idea* is ; and a little plainer too ; for I can shew him, upon occasion, what are the Properties by which I conceive they agree or are distinguishable from other individuals. But he can't shew me his abstract *Idea*, unless he means the same I do ; and if he does, then he may put down his new Word amongst useless inventions : He serves me but like a Quack, that when I send for him to tell me the Cause of my Distemper, and to remove it, tells me, that I have an *Adiathesis*, which I knew before ; but only did not know his new Name for Indisposition. And thus we come by general or specifick Names, not by comparing each individual with a general or abstract *Idea*, that is in our Minds, but by comparing each individual with other individuals, if Substances in their Properties, if particular Properties in their Mode of affecting us, and then giving each individual a common Name, which is the Sign of our observing such Agreement ; and the only Reason we make use of the *Genus* or general Word in Definitions, is only to save the Trouble of enumerating all the Particulars in which things agree, which sometimes may be very many, and are presum'd to be understood ; and because the Particulars may breed a necessity of being defin'd also, and so the Work endless ; of which our Author has given us a very good Specimen : for instead of the old-fashion'd Definition of a Man, that it's a living reasoning Creature, he has melted it into these Particulars. A solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning. We reckon him in the Country but a bad Tinker that makes more Holes than he finds, except it be

be to mend them. But, I doubt, by that time he has explain'd what Solidity, Extension, Substance, Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, Faculty, Reasoning, signifie, we shall need another Definition-mender. However, let's try if we can understand some of my Author's new mystical Language.

VII. 1. He says, *General and universal are Creatures of the Understanding.* That's true, if he don't mean something besides the Words; for they are indeed arbitrary and artificial: But the Notions, of which those general Words are the Signs, are not arbitrary, but are deriv'd from Observation of really existing Things or Actions, and the Modes of them that have, or might have, existed in Nature; and a blind Man may as well form the Idea of a Rainbow, as any other Man of a Bat-tel, or of a Murder, or any other mix'd Mode, if he had not seen them or heard them represented by such Actions as he found had been wrought, or found himself or others to have a natural Power to perform.

General words
are Creatures
of the Under-
standing.

VIII. 2. He says, *Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.* And again, *Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence;* and for the Explication of this, he says, if the real Essences were distinct from our abstract Ideas, they could not be the Essences of the Species we rank things into. And to make all this plainer yet, if possible, he says farther, that *Two Species may be one, as rationally as different Essences the Essence of one Species.* And now, I suppose, every body is convinc'd that *abstract Ideas* are the Measures of Species, and that this Gentleman is likely to refine the Schools and Universities in a clear way of expressing their Conceptions. Now the Sense of all this we were contented, before this Reformation, to have express'd thus: "The only Reason why we reckon any thing of this or that Species (suppose this an Horse, this Lead, the Instances he himself gives) is because we find those two Substances to have all the Properties and Qualities which other individual Substances have, to whom we give those Names of Horse and Lead; and because 'tis hard, if not impossible, to know all the Properties which may be in a particular Substance; therefore we are forc'd to give them Names, and rank them into Species or Sorts, only by those Properties we do know. And this, I am pretty confident, is his whole Sense, and is certainly true; and for that very Reason we disallow his Distinction of *Real* and *Nominal Essence*; for he owns, we don't, nor can understand what the real Essence is of any Substance. To which I add, Nor of any one Quality or Mode whatever; for if any one will tell me the real Essence of the Yellowness in Gold, that is, the precise Figure, Position, Bulk, Cohesion of Parts, which is necessary to make that Colour, I may be tempted to try to give him a full Account of the real Essence of that Substance; but in the mean time I shall think a Man imposes upon me, when he tells me that the real and nominal Essence in simple Ideas and Modes, are the same, but in Substances different; whereas the real Essence of both that which makes Yellowness and Gold, are equally unintelligible; as will farther appear in the next Chapter. That which I would farther note here, is, 1. That if it were allow'd to be proper to say, that the abstract Idea was the only Measure of *Species* and *Genus*, yet it's both obscure and confounding to say that abstract Ideas are the very Essence of those things which are sort'd; for this does not keep up the Difference between the Act of the Mind and its Object; for the Idea surely is in the Mind, and the Properties which make the Essence are in the Objects, and would be there whether we conceived them or not. 2. That the Words *Genus* and *Species*, as before explain'd, are more proper than *nominal* and *real* Essence; for they are fairly resolvable into the Properties by which things agree or disagree with one another, which are sensible and intelligible for sufficient Distinctions in their Names. But neither *real Essences* or *abstract Ideas* are in the least intelligible. The first we can't understand; and the second we can't form; because they comprehend so many Properties, Actions, and Modes of Action, that no Man upon earth can have one Idea of them, unless he could think of twenty several things at a time, as in the case of Processions and Triumphs: And that he can no more do, than a Body can be in twenty Places in the same instant.

Abstract Ideas
not the Es-
sence of any
thing.

The Distinction
of real and
nominal Es-
sence insignifi-
cant and con-
founding.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of simple Ideas.

I. **T**HO no Words signifie any thing immediately, but the Conceptions of him that uses them, because there is no natural Connexion between the Names of things and the things themselves; yet there is, says my Author, something peculiar in them when used for simple Ideas or Modes, mix'd Modes, and Substances. As for the *Names of simple Ideas* (that is, single Qualities or Properties, when consider'd as in the Objects) he has observ'd these six Particularities. 1. They intimate some real Existence. 2. They signifie the Real as well as Nominal Essence. 3. They are undefinable. 4. They are the least doubtful. 5. They have few Ascents *in linea prædicamentali*, that is, few words that can be their *Genus* or more general. 6. That they stand for Ideas, not arbitrary. As to the first Particularity, 'tis certain enough, if we may trust our Senses and Faculties, as we must, else we can't be certain of any thing. As for the second: I shall shew that is false in my Explication of his, and my own Reasons, why they are undefinable; which is his third Particular. As for the other three, they are true enough and very obvious, as will appear in Discourse about the third.

What Peculiarities are observable in the Names of single Qualities.

Why single Qualities can't be defin'd.

II. He thinks the Names of *simple Ideas* undefinable; because a Definition, he says, is but the shewing the Signification of one Word by several other, not synonymous Words, that is, several Words not signifying the same that the Word does which we define, because those several Words signifying several Things or Ideas can explain or define nothing but complex Ideas which are compounded of simple ones. And thence he takes occasion to be very witty upon the old and new Philosophers in their Definitions of Motion and Light; in which, I think, he has said nothing but what is true and notorious; because they are made more obscure by their Definitions than they are to every Man's Senses, that has any proper to know them. And I have nothing to note farther but only this; that a Definition has been usually reckon'd the Name of a Proposition, in which the Property or Properties of any thing is so set forth or explain'd, that the Thing may be distinguish'd from every thing else; or, in the Terms of Art, shewing the Essence of that Thing; or again, shewing the *Genus* and *Differentia*, which is much the same. For, enumerating the Properties of any thing is shewing the Essence of it, *Genus* and *Differentia* include those Properties, and the general Word is put in only to save a long Enumeration of all the Particulars, upon Presumption (tho that is often groundless) that they are sufficiently known. And as for the Definition which our Author has given us of the Word *Definition*, that's commonly call'd the Definition of a Word, not a thing, that is a Substance or a Mode of it. However, I perceive the same is meant by him: For a Word is only a Sign of an Idea, and an Idea is the Sign of the Thing; and so to define a Thing and to define a Word, is all one; which is very pretty for making Confusion. Secondly, I note, that simple Ideas (that is, single Qualities) have been commonly reckon'd undefinable on these two accounts; 1. Because it's suppos'd a Definition is an Explanation: Now a single Quality can't be explain'd, because nothing can be plainer than that is which occurs to our Senses; for that's the true Reason why Motion, Figure, Rest, Colours, Sounds, Smells, &c. can't be defin'd, because no Words can make them plainer than they are already to our very Senses; because Words written or spoken have no natural Connexion with the Things themselves, or the Idea of those Things. For Example; Repeat the Words *White, Red, Black*, as often as you please to a blind Man, he will have no Perception of any things but of the several Sounds; and those Sounds will produce no Perceptions but of themselves, not of the Colours. Now, tell him again, that Whiteness is nothing but the Impression upon the Eye which a certain round subtil Matter turn'd clear round about

Two Reasons according to the common opinion why single Qualities can't be defin'd.

about its Centre, whilst it moves from the Object to the Eye; that Red is produc'd by the like Motion half way round; Black is no such Motion at all of such Matter about its own Centre; yet this, tho it were suppos'd the true Account of the Cause, would make the blind Man not a dram the wiser; he must know it by his proper Organ of Sense, or not at all: And so for Smells and other sensible Qualities. And this is the true Reason why single Qualities can't be defin'd; not because they are simple Ideas; for no Man can have any simple Ideas at all: The Qualities must be complicated or united to their Subjects, and conceiv'd so, else he shall have no Ideas at all, any more than a blind Man has of Colours, or a deaf and dumb Man has of Sounds: But the Reason is, because they are sensible and must be known by the help of proper Organs; and when they are so known, no Words can make them plainer. A second Reason (which my Author does not touch) and, I think, as true as the other, why simple Qualities can't be defin'd, is, because the Reason or Cause of them can't be known at all. We all, for Example, know well enough for the Purposes of Convenience, what Whiteness is; but the exact Position, Figure, Bulk of the Particles, of which a white Body consists, as differing from a black one, is beyond the Reach of our Capacities, at least with any Certainty; and if it be so in that and all other sensible Qualities, that's the Reason also why they can't be defin'd. And by the way, it must be noted, that for that very Reason, the real Essence of single Qualities, as well as of Substances, and of Substances as well as Qualities, is altogether unknown to us; and therefore my Author's new Distinction of *nominal* and *real Essence* is quite lost. For the real Essence can't be the nominal in Qualities more than in Substances: For the blind Man knows what is the real Essence of any Colour, as well as the seeing Man does; that is, they are both equally in the dark: But thus far it's true, that a particular Substance may have its several Properties enumerated and represented to a Person that has observ'd and perceiv'd them in other individual Substances; and thereby he may know more of that Substance than he did before; but he shall be never the nearer knowing the inward Contexture or real Essence than he was before, because he shall still be ignorant of the Cause or Reason of its several Qualities, and so shall not be able to make a compleat Definition of that Substance. Therefore the talking of real and nominal Essences, is of no manner of Use, but only to breed Confusion: Whereas, if the Word *Essence* be taken, in its old Sense, only for the Combination of the knowable Properties and Qualities, by which one Substance is distinguishable from another, all that Confusion is easily avoided. Every Man may know so much of the Essences of Substances, single Modes, and mix'd Actions, as may be sufficient to guide and govern his Actions with discretion, in all civil, moral and religious Matters; whereas by setting up this new Distinction of *nominal* and *real Essences*, of *simple*, *complex*, and *abstract Ideas*, all Knowledge and Action must be turn'd into Dreams and Fancies, of which my Author has given us a very pretty Specimen in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mix'd Modes and Relations.

I. **M**ix'd Modes are commonly, when call'd by any distinct Name by others, call'd *complex Actions* with their Modes or Circumstances, when consider'd as out of the Mind; when in the Mind, *mix'd Notions*. In the Names of these my Author has observ'd these two Peculiarities, which he expressly says are worthy Observation; and I think so too. For if they be true, they'll confound all Morality; but if not, all that he means might have been express'd more intelligibly, and in fewer words. 1. That the Ideas they stand for are made by the

Mix'd Modes have, in this Author's account, two Peculiarities worthy Observation.

Under-

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be examin'd.

Understanding. 2. Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns. But before I enter upon the Examination of them, I would premise these few Notes, for the better clearing his Sense and my own. 1. I suppose that he means by the Names of *mix'd Modes*, the Actions themselves; because Names are only the Signs of Ideas; and Ideas in the Mind are the Signs of Actions, their Modes or Circumstances out of the Mind; for this does but agree with his Definition of the Word *Definition* in the former Chapter; to define the Word is to define the Thing: To define the Word *Motion*, *Gold*, *Theft*, is to define *Motion*, *Gold*, *Theft*. 2. That the Words, *Religion*, *Justice*, *Charity*, *Murder*, *Sacrilege*, *Adultery*, are *mix'd Modes* in his Sense; and for the understanding my own meaning, I must declare, that I don't pretend any of these Notions are the same in all Men. Nor 2. that the Essences or Bounds of distinction of them are so exactly set out by God, Nature, or Humane Laws, but that there are a great many Circumstances which may add to, or detract from the Degrees of a Virtue, or aggravate or lessen a Vice; and therefore there is a great deal of room left, for the Exercise of Christian Charity, in censuring and punishing Vices by Humane Laws. All then I mean is, that the Essence or Marks of Distinction of these Notions (suppose Virtue from Vice) are so set forth by the Laws of Nature (which I reckon divine Laws, because establish'd by the Author of Nature, as well as Revealed) that any Man may know them asunder (if he use the like Attention, and be as free from Prejudice) as well as he can one Substance from another, upon all emergent Occasions; and where that Distinction cannot be made, there Charity, which is the fulfilling the Law and Gospel too, is to take Place. But it must be noted also, that the word *Essence*, when used for these *mix'd Notions*, is not full out so proper, as when used for Substances or their Modes; for that Property or those Properties, which make an individual Substance, or Mode of it, to be what it is, co-exist: But these Actions, and Modes of them, do not co-exist, but are successive; and therefore the word *Essence* must be suppos'd to be used figuratively, or with some Latitude, when they express these Notions, which in Nature do not co-exist: And now I am ready to examine my Author's two Peculiarities, and the Reasons he offers to prove them.

Mix'd Modes
are no more
Creatures of
the Under-
standing than
Substances.

II. 1. He says, these *mix'd Modes* are Creatures of the Understanding, are voluntary Collections of *simple Ideas*, put together by the Mind, independent from any Patterns in Nature; because they may be made, abstracted, and have Names to them, before any Individual of that Species ever existed. His Instances are, *Sacrilege*, *Adultery* and *Murder*, and particularly pretends to prove it as to *Murder*, because there is no more Connexion in Nature between the *Idea* of Killing and a Sheep, than there is between the *Idea* of Killing and a Man. Now, here I pause, to try if we can understand his meaning. His Sense must be, either that there is no more Connexion in Nature between the Words *Killing*, and the Action (suppose cutting the Throat), and the Word *Sheep*, than there is between *Killing* and the word *Man*. Which is certainly true; for there is no natural Connexion between any one Word and another. Sheep might have been call'd Men, and Men Sheep, if the World had but agreed upon it. Or, 2. His Sense must be, that there is no more Connexion in Nature between the Action of *Killing* and a *Man*, than there is between the *same* Action and a *Sheep*; for both are but Killing, both are but cutting the Throat; and so the only Difference is, that Sheep are one sort of Animal, and Men another sort. But now I note, that from this very Passage, any one may discover the whole Intrigue and Blunder about *abstract Ideas*: For the plain Truth is, there is no such thing in the World as Killing in the Abstract, or Killing Man or Sheep either, in the general. He that kills must cut the Throat, stab, shoot, or some other way put an end to the Life of a single individual Man or individual Sheep. Killing and Murder too are very innocent things in the Abstract: But now, if you lay aside your abstract Idea or Notion, and talk like other People, suppose a particular Person whose Name is *John*, and a single Sheep whose Name is *Nan* (as poor People often call'd their Cade-Lambs) is there no more

more Connexion in Nature between another Person and *John*, and that same Person and *Nan*? If there be no more, then Men agree with other Men but just as they do in Nature with Sheep or Lambs: If there be more, then we can as easily know that the killing an innocent Person is a Vice, and the killing a Lamb is none, as we can distinguish a Man from a Sheep. And the Distinction is founded in Nature in one case as well as in the other, and all the Trick is in the Word *abstract Ideas*; for if they be the Signs of real Actions, the Actions, when applied to particular Cases, appear as manifestly different as the Substances themselves. And in that Sense I oppose this Answer to the Instances he produces. 'Tis indeed impossible to prove, but that a Man might have a Notion of Sacrilege, Adultery, Murder, before any such Fact was committed. But I think 'tis certain, that no Man had any Notion of Murder (and the like of the other Crimes) before he knew that he himself and others had power to do it, and so a Law might possibly be made against it, before it was actually committed; and that Law might be founded in Nature, as those and all Powers are not meer Creatures of the Imagination. And 'tis as certain again, that there was a Law of Nature against Murder, as old as Humane Nature itself, unless Men were like Sheep or such Beasts, as my Author has an Account of from Travellers into those Countries, where never any Men were. And surely there is more Connexion between Men and Men, if such as we are now, than between Men and Sheep: But if any Man should think otherwise, and offer to kill another innocent Man, with as little Reluctancy as he does a Sheep, he would soon find whether he could then be as secure of his own Life from other Men, as he is from other Sheep, if he kills one of them. I doubt not, but he would find an ugly Substance, which unphilosophical People call a *Knife*, a *Sword*, or something like them, hanging over his own Throat continually, and the Fear of that (if there was nothing else) which even in the State of Nature, would be as necessary as eating when he's hungry, would make him feel the Sanction of the Law of Nature against that voluntary Idol he had set up in his Mind of Murder. And surely again, there is a greater Connexion in Nature between Father and Son, than between the Son and other Men; and therefore the Law against Parricide is founded in Nature; and therefore tho in the Notion of Incest, the carnal Knowledge of the Sister is join'd with that of the Mother, and so far indeed was voluntary; yet that does not argue there is no more Difference in Nature between the Son and the Mother, than there is between him and his Sister; because all Laws are not squar'd by the Rules of Nature; for if they were, wilful Perjury, to take away a Man's Life and Estate, would be more severely punish'd than it is. But all this while, I am willing to believe, that I have mistaken his Meaning; it is not, that the cutting an honest Man's Throat is really no Crime, except the Man himself think so; for that indeed would be making every Man his own God, his own Lawgiver; but only that the *Species* of Murder, such as stabbing, shooting, cutting ones Throat, these are of humane Invention; and then 'tis so far true, for Swords, Guns, and Knives were certainly of humane Invention, and consequently the Sorts and Names of Actions thence deriv'd; but that can't be his Meaning, because Legs and Hands were not humane Inventions, and these may easily be the Instruments of another Man's Death. It remains then, according to his Principles, that what we call Murder or Parricide, are made distinct *Species* of killing, only for the Benefit of Communication, that People, when they use any of those Words, may understand what sort of killing they mean, not to distinguish any natural Abhorrence they have of killing a Man, more than of a Sheep; or of Parents, more than other Persons; because neither God or Nature have made any Laws, Patterns or Standards, by which to try or compare Actions; but have left every Man his free Choice to make what Laws, Patterns or Standards he pleases; and if humane Law-givers should inflict Punishments upon killing a Sheep, and then call it Murder, there would have been no Offence against a Law of Nature to have hang'd a Man for it; or if they had but rewarded killing a Man or ones own Parents, and call'd it Blessing them, it had been inno-

The Author's first Objection answer'd by shewing the ill Consequences of that doctrine.

The difference
between Vir-
tues and Vices
as easily
known as be-
tween Sub-
stances.

His second
Argument an-
swer'd.

cent, just and honourable, if it had been fashionable. If I say my Arm is two Yards long, I may be rectified, because there is a fix'd Standard of a Yard, which upon measuring, would confute me: But if I call that Covetousness, which another calls Frugality, that Murder, which another calls Justice, that Charity, which another calls Folly, there is no Standard to rectifie my Error, neither indeed is there any Error; for every Man's own Idea of them is the only real Standard, the Type and the Archetype; there is no *Criterion*. And in this Sense indeed *mixt Modes* have their Peculiarities, and are distinct from *Substances*; for we can't make *Substances* either such as they are, or other than they are, by all the Powers of Imagination: That will be Gold, and this will be Silver, let us call it what we please; but in *mixt Modes*, not only the *Ideas* of them may be form'd before there are any individual Actions conformable to them, but after any Actions are exerted (suppose virtuous or vicious) every Man's own Idea of one or t'other is the only Standard, the only Essence or Mark of Distinction between one and t'other; and tho another Man's Idea may be different from mine, yet mine is as true, real and just as his, because there are no standing Rules, by which to try his or mine, God and Nature having left us at liberty to use our own Discretion in such Matters. But if these be not the natural Consequences of my Author's Notion of *mixt Modes* (particularly of the Names of all moral Actions) I should most gladly be inform'd wherein their Peculiarities consist, or wherein different from *Substances*: For if a Man can as easily distinguish between a Virtue and a Vice, as he can between some Animals, Plants and Minerals, as infallibly he may (if he use the like Industry, and be as free from Passion) then certainly the Author of Nature has given every Man some such Rules, by which to compare Actions; and 'tis unaccountable otherwise how it comes to pass that Mens Notions of Good and Evil are not as different as their Habits and Languages; and yet as barbarous as some Men are pleas'd to represent others; most sort of Actions that are esteem'd good or bad, are so distinguished (however different their Names for them are) all the World over; and therefore are not voluntary or arbitrary.

His second Proof that *mix'd Modes* were not deriv'd from Nature, but are meer Creatures of the Understanding, is, because there are in most Languages, Words which are hardly translatable into other Languages. He mentions *Versura* amongst the *Romans*, much like perhaps our Brokering, and *Corban* amongst the *Jews*, much like our Oblations to pious Uses. Now this seems to me a cogent Argument that Words have no natural Connexion either with the Ideas or with Actions, but People may use what Words, and in what Sense, they agree upon; but this does not prove in the least, that the *Ideas* of the Actions were voluntary or arbitrary; for let the *Romans* or *Jews* have agreed upon any other Words to signifie those Actions, yet the Actions would have been the same; they did not depend upon any thing which lay in the Power of the Peoples Minds barely; for if other People, in another Country, had had the same Usages (tho their Names might have been different) yet the *Ideas* of those Actions would have been the same, in the different Countries. Neither can I yet learn, how the Names of these mix'd Actions rye the Actions together, more than the Names of Substances do their Properties: The Words *Triumph*, *Procession*, *Murder*, have no more Connexion with the several Actions which the Mind conceives, than the Words *Gold* or *White* have with that Substance or that Quality, to which we give those Names. They serve to bring into the Mind the several Actions and Modes (and so do the other) neither more or less: When I hear the Words *Triumph* or *Procession*, I am as free to think of *Æmilius's* or *Scipio's*, as, when I hear the Words *Gold* or *White*, to think of a whole as half *Guinea*, of *Snow* as of *Milk*, and am as free to add or diminish of the Quantity of Gold, or the Degrees of Whiteness; and yet one shall still have the Essence of Gold, and the other of Whiteness; as I can add or detract from the Modes or Circumstances of a Triumph or Procession; and yet the Essence of both remain: And this is applicable to moral Actions; our Notions of them are alterable, according to the various lessening or aggravating Circumstances; but the

the Distinction between one and t'other, or the Essence, may be preserv'd in one Case as well as the other.

His third Argument to prove that the *Species of mixt Modes* are the Creatures of the Understanding, is because their Names lead our Thoughts into the Mind and no farther. He instances in Justice and Gratitude. Now I always thought that it was as impossible for a Man to form any Notions of Justice or Gratitude without comparing his own or the sensible Actions of others with the Laws of Nature which incline him to the Practice of them, as of a Horse or Iron (my Author's Instances) without seeing them or having them represented to him by something like them. Neither can I imagine a Man just or grateful, that does not conform his Actions to those natural Inclinations according to his Powers, more than I can a Horse without Legs, or Iron as light as a Feather. And tho indeed the Modes of expressing, or the Measures of them, are not set forth by Nature with such sensible Marks as the Properties of a Horse or Iron are, yet a Man may as easily know whether he himself be just and grateful, or the contrary, as he can distinguish between a Horse and a Mule, between Iron and Lead.

His third Argument answered.

If then the Names of all *mixt Modes* signifie the real Essences of their Species, are made by the Understanding and therein differ from *simple Ideas* which are presented to the Mind by real Existences; and not only so, but are made arbitrarily, without Patterns or References really operating upon them, which are my Author's Words, then I would be glad to know why the Dreams of a Man asleep, the extravagant Fancies of mad or feverish Men, may not be to all Effects and Purposes as true and real Ideas as any other. Suppose a Man dream, which is easie to do, that he is a great General, and in a notable Battle, gain a Victory by cutting off his Enemies Heads with his own Sword as easily, as a waking Man may the Heads of Poppies with his Stick, why should this Man be denied a real Triumph? For tho the *Roman Senate* were sometimes shy of granting that Honour, except the Persons acted by their Commission and in their proper Sphere, unless they brought home their Armies, and with little Loss and great Spoils; yet this Man in a Dream, Fit of Madness or a Fever, can have none of these Exceptions; for he can give himself what Commission he please, bring home as many of his Troops, as much Spoil, and with as little Loss as can be desired; besides, he can make his Cavalcade as magnificent as his Heart can wish, his Chariot as princely, his Equipage as splendid, and, with the Help of my Author's Ideas, he can have all the Musick, all the Smells, all the Tasts, except of Pine-Apples, and all the Variety of Colours that can be devis'd. Now then, why is not this Battle, this Victory, this Triumph, which are all *mixt Modes*, to be reputed real? Here is Type and Archetype; the Essence, and the Ideas which make the Essence, all in due Form and Figure; nothing wanting to make the Man as Great as all the World can make him, only that others be as mad as himself, and that may be as soon as they please; for there is nothing in Nature to hinder them: The World has furnish'd them sufficiently with an infinite Number of *independent Ideas*, and they have nothing to do but to tye them together by Names, and so the String is in their own Hands. But if any one will be so humorfome as not to believe these real Battles, Victories and Triumphs, he must go upon other Principles than my Author does, or he must at least own him the most incomparable Artist in making things obscure which are obvious, or profound Mystery which is hardly common Sense, that ever set Pen to Paper. But for my own part I believe all these Consequences which may be fairly drawn from this Author's way of stating the Notion of *mixt Modes* to be wholly imputable to his Zeal to keep up the Honour of his Ideal Style; for it seems plain to me, that these which he calls *mixt Modes* are nothing else but mixt Actions with their Circumstances, and that we have no Idea at all of them in our Minds upon the hearing or reading their general Names, till they are resolv'd into the particular Actions, and their Modes which constitute them. For example; When I hear the Word *Procession*, I have no general or abstract Idea of it at all; but when indeed there comes into my Thoughts the

Idea

Idea of particular Persons, in a certain place, and at a certain time, in certain Habits, walking regularly with Images, opening their Mouths to sing, with Censers in their Hands to perfume the Air, Flowers, Tapers, musical Instruments and other visible Objects; then I have the abstract Idea of a Procession. And when I meet with such several sorts of mixt Actions in another place or time, agreeing in all or most of these Circumstances, then I give the same common Name of *Procession* to these other mixt Actions, which I did to the former. But when I hear barely the Word *Procession* in general, I have no Idea of it at all. Whether it be thus with other Men, and whether it be not thus in moral Actions and all other mixt Actions, I must leave to every one to consider, by turning his Thoughts into his own Mind; and if he find it so (as I am confident he will) he will plainly discover these Notions thus form'd to be founded in Nature, and upon as real Actions as the Notions he has of Substances and Modes, when he hears or reads their general Names, and consequently that there are no such Peculiarities in their Names as my Author fancies; only indeed some more Labour of Thought or Attention of Mind in the forming the particular Ideas of these *mixt Modes* than of *single Substances*, that is all the Difference I find. The Sum is; The Names of *mixt Actions* are of humane invention, as the Names of all *Substances* and their *Modes* are; but the particular moral Actions (for Example) which give this or that Name of Murder or Charity (suppose) are as real Actions as particular Qualities in any Substance (suppose) Gold or Loadstone are real Qualities. The Rule or Standard by which they may be tried (namely, the Laws of Nature) is as fix'd as that by which to try those Substances. And therefore there are no such Peculiarities in them as my Author has assign'd, unless Virtue and Vice and all mixt Modes are only meer Names.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

The Essence of Substances are Properties by which they are distinguish'd from each other.

I. 'TIS certain enough, that the common Names of *Substances*, such as Man, Horse, Fish, Fowl, Tree, Metal, Stone, &c. stand for sorts. But 'tis as certain, they are only the Signs of our Conceptions that the Individuals which have those Names agree in several Properties, Qualities and Accidents, which consider'd as in the Individuals, we call their *Essence*, as in the Mind we call *Notions*, or *complicated Notions*. But we never heard before that these Notions or abstract Ideas, as our Author calls them, were the Essences themselves; because that Property, or those Properties, which make the Essence of any thing, would be in it whether we conceiv'd them in it or not. That which makes the Sun to be the Sun, or any Parcel of Matter to be Gold, or that Bulk, Figure, Position of Particles which makes or denominates a thing white, sweet in Smell or Taste, hard, &c. would be in those Bodies, whether we perceiv'd them or not. But the Names indeed of those Substances or Qualities, are arbitrary, depend wholly as Languages do, upon the Consent of People, they having no natural Connexion with the Substances or Qualities. But 'tis as improper to say those Ideas, or those Perceptions of the Properties in the Sun, or any Parcel of Matter, were the Essence of them, as to say the Mind, when it perceives them, is hot, luminous, yellow or heavy. The real Essence therefore of any Substance is nothing else but the Combination of those Properties in it; by which we distinguish it from every thing else; and we give several Individuals a common Name for their Agreement in those Properties. The Properties, so far as we commonly know in every Parcel of Matter that has the Name of Gold, are Yellowness, Malleableness, Fixedness, greater Weight than other Bodies of the same Bulk; and when we find several individual Pieces of Matter agree in those Properties, we give all of them the general Name

of

of Gold ; but we have no general Idea of that or any other Substance ; all our Ideas are of particular things ; there is nothing general but the Name, and that's no Sign of any abstract Idea in the Mind at that instant we hear or read the general Word, but only of its having observ'd several Individuals agree in their Properties. Having premis'd this, it will be easie to solve all the Difficulties, with which my Author has perplex'd this plain Subject.

II. First, Nothing, he says, is essential to individuals, in his sense of the Word *Essence*, supposing, namely, that it's only the abstract *Idea*, the Measure and Boundary of each Sort or Species of things : But what if there be no such thing in the World as abstract Ideas ? What if all Ideas be of Particulars ? as certainly they are ; then it will be so far from being true, that there is nothing essential to individuals, that every thing that is essential, is essential to individuals ; for Essential is only the Title or Name we give to those Properties and Qualities which distinguish individuals from all other individuals which want them ; and Properties are not in Generals, but in Individuals. Reason, Sense, Life, spontaneous Motions, are not in the Word *Man*, which is the General ; but in several individual Men ; nor Malleableness, Fixedness, Yellowness, Weight, are not in Gold in general, but in each individual Piece of Gold : This is, I am sure, the common Opinion : And tho we say indeed, that This and That Man, This Guinea and That have the same Essence, we mean only that this Man has all the Properties by which he may be distinguish'd from all other individual Animals which have another Name, and this Guinea has all the Properties by which it may be distinguish'd from all other Coyns. And so if the Word *Essence* be taken, in the old sense, for that Property, or those Properties, by which one thing is distinguish'd from another that has not the same Name ; then every thing that is essential, is in individuals only ; and the Measure and Boundary of each Species won't be the abstract Idea but the Properties in each individual which we observe it to have and others to want. And therefore I make the same Appeal to every Man's own Thoughts for the confirming this Truth, which my Author does for the contrary, when he hears any general Name, such as Man, Horse, Gold, does not some individual Man, particular Horse or Piece of Gold come presently into his Mind ? If not, he only rumbles over the Word, but has no Idea fix'd there at all. And the Case is the same as to the general Names of Qualities. Taking then the Word *Essence* as applied to Substances, it can't be any Fiction of the Mind, or any abstract Idea of it ; for then the Properties which make that *Essence* would alter according to every ones Knowledge, Fancy or Experience. Yellowness, for Example, would be the Essence of Gold, because a Child considers nothing else, Colour and Weight to the Vulgar ; Colour, Weight, Malleableness, Fixedness to most Men ; all these and Solubility in *Aqua Regia* to the Chymist ; whereas these Properties can never be alter'd by meer Thought. This is plain *English*, and will neither need Proof or Explication ; or if it may seem to want any, it will be made good in the Solution of those Difficulties with which my Author has very artificially puzzled his Reader.

Nothing is essential in the true Sense of the word Essence, but to Individuals.

III. 1. Suppose, says he, an *individual* Person. An Accident, a Disease may alter his Colour or Shape, a Fever or a Fall may take away his Reason or Memory ; an Apoplexy may leave neither Sense, Understanding nor Life : Hence he argues, that *Nothing is essential to individuals*. But I answer, that my Author forgot, in laying down this for one of his Maxims, that nothing is essential to individuals, to except God ; for tho he is an individual Substance, yet every thing that is essential to him is inseparable from him ; and if it be so in God (which I presume he will admit) then why may not God communicate that Excellency to a spiritual Substance, of having some Properties which cannot be separated from it, and thereby in all States and Conditions make it distinguishable from all Bodies, and from all other individual Spirits ? And that this is no precarious Supposition, but is founded upon Reason, is manifest from hence ; because, so far as we can conceive, no Particle or Particles of Matter are capable of thinking, and the indi-

Nothing essential but to Individuals farther clear'd, from the Author's Objections.

vidual Thoughts of one Spirit cannot be Thoughts of another, any more than one Man's Head-ach can be anothers; and then it will follow, that tho Disease or Accident may take away a Man's Life, yet it cannot annihilate his Soul, the thinking Substance; nor destroy those Thoughts by which he is distinguishable from all Bodies and all other individual Spirits; and those Properties so retain'd we call the *Essence of that individual Spirit*. But as for individual Parcels of Matter, it must be own'd, that they may be so mixt and blended with others, as not to be distinguishable from them, as not to retain any such indelible Marks, by which we can say this is that by Name; and in that sense their *Essence* (that is, *distinct Properties*) may be alter'd. But then these two things may be noted, which may sufficiently evince, that *abstract Ideas* are not in any case their *Essences*. 1. None of these Alterations are made meerly by our Thoughts; 'tis the real Operation of natural Causes that turns Air into Water, or Water into Ice, and so alters the Properties, by which one Substance becomes different from another; for the abstract Idea of every individual Substance must alter as the Properties do; and therefore, 'tis Nature, or rather the Author of Nature, that makes Essences Species or Sorts, not the Mind: All the Mind can do, is but to observe these Properties as they alter and give the Substance that has them the same common Name which other individual Substances have that have the like Properties. 2. Every thing that exists, has something by which it may be distinguish'd from every thing else. Suppose a Particle of Matter, it must fill some space which no other does or can at the same instant; and it must have some particular Figure or other, and thereby it will be distinguishable from all individual Particles of Matter: And tho we cannot so follow Nature in all minute Changes it makes in the material System, as to know them all; or, if we could, it would not be worth the while to give new or distinct Names to every individual Particle upon such Change; yet no doubt but it has some Properties or other by which it is distinguishable, and those Properties are its Essence, whether we do or can observe them or not. 'Tis not by our Ideas, but by their own Properties that every thing is what it is; and they are the Boundaries and Measures of their Species or Kind: All we can do, is but to give Names to them, as we observe other Individuals agree with them in those Properties; and we may observe that we do every day change the Names or Appellations, even of Individuals, when the Alteration is sensible, and when it will serve our Conveniencies to keep up a Distinction. We say an individual Man is another Sort or Species (if you will) of Man, when he becomes sensibly wiser and better, and *vice versa*; that a Watch is another Sort of Watch when it goes better or worse, or has any remarkable Alteration in its Parts or Properties; an Horse another sort of Horse when he is fat or lean; but yet we commonly continue to each Individual the more general Name of Man, Watch or Horse, because that's the Sign that in all those Changes they retain so many Properties as make them really distinguishable from all other Individuals that have not the like Properties. But in all these cases 'tis the Properties of the Individual that make the Essence or Species. And as for abstract Ideas continuing the same, and thereby the Essences being unalterable, ingenerable, as my Author fancies, we must give him leave to honour his own Brats with what Titles of Honour he please; for a Man that is a right Idea-maker has all the World in a String; but really there are no such things in any Man's Head (so far as I can judge of others by my own) as *abstract Ideas of Substances*; and 'tis as impossible to frame an abstract Idea of Man, Horse or Clock, or any thing else in general, as to crowd all the World into a Nut-shell. All abstract Ideas are of single individual Substances, and those continue or change as the Properties or Qualities of each individual do; and those in all those successive Changes are their true and real Essences; and those all the World owns, in material Substances, are neither unalterable nor ingenerable, but depend upon the various Operation of natural Causes.

The Occasions
of the mistake
that nothing is
essential to in-
dividuals.

IV. When we say that such or such Properties are *essential to Individual Substances*, we don't mean that they are inseparable from them; but that they distinguish them

them from all other Substances and Individuals, and are in that respect incommunicable, that is, cannot be in two Individuals. Two or more Bodies may agree in having the like Figure, Bulk, Position of Parts, Colours, Smells, Tastes, &c. and on that account we commonly say that they have the same Essence or Nature, but we don't mean they have the same individual Properties or Qualities, but only that they agree in having such and so many of the like Properties, as to be the same to us, or affect us much after the same way; and therefore give them the same common Name. Tho two Eggs be never so like one another, yet they are really as distinct Substances as Fire and Water; and since they have distinct Existences, they must have Properties or incommunicable Essences to distinguish one from the other. If a Man be to pay me Ten Pounds, I may say 'tis the same thing to me whether it be in Gold or Silver; but no body will say those two Substances have the same Essence or Nature: Nay tho a Man at the Tower should get a certain Guinea melted and recoin'd in the same Mould; tho this new one would be the same to him as the old one, yet it would not be the same individual Guinea, because not only the same Matter, but the Combination of all the same individual Properties are requisite to make it so, which in that case would be alter'd. And hence I gather, 'tis the ambiguous Use of the Word *same* in common Discourse that occasions the common Mistake that *nothing is essential to Individuals*: And 'tis no Contradiction to say, Two Men have the like Essence, and yet have distinct Essences; for it would be a Contradiction rather to think the contrary; for the Word *like* implies Relation, and that is always between two things, or at least one thing consider'd at different times; and it would be a Contradiction to say, Two things, how near soever to one another in Nature or Properties, were one thing; or, which is the same in sense, had no Distinction: And therefore in the first case, we mean only that the Two Men (tho we may call it the same) have the like Nature or Properties by which both or either of them are distinguish'd from other Animals. But in the second Case, we mean that each Man has such Properties which are incommunicable to the other, and thereby distinguishable; but in both these cases, and in all others, the Properties in each Individual make the Essence, and not the Ideas we have of them; for the Mind has nothing to do therein but only to observe them such as they are made by Nature, and give the Substances wherein they are, common or different Names.

Another Occasion of that Mistake, that *Nothing is Essential to Individuals*, is, our Aptness to take Names for the Things themselves, of which they are only the common Names; and hence it comes to pass, that we often say, that such or such Properties are essential to the Names of Substances. For Example; that Reasoning and Shape of Body are essential to *Man*, a peculiar Weight to *Gold*, whereas neither these are essential to Man, but to individual Men, or the other to Gold, but to individual Parcels of Matter; for *Man* and *Gold* are only common Names; and there can be nothing essential to Names but the distinct Sounds when pronounc'd, or the particular Letters when written; but all that is really essential is in the individual Substances which have those common Names; and any one may satisfy himself that it is so, by asking himself whence he has the common Name of *Man* given him; Is it not from that Shape of Body and Reasoning Faculty which he has common to himself and other Men? or has he those Properties from his being call'd Man? That common Name *Man* is of humane Invention, and any other would have serv'd as well as that, if People had agreed in the Usage of it, for the expressing their Conception of those Properties: But I presume no body will own his Properties are so, but rather the Effects of the kind and wise Author of his Nature. And the case is the same as to all the common Names of Substances; they are given to Individuals by Mens Observation of their Agreement or Disagreement with one another; but still that in which they agree, and thereby come to have common Names, and that in which they disagree, and thereby come to have different Names, and in which their Nature, their Essence consists, is wholly deriv'd from the Original Author of all Beings and their several Properties.

V. But

The true
Boundary of
Substances are
the Properties
in them, not
our abstract
Ideas.

V. But to make it yet clearer, that the true Boundary of the Species of Substances are the Properties observable in them, and not any abstract Ideas of them, I will propound a plain Instance, which will discover the whole Mystery of *Abstract Ideas*, and shew how unsatisfactory they are in the Proof of any Proposition. Suppose a single Guinea laid upon the Table; if any one asks me, what is the Essence of a Guinea? I answer in the common Language, The King's Stamp, its Colour, its Figure, its Malleableness, its Fixedness, its Weight above any Body of that Size; for these are the Properties which distinguish it from a Shilling, a double or half Guinea, a *French Pistole*, and every thing else: And if I be ask'd, why I call this on the Table a Guinea, or reckon it of the Species of Guineas? I answer again, Because, so far as I can perceive, it agrees with all other individual Parcels of Matter that have that common Name, in all those Properties; and so the Essence of the Guinea is the Combination of those Properties; and this I take to be the ordinary way of talking. But now, if I meet with one in my Author's way, I ask first, what is the Essence of a Guinea? His Answer must be, Its abstract Idea. Well, but because I am suppos'd a Stranger to that word, I ask again, what kind of thing that abstract Idea is? He answers, 'Tis a compounded Idea of several simple Ideas. I ask again, and what are those simple Ideas, for there is much talk of them of late; I would be glad to see or feel one of them? He answers, When in the Mind, they are call'd *simple Ideas*; when in the Objects, the vulgar call them single Qualities, Properties or Accidents. Well; But I ask again, Can you shew me any one or more of these simple Ideas in or out of the Mind? Now here he must be at a Stand; for if he point me to the Guinea on the Table, or any other these simple Ideas or Properties are not single, but are united to or combined with the Substance. At last then I ask him, why he calls that piece on the Table a Guinea? how he proves it to be of that Species? He says, Because it answers his abstract Idea of a Guinea. But how shall I be satisfied that agrees with his abstract Idea? I told him before, I call'd it so, and could prove it so by comparing it with all or any of the individual Parcels of Matter that have that Name; but it's impossible for him to prove what he says, without producing some other individuals; and if he does that, then he leaves his abstract Idea, and comes to the comparing one individual Substance with another, which is the common way: But if he does not take that Course, I can have no better Proof or Satisfaction from him, that this is or is not a Guinea, than I had many years since from a Man in *Bedlam*, that he was a Prince; and whether this new way of proving any Proposition whatever be true or false by abstract Ideas, be more satisfactory in any case than in this obvious one, will deserve farther Consideration. I have been the larger in this particular, because it will make the rest of this Chapter the easier to be understood, and will help to resolve all his hard Questions.

Objections of
the Author's
answer'd.

2. Suppose, says my Author, there be a Parcel of Matter to be found, which will not obey the Magnets Attraction; Is this Iron? has it the Essence of Iron? I answer, It has not the whole Essence of Iron, but it has part of it; that is, it has some of the Properties, not all; and People may call it Iron if they will not trouble themselves to make a new Name for it; but it ought to be reckon'd a particular Sort or Species of Iron; an Essence it has, and Properties by which it may be distinguish'd both from common Iron and every thing else; and those Properties are the Boundaries of its Species; and then there is no Mystery in the case, if *abstract Ideas* and *nominal Essences* be not brought in to make one.

Properties be-
long to indivi-
duals, not to
the Species, or
Names of
them.

3. In the Explication of his own invention about *nominal* and *real Essences*, Sect. VI. he says, Properties belong only to *Species*, not *Individuals*. But if any one be of his Mind, let him try if he can satisfy another Man's Hunger or Thirst by his own eating and drinking; or can make another Man conscious of his individual Thoughts, or feel his Pleasures or his Pains; and by the issue of the Experiment, he will find *Properties* belong to *individual Substances* or particular Men, and not to the specifick Name or general Word *Man*.

4. He

4. He endeavours to prove, that the nominal Essence bounds the Species of Substances, from the Disappointment which wary Chymists have met with in Experiments upon Sulphur, Antimony and Vitriol. This proves indeed they were mistaken; but that Mistake did not alter the real Essence, that is, the real Properties which were in them, (for that's all we mean by *real Essence*) and what those Properties were, their Mistake did not alter, tho' their Fire or Spirits, used in their Operations, might; and thence it appears, that it's Nature, not Mens Thoughts or Ideas, which makes Essences.

5. He is very large in proving, that neither the *real Essence*, in his own Sense of that word *Essence*, nor *Substantial Forms* constitute the Species of Substances; all which he might have saved; for neither he, or any body understands either what his real Essence is, or substantial Forms; but every body understands what Properties, Qualities or Accidents are; and so far as he understands of them in any Substance, so far he understands its *Essence*, and will be able to give it a common Name with other Substances, with which it agrees in those Properties: And prudent People will not pretend to be so wise as to understand that which they themselves own they don't understand. And therefore, I must leave my Author to deal with his own Brat of *real Essences*, as he pleases; for I have no Informations to give against *Ideal Murder*, if he is minded to starve it.

6. His pretty instance of a Man's coming from *Jamaica*, who never saw Ice there; but being in *England*, finds the Water he wash'd his Hands with over night, turn'd to Ice the next Morning. This Instance, I say, does not in the least affect the common Notion of *Essences*: 'Tis, without doubt, a different Sort or Species from Water, because it has distinct Properties; but whether the Man has heard the Name *Ice*, or knows to what kind of Substance to give that Name, is not very material: He may call it hardned Water, if he please, and is not therein more mistaken, than he that calls melted Wax fluid Wax; the Air altering the Properties in one, as much as the Flame has alter'd the other; and from thence I gather, that giving Names depends upon every ones Experience; but not making Essences; that's the Work of Nature, not of meer Thoughts or Ideas. Every Man will give Names according to his own Experience or Knowledge of the several Substances: Gardners to Trees, Watch-makers to Watches, Chymists to Drugs; every Man in his own way and trade: But as for the Properties which make the Essences or distinct Species of them, they depend upon real Operations, either natural or artificial; and not upon Mens voluntary naming them, or Ideas of them: And, I doubt, without an Act of Parliament to commission Name-makers, *English-men* will give Names to all Substances according to their own Discretion and Experience; and when the Commission comes to be executed, there will be no Alteration in the Scheme of the natural or artificial World; every individual will keep its own Properties, its own Essence, its own Species: Tho' the Names were alter'd, yet that which had the Properties of an individual Man, Horse, Tree, Watch, would be of the same Species and Essence; and tho' taking away a Man's Mony upon the Road by Force might be call'd heroical Bravery or Valour, yet it would be a Species of Injustice still; and so of all mixt Modes as well as of Substances: The Names might be alter'd, but not the Properties, the Nature, Essence or Species.

Names are alter'd at every ones pleasure, or according to his experience; but not the Essence, nor the Properties.

But my Author's most mortifying Proof, that the Species of Animals are not made by Nature, but by our voluntary ranking them according to our abstract Ideas, is from the infinite Variety of Creatures in the World, of Spirits in the Planets, which are easily and probably imagin'd, and of other Animals upon earth; some with shapes like ours, but hairy, and want Language and Reason: Some Naturals or Ideots among us, that have perfectly our shapes, but want Reason, and some of them Language also; others that have Language and Reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, but have hairy Tails (but with a Caution, *sit fides penes Authorem*, for no body will believe it but a thorough-paced Species-confounder) others with a Man's Head and a Hog's Body; some with

Man's Body and the Heads of Dogs and Horses, but none I perceive with Horns in those happy Countries. Well, by this we may see this industrious Author has spared for no Searches into the *Terra incognita*, nor into the Planetary World, for the making good the Harmony of the Universe, as he calls it, but others call confounding the several Species of Animals. But after all, I can't find any Reason to believe, but that all these Species of Animals were of Nature's making; for Nature seems to operate by necessary Causes, tho we may not know them; and if we suppose any such Mixtures as we call unnatural between Man and Beast-kind, if the Issue was such as in natural Mixtures, such Issue would be more properly monstrous than any our Author's History furnishes us with. And therefore whatever they are, they are Creatures of Nature's, not ours; and therefore this Argument is of no Force. But this Note I must add, That God has given us no better Standard by which to judge of the Species of Mankind, but only the visible Properties in the shape of the Body; and therefore tho there may be one in a hundred thousand that may want that degree of Reason which he has given the rest, yet we dare not presume to be so wise as to exclude Ideots and Naturals out of the Classis of Mankind; and are willing to be rather too charitable than too wise, in offering to penetrate into the Secrets of Heaven, by denying them all the Benefits that civil and Christian Society can afford. But as for such monstrous Births (if there be any,) we rely so far upon the Goodness and Favour of our infinitely wise Maker, as not to judge them of humane Race, because there is hardly one such into twenty Millions, not in all *Europe*, in an hundred Years; and therefore 'tis no Inhumanity to kill them, because he has not made us wise enough to judge otherwise; but that they are the Issues of unnatural Mixtures. In short: Whatever is, has some Properties or other to distinguish it from every thing else, and those are the real Essence of it, so far as we know, and we give it a common Name, or reckon it of this or that Species with other Individuals that have the like Properties. And thus, tho perhaps our manner of Expression is different from my Author's, yet the Difference may not in this particular, be so wide as it may seem. And if we be ask'd what Properties, or precise number of them, are requisite to make a particular Substance of any Species, or intitle it to this or that Name, we don't pretend, in natural Substances, to know them, neither indeed will any abstract Ideas, when they are to be had, help us in the least in that, because they can go no farther than individual Substances, neither do we pretend to know so much as the Cause of any one Quality, Property or Accident whatsoever. But if any one will teach us what Figure, what Position of Particles, what Bulk, what Kind and Degree of Motion constitutes any Colour, Smell, Taste, Sound, tangible Quality, or other Property, we shall then be able to tell what, and precisely how many of these Properties must concur to make any individual Substance of this or that species or kind: But in the mean time, we are contented with the Liberty of giving general Names to Substances, as we find the Individuals agree or disagree in these discernible Properties, and we leave the Grand Author of Nature the only Honour of making all these Properties, and combining them in Substances, as he, in his unsearchable Wisdom, shall think fit; but for making Essences by *voluntary abstract Ideas* of our own, we utterly disown. Whether this or my Author's way of talking about *real* and *nominal Essences*, *complex* and *abstract Ideas*, be more intelligible or increase Knowledge best, must be left to the Discretion of every unprejudic'd Reader.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

I. **P**articles are such Parts of Speech, as either signify our Conception, that the things are coherent, or incoherent in single Propositions; or the like Coherence and Incoherence of several of our Conceptions put together in Sentences. The Particle *Is* signifies the Coherence or Affirmation in single Propositions, and is commonly call'd the *Copula* of the Subject and Predicate, and is often included in a Verb: And the Particle *Not* signifies our Conception of the Incoherence or Negation: And the rest of the Particles, in like manner, are Signs of the Coherence or Incoherence of our Conceptions in Discourses and Reasonings. And tho my Author has well observ'd, that to understand the Force of those Particles exactly, we should take Notice of the several Views, Postures, Stands, Limitations, Exceptions, and several Modes of Thought; yet they are all reducible to those two of Conjunction or Disjunction; such are the Particles *And*, *If*, *Or*, *Because*, *Therefore*, *But*, &c. For tho each one may have different or contrary Significations, yet they are resolvable into them two, as in the Instances he has given in the Particle *But*: "*But* to say no more; there, he says, it signifies a stop of the Mind; right, but then that stop implies a Coherence of the Thoughts express'd with them that are not express'd. "I saw *but* two Planets; that is, I saw no more than two; where the Negation is manifest. "You pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion, *but* that he would confirm you in your own; in the former the Particle *But* is plainly negative; for 'tis the same in sense, as if one should say, "You don't pray to be confirm'd in the true Religion: and in the latter too; for it implies the Exclusion or Negation of all other Religions. "All Animals have Sense, *but* a Dog is an Animal; there it is as plainly affirmative. The Truth is, these Particles are used in so different and contrary senses, that it creates a great Difficulty in learning the *English*, and, I doubt, all other Languages by Rules, and those would be so many as to make it almost as easie to understand the whole Language, as those very Rules; but yet are easily learnt by Practice; and so I suppose it is in most Arts. The Art of Navigation, of Building, even of making Shooes and Saddles, would require a very curious mathematical Genius to learn by Rule; but yet, we find, are easily learnt by Practice; and whether it be not so in the liberal Arts of Oratory and Poetry, is much to be question'd. But as to these Particles, I know but of one easie Rule to understand their peculiar Force; and that is, to put the Words, as they are express'd with the Particle, into another equivalent Form. For Example; the Particles *Although* and *Yet*, which I find are reckon'd amongst the very hardest: Suppose I say, "*Tho* I don't believe there are any abstract Ideas of mix'd Modes, *yet* I do believe there are abstract Ideas of visible particular Objects: My Meaning is, that my Thoughts are unlike my Author's in the first instance, but like his in the second; and by that means the Conjunction or Disjunction will more plainly appear; almost as plainly as the Note of Affirmation and Negation in simple Propositions.

What Particles of Speech are the signs of.

Particles used in very differing senses, but easily learnt by Practice, tho not by Rules.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

I. **B**Efore I offer to explain my Author's Gibberish about abstract Terms, I will try to explain their sense in the common Language. *Concrete Terms* can be nothing else but the Names of Substances given them on the Account of some

What are concrete and abstract Terms.

Concrete the
Names of
Substances.

some single Quality or Property in them or their Relation to other Substances. Such are the Words *Just, Moving, Figured, Round, White, Sweet, Equal, Like, &c.* in them there is no Difficulty. But in *abstract Terms*, how near soever they seem in sound, to *concrete*, yet, when put into Propositions, are notoriously different. *Snow is White*, is a true Proposition; but *Snow is Whiteness*, a false one. How agreeable soever their Ideas may seem in my Author's Language, which plainly shews that Truth of Proposition is not Agreeableness or Disagreeableness in Ideas, as he fancies; for the Idea of Whiteness is as agreeable to the Idea of Snow, as the Idea of White; and from thence 'tis natural to infer, that sensible Qualities are really not Ideas, but only the Names of our Modes of perceiving Substances. Now then if we could learn the Reason why Whiteness cannot be truly the Predicate of a Proposition, tho White may, we might thereby understand the Difference between *concrete* and *abstract Terms*. First then, one obvious Reason why Snow can't be said to be Whiteness, is because there are other Bodies white as well as that; for we may observe, that when a Substance has all the sorts and degrees of any Property or Quality in it, then it's not at all improper to attribute an *abstract Term* to it. Justice, Goodness, Wisdom, Power, Love, are all *abstract Terms*; but because we conceive God to have all those Perfections in him eminently, and of all sorts, 'tis not improper to say, that God is Justice, Goodness, Wisdom, Power or Love. 2. Another Reason why Whiteness cannot be affirmed of Snow, is because 'tis the common Name only of the Quality from which the Substance is named; not the common Name of the Substance itself. Whiteness, Motion, Roundness, are the Names of white, moving, round Bodies; Justice, Power, Wisdom, are the Names of just, powerful, wise Beings; and so are only the Names of the Names of Substances; and so of all other *abstract Terms*. And for this Reason it is, that we can have no Notion or Ideas in our Minds answering those *abstract* words, till we consider them as in, or united to some one or other individual Substance in which those Qualities or Properties are; and if any one try it upon his own Mind, whether he has, or can have any Notion or Idea, suppose of Whiteness, Motion, Justice, Equality, Likeness, or any other, abstracted from the Substances wherein they are, he may be convinc'd that they are not the Names of the Substances, but only of those Properties or Qualities which give them, or are the Reason of those general Names: And thus by reckoning *abstract Terms* only as the Names of Qualities or Properties, and not of the Substances themselves, it will be easie to answer all the Questions which my Author proposes; and, if I mistake not, speak more intelligibly than in his Language of *abstract Ideas*.

Abstract
Terms the
Names of
Qualities or
Properties.

The true Reason why abstract Terms are not Predicates in Propositions.

II. First then, he asks why one *abstract Idea* can't be affirm'd of another? His Answer is, because no one whole abstract Idea can be another. Now what Man has any whole abstract Idea of Justice, Motion, Equality, for Example, without the individual Substance, of one sort or other, in which he conceives them to be? Whereas, supposing these *abstract Terms* to be meerly the Names of the Properties, Qualities or Actions of the Substances, then 'tis very easie to give the Reason why one abstract Term can't be affirm'd of another; namely, because one common Name can't be another; Whiteness can't be Redness, Motion can't be Roundness, Justice can't be Temperance; they are the Names of differing Qualities, Properties or Actions. But where the Subject of any Proposition is itself only a Name, then the Predicate, if more general, may be a Name too. As a Definition is a Proposition; but no Name can be the Name of another Name, except it be either synonymous, or more general, as in that last instance; nor no Name of one Quality, Property or Action, can be the Name of another; because 'tis the sign of clear another thing; nor the Name of a Substance, because 'tis the common Name of the Quality, Property or Action of the Substance, not of the Substance itself.

Why few abstract Names of Substances.

III. Secondly, he asks why there are so few *abstract Terms* from Substances, most of our abstract Terms being from particular Qualities, or simple Ideas, as he

he calls them. His Reason is, because we have no Knowledge of the real Essence of Substances (in his own sense of these words *real Essence*) tho we have of particular Qualities: And thence he takes occasion to squeeze an Argument out of the Coyners of abstract Terms, the old School-men, for his beloved Notions of abstract Ideas and real Essences. Whereas neither the School-men, or any others (taking the word *Essence* for that which makes any thing to be what it is) know any thing more of the Essence of any one Quality, than they did or do of any one Substance whatever; and therefore that could not be the Reason. But now, supposing *abstract Terms* to be only the Names of Qualities, there is no Mystery in the case at all; for the Reason is, because no two or more Substances can so easily be like one another in every one of their Properties or Qualities, as they may in some one leading Quality; and therefore 'tis easie to observe, that where there has been Offer to make abstract Terms from Substances, 'tis only to express some peculiar Quality, and not all the Qualities. As in the words *Humanity* (if we suppose it the Abstract of *Homo*) *Aquosity* or *Waterishness*, *Earthliness*, *Airiness*, *Fieriness* or *Fury*, they are intended only to signify some peculiar Quality in a Man, to be very kind to other Men; to be insipid, as Water; dull, as Earth; moveable, as Air; over-active, as Fire. What will remain necessary to be understood of *abstract Terms*, will be farther explain'd in the next Chapter. In the mean time, by *concrete Terms* we commonly mean the Names of Substances, given them either on the account of one Quality or Property, or their Relation to one another; and by *abstract Terms* we mean the common Names of those Qualities, Properties or Actions observ'd in Substances, compar'd with one another in those Qualities, Properties or Actions, without regard to any other of their Properties or Actions.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

I. **T**Here are (my Author says) two Uses of Words. The first is, recording Two Uses of Words.
our own Thoughts. The second, the communicating them to others. Of the latter Use of Words there is no doubt. The former is not so plain, except he meant (as he do's not) the writing our Thoughts for our better Remembrance of them; in which case there is no doubt again they are of singular Use. But how Words record or help our Memories, when we talk to our selves (which is his Meaning) is not so clear: 1. Because deaf and dumb Persons, without doubt, remember their own Thoughts, without Words; and perhaps so far as their own Observations reach, remember better generally than other Persons do, for the same reason that blind Men remember the Voice, Tread, and Sounds of particular Men and Animals, better than seeing Men do; namely, because less confounded with differing Impressions. 2. When Persons talk to themselves, their Thoughts precede their Words, or excite their Remembrance of the Words, just contrary to what occurs in Conversation or Reading.

II. Of the Use of Words for Communication, 'tis either in civil or philosophical Double Use of Words in conversation.
Matters: Civil, such as may serve for common Conversation: Philosophical, such as conveys the precise Notion of things to the Hearer or Reader, which is in the Speaker or Writer, in order to the forming general Propositions and undoubted Truths. This latter is indeed deservedly to be aim'd at, as well in civil as philosophical Matters; but will appear utterly impracticable, for the very same Reasons which my Author assigns of the doubtful Signification of Words. The main Use of Words being to excite the same Thoughts or Conceptions in him that hears or reads, that were in him that speaks or writes. Words he judges must become doubtful these four ways.

Four ways by which words become doubtful in signification assign'd by this Author.

1. When the Ideas they stand for are very complex; that is, when each single Word is design'd to excite a great many Thoughts.

2. When the Ideas they stand for have no Connexion in Nature, and consequently no Standard existing by which to rectify them; that is, when a single Word is to be a sign of several mixt Actions, and the Substances of which they are the Actions have no Connexion in Nature; such as the Words *Procession* and *Triumph*, and the Names of all particular Virtues and Vices.

3. Where the Signification of a Word refers to a Standard which is not commonly known; that is, when the Word used signifies a thing that is hardly to be met with; As the Words *Cassowary*, *Querechinchio*, *Drill*; sorts of forein Birds or Animals.

4. Where the Signification of the Word, and the real Essence of things are not the same; that is, suppose the word *Gold* used for all the Properties that are in a Parcel of Matter which has that Name, whether known or unknown. But whether my Author has laid the Saddle upon the right Horse, in these four cases, is much to be question'd; for the Doubtfulness, that may arise thus, seems rather chargeable upon the different Experience of the Persons, using, and hearing or reading these words, than the Uncertainty of their signification: But whether it be so or not, will appear by considering the vulgar Reasons for the Doubtfulness in the signification of words; for common People reckon such as these that follow, the cases in which words become doubtful.

The common Reasons of doubtfulness in the signification of Words.

1. When words are used, which, in the common Language of the Country, have widely different significations. As the Word *Substance*, which is sometimes taken for a Man's Estate; sometimes for something independent upon other things for its Existence; often for the Essence or Nature of particular Substances; in which last sense 'tis often taken in Theological and Philosophical Discourses. The Word *Accident*, for Qualities suppos'd to be inherent in Substances; often for Events whose Causes are unforeseen. The Word *Mode*, sometimes taken for Fashion in Habit; in Philosophical Discourses, for any thing which serves to distinguish one Substance from another, or one Quality from another. The Word *Church*, which sometimes signifies only the Building; sometimes the People gather'd together in it; often the Persons exercising Authority in religious Matters. Thus also some Particles of Speech, which sometimes signify the Coherence, at other times the Incoherence of our Conceptions; such like Imperfections as those are obvious in all Languages, and are properly their real Defects.

2. When Words are relative, and the Reference is different in the Mind of the Speaker from the Hearer; as when I say, " 'Tis just the poor should be reliev'd; perhaps I mean with regard to the Rules of Humanity and Christianity, the Hearer thinks only of the Reference to the positive Laws of the Land; and so when I say, " 'Tis unjust to have ill Thoughts of a Person, till he has done some " ill things; I may mean with relation to the Laws of Humanity; or, which is the Perfection of it, Christianity; another means only in relation to Prohibitions by the Laws of the Country; and on this account almost all words may be call'd doubtful, even such as signify single Qualities or simple Ideas, as much as any other. Such as, *Sweet*, *White*, *Green*, *Swift*, *Hot*, *Cold*, according to the Variety of the things to which there may be comparison in different Persons.

3. When Words may be taken with less or greater Latitude; such as the Words, *Religion*, *Grace*, *Faith*, *Idolatry*, *Superstition*, which may indeed be call'd the different significations of the same word: But this Imperfection is capable of an easie Remedy; namely, by enumerating its several significations, the Want of which has been the occasion of a world of voluminous Disputations; but this is not to be charg'd upon the natural Defect in the Words, but the Negligence or Design of the Speaker or Writer.

4. When Words are used to signify Actions, that agree in some particular Circumstances or Modes, with other Actions which don't agree with them in all, and are therefore to be reputed metaphorical, in strictness. So if I call a *Lord-Mayor's Show*

Show a Procession, the Riding of a few Ships in open Sea or Harbour, with others taken from an Enemy, a *Triumph*; and thus 'tis in abundance of other words, when used in senses different from their original signification; both Actions and Substances too; as when the Word *Understanding* is used to signify the Faculty or Act of the Mind by which it perceives anothers Meaning, by words spoken, written, or other signs; tho originally it may signify the *standing under* some thing for the view of its inward parts. Thus *Doubting* is used for the Suspence of the Mind between two Opinions, tho originally it might signify the Posture a Man is between two different Roads: And thus 'tis in the Words *Explication*, *Explanation*, *Apprehension*, *Imagining*, and very many others. And the like happens in the Names of Substances; such as the Words, *Spirit*, *Angel*, *Devil*, *Demon*, &c. But these Imperfections in Language seem to be natural and unavoidable. These that I have nam'd are obvious Instances of the Imperfections of Words; and there is no Mystery in the case: And this makes me very apt to think, that all the Obscurity with which my Author has involv'd this whole Matter, is imputable to his Fondness to the word *Ideas*; and making all Words the signs of Ideas; and consequently, *general Words* must have *general Ideas*; whereas really there are no such things in the Minds of Men, as general Ideas; there is nothing general but Words or Names, and those are given to particular things for their Agreement with other things; which I shall endeavour now farther to evince, by going over the Observations he has made upon the Reasons of the doubtful signification of words applicable to the several sort of Ideas.

III. 1. The Names of *mixt Modes*, which are commonly call'd by others *mixt Actions*, with their Circumstances, become doubtful, because the Ideas they stand for are very complex; that is, the Actions are manifold or of several kinds. Now, I conceive, what he calls Doubtfulness, is not chargeable upon any defect in the words themselves; but the difference there, is in Persons Knowledge of, or Experience in the Actions or Circumstances of which those words are made the signs. Suppose I use the words *Procession* or *Triumph*, which are amongst his mixt and most complex Modes. These bare words indeed, like other words, when pronounc'd, beget in the Auditors Mind no Thoughts or Perceptions, but only of the Sounds: And the only Reason, as it seems to me, why he has not the same Thoughts excited in his Mind that was in mine, was because he may not have read or heard so much of Triumphs or Processions, as I have; but the Defect is not in the words; there is no Doubtfulness in them; their Sound is distinct enough from any other Sounds, and can be Signs of no other Actions or their Circumstances, than what I intended them for: And tho indeed they may be the Signs of several Actions and of several Substances, and their Modes; yet, if I be so minded, I can make the Thoughts of all the main Actions succeed one another in my Mind, or in his, if there be a necessity, as easily as I can of the Properties of any Substance, whether natural or artificial; and so there seems to be no more Doubtfulness in the sense of those two words, than there is in such as these, *Gold*, *Wall*, *House*, *Watch*, or any the most obvious words that can be used: For any of these words imply as many Particulars, either in their Properties, Materials, Positions, Shapes, as the other two, or any words which signify a Combination of moral Actions. So the Multiplicity of the Ideas cannot be the Reason of the Doubtfulness of such words; but either the Neglect, Ignorance or Prejudice of the Person speaking or hearing.

Doubtfulness in the signification of words often chargeable upon the difference of persons opinions or experience, not on the words themselves.

IV. 2. He thinks also, the Names of *mixt Modes*, especially *moral*, become doubtful, for want of Standards. Now this Doubtfulness again seems rather imputable to the Prejudices of the several Persons speaking or hearing, and not to the words themselves, or the want of Standards: For I reckon the Standards of moral Actions to be as fix'd, as of Substances, natural or artificial; or even as of simple Ideas or Qualities: For Example; I tell a Man, taking away another's Money upon the Road, by force, is *Theft*; shooting him upon his Refusal, is *Murder*; taking away a Cup out of a Church or Chappel, without the Proprietors Consent, is *Sacrilege*. Another Person, that is under Prejudices, may think any of these Actions Instances of a no-

Doubtfulness in the sense of moral chargeable upon prejudice, rather than the words themselves.

The Standard
of moral A-
ctions as well
fix'd as the
names of Sub-
stances or par-
ticular Quali-
ties.

ble Boldness or Bravery: Now, how must this Controversie be ended? I know of none but appealing to the common sense of Mankind, just as I must to convince a Mad-man that his Body is Flesh, Bones and Blood, and not Glass. A Man sees a Wall through a green Glass, he may say it's green; or a Stick is crooked, when immersed in Water; but he may be convinc'd, if in his Wits, by removing the Glass, or taking the Stick out of the Water; but the Mad-man can't be convinc'd, without letting out good store of his Blood, and thin Diet, or removing the Cause of his Misjudgment; and that's the very case of him that misjudges in such plain moral Instances; if he can't be convinc'd by the Power of Words, and will not take his measures by the standing Laws of God or the Country, I must esteem his case no better than that of the Mad-man's, and his Misjudgment a sort of wilful Madness. But if one of my Author's Disciples asks where this Standard is to be found, where are the Laws of Nature which I call Gods Laws, and where are the Laws of the Land? I can give no better Answer than this, That the Standard for *moral Actions* is as easily to be found as the universal Standard for the Names of Substances or any of their Qualities; the Laws of Nature are, as it were, written in every Man's Mind; and the Laws of the Land are recorded in Books on purpose. Alas! says he, there are no such things as the Laws of Nature written in the Hearts of Men; and as for the Laws of the Land, they are preserv'd in musty Writings, and they are Noses of Wax, which may be twisted into any Shape, according to every Man's arbitrary Ideas. Now, it must be confess'd, that the Phrase of being written in every Man's Heart, is but metaphorical, but for all that, the Meaning of it, in its common, and therefore proper sense, is, that those Laws may be as easily understood as any thing else that is written in legible Characters which all Mankind can read, and that all Men, free from Prejudice, can as easily distinguish between moral Good and Evil, as they can between white and black, and in all the Instances of particular Vertues and Vices, as between the Variety of Colours; and can give them Names to distinguish between one and t'other, as easily as they can between the several Degrees of Colours; and that's all we mean. And if the common sense of Mankind will not satisfy a Man about *moral Names*, why should I be satisfied by the like Pretence, if I should tell a Man, that putting his Neck into a Snittle, and taking his Feet from the Ground, when one end of a Rope is made fast to a pair of Gallows, will do him any harm. Hanging a Man is a mixt Mode; there is no Connexion in Nature between the Ideas of a Rope, a Man's Neck, and taking away a Man's Life; these are Ideas voluntarily hung together by the common mistake of silly Men; for such *moral Actions*, such as those before-mention'd, seem to me to be as inevitably mischievous to the natural Good or Happiness of Mankind, as hanging in that manner is to the Life of a single Person. Why then I ask, Is the Essence of those Vices more the Creature of every Man's own Understanding, or a more voluntary Combination of Ideas than the Essence of hanging, or other Modes of ending a Man's Life. The Words or Names indeed, for those Combinations of Actions, were voluntary, as all Names and Words were originally. Ay, but my Author's Scholar will tell me, those *moral Actions* are not in Nature combin'd, united or coexisting, as the Properties are in Substances; every Man may call what he please *Religion, Justice, Charity, Theft, Murder, Sacrilege*. I answer, 'Tis true; and so he may call a Shilling a Guinea, a Hog a Dog, a Man a Machin; but the Essence of those *mixt Actions*, by which they become morally good or evil, and their Relation to the Laws of Nature and the Land, are as unalterable by the Power of Names, or the Ideas of particular Persons, as the Properties or Essences of Substances; neither is there any more universal Standards or unappealable Judges for the proper Names of Substances, than there is for moral Actions; for any one that is free from Prejudice, can as easily distinguish particular Vertues and Vices from each other, and Virtue from Vice in the general, as he can a Man from a Wheelbarrow, a Horse from a Mule, a Greyhound from a Spaniel, or Gold from Silver; and when in nice cases the Difference is not so discernible, there Charity must be used just as Discretion is in giving Names to Substances that are near akin.

But

But my Author tells us, that he that first invented the new words *Sham*, *Wheedle* and *Banter*, made them stand for what Combination of Ideas he pleased; and so he that first invented the words *Murder*, *Sacrilege*, did. Now, this is certainly true; but nothing to the main purpose; for the whole Question is, whether those Actions, of which those Words are the Signs, be not immutably agreeable or disagreeable to the Laws of God, and consequently good or evil; and whether those Laws of Nature be not as certain and fix'd as the very Laws of Motion, by which Bodies of different Figures and Positions in their Particles produce the Sensation of various Colours? The Variety of Names, or particular Persons Perceptions don't in the least alter the Property or Essence in those Actions, any more than they do the Figures or Positions in those Bodies; as the Indisposition of the Eye, or improper *Medium* or Distance don't alter the real Properties of the Objects, so the Interest, Lust or Passion of Persons don't alter the real Nature, Essence or Properties of those moral Actions which we now call good or bad. But my Author says, what the Words *Murder* or *Sacrilege* signifie, can never be known from things themselves, because there are many Parts of those two complex Ideas which are not visible in the Actions themselves, such are the Intention of the Mind, and the Relation to holy things; and these have no necessary Connexion with the visible Actions: All this is true again; but it don't reach the Bottom of the main Question; for a Man may pull the Trigger of a Pistol, or carry a Cup out of a Church, and have no more design of *Murder* or *Sacrilege*, than I have in writing these Lines; but still the Question remains, which is, whether those Actions when they concur, when they are voluntary or design'd, be not immutably evil. The proving them voluntary depends upon other sensible Signs, and is clearly another Point: All that we contend for, is, that such Actions of the Will cannot become innocent or honourable by any Persons judging them so; the Essence of the Facts is their Contrariety to the Laws of Nature or the Country, and no Man can alter that Relation by his own voluntary Thoughts; tho the Actions be voluntary, yet the Relation they have to the standing Laws don't depend upon any Man's Will or Pleasure; and if this Author means thus, then moral Terms are no more doubtful than the Names of Substances or simple Qualities or Ideas may be; and the Standards by which they may be tried, tho they are not so sensible, yet are as universally fix'd by the common Sense of Mankind, as the Propriety of the Names of Substances or single Qualities.

An Objection
of the Authors
answer'd.

The significa-
tion of moral
Names no
more doubtful
than of Sub-
stances.

V. And whereas my Author says, Propriety in Language cannot help this Imperfection in the Names of mixt Modes or Actions, because there is no proper Standard by which to try whether a Word be proper or not. To that I answer; 'Tis not at all material whether the Word be proper or not in its original signification; tho the Word *Justice* may have been deriv'd from *Jus*, which signifies Broth as well as Right, yet it being now used commonly for the Virtue of giving every one his due, that makes it proper. Just as the Usage of the Word *Understanding*, for a Faculty in the Mind, has made it proper to all Effects and Purposes, tho it originally might signifie nothing but *standing under*; and the like in many more Words. And for my own part, I am so far from thinking that the Names of *moral Actions* or *mixt Modes*, are doubtful, that hardly any Words in any Language are more appropriated to that precise Combination of Actions, which they are intended to signifie, than they are. Nay, the very Names of Substances and single Qualities are generally more ambiguous. But I confess, that if a Word must be reckon'd doubtful for not conveying all the same Thoughts to the Hearer or Reader, which were in the Speaker or Writer, then such Words as comprehend a great many Actions, and those of a great many Agents distinct in Nature (and then my Author is in the right) this sort of Words must be the most doubtful; but then the Defect will not be in the Words themselves, but in the Speaker and Writer, or Hearer and Reader. If a Man knows no more of Religion, Justice, and Charity, of Murder, Sacrilege, and Adultery, than he does of Cassowaries, Querechinchio's and Drills, the Imperfection is not chargeable upon the Words more in one case than in the

other, for they are distinct and sufficiently appropriated; but on his Ignorance or Neglect.

The doubtful-
ness of the sig-
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moral Words
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than on the
Words.

VI. And whereas he says, that Peoples learning the Names of *moral Actions* or *mixt Modes*, such as Religion, Faith, Gratitude, Grace, &c. before they understand the Ideas or Actions of which they are the Signs, contributes much to the Doubtfulness of their Signification. This is so far true, that when Persons have once gain'd Words, they will apply them in Discourse otherwise than they should, on purpose to make a better Figure of Wisdom than becomes them; but still this is to be reckon'd rather as an Abuse of the Words, which comes from Peoples Vanity, than any natural Imperfection of the Words themselves; the several sorts of Actions of which those Words are the Signs, must be learnt by more Steps and Attention of Mind than the Signification of the Names of Substances or Qualities, which occur every day to their Senses; but nevertheless those Words may have their several Meanings, as well (tho not so easily) ascertain'd as the Names of other more obvious things; and therefore their Ambiguity seems rather to be charged on Peoples wilful Ignorance than on the Words themselves. The Words *Grace*, *Faith*, and many such moral Words signify several Actions; but those are no more inconsistent with each other than the several Properties of Gold or Iron, or any other Substances; and therefore, as there is occasion, those several Actions must be enumerated, just as the several Properties in Substances must: And therefore if a Man should speak of Christian Faith, as if he thought it only believing the divine Revelations; or of Grace, as if he thought it only implied the Benefits of the Gospel, he would make as great a Blunder in Divinity, as he that should speak of Gold, only as a Substance that was yellow and heavy; or of Iron, as of a Substance that was attractable by a Magnet, would in Philosophy. But if one should do so, that's not to be imputed to the Words, but the Persons Ignorance.

This Author's
Observation a-
bout the
doubtfulness
of moral
Words is car-
ried too far.

VII. From this manifold Signification of *moral Words* my Author infers there must be an unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors, both in the Explication of the Laws of God and Men. But methinks he should on that occasion have done right to the Principles of Christianity, or at least of Natural Religion and Morality, to have distinguish'd between the common or necessary Principles and the controversial Points; for tho in the latter there are Comments upon Comments without end, as he rightly alleges, yet in the former, and which are the main, we may observe almost an universal Consent allowing something for the manner of Expression; and I verily believe, as my Author does, that many, if not all those Disputes, in the last Result, arise from a Misunderstanding in the Sense of Words; and if Prejudice, Passion and Interest could be laid aside, it would not appear so hard to prove it so as may be imagin'd. But that I doubt will be a fitter Subject for our Prayers, than Hopes; and better Exercise for our Charity, than Wit.

Names given
to Substances
and mixt
Modes accor-
ding to Per-
sons experience
not by compa-
ring them
with abstract
general Ideas.

VIII. As the Names of *mixt Modes* or *Actions* are not doubtful, as this Author imagines, for want of Standards by which to try particular Actions; so neither again are the Names of Substances doubtful, because they are supposed conformable to their real Essences, as made by Nature. For the Names of Substances are given them by particular Persons, according to the Properties they observe in them, common to other individual Substances. The Reason why I give the common Name of Gold to the Ring on a Man's Finger, is because, so far as I perceive, it has all the Properties which other individual Parcels of Matter have, to whom that Name is given: For if I had never before seen any thing that had those Properties, I should not call it Gold, but a shining yellow Substance, or to that effect: And the Reason again, I give it the common Name of Yellow, is because it affects my Eyes just as other things do that have that Name. And I always thought this was the Reason any Man would give, that was askt for one, in *mixt Modes* or *Actions*. If a Man take my Horse out of the Stable by Force, or without my Consent, if I could be supposed never to have heard of any such Fact before, I should not call it *Theft*, for that's a common Name for such Actions by which Persons Goods are taken away without their Consent; but I should only call it Taking away a Horse

Horſe by Force; and whether this be not the true and only Reason why Perſons give common Names to Subſtances, Qualities, or a certain Combination of Actions, rather than their comparing them with their own abſtract Ideas, muſt be left to every Man's own Obſervation. I am ſure this is the common and moſt intelligible way of talking. As for abſtract Ideas of Subſtances, I confeſs that I have none but of particular viſible Subſtances; nor of Qualities, except they be viſible, or when I actually perceive them; and then I give them the Names proper to thoſe Modes of Perceptions, but not Ideas. And as for *mixt Modes* or *Actions*, I have no abſtract Ideas of them but ſo far as they are viſible; and then only with relation to Particulars, and not in the General; for I cannot conceive any thing general but Words, and from thence am apt to infer, that the Names of Subſtances don't become doubtful from any Defect in the Words themſelves, but from the different Degrees of Knowledge or Experience Perſons have in the individual Subſtances to which thoſe common Names are given.

Again 2. As every one gives a common Name to Subſtances according to his particular Capacity or Experience, without reference to any real Eſſence, of which he knows nothing; ſo neither with reference to all the Properties or Qualities that do or may coexiſt in any Subſtance that has the ſame common Name, but only to thoſe which by his own Experience or the Report of others he underſtands, and no otherwiſe. The Hiſtory of Nature is an excellent Part of Learning, and deſerves all the Encouragement that the Lovers of Learning can give it; becauſe 'tis uſeful and makes Men really wiſer: But let a Man be never ſo ignorant or knowing, his giving common Names to things will always be guided by the Knowledge or Experience of the Properties or Qualities he has obſerv'd in *Individuals*, and not by any *abſtract Idea* of ſuch as he has not obſerv'd. A Chymiſt will give the common Name of Gold to nothing but what is yellow, fix'd, fuſible, has a precise weight above other Metals, is ſoluble in *Aqua Regia*; an ordinary Countryman will give it to any thing that has that Colour and precise Weight; a Child will give it to any thing has that bright Yellowneſs: One will call the Subſtance in the Nerves a Liquor; a ſecond, animal Spirits; a third, only a moiſt, moveable, ſubtil Subſtance; all according to their ſeveral degrees of Knowledge in individual Subſtances which they have obſerv'd to have thoſe common Names; and ſo the Doubtfulneſs which ariſes, will be chargeable upon the Defect of Knowledge of the Nature or Properties of the things they ſpeak of, not on the Words themſelves; and that Imperfection can never be cured, except Perſons could be learnt to be ſilent in every thing they did not perfectly underſtand, or that all Men were made equally wiſe, both which are impracticable; and if there ſhould ariſe any Diſpute whether the Subſtance in the Nerves be a Liquor, as my Author ſays there did in his Company, the Doubtfulneſs, I ſuppoſe, was occaſion'd not from the Signification of the Word *Liquor*, but from the imperfect Knowledge thoſe Gentlemen had of all the Properties of that Subſtance which is in the Nerves; juſt as there may concerning any particular Parcel of Matter, whether it be Gold or not. Therefore every one muſt be allow'd to give common Names according to his own Experience; elſe no general Words muſt ever be uſed, becauſe all the Properties of every Individual can never be known, and conſequently there muſt be an everlaſting Diſpute. The true Reason why the Names of ſingle Qualities, ſuch as *White*, *Bitter*, *Sweet*, adminiſter leſs occaſion for Diſpute than the Names of *mixt Modes* or *Actions*; ſuch for example, as *Frugality*, *Modesty*, &c. is not from the Ambiguity of the Names of one ſort more than the other, or for want of Standards, as my Author imagines; but becauſe all Perſons almoſt have Experience every hour of thoſe Qualities in individual Subſtances, which give thoſe Names; but not ſo of thoſe Actions which give the Names of *modest* or *frugal* to particular Perſons; neither is there any fix'd and unappealable Standard any more in the former, than in the latter Caſe; but the common Senſe of Mankind muſt determine Controverſies as much in one as the other, when they ariſe; and if People won't acquieſce in that, why ſhould they in the other? Why ſhould I think one Man's or an hundred Mens Eye or
Palate

This farther
clear'd.

The Reasons why this Author charges the doubtfulness of Words on the Words themselves rather than the difference in Persons, not good.

Moderation tho a great virtue yet does not extend to oblige us to fix no certain sense on the Holy Scriptures or other ancient writings.

Palate is a surer Standard of Colours or Tasts, than mine, ^{if} He will not allow the same Rule to be observ'd about Virtues or Vices; and so the Ambiguity which arises, is not from the Names or Want of Standard, but the different Experience or Knowledg which Persons have in those things, of which those Names are the Signs.

IX. The Reason why my Author charges this doubtfulness in the signification of Words rather upon the Words themselves than the want of Knowledge of the things of which those Words are signs, is because, tho' all Knowledge terminate in Things, yet when that Knowledge is communicated to others, it must be express'd in Words put into Propositions; and therefore the sense of Words cannot be separated from the Knowledge of the things themselves: Which is thus far true, That if any Man intends to make another wiser by his Discourse or Writing, he must use the Words in the same precise Sense that his Auditors or Readers have been used to have excited in their Minds by such Sounds or Letters; else indeed they will be meer Sounds, dead Letters, and to all Effects and Purposes another Language to them; because Words have no natural Connexion with Thoughts. This therefore makes it yet plainer, that the Ambiguity of Words, when there is any, arises not from the Words themselves, but the different degrees of Knowledge between Speaker and Hearer, Writer and Reader; because the bare Sounds and Letters will excite no other or more Thoughts or Ideas than they are used to do, and consequently no Doubtfulness will arise meerly from them: But if any Man intend to excite new or other Thoughts than Persons are used to have from general Words, he must enumerate the several Properties, Qualities or Circumstances of the things of which he speaks or writes, and thereby only he will make them wiser than they were before; for those Properties are the Essence as well of the mixt Actions as the Substances; 'tis by them they are distinguish'd from each other, and that's the Essence of them.

X. From this Ambiguity in Words my Author takes occasion to inter the great Reasonableness of Moderation in imposing the sense of any ancient Writings. I like the Practice of Moderation in all things wonderfully well, and have always esteem'd it one of the surest Marks of a good Church or Sect; and for that very Reason that the CHURCH OF ENGLAND will stand the fairest of any Sect in the World for the Character of a *true* Church; and if any one was to be made or establish'd the Catholick Church, there's no one Sect in the World that will be found to be less imposing, or requires fewer or less disputable Terms of Communion than That does; and therefore I am free to be so far my Author's Disciple: But if his Meaning in that Expression be, that the Holy Scriptures are of little or no Use, because the Essence of *mixt Modes*, or *moral Actions*, must be left to every ones own Mind to make, and consequently the Words used in those ancient Writings can't convey the Thoughts which were in their original Authors to them that read them, there I must leave him; for I believe as to the grand Concerns of Religion the sense of those Holy Writings (as ancient as they are) attested by the Profession of the Truths and Practice of the Christian World, of its Rules of Life as well convey'd to us, as they would have been in the present current Stile of the Country: Neither can I see any more Reason to doubt of their original sense in moral Actions than I have whether *Man, Horse, White, Black, Living, Dying*, or any such Words signified different Substances, Qualities or Actions, from what they do now; and therefore tho I'll heartily join with him in magnifying the Goodness of God for spreading before all the World such legible Characters of his Providence, as may sufficiently convince them of his Being; yet I can find no Reason to refuse joining also with the Christian World in adoring the same Goodness of God for his special Providence about those ancient Writings for the preserving a lasting Standard for our Faith and Manners. But whether my Author's meaning was thereby to insinuate that the World might do as well or better only with the Principles of Natural Religion, pick'd up by every ones own Observation of common Occurrences, or the Fashions of his Country and Familiars, without any standing Records of peculiar divine Revelations, I must leave to his own Interpretation.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

I. **T**HE natural and unavoidable Imperfections in Words, are commonly reputed to be, that one Word often signifies two different things, and are no ways to be help'd, but telling those different Senses, of which I gave some of the most obvious Instances in the last Chapter. But as for those which my Author mention'd, they seem to arise rather from the different Experience several Persons have concerning the things of which they speak or hear, write or read, and their Rashness and Vanity in misapplying them, for which there is no help, but either making Men silent, or enumerating the several Properties or Qualities of the Substances, or the several sort of Actions of which those general Words are the Signs; both which are equally impracticable. But the wilful Abuses of Words, my Author reduces to these several Heads.

The Defect of Words not perfectly curable.

II. 1. When Words are used without any or clear Ideas; that is, when there are no Thoughts or not distinct ones in the Mind answering those Words; for then they become Signs of nothing, meer empty Sounds and Cyphers, an infinite number of which we may find, he says, in the Writings of School-men and Metaphysicians, and to them he refers his Reader; but I am cruelly afraid we shall need to go no farther than his Essay; for he seems to stand as fair for the Title of *Doct̃or Angelicus* or *Profundus* in this Age, as *Thomas Aquinas* or *Don Scotus* did in theirs; and therefore before he charge them or any others with affecting something singular, and out of the common way of Apprehension, to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weaknesses in their several Hypotheses, he would have done well to clear the Sense of his own Words, such as *Ideas*, *simple Ideas*, *abstract Ideas*, *mixt Modes*, and several others; it was as easie for them, and will be to others, to say their Notions are new above the common Level, as 'tis for him. If by Ideas he means any thing besides Thoughts or Perceptions; by simple Ideas any thing differing from the single Qualities, Properties or Operations of Substances; by abstract Ideas of Substances any thing more than the Images in the Mind of individual Bodies which are visible; by mixt Modes any thing else but the Names of mixt Actions, he would do good Service to the philosophical World to give such clear and distinct Accounts of them, as others might partake of his Happiness, else he must be contented with the Pleasure of pitying others Ignorance, and they of reckoning his Language Gibberish and Jargon: Of this way of abusing Words, he reckons the familiar usage of such Words as these, *Wisdom*, *Glory*, *Grace*; and he might have added *Religion*, *Justice*, and indeed the whole Tribe of mixt Modes; for these Words are the Signs of very important Ideas, and very few have clear and distinct Thoughts answering them. Now on that occasion he would have acted like an ingenuous Philosopher to have told us what kind of Ideas those were; for most Men are so dull as to find they have no Ideas of them at all, and can't be convinc'd that they are any thing more than the Names of such Properties or Actions of individual intelligent Beings, and from which they are denominated *Wise*, *Gracious*, or *Glorious*: But tho they don't pretend to have any Ideas of those Properties or Actions distinct from some individual intelligent Substance or other; yet they have as clear Notions of them, or know as distinctly what they mean when they attribute them to Individuals, as they do when they say a Body is *white*, *sweet*, or *round*. But if any one has any Ideas in his Mind when he hears or reads any of those general words, he would gratifie the Curiosity of a world of People to make some little Draughts of their Features, Figures, and Colours; for they would be indeed, as my Author says, very important Ideas, and worth seeing.

How Words are wilfully abused.

III. There is no doubt, but Peoples being accustom'd to use such general Names, as those of *mixt Modes*, from their Cradles, before they understand those Actions of which those Words are the Signs, do much contribute to their Misapplication in Discourse: But then the Fault is not in the Words, but in the Persons Affectation

It's impossible to correct the abuse of words.

to seem wiser than they are; and then the Reason why their Discourses are fill'd with unintelligible Noise about Moral Matters, is not because the Words are Signs of Collections of arbitrary Ideas, but because they love to prate of things, before they have adequate Conceptions of those Actions by which one Virtue or Vice may be properly distinguish'd from another that is near akin to it; just as other People talk of Animals, Vegetables, artificial and natural Bodies, their Powers and Faculties, before they have form'd distinct Ideas of them. But this Abuse of Words, if it must be term'd wilful, can never be cured till there is a new Method of Education invented; namely, of not letting Children hear a Word, till they have the Idea of which it is the Sign set before their Eyes; and that will be impracticable, till somebody, by our Author's Scheme, has drawn the Picture of all sorts of Animals, Vegetables, Bodies organiz'd and unorganiz'd, with all their Properties, at their full Length; and of God, Religion, Wisdom, Grace, and of all Virtues and Vices, with their true Shapes and Characters; and all simple Ideas, such as Motion, Figure, Colours, Tasts, Smells, for the preventing Confusion, without any Bodies for their Subjects; and when that's done, there remains nothing but what will be very easie to get the free Consent of all Mankind, that they shall call every thing by that Name, and no other, than what the Protoplast of their several Natures and Essences, has given them. This will be a Work worthy the Name of a *Reformer* indeed.

IV. A second way by which Words are wilfully abused, is by unsteady Application; that is, using the same Word sometimes in one Sense, at other times in another: This indeed is a scurvy Fault, and to be as much avoided as calling *English Pounds*, *French Livres*; especially when the whole Cause (as it often does) turns upon the right understanding the Sense of a Word. And my Author would have done like a Reformer of that Abuse, to have set an Example in the Word *Idea*, on which almost all that is new in his Essay depends; for he uses it sometimes for the Act of Perception; sometimes for the immediate Object of that Perception; at other times for the Qualities or Actions in Objects, whether known or perceiv'd by us or not. Thus *Sensation* is an *Idea*, *Thoughts* are *Ideas*; *Figure*, *Motion*, *Bulk*, *Position*, are *Ideas* tho not known. This seems not fair Dealing.

V. A third way by which Words are wilfully abused, is, affected Obscurity, by their wrong Application; that is, using old Words in new Senses; or introducing new ones without defining them. And with this Fault he charges both the *Peripateticks* and *Cartesians*; and the latter particularly, in using the Word *Extension* for *Body*. But he would have done ingenuously to have quoted the Place; for I can't recollect any Passage where any of them say *Extension* is *Body*. They say indeed, every Thing which is extended is *Body*, and therein perhaps are mistaken about Space; and that every *Body* is extended: But no where, that I remember, are guilty of so much affected Obscurity, or rather Nonsense, as to say, that *Extension* is *Body*; and therefore own it only the leading Property, or characteristical Mark of Bodies. But how my Author will acquit himself of this Abuse of the Word *Solidity*, is not very obvious; for no body ever, before himself, used it for that Property by which *Body* fills Space; but only in Contradistinction from Hollowness, Fluidity, or something of that sort. However, this open'd the way into a large Field of witty Invectives against Logick and the Art of Disputing, in which he has plaid very handsomely with his own Shadow. But if he would draw the Picture of an University-Tutor in the present State of the Universities, with as much Art and as little Prejudice, as he has done of a private Tutor, whom in his ingenious Book *Of Education* he recommends to Noblemen and Gentlemen, he might find all the Features of solid and useful Learning, abating the artificial Shade of Ideas; and if he would take his Eye off the Glass when he drew his own Picture in that particular, he might discover as much of the Air, and Beauty of a free Philosopher, as he could in himself, or any wise Man could wish: And as for the Art of Discoursing in publick by Syllogisms, as 'tis now manag'd, he might be convinc'd, that 'tis as proper an Instrument for improving Persons in real Knowledge, as is yet practis'd in any part of the World, or perhaps will ever be invented.

VI. 4. Another great Abuse of Words, is the taking the Words for Things ; of which he gives these Instances, *Substantial Forms, Vegetative Souls, Abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional Species, Conatus to Motion in resting Bodies, The Soul of the World* ; for all which Words there are no *real Ideas* or Thoughts in the Mind correspondent to them. In which Particulars, as usually describ'd, he is in the right. To which I doubt he might add his whole Tribe of *mixt Modes* or *abstract Ideas* of them ; and if any one think they are any more than meer Names of Actions, 'tis wish'd they would speak so intelligibly of those Ideas, that others might partake of their Happiness. For an Instance of this sort of abusing Words, my Author mentions (whether pertinently or not is not worth enquiring) making Matter stand for Body, which, he says, are Signs of different Ideas ; tho he seems to speak more warily afterwards ; for instead of using his old word *Ideas*, he says, they stand for different Conceptions ; which seems to imply there may be Conceptions of things tho there cannot be Ideas, which is a great Truth, tho he may be loth to confess it ; for a Man may have a Conception, a Notion, a Knowledge of God, of a Soul, of the Air, but no Idea or Image of them in his Mind, except of the visible permanent or transient Effects of them ; from which he may form a rational Conception, Notion, or be said to have a Knowledge of their Existence and Nature, but not any Idea of the Substances themselves : But in this Instance about Matter and Body, the Words really signify the same Conception ; or, to speak more distinctly, we have no Idea or Conception of them at all. They are both general Terms ; and there is no Idea or Conception properly but of Particulars ; and there is no more a Body in general, than there is Matter in general ; but every single Body is Matter, and every single Parcel of Matter is Body : And tho it does not sound so well to say, there is one Body of all Matters, as to say, there is one Matter of all Bodies ; yet the Reason is, because we have not been used to call any thing Body, but what has distinct Properties and a particular Name ; but not so of every Parcel of Matter : When 'tis said therefore, there is one Matter of all Bodies, the Meaning is only, that all Bodies, how distinct soever in other Properties, are equally extended, equally fill Space ; and that's as true of every Parcel of Matter : And 'tis every whit as proper to say, the *Chaos* was one Body, as to say it was one Matter : And therefore the Conception or Idea of Body and Matter is really the same ; or rather indeed we have no Conception or Idea of either in the general, because they are only the Names of Substances ; but only of the Particulars that have those common Names ; and so every single Parcel of Matter has as good right to the common Name of Body, as every single Body has to the common Name of Matter. Therefore this Blunder is brought to my Author's own Door, in making *general Words abstract* or *general Ideas*.

VII. A fifth Abuse of Words is making them stand for things which they can by no means signify ; as for Example, we make the Word *Gold* stand for the real Essence, or for more than the nominal Essence ; that is, in other words, for more or other Properties, than we know in it : But this I take to be a meer Fiction ; for no body, when he uses a general Word, means any thing more than the Properties in which he finds the particular thing of which he speaks, agrees with others which have that Name : When we say a Man is a *rational Animal*, we mean no more than that every Individual agrees in having that Property, but make no Reference to we know not what real Essence : When we say of a Child or an Idiot, that it's Mankind, we mean only that it has such a Figure of Body, by which it may be distinguish'd from Beasts, and is more capable of Reason than they are. And the Reason why we don't alter the common Name of an individual Substance, upon the Change of some of its Properties, is because it may retain enough to distinguish it from such Substances as have a different common Name : We call a single Person wise or unwise, young or old, good or bad, by the common Name of Man ; or a Parcel of Matter whether hard or melted, Gold, because in all these Alterations, they retain enough to distinguish them from other Animals or other Metals that have different Names : But in *mixt Modes* or *Actions* the case is quite different ; *Chance-medly, Man-slaughter, Murder, Parricide*, all of them agree in being such a Combination of Actions by which a Man loses his Life ; but then if you leave out the Act of the Will to do a Man any harm, then

Words are not abused by References to abstract Ideas, or real Essences.

then 'tis only *Chance-medly*; if the Act of the Will to kill him, then 'tis only *Man-slaughter*; if you put in to the former Combination of Actions a Will to kill him, against Law, then 'tis *Murder*; if you add also the natural Relation there is between Father or Mother and Son, then it is *Parricide*. Hereby the Essence, or that which makes the Distinction of the several Combination of Actions one from the other, is quite alter'd: But 'tis not so in the common Names of Substances; the leaving out or putting in of Wisdom, Virtue, Youth or old Age, does not alter the Person so much as not to retain the Properties in which he agrees with others that have the common Name of Man, or is distinguishable from Brutes; or a Parcel of Matters being fluid or solid does not alter it so, but that it still retains the Properties by which it agrees with others that have the common Name of Gold, and by which it's distinguishable from other Metals that have different Names; so, the Reason why the Names of *mixt Modes* or *Actions* are alter'd otherwise than in Substances, upon the leaving out or putting in another Action or Relation, is not, as my A. feigns, because their nominal and real Essence is the same, for 'tis so in Substances as well as *mixt Modes* or *Actions*; for the Essence is nothing but the Name or Title given to those Properties by which one Individual agrees with others that have that common Name, and by which it differs from others that have not that common Name; *Chance-medly*, *Man-slaughter*, *Murder*, *Parricide*, agree as much as one silver Cup does with others that are so call'd; but differ in Nature as much as a silver Cup does from others that have several Degrees of Weight, or are single, double or triple gilt; and as each Degree of Weight, or each gilding, adds to the Value, Nature or Essence of the Cup, so each Act or Relation does to the Value, Nature or Essence of the Fact. As the common Name of *Cup* continues in all those Variations and Differences, so the common Name of *killing* a Man does in all those different Facts; but as the additional Name alters with the Properties in the Cup, so the Names of those mixt Actions do as the Actions and the Relations vary; but in both cases the *real* and *nominal* Essence are equally the same; or in other words, The Properties any one finds in which one Substance agrees with another, is the Reason he gives them a common Name; and that to him is the real Essence. A Child gives the Feathers on a Peacock's Tail the common Name of Gold, because that shining Yellowness is to him the real Essence; he knows no more or better; and so every Man's naming of things is conformable to his own Knowledge or Experience: But as the giving this Name, whether right or wrong, does not alter the real or true Properties that are in any particular Substance; so neither does it in mixt Modes, or a certain Combination of Actions: The calling the accidental or undesign'd killing a Man, *Murder*; or the wilful doing it, *Chance-medly*, won't alter the Nature or Essence of the distinct Facts; because that which makes their real Essence, or is the true Reason of their Distinction, will be unalterable by any particular Man's Ideas or naming them; because they are founded in the relation they have to the Laws of God or the Country, which is out of his Power to alter.

Nature works regularly, but naming things is arbitrary.

VIII. The Reason, my Author thinks, why People are apt to make Names stand for *real Essences*, that is, for unknown Properties, is because they suppose *Nature* to work regularly in the Production of things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those Species, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each Individual. But herein, I suppose, he misinterpretes most Peoples Thoughts; for tho they believe that Nature always works regularly, that is, produces the same Effects by the same Causes, as well in monstrous Births as others, tho we may not know how in either, yet no body believes that the real Essence of any Individual is any thing more than its Properties, in which it agrees with some, and by which it is distinguish'd from other Individuals: And therefore tho they may give any Individual what Name they please; yet the Essence or distinguishing Properties come from the Author of Nature, and not from themselves; for their naming them so or so, won't alter them in the least.

IX. A sixth Cause of the Abuse of Words, is, a Supposition in him that uses them, that others understand them just as he does. This is indeed too common a Practice, and the ill Effect of it has been, as my Author rightly observes, a world of wrangling and voluminous Disputations, which might have been saved. But why this should

should be call'd a wilful Abuse of Words, I can't see; 'tis but a Mistake, that Persons are not so wise as he presumes them; and 'tis hard to judge it wilful in any Man, much less in all, unless we could be so uncharitable as to think Men take Pleasure in deceiving. However, we are engag'd to him for his kind Attempt to rectifie these Abuses, of which he gives a very good Specimen in the next Chapter.

C H A P. XI.

Of the Remedy of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

I. **T**His Author often intimates, That most, if not all Disputes, arise from the different Signification of Words; that is, from their being made Signs of differing Things. So that if the Signification of Words was fix'd, all, or most Disputes would end. Now, tho this were allow'd to be true, as it must in abundance of cases; yet this is as impracticable, as making Men equally wise; that is, equally understand the Properties and Qualities of every thing they speak of, and the precise number of them which shall intitle any particular thing to this or that common Name; then indeed that Disputes would end, is both a very great and obvious Truth. But the Difficulty lies there not in the Ambiguity of the Words themselves; which will be made plainer by the very Instance he gives. Suppose it were disputed whether a Bat was a Bird or not. No man, I think, ever disputed whether either a Bat or a Butterfly did not agree in some Properties with any thing that has the common Name of Bird; or differ'd from it in more or others. Unless, therefore, People could know all the Properties and the precise Number of Properties which shall have the common Name of Bird or Bat (which is utterly impossible) the Dispute can have no end, as the beginning was silly. However, in order to the communicating that Knowledge which any one has to another, and preventing as far as 'tis practicable, these Imperfections and common Abuses in Words, my Author prescribes these Rules.

II. 1. *That no Word be used without a Signification, that is, but what is a Sign of some Idea or Thought which is different from that of which another word is the proper Sign of, or would excite.* Now there being no natural Connexion between Thoughts and Words, 'tis Usage alone that can make any Word the Sign of one or more Thoughts; therefore when any Man pronounces or writes a Word, which is not commonly used to signify or excite a distinct Thought or Thoughts, he spends his Breath in vain, or Pains in writing to no purpose; he uses an unknown Language. Any Word will serve the turn in a Man's Discourse with himself. If I have used to call mutual Affection, Sympathy; mutual Hatred, Antipathy; natural Inclination, Instinct; the Words are proper enough, because Propriety is common Usage; but if I use those Words to another Person that has not been accusom'd to have those Sounds, the Signs of such Thoughts, I speak Gibberish to him, I don't answer the Ends of Speech; So that the meaning of this Rule is, that we use only such Words, as common Custom has made proper.

Rules for preventing the Abuse of words.

III. A second Remedy which he prescribes, is *to use no Words but such as are not only the Signs of Ideas, but also the Signs of clear and distinct Ideas.* But this Rule, as to the main, I take to be the same with the former; or, if he means more, I doubt 'tis impracticable. For if a Man has an Idea or Thought excited in him by a Word, that Thought or Idea must be something, and that something must be distinct from every thing else; otherwise 'tis nothing. But my Author intended this for a Rule in the Use of Words, which signify mixt Modes or Actions, and Substances also; and therefore advises, that we should resolve that one *abstract Idea*, of which any Word is the Sign, into all the *simple Ideas* of which that *complex* one consists. Now, as to the Names of mixt Actions, I deny there are any abstract Ideas or Thoughts in the Mind, answering to them, till it has both consider'd those several Actions, and compar'd them (if moral) with a Rule; and 'tis the Thoughts of those Actions so compar'd, of which those Words are the Signs, and not any one *abstract* or *complex Idea* immediately answering those general Words. When I hear or read those two

A second Remedy: But the same with the former, or impracticable.

Words, *Justice*, *Theft*, my Mind presently runs its Thoughts over such a Combination of Actions, by which one Person gives another his due, or takes from him by Force, or without his Consent, that which is his due; and then comparing the former Combination of Actions with the Laws of God, or the Country, and finding them agree therewith, I give them the common Name of *Justice*; and the other Combination of Actions for their Disagreement with those Laws, the common Name of *Theft*; and the like of all mixt moral Actions: And thus they seem to me only the general Names of a certain Combination of real Actions, and not the Names of any abstract Ideas, which I or any one else can voluntarily frame as we please. For I can no more make such a fix'd Combination of Actions to be other than such as denominate a Man just, or a Thief, than I can make a Triangle with two strait Lines. I, or he at least who first made certain Sounds the Signs of certain Ideas or Thoughts, may call two strait Lines meeting one another in a common point, a Triangle, just as he, or I, may call Theft, Justice, and *vice versa*, if we please: But that would not alter the Essence or Properties of those mixt Actions, or their Relation to their Rule, any more than the Name would the Properties of the two Lines; for that Relation is fix'd by the Constitution of the Author of Nature, or the Laws of the Land; and therefore why the Names of mixt Moral Actions should not have as certain a Signification as any others, I am not yet able to apprehend, unless the Laws of God or Men be mutable by every single Person's voluntary or arbitrary Ideas: For the Essence of every Virtue and Vice, or that which distinguishes them from each other, seems to me to be as immutable as the Properties of a Triangle. But if by clear and distinct Ideas my Author meant such as would exactly fit all the various Actions and Circumstances that may occur, and deserve those common Names of *Theft*, *Justice*, &c. then this is as impracticable as to give proper Names or Definitions to Triangles, Circles, Gold, or any other Substance, till we know all the possible Properties of those Figures or Substances, of which those that know most, despair of ever knowing perfectly: And therefore we must be contented to use such Names as are the Signs of such Ideas or Thoughts as we have; and every one will use his Liberty to call things as he pleases, unless there was an Universal Monarchy, which extended to the Limitation of the Motions of Tongues and Pens. As Words therefore become proper by being made the Signs of such Ideas or Thoughts as they commonly excite, so the Ideas or Thoughts themselves are clear and distinct, if they be different from what other Words excite, tho they be not commensurate to all the Particulars; for that, as has been said, is utterly unattainable.

A third.

IV. A third Rule is, *To use Words that be proper, that is, such as are the most common Signs of such or such Ideas or Thoughts.* Which Rule needs no Explication or Proof of its Usefulness.

A fourth, very useful and practicable.

V. A fourth Rule is, *That we make known the Meaning of the Word we use, especially if either not commonly known, or common Use has made something uncertain; and this may be practis'd in simple Qualities, since they are not definable, 1. Either by some synonymous Word; that is, better known to the Hearer or Reader. 2. By shewing it. Or, 3. By mentioning the Subject in which the Quality is usually to be found; as Green, the Colour Grass has at Spring; Fevillimote, the Colour which wither'd Leaves have in Autumn. And as for mixt Actions, by Definition; that is, Enumeration of all the several Actions and their Circumstances which are to concur in their Constitution. And the like for Substances, by Definition; that is, either more general, or, upon occasion, a particular Recital of such Properties, by which the Individuals, that claim that general Name, may be distinguish'd from all others that have different Names; or by shewing them, if possible; if not, then by comparing them to others better known, and relating the Differences between them. This is a very good practicable and very obvious Rule. But as to mixt Modes, especially moral ones, my Author seems to have a singular Concept; namely, that they may be demonstrated as well as Quantity in Mathematicks. I don't remember he has given us any Specimen of this Novelty in his Essay, but by the Reason he gives why he thinks Morality demonstrable, one may make a near Guess at his meaning. His Reason is this; because the Ideas of mixt Modes or Actions are such Combinations*

The Author's concept about demonstration in Morality explain'd and proved useless.

tions of simple Ideas, as every Man's Mind puts together by his own Choice, whereof there are no standing Patterns to be found existing, no Archetypes from which he forms them; but if this be all the Secret, when it comes to be discover'd, it will appear ridiculous and of no Use; for it seems by this, that the Reason why Morality may be demonstrated, is because every one making his Ideas of Virtues and Vices, according to his Fancy, he will be upon as sure Grounds as if he demonstrated, because no body will be able to judge but himself, whether his Ideas be right or wrong; and consequently he can never be confuted. But if this be a good Reason, then the Pains of the Demonstration may be all saved; for if he can't be refuted in his Mistake, when he makes one, then he can't, for the same Reason, refute anothers, and so it will be of no use but for his own Satisfaction. However, that's all one; according to my Author's Principles this must be call'd *real Knowledge*, for with him Knowledge is nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement between a Man's own Ideas. But, I doubt, let him call it real Knowledge, if he please, and shape a Definition of Knowledge itself, on purpose to fit this Concept, yet others will esteem it no better than a Dream, or one of *Don Quixot's* Ideas. However, to make his, or at least my own Meaning as plain as I can, I will put as obvious an Instance of a moral mixt Mode, as can be devis'd, and then try how to form a Demonstration of it, that we may learn the use of demonstrating Morality. Suppose then, the Instance to be *Theft*, and this to stand for the Definition of it till a better is made; namely, *That it's a mixt Mode, by which one Man takes from another his Goods, by Force or without his Consent, and to his Prejudice*; the Words *to his Prejudice* are added, because taking away a Man's Goods by Force may happen to be his Advantage sometimes, as the taking away from a Man in a Passion, his Sword or Knife, or a Drunkard his Glass or Cup. Now, by my Author's way of talking, and his Principles, the abstract complex Idea of Theft consists of four simple Ideas, and those again may perhaps be melted into as many more, and they again, in like manner, and so the Demonstration may be too long, and perhaps hang together like Ropes of Sand; and therefore to make the Chain as short as we can, we'll take notice only of those four Ideas which appear at first view. 1. Here is the Idea of a Man. 2. Of Goods. 3. Of Force, or without Consent. 4. To another's Prejudice: And these four Ideas are to be compar'd with the Laws of God, or the Land. Now, to apply this to a particular Instance; for if that be not done, or cannot ever be done, the Demonstration can be of no use at all. Suppose *Jack* the Man; a Horse the Goods; breaking open the Stable-Door the Force; the Loss of the use or value of the Horse the Prejudice. First then, to make out this Demonstration, we must enquire whether the *abstract Idea* of Man fits *Jack*; yes, to a Hairs Breadth, unless he appear a Monkey or a Drill; and to avoid that Pretence, my Author wisely foreseeing that Substances must be often used in these moral Demonstrations, owns that if a Monkey had the use of Reason, he must pass for a moral Man, and be Subject to Law. 2. We must enquire, whether the *abstract Idea* of Goods comprehend the Idea of a Horse; there is no doubt to be made of that. 3. Does breaking open the Stable-Door imply the Fact was without the Owner's Consent, or Force? That is demonstrably plain. 4. Is the taking away the Horse to the Owner's Prejudice? No doubt of that: If then the *abstract Idea* of Man fits or is equal to *Jack*; the Horse to Goods; breaking open the Door to Force; the Loss of the Horse Prejudice; then *Jack* is guilty of *Theft*, *Quod erat demonstrandum*. Now let any one judge whether this way of Demonstration in Morality will improve any Man's Knowledge of particular Virtues or Vices, or learn him to be wiser in the Application of Cases that may occur. And besides, it will be liable to this scurvy, and to me unanswerable Objection; and that is, If the real Essence of Theft, and so of all moral Actions, be only an Idea of every ones own making, and without regard to any standing Law, by which to judge of its Rectitude, then it will be impossible to prove to any ones Satisfaction, but ones self, that any of these *abstract Ideas* comprehends any possible particular Combination of Actions, and so they will be of no manner of use; and *Jack*, or any of his Friend's Dream of his being hang'd, will be as good Satisfaction to the Executioners of the Law as these *abstract Ideas* of the Judge

Judge or Jury to any others but themselves. But I perceive my Author has invented an Evasion of this Pretence, by alleging that the case is the same in mathematical Demonstrations, and therefore must be allow'd to be *real Knowledge*, as that is by all Mankind: There is no need, he says, of any real Actions conformable to these *abstract Ideas of mixt Modes*, any more than there is of a true Triangle or Circle for the gaining a real Knowledge of their Properties; 'tis enough that what is infer'd be clear and evident in the Circle or Triangle in Idea only. Now this must be granted, that Demonstration in common Mathematicks is of Lines, Angles and Figures only in Idea; for 'tis certain enough, there can really be no such thing in Nature as a true strait Line, right Angle or Circle; for let them be drawn upon any Superficies never so exactly, there will be some (tho not sensible) Unevennesses, Protuberances in the Lines and Angles. But then I answer, Mathematicks itself is so far of no manner of use: Suppose it was never so clearly demonstrated that the Square of the Line which subtends (or is the Hypothenuse of) the right Angle of a Triangle be equal to the two Squares made upon the other two Side-Lines; yet if no sort of Body whatever that is made the solid Square of such a Line, be equal either in Bulk, Weight or other Quality to two other Bodies made square and solid upon the other two Side-Lines, then this Demonstration, and so of all others, so far will be of no use but to exercise Peoples Eyes to require Attention and puzzle their Brains: And therefore call this real Knowledge, or what you please, it is as useless as the School-mens most *abstruse Metaphysicks*. And so neither the Demonstration in Mathematicks, or Morality, will be of any use.

Very useful directions for the improvement of the Knowledge of Substances.

VI. As to the Imperfection or Abuse of Words signifying Substances, my Author has given some very good and practicable Rules, but they all come to this one, that Persons skilful in natural History enquire into the Properties of individual Substances, and observe in what they agree or disagree with others, and then that a kind of Dictionary be made enumerating those several Properties; and this will be of far more use than only giving us some synonymous Words, and where 'tis possible, some Pictures of them, instead of those imperfect Translations of Words which are apt to mislead our Conceptions of the things. For if a Man was to take the *Roman Toga, Tunica, and Pallium*, for such as we now call *Gown, Coat, and Cloak*, we should be cruelly mistaken; and the like of the Words *Strigil* and *Sistrum*, mention'd by *Juvenal*, if we should think them one like a *Currycomb*, and the other like a *Cymbal*, as they are commonly *Englisht*. Therefore, as I remember, *Dr. Holyday* upon *Juvenal* has observ'd that Rule, by giving us in his very learned Notes, the Pictures of the things those two last Words signify; and this Rule is very practicable, and would be useful when there is Mention of forein Animals, Plants, Herbs, natural or artificial Bodies, which are not commonly known.

Another good Rule.

VII. A fifth Rule he prescribes to prevent the wilful Abuse of Words, is, the using the same Word steadily for the same thing; or if not, giving express notice of it. This is unexceptionably a very honest and good Rule, and I wish my Author had set an Example, by observing it himself; for his ambiguous use of the Word *Idea* has cast a great Mist before his Readers Eyes, or at least requires more Attention to understand it, than sometimes the Matter deserves.

End of the Third Book.

O F

Humane Understanding.

BOOK IV. CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

1. **K** Nowing can be nothing else but the Name of some Operation of our Minds; and that Operation must have some Object about which it is employed; and that Object must be something within us, or without us; if within us, it can be nothing but our own Thoughts or Perceptions; if without us, it can be nothing but either Substance itself, or some Mode of it, or other. Therefore all Knowledge can be nothing else but the Perception of the Relation that Substances have to their own Modes, to us, or one another; thus the Knowledge of those Qualities in Bodies, which are commonly call'd sensible, such as Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, Roughness, Hardness, is the Perception of their relation to us; the Knowledge of their Motion, Rest, Figure, Position, Bulk, is the Perception of their Relation, not only to us, but to one another; and in general, in our Perception of the several Relations which Substances have to themselves, to us, and one another, by their several Properties, Qualities, Accidents, and Operations, consists all the Knowledge we can attain; and all Truth is only joyning or disjoyning these Substances, or their Modes, according to their Relation to themselves, to us, or one another. This I shall have farther occasion to explain in the Examination of my Author's Definition of Knowledge, which is this. *Knowledge is the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* I shall take this occasion to shew. *First*, That our Knowledge is of something else, besides of our own Ideas. *Secondly*, Else that 'tis altogether useless. And lastly, That it involves us in endless Scepticism or Doubtfulness of the Truth of all Propositions whatever.

What Knowledge is.

The Author's Definition of Knowledge Examined.

For the proving my first Proposition, the plainest method is by instances; and I will go no farther than those which my Author himself has chose, as most for his purpose: *First*, When we know, says he, White is not Black, what do we else but perceive those two Ideas do not agree; I say we perceive two Bodies do not agree in affecting our Eyes after the same manner; or in other Words have different Relations to us. And the Reason I say so, is, because we have no Ideas at all of Whiteness or Blackness, distinctly from the Bodies, to which we give those two Names of White and Black; and therefore 'tis neither a true or false Proposition, it's a meer sound to say White is not Black; except it be meant that Bodies differ in affecting us, and then indeed it's a true Proposition, because it disjoyns things that have different Relation to us; but the Idea of Whiteness separate from Body, do's not differ at all from the Idea of Blackness separate from Body; because we neither have, or can have any such abstract Ideas of either.

But if any one think that Knowledge is nothing but the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; let him when he does not actually feel Fire or Water, form the Ideas of them distinctly succeeding one another in his Mind; and then I would only ask him, whether he felt himself heated more by the Idea of Fire than of Water, or cool'd by the Idea of Water more than of the Fire; and if it be not so, then he has a sensible Proof that Knowledge is something more than the Perception of the different Ideas in the Mind, and that it is the Perception of really different Operations of other Bodies upon

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our own. And that is the Case of Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, and tangible Qualities; they are the Names of clear other sorts of Perceptions from them, we have only in Idea, or when the Bodies are absent: His Second Instance. When we possess our selves with the utmost security of the Demonstration that the Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to Two right Angles, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the Three Angles of a Triangle.

To this, I say, how true soever this Proposition be, the Knowledge of its Truth is not the Perception of the Idea of equality in the Three Angles in the Triangle, agreeing to the Idea of Two right Angles, because no Man has any Idea at all of equality abstracted from the Bodies, Spaces, or Numbers, which are said to be equal. Equality is only the Name of the Relation, there is between the things that are equal, and there is no Idea in the Mind immediately answering to it. The Three Angles indeed are equal to Two right ones; but then they must be in, or described upon the Superficies of some Body; then 'tis a true Proposition, because then the Relation is of equality: But in Idea only, they are neither equal nor unequal, or at least can't be demonstrated to be so, because the Proposition does not connect things that are connected, which is necessary to make any affirmative Proposition to be true. 'Tis a trifling and useless Proposition if it be not of Bodies or Space.

Farther explained in particulars.

2. This I shall endeavour farther to explain and evince, by considering the Four sorts of Agreement or Disagreement, which my Author observes in Ideas.

1. Of Identity or Diversity.
2. Of Relation.
3. Of Coexistence.
4. Of Real Existence.

What Knowledge of Identity and Diversity is.

1. Of Identity or Diversity, 'Tis he says, the first act of the Mind, when it has any Ideas at all to perceive them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their differences: For example; a Man knows as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, the Ideas he calls *white* and *Round*, are the very Ideas they are; and that they are not other Ideas, which he calls *Red* and *Square*: That is, as soon as the Mind begins to exercise its innate Power of Perception, it feels or perceives a different Operation of other Bodies upon itself, and thereby knows that one thing has one, another has a different relation to it, and by degrees learns perhaps to call them by different Names; such as, *white*, *Red*, *Round*, *Square*.

But then I utterly deny, that the Mind has any Ideas, of *white*, *Red*, *Round* or *Square*, abstracted from those Bodies, whose Modifications they are: And then this sort of Knowledge which he calls of the *Ideas of Identity and Diversity*, is in plain *English*, no more than the Perception of those Properties or Qualities, in substances by which they have different Operations upon us, or Relations to one another.

What relative Knowledge is.

2. *Relative Knowledge* he calls the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas, whether Substances, Modes, or any other. Now the truth is, the Knowledge of the Relation of one thing to another comprizes all the Knowledge we can have; for all that we can possibly enquire after about any thing in the World, is either, first, whether it has, does, will or can exist; and so our Knowledge of that is the Perception of its Relation in time to us or other things. Or 2^{dly}, What is its Nature, Essence, Properties, Qualities, Accidents, Operations, by which it comes to be denominated the same, like, unlike, equal, unequal, good or evil, Cause, Effect, Subject, Adjunct, according to that variety of its Relation: But then the Knowledge of these Relations is something more than the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas; for some of these Relations are either the Perceptions themselves in the Mind; such are Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Heat and Cold; or the Properties of Substances out of the Mind, such are Figure, Motion, Rest, Bulk, Position, from the variety of which the former Per-

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Perceptions and all Colours, Smells, Taſts, Sounds, and all other Qualities call'd ſenſible Proceed. But I preſume no Body has Ideas either of thoſe Perceptions or of thoſe Modifications by which they are produced ſeparate from the Subjects wherein they are, or by which they are produc'd; ſo that they are either the Names of the Perceptions themſelves, or of Qualities in Subſtances, according to their ſeveral Relations to us, or one another: If a Man indeed could have Ideas, for example, of Pleaſure, or Pain, diſtinctly from the Perceptions themſelves, of which thoſe words are the Names; or of Motion and Figure abſtracted from the Bodies moving or figured, then our Knowledge of them would be only the Perception of Ideas, and the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe Ideas; but ſince that is impoſſible, the Knowledge of them can be only of the Perceptions themſelves in the Mind, or thoſe qualities in the Bodies, which is their Relation to us, or to one another; and their Names can be nothing elſe but the ſigns of that Relation. As for the Names of things, whether proper or common, there is no Relation or Agreement or Diſagreement between them, except in their Sounds when pronounced, or Figure of the Letters when writ; and the Knowledge of them barely, without the Subſtances or Modes, of which they are Names, can be nothing but the Perception of thoſe Sounds or Figures compared to one another, and that is their Relation.

3. As for that Knowledge which my Author calls of *Coexiſtence*, ſuppoſe of Fixedneſs (his own inſtance) with Yellowneſs, Weight, Fuſibility, Malleableneſs, Solubility in *Aqua Regia*, all which he reckons make up the complex Idea of Gold: All this Knowledge in common Stile, is of the Properties or Qualities of ſuch individual Subſtances as have that common name of Gold, which again is only the Perception of the Relation thoſe Subſtances have to themſelves and others.

What Knowledge of Coexiſtence is.

4. The laſt ſort of Knowledge which he names, is of *Actual real Exiſtence*. Whatever exiſts muſt either be Subſtance or Mode of it; if a Subſtance, the Knowledge of its Exiſtence muſt be more than in Idea, becauſe there can be no Idea at all of meer Subſtance, as my Author himſelf owns: Beſides, there are no ſuch things in the whole World as *Naked Subſtances*; they are all cloathed or diſtinguiſh'd by ſome Properties or Qualities or other; and as no one can have an Idea of a Subſtance abſtracted from all Qualities; ſo neither can he of all, or any one Quality or Mode abſtracted from all Subſtances; ſo that to know the Exiſtence of any Subſtance, or Mode of it, is to know the Subſtance or Mode itſelf, with its Relation to Time, ſtated by our preſent or ſucceeding Thoughts, whoſe Durations are meaſur'd by the Motion of the Sun, Moon, Stars, or ſome periodical Appearances upon Earth; and thus it is manifeſt, that all that which my Author calls by theſe Four ſeveral Names of Ideas, amounts only to the Perception of the Relation that any Subſtance has to itſelf, to us, or other Subſtances in its Properties, Qualities, Accidents or Operations, and thereby it is real Knowledge; whereas if all Knowledge be only in Idea, then 'tis not real; or if it be, can be of no uſe: Which will farther appear by going over all thoſe very Inſtances which he himſelf has mention'd.

What Knowledge of Exiſtence is.

Knowledge meerly in Idea of no uſe.

What good can it do me, or any one elſe, to know that the Ideas of White, Red, Round and Square, diſagree, if there be really no Bodies without me that have thoſe Powers to reflect Light differently, or has any ſuch Figures? To what purpoſe is it for me to trouble my Head with the Relation of equality between the Three Angles of a Triangle, and Two right ones, if there be no Body that has, or can have Three Angles equal to Two right Angles? What uſe will the Invention of the Power of the Loadſtone be to the World, if there be no individual Subſtances that have the common names of Loadſtone and Iron, which have really thoſe Powers of drawing or being drawn? What purpoſes again will it ſerve for me to know my own, or the Exiſtence of God, if I don't know my own Relation to other Subſtances, and eſpecially to that to which we give the name of God? So that either all our Knowledge is uſeleſs, or if it be
of

It's impossible
to prove the
real Existence
of any thing
by the way of
Ideas.

And for this
reason these
Principles
chargeable
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cism.

of any use, then 'tis the Perception of a real Relation things have to us, themselves, or one another; and that real Relation cannot be, except the things so related really exist: But this real Existence can never be proved merely by Ideas, because we can never have any Ideas at all of Substances, and consequently not of their Relation to their own Properties or Modes, or to other Substances. This I say can't be proved, because there will always be wanting an Idea, by which we must prove or explain that Relation. For example; how can I prove that any piece of Gold is yellow, malleable, or any other Quality to be in it, when I must always want an Idea to make that Connexion appear; or if I pitch upon another Idea, that will want another as much as the former did, and so *in infinitum*? How again can I prove by the way of Ideas, the Existence of any Substance whatever, when I shall ever want a middle Term, or an intervening Idea, in my Author's Language, to make the Connexion between the Substance or any one of its Qualities appear? How shall I prove the Existence of God, or indeed of any Substance whatever, when I can neither have the Idea of the Substance itself, without its Properties or Operations, nor of those Properties or Operations without the Substance? So that I must either suppose the Existence of the Substances themselves, or go upon the common Maxims in which all Mankind are agreed; both which are downright contrary to my Author's Principles. And for this reason it is, that I charge these Principles, as well in Relation to natural Religion as reveal'd, with inextricable Scepticism. I dare not be positive that I can make good this Charge (for that does not become one that does not pretend to greater Abilities to judge than every body else may). But if this Gentleman be such a great lover of Truth and Learning, which is the highest Character that the best and wisest of Men can be ambitious of, as I have reason to believe he is, he can't take it amiss that I or any one else endeavour it, especially if it be without any Reflection upon his Person, as to be sure mine must, because I am perfectly a Stranger to him; and have only for some Months studied to understand his Writings, that so I might in this way be serviceable to my own Sons in their Studies, for whom I confess I did at first only design these Notes. To make that I mean, plainer. Suppose any Proposition. Put the Case, a Man believes, upon pretence of any positive Reason (for that I suppose in all the Instances hereafter mention'd) this Proposition to be true, *That there is no God*; I think there may be very good Arguments drawn from these Principles, that his Reason will not hold. If he believes there is a God, there may, I fear be as powerful Arguments fetch'd from these *Ideal Principles* to shake the Foundation of his Faith. If a Man be persuaded that the whole Universe is nothing but Matter, shaped by motion into differing or distinguishable Parts, with Names to them; here are very cogent Arguments to be gather'd out of this Essay, to blast his best Proofs; but if he believe there is any one or more Substances in the World distinct from Matter, he will have difficulty to stand the shock of Arguments from hence, unless he be on surer Ground than meer Ideas can set him. If he be a Jew, Turk, Heathen or Christian, upon pretence of Divine Revelation, or the Principles of Reason, ('tis all one which) he shall fall, if he have no better Principles to support him than what he can gather merely from Ideas. This I shall attempt to make out in the sequel of this Book; and if I fail therein, I shall either make these Principles, if true, the plainer; if false, induce others of greater Abilities to evince them to be so in a better method; and if I gain either of those ends, I shall rise to the height of my Ambition.

Knowledge
Actual or Ha-
bitual.

3. There is nothing farther material in this Chapter but my Author's Division of *Knowledge* into *Actual* and *Habitual*: What *Actual Knowledge* is, in his and in the common Sense, I have already explain'd. By *Habitual Knowledge* he means 'such a Perception of any Propositions, which having been once laid before the mind, it evidently perceiv'd the Agreement of the Ideas of which it consisted, and so lodg'd it in its Memory, that whenever that Proposition

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‘come to be reflected on, it wou’d without Hesitation embrace the right side. These are his words. But I doubt that if Knowledge be only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement between *Ideas*, there will be very little habitual Knowledge. The *Idea* of a Body so far as its visible ’tis certain we can have, tho’ it be not actually present to the Senses; and therefore in all those Qualities we may retain a remembrance or easiness to re-perceive and know. But we can have no *Idea* of Smells, Tasts, Sounds, except we actually perceive the Operation of Bodies upon us, nor no *Idea* of Spirits, or their Operations, excepting their visible effects; and therefore all the habitual Knowledge we can have of any of the Properties of Substances (except they be visible) must be gain’d by rational Inferences, that such or such Causes will produce such or such Effects; or such Effects argue such Causes, which are Maxims, when applied to particulars. When I say a Rose or Violet is sweet, I can mean no more than that the individual Flowers which have those two common Names used to produce those kind of Sensations in us, which we call by the name of sweet. But I cannot positively say that this Rose, or that Violet is sweet, unless I actually feel it; because I have no actual Perception of the Connexion between those Substances and those Powers which produce those Sensations; and therefore all this sort of *Habitual Knowledge* is grounded upon some such Maxims as these, the like Cause will produce the like Effect; or the like Effect argues the like Cause; but not on the Connexion of the *Idea* of a Rose or Violet with sweetness, because I can have no *Idea* of Sweetness, but when I actually perceive it; unless a Man could have an actual *Idea* of a thing which he does not actually perceive; which to me seems impossible and unintelligible.

C H A P. II.

Of the Degrees of Knowledge.

I. **T**Here are in this Author’s Account three Degrees only of Knowledge. Three Degrees of Knowledge.
 The first he calls *Intuitive*; the second, *Demonstrative*; the third, *Sensitive*: All our Knowledge, he says, consists in the view the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is thus far true, let there be never so many kinds of Substances in the World, and let them have never so many Powers to operate upon each other; and let them also exert all those Powers; yet there are none of these to us, unless notice of them be brought to our Minds by our Senses or some other means; and in that Sense ’tis true; for we can know nothing but our own Thoughts, or the things we think of; the former, is the Relation the Mind has to its own Operations; the latter, is of that Relation which things have to themselves, to us or one another, which have come to our Observation: Such Truths as the Mind perceives at the first sight of the *Ideas* put together without the Intervention of any other, these he reckons are the most certainly known; and the Knowledge of such Truths he calls intuitive. Of this sort of Truths he mentions only these three or four. White is not Black, a Circle is not a Triangle, three are more than two, or equal to two and one: Now, of the clearness and certainty of these and of an infinite number more of Propositions, to the Knowledge of which we come by our Senses, there is no manner of doubt: The only Questions that arise are these Two. First, whether after the Mind has got notice of the Existence of things without it, and their Relation to itself and to one another, there be not a certain innate Power in the mind of so comparing things one with another, as to form Propositions which shall gain as absolute assurance of their Truth as of such of which it has notice by the Senses or immediate Intuition. For example; cannot one that is, and always was deaf and dumb, and consequently cou’d not be taught by Words or other general Signs,

Intuitive Knowledge.

Intuitive Knowledge not real, but on the Supposition of the Truth of the Senses.

The Reasons why this Author charges the doubtfulness of Words on the Words themselves rather than the difference in Persons, not good.

Moderation tho a great virtue yet does not extend to oblige us to fix no certain sense on the Holy Scriptures or other ancient writings.

Palate is a surer Standard of Colours or Tasts, than mine, ^{if} He will not allow the same Rule to be observ'd about Virtues or Vices; and so the Ambiguity which arises, is not from the Names or Want of Standard, but the different Experience or Knowledg which Persons have in those things, of which those Names are the Signs.

IX. The Reason why my Author charges this doubtfulness in the signification of Words rather upon the Words themselves than the want of Knowledge of the things of which those Words are signs, is because, tho' all Knowledge terminate in Things, yet when that Knowledge is communicated to others, it must be express'd in Words put into Propositions; and therefore the sense of Words cannot be separated from the Knowledge of the things themselves: Which is thus far true, That if any Man intends to make another wiser by his Discourse or Writing, he must use the Words in the same precise Sense that his Auditors or Readers have been used to have excited in their Minds by such Sounds or Letters; else indeed they will be meer Sounds, dead Letters, and to all Effects and Purposes another Language to them; because Words have no natural Connexion with Thoughts. This therefore makes it yet plainer, that the Ambiguity of Words, when there is any, arises not from the Words themselves, but the different degrees of Knowledge between Speaker and Hearer, Writer and Reader; because the bare Sounds and Letters will excite no other or more Thoughts or Ideas than they are used to do, and consequently no Doubtfulness will arise meerly from them: But if any Man intend to excite new or other Thoughts than Persons are used to have from general Words, he must enumerate the several Properties, Qualities or Circumstances of the things of which he speaks or writes, and thereby only he will make them wiser than they were before; for those Properties are the Essence as well of the mixt Actions as the Substances; 'tis by them they are distinguish'd from each other, and that's the Essence of them.

X. From this Ambiguity in Words my Author takes occasion to infer the great Reasonableness of Moderation in imposing the sense of any ancient Writings. I like the Practice of Moderation in all things wonderfully well, and have always esteem'd it one of the surest Marks of a good Church or Sect; and for that very Reason that the CHURCH OF ENGLAND will stand the fairest of any Sect in the World for the Character of a *true* Church; and if any one was to be made or establish'd the Catholick Church, there's no one Sect in the World that will be found to be less imposing, or requires fewer or less disputable Terms of Communion than That does; and therefore I am free to be so far my Author's Disciple: But if his Meaning in that Expression be, that the Holy Scriptures are of little or no Use, because the Essence of *mixt Modes*, or *moral Actions*, must be left to every ones own Mind to make, and consequently the Words used in those ancient Writings can't convey the Thoughts which were in their original Authors to them that read them, there I must leave him; for I believe as to the grand Concerns of Religion the sense of those Holy Writings (as ancient as they are) attested by the Profession of the Truths and Practice of the Christian World, of its Rules of Life as well convey'd to us, as they would have been in the present current Stile of the Country: Neither can I see any more Reason to doubt of their original sense in moral Actions than I have whether *Man, Horse, White, Black, Living, Dying*, or any such Words signified different Substances, Qualities or Actions, from what they do now; and therefore tho I'll heartily join with him in magnifying the Goodness of God for spreading before all the World such legible Characters of his Providence, as may sufficiently convince them of his Being; yet I can find no Reason to refuse joining also with the Christian World in adoring the same Goodness of God for his special Providence about those ancient Writings for the preserving a lasting Standard for our Faith and Manners. But whether my Author's meaning was thereby to insinuate that the World might do as well or better only with the Principles of Natural Religion, pick'd up by every ones own Observation of common Occurrences, or the Fashions of his Country and Familiars, without any standing Records of peculiar divine Revelations, I must leave to his own Interpretation.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

I. **T**HE natural and unavoidable Imperfections in Words, are commonly reputed to be, that one Word often signifies two different things, and are no ways to be help'd, but telling those different Senses, of which I gave some of the most obvious Instances in the last Chapter. But as for those which my Author mention'd, they seem to arise rather from the different Experience several Persons have concerning the things of which they speak or hear, write or read, and their Rashness and Vanity in misapplying them, for which there is no help, but either making Men silent, or enumerating the several Properties or Qualities of the Substances, or the several sort of Actions of which those general Words are the Signs; both which are equally impracticable. But the wilful Abuses of Words, my Author reduces to these several Heads.

The Defect of Words not perfectly curable.

II. 1. When Words are used without any or clear Ideas; that is, when there are no Thoughts or not distinct ones in the Mind answering those Words; for then they become Signs of nothing, meer empty Sounds and Cyphers, an infinite number of which we may find, he says, in the Writings of School-men and Metaphysicians, and to them he refers his Reader; but I am cruelly afraid we shall need to go no farther than his Essay; for he seems to stand as fair for the Title of *Doctor Angelicus* or *Profundus* in this Age, as *Thomas Aquinas* or *Don Scotus* did in theirs; and therefore before he charge them or any others with affecting something singular, and out of the common way of Apprehension, to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weaknesses in their several Hypotheses, he would have done well to clear the Sense of his own Words, such as *Ideas*, *simple Ideas*, *abstract Ideas*, *mixt Modes*, and several others; it was as easie for them, and will be to others, to say their Notions are new above the common Level, as 'tis for him. If by Ideas he means any thing besides Thoughts or Perceptions; by simple Ideas any thing differing from the single Qualities, Properties or Operations of Substances; by abstract Ideas of Substances any thing more than the Images in the Mind of individual Bodies which are visible; by mixt Modes any thing else but the Names of mixt Actions, he would do good Service to the philosophical World to give such clear and distinct Accounts of them, as others might partake of his Happiness, else he must be contented with the Pleasure of pitying others Ignorance, and they of reckoning his Language Gibberish and Jargon: Of this way of abusing Words, he reckons the familiar usage of such Words as these, *Wisdom*, *Glory*, *Grace*; and he might have added *Religion*, *Justice*, and indeed the whole Tribe of mixt Modes; for these Words are the Signs of very important Ideas, and very few have clear and distinct Thoughts answering them. Now on that occasion he would have acted like an ingenuous Philosopher to have told us what kind of Ideas those were; for most Men are so dull as to find they have no Ideas of them at all, and can't be convinc'd that they are any thing more than the Names of such Properties or Actions of individual intelligent Beings, and from which they are denominated *Wise*, *Gracious*, or *Glorious*: But tho they don't pretend to have any Ideas of those Properties or Actions distinct from some individual intelligent Substance or other; yet they have as clear Notions of them, or know as distinctly what they mean when they attribute them to Individuals, as they do when they say a Body is *white*, *sweet*, or *round*. But if any one has any Ideas in his Mind when he hears or reads any of those general words, he would gratifie the Curiosity of a world of People to make some little Draughts of their Features, Figures, and Colours; for they would be indeed, as my Author says, very important Ideas, and worth seeing.

How Words are wilfully abused.

III. There is no doubt, but Peoples being accustom'd to use such general Names, as those of *mixt Modes*, from their Cradles, before they understand those Actions of which those Words are the Signs, do much contribute to their Misapplication in Discourse: But then the Fault is not in the Words, but in the Persons Affectation

It's impossible to correct the abuse of words,

No Proposition true or false but on supposition of the Existence of things without us, and the truth of the Senses.

as certainly know that the whole of any thing is equal to all its parts, or bigger than any of them; as that there is a Sun in the Heavens, or Fire upon Earth? And may he not with as much Wisdom and Safety govern all the Actions of his Life by his Knowledge of those Two mental Propositions, as the other Two which he has gain'd only by his Senses? For if it be so, then there is some Knowledge in the Mind, which is as well grounded as that which it gains by Observation of the Agreement or Disagreement of sensible *Ideas* only: For I presume, no body pretends to sensible *Ideas* of all the wholes and parts in the Universe. And yet we are as sure of the Truth of such Propositions, as if we had perceiv'd them all by our outward Senses. The second Question is, whether that assurance the Mind has of the Truths of which it gains notice by the Senses, be only from the intuition of its own *Ideas*; for I conceive the Mind always supposes things to be really such as they appear to it, for if that be not suppos'd, then I deny there is any Agreement or Disagreement between the Subject and Predicate (as they are commonly call'd) of any of those foremention'd particular Propositions; all the Agreement or Disagreement is in the things themselves, of which the Mind may have those *Ideas* or Notions. If one Body be not suppos'd to affect the Eye differently from another, the *Ideas*, the Thoughts, all that is in the Mind would be of one Colour or Figure and without number; there would be but one continued Thought, or rather no Thought at all. And therefore those Three Propositions are neither true nor false, unless they be understood with Relation to those things of which the Mind has *Ideas* or Notions. White is not black, is no true Proposition, unless it be meant for the Names of Bodies; nor a Circle is not a Triangle, unless it be meant for Space or Body of those Figures. Three is no more than Two, if it be not intended of things number'd; for no Man has any *Ideas* at all of Whiteness or Blackness, of Circle or Triangle, of Three or Two, abstracted from the Bodies that are White or Black, or space that is Circular or Triangular, of Thoughts ~~are some~~ things out of the mind which are number'd; and so all the Agreement in Affirmative, or Disagreement in Negative Propositions, is in the things themselves, not in the *Ideas*; for the *Ideas* are the signs of the things, as Words are the signs of the *Ideas* or Thoughts; but neither the *Ideas*, or the Words are Signs of any thing, if the things themselves be not suppos'd; they signify nothing, the *Ideas* are meerly imaginary or nothing rather, nor the Words any more than meer Sounds. So that if the Truth of our Sensation and other Faculties be not presuppos'd (though I think the Mind does always presuppose that) there can be no Certainty, no Knowledge of the Truth of those very Propositions which the Mind has by Intuition. How can I satisfy another, or indeed he satisfy himself, that a Circle is not a Triangle, except he be made to see or feel them? But if he don't suppose his Senses inform him rightly of the real Disagreement in those Figures, he cannot be any way assured of the Truth of that or any other Proposition, which concerns things without him, because Truth is the Conjunction or Disjunction of Words that are terminated in things; and therefore it seems preposterous to talk of intuitive Knowledge, or Certainty, before it be either suppos'd (as the Mind always does) that its Sensation and other faculties are true, or prov'd to be true; but I am pretty confident, that it cannot be prov'd by the way of *Ideas*, that our Senses are true, or inform us truly of the real Existence of any thing in the World without us; and consequently, that no Proposition can truly be form'd about them. But more of that afterwards.

What Demonstrative Knowledge is.

II. *Demonstrative Knowledge*, (which is the next Degree to *Intuitive*) is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Two *Ideas* (that is, the Subject and Predicate) by the Intervention of a third *Idea* (that is, a *Middle Term*.) For example; the Three Angles of any Triangle are equal to Two right Angles; but because the Three Angles cannot be so immediately set to Two Angles, as that they shall clearly appear to the Eye to be equal at first view, the Mind is forc'd to find out Three other Angles, which are not in Triangles, to which Two right ones

ones are equal, and these Three other Angles are the middle Term, Argument or Proof, and in my Author's Language the Third *Idea* which helps to discover the Agreement between the other Two. All this is very obvious, and no difference between him and others. But only what they call'd *Subject*, *Predicate* and *middle Term*, he calls the *Three Ideas*. But now whether this celebrated Proposition can be said to be a true one only in *Idea*, or if so, can be of any manner of use, is still a Question. Suppose a Cube or Dye; if it be divided by a Diagonal Line, the now Triangular parts must each of them have Three Angles equal to Two right ones; because, before the Division its Four Angles were all right ones; now if these Two Triangular parts are not really equal in Bulk or Weight, or cannot possibly be so, let the matter of both be never so homogeneous, what use can any one make of that Demonstration that the Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right ones? None at all; but that's the Case of Demonstration only in *Idea*. To make what I mean plainer, I shall propose the most obvious Case I can think of. Suppose Two Walls or Houses, and I would gladly know whether they be of equal height, length and breadth; or how much they differ in all, or any of these Dimensions: I cannot determine this by the Eye with any exactness; neither can I set the Houses or Walls together; and therefore I clap a Foot or Yard Measure, divided into Inches and less parts, to one Wall, and then to the other with the greatest exactness the Eye can discern; and so I come to the certainty or Knowledge of their equality or inequality; in this Case the Two Walls are the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition, or the Two *Ideas*, and the Measure I use is the Middle Term, or intervening *Idea*. But now if this Foot-measure be only in *Idea*, how shall I satisfy another that I have made a true Demonstration? Must I bid them compare my *Idea* of a Foot or Inch, with the *Idea* that others have of that Measure? Or must I bid him try my individual Foot or Inch-measure with any, or all other Measures that have that Name? Yes, says he, by all means with the *Idea* only; for there are no Two Bodies whatever that can be so equal to each, but they may differ in a Thousand points, tho' they are not perceivable by the Eye; and therefore if you don't try it in *Idea* only, you do nothing: You may have made a near guess, but you have not demonstrated their equality or inequality. Now let any one judge, whether that be practicable, and consequently can be of any use. If then this *Demonstrative Knowledge* be of any use, we must presuppose the Senses true in this as well as *Intuitive Knowledge*; for how can any one be sure that Two visible Objects are equal or unequal, without supposing the Eye, which by the attention of the Mind is carried from one to the other, represents things really as they are? For I presume that no Body purely by his Eye has any more perfect *Idea* in his Mind than what is conveyed to it that way, any more than a Blind Man can have of Colours; so that if he gain a more perfect Knowledge of any thing than he has by his Senses, so much as 'tis more perfect is not by sensible *Ideas*, but by the exercise of his reasoning Faculties.

Is not of any use meerly in *Idea*.

III. This *Demonstrative Knowledge* is neither so easie, nor so clear, as that which he calls *Intuitive*; not so easie, because the Mind must direct the Eye from one Line, Angle, or Figure, to another, and from that Second to a Third in the Series of the Demonstration; and therefore it requires not only great attention and labour of Thought, but also a quick succession of those Thoughts, so as it may readily re-perceive and run over those several Comparisons, and thereby understand the connexion of the first with the last not so clear, because the successive thoughts will by degrees fade, as the impression from the Object does, and thereby loose the distinction of Perception which it had at first; just as 'tis in Echo's, or as my Author well describes, in Mirrors that reflect the Image from one Superficies to another, till at last it becomes so dim as not to retain the Colours and Features which it had in the first reflection; and from thence by the way it appears that Demonstration is not by *Ideas*, and that 'tis only repeated Sensation; and that what my Author calls *Ideas*, is nothing but a new Name for those repeated Sensations, which the Mind derives from the Objects themselves;

Demonstrative Knowledge neither so easie or clear as *intuitive*, and why.

for

This Author's
inference a-
gainst Precon-
ceptions and
Precognition,
not good.

Some things
must be pre-
supposed in all
Knowledge or
certainty.

for if the *Ideas* were any thing but the effects of sensible Impressions, there could be no Reason given why the Second *Idea* should not be as clear as the First, and the Third as the Second; just as we find it is in Dreams, when the Perception is properly an *Idea*, and that *Idea* often clearer than when awake; not because there is any thing more perceived in the Object than what was originally convey'd from it by the Senses; but because the Impressions which came from the Object are less mixed and confounded with impressions from other Objects than when awake. However, this is certain; that in each Step of the Demonstration there must be an *Intuitive Knowledge*, as my Author calls it; or, in other Words, there must be a *Sensitive Knowledge* or a Perception by the Senses; otherwise the Mind could not with any certainty judge of the connexion between the several Objects in the progression of its Thoughts. But from the necessity of this *Intuitive* (or rather *Sensitive*) Knowledge, in each Step of Scientifical or Demonstrative Knowledge my Author infers, arose that common mistake, that all reasoning was *expracognitis & preconcessis*, and that, that is a mistake he pretends to prove at large in his Chapter about Maxims; and till I come to examine that Chapter, shall leave here these two Notes. 1. That what he calls *Intuitive Knowledge*, is neither real or certain Knowledge, but upon supposition and preconcession that our Senses and other Faculties are true. That a Circle is not a Triangle, White is not Black, are neither true or false Propositions only in *Idea*; they are meer sounds, there is neither real Connexion or Disjunction in the *Ideas*, except they be signs of real Figures or Powers in the Bodies from which they are derived; neither indeed can the very Existence of those things without us be proved, much less their Relation to us, but on a presupposition of the Truth of our Senses. And the case is the same, and for the same reason in *Demonstrative Knowledge*; 'tis not, I say, a true or indeed a false Proposition in *Idea* only, that the Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right ones; for if there be not, or cannot be out of the Mind, *in rerum natura*, Two right Angles, there can be no true Proposition form'd about them; because Truth is nothing else but connecting things that are really connected, or disjoyning things really disjoyn'd. Besides, if it be not supposed, that there are or may be right Angles *in rerum natura*, or that Two Lines are or may be strait and Parallel to each other, it cannot be Demonstrated, that Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to them; and therefore there be some things presupposed, namely, the Truth of our Senses. Secondly, The possibility at least of the Existence of Two right Angles and two strait and Parallel Lines. Thirdly, As to the Maxims against which he so much clamours, they are not more clear than several particular Propositions are; neither do I know of any that ever pretended they were; yet they are as clear and certain to any one that understands the Words wherein they are expressed, as any particular Proposition can be. 'Tis, for example, as certain and clear, that every whole is bigger than one of its parts, as that my Hand is bigger than one of my Fingers; and therefore 'tis not pretended, as my Author supposes, upon mistake, that those general Propositions are more certain or clear than some particular ones may be; but only that they are more universally known and owned to be so clear and certain, that's all; and therefore not of use to improve us in new acquits of Knowledge; but to shorten Discourse, for the confirming others in the real truth and certainty of that which they do know by appealing to the common consent of Mankind in such Maxims. I think no Body ever brought that Maxim, the whole is bigger than one of its parts, to prove, that a Man's Hand is bigger than one of his Fingers, except it was to convince one that was so mad as to doubt of it, that the case was the same in all other Bodies in the World, and so run over in a Breath Twenty instances of that kind, if there was occasion; and these Maxims are of use to save that Breath: But if after all, the Man won't trust his own Senses, or of all Mankind beside; or, which is the same in other Words, the veracity of the Author of Nature, the Man is Mad, and must be pittied; but to talk of giving him Satisfaction by referring him to clear distinct and insensible Ideas, is making him out of his Senses before his time.

IV. Demonstration my Author thinks is not limited to quantity in Number, Extension and Figure; and I am clearly thus far in his Mind, that we may be as fully satisfied of the Truth of several Propositions as we can of others, by the Evidence of our Senses; and if the word *Demonstration* be taken in that Latitude, 'tis true; but then the Evidence will not be from sensible *Ideas*, but rational Deductions. For instance; I may be certain that something or other must have been from Eternity, and will continue in existence to Eternity; but I presume no body will pretend to have an *Idea* of Eternity from his Senses, and therefore the assurance we have must be by Deduction, from such Principles of Reason as all the World is agreed in; namely, if any thing exists now which did not exist there, must have been some Cause or other to produce it; if any thing does now, or ever hereafter shall cease to exist, there must be some Cause or other to destroy its Existence or annihilate it; and therefore there must have been and must be something from and to Eternity. I shall have occasion to give more instance of this kind; but this one is enough to evince that all certainty is not founded in the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, but in the real and immutable Relation there is between things themselves.

Some things may be as certain as Mathematical Demonstration and yet not by Ideas.
An Instance.

V. My Author has given some very good Reasons, (especially if expressed in common Language) why Demonstrative Knowledge cannot be attain'd in Smells, Tasts, Sounds or Colours, at least not to that exactness, as in Figures and Numbers; especially Numbers, namely because the just equality or difference may be easier discerned between Lines, Angles, and Numbers, than between the different Degrees of the other; because those Degrees depend upon such Minute variations in the Figure, Position, Motion and Number of the Particles of the Bodies which produce those Sensations, that its impossible by our Senses to discover them. Suppose, for Example, as *Descartes* does, that Whiteness proceeds from a certain Rotation of the Particles of Light about their own Centre, as well as progressive Motion; from thence indeed it would follow, (if the Supposition was granted) that any Body will be so much the whiter, as its Superficies is disposed to reflect the more Rays that have that progressive and circular Motion united; but unless we know (which is impossible,) what Arch of a Circle each Ray described, we shou'd never be able to fix a Name to that Degree of Whiteness, and so cannot form any Demonstration about it; and for the like Reason not about any of the other sensible Qualities. But now in Figures or Lines, the least difference almost may be discerned by the Eye or sensibly measured; and as for Numbers, the least variation is made sensible to the Mind, or by the Figure or other sign of the Minds adding or diminishing one Thought; for Number is properly only one Thought, so or so repeated. Thus it comes to pass, that 'tis easier to know the exact equality or difference between Two Lines, Two Angles, and Two Figures, than between the Whiteness of Snow and Milk, the smell of Two Roses, the taste of Two Lumps of Sugar, the sound of Two Bells, the smoothness of Two Marbles. But tho Demonstration be impracticable in those Qualities before mentioned, yet why the just proportions of Bodies might not be as certainly known by Weight and other Measures, as well as by Lines, Figures and Angles, I cannot see; and tho 'tis true, this sort of Knowledge would not amount to an *Ideal Demonstration*, yet it would be more easie and useful than that is. What a World of References to other Propositions and Suppositions are required to make it clear in meer Figure upon a plain, that any Two Triangles upon the same Basis, and between Two Parallel Lines are equal? And yet how easie is it to make it appear in the equality of Two Bodies of any Homogeneous matter made upon the same, or equal Basis, and between Parallel Lines, by weighing them, or if the Figure alter any thing of the Weight by moulding them afterwards into the same Figure as near as can be; How difficult, if not impossible it is to come to the Knowledge of the just proportion between a Square and a Circle, whose Circumference comprehends the Four Angles of the Square; and yet 'tis easie to be known by Measures of Fluid Bodies put successively into Vessels, whose concave Superficies were made in those Figures, and then

Why no Demonstration in Smells &c.

Demonstration might be as useful and more easie than meerly in Figure.

weighed in Balances? This way indeed of teaching Mathematicks would not look so Learnedly as the other, by Lines and Figures; but whether it would not be easier, better remembred, and more useful, deserves to be considered. But my Author means, when he says Demonstration is not limited to Quantity, that it may be extended to Morality, because he supposes Demonstration to be nothing else but the Perception of the Agreement of Two *Ideas* by the mediation of a Third; and therefore every one having liberty to give what Name he please to any Combination of actions, just as he may to Figures, and those Names being in his account all the Essence they have, there will be no more need of any such actions really existing, or possible to exist, than there is of a real Circle or real Triangle in Bodies, in order to make Demonstrations about them, and so all is Demonstration which any Man finds agrees with his own *Ideas*; because those *Ideas* are Archetypes, not Copies made by any thing really existing, or ever possible to exist without the Mind that forms them. And at that rate, the neither Demonstration in Morality, or Mathematicks, be or can be of any use, yet it must pass for real Knowledge, because agreeable to those *Ideas*.

Sensitive
Knowledge
what.

This is really
the Founda-
tion of Intui-
tive and De-
monstrative

The Third sort of Knowledge in my Authors account is *Sensitive*, or that Knowledge we have of the existence of things without us. This, I think, should have come first; for till we are assured of, or suppose the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties, we can be sure of nothing; we can have no real Knowledge at all. However I will at present follow his Steps. There can be nothing, he says, more certain than that the *Idea* we have in our Minds from external Objects is there, whether there be any real Cause that produced it or not, this is *Intuitive Knowledge*. But stop there; if we don't know or suppose our Faculties true, how can we know the *Idea* is there in the Mind? For how can we be sure of that, but by our Perception that it is so; and if that Perception be false, where are we then? Suppose, for Example, we feel Pleasure or Pain, those *Ideas* are there, it may be said whether there be any real Cause for them without or not. That's true again, if your Perceptions or Feelings be true; but if not, then there is no such thing as either Pleasure or Pain; for they are bare Names of Perceptions; and if the Perceptions are not real, they are meer Sounds without signification. But this sagacious Author has found out, he thinks, an infallible cure for this Scepticism, which is this, he asks, whether we are not invincibly conscious to our selves of a different Perception when we look on the Sun by Day, and think of it in the Night? When we actually tast Wormwood and smell a Rose, and when we only think of that Tast or Odour? I answer, yes, if you allow or suppose my Senses right; but if you don't allow or suppose, (though you must inevitably) the Truth of my Senses or Faculties, then there is no difference at all between the *Idea* of the Sun by Day or Night, Light or Darkness; between the actual tast of Wormwood and smell of the Rose, and the Thoughts of them; for all the Reason I can have to believe there is any difference, is the difference of my Perceptions; and if you don't admit that difference, then I can have no Reason to think there is any between those Objects at different times. But *Secondly*, Suppose this a good Evidence, yet it is not so by the way of *Ideas*; for what, I ask, is the intervening *Idea* between that of the Existence of the Object itself, and my *Idea* of it? It must be something within me or without me: If within me, then you must suppose as I do, the Truth of my inward Sensation and other Faculties, else I shall want another Thought or *Idea* to prove its Existence, as much as I did that to prove the former; if without me, the same doubt will arise again; for I shall need a third *Idea* to prove the second as much as I did the second to prove the first, and so *in infinitum*. But to make it plainer, if possible, that there can be no evidence of the Existence of things without us, by the way of *Ideas*, and consequently of the Truth of any Proposition form'd about them, I shall put this obvious Case; suppose I doubt of the Existence of this Paper on which I now write, it will be impossible, I say, to prove it by any middle Term or intervening

All Knowledge
is grounded
upon the Sup-
position of the
truth of our
Senses and
other Facul-
ties.

ning *Idea*; for I ask what shall be that intervening *Idea* that shall shew me the Agreement between this Paper and its Existence? Not my writing upon it; for alas, I have often dreamt that I saw Paper, and was writing too, but found afterwards I was deceiv'd in both, and therefore I shall need an *Idea* to shew me the Connexion between my Writing and the Paper, as much as between the Paper and its Existence, and so I shall be but just where I was at first. For I shall want a fourth *Idea* to prove the Existence of that third, as much as I did to prove the Existence of the Paper itself; and therefore we must suppose the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties, else shall never be able to prove the reality of either that which my Author calls *Intuitive* or *Demonstrative Knowledge*. And my Author seems sensible of this weak side in his Cause, and that his Principles of judging of the Truth of any Proposition by *Ideas*, will not give us the least assurance of the Existence of things without us; and therefore seems to fling up the Cause, by telling the Sceptick he pretended to satisfy, that since we certainly find Pleasure or Pain follows upon the Application of certain Objects to us, 'tis no matter whether we really perceive, or only dream; we perceive their Existence by our Senses. This Certainty is as great as our Happiness or Misery, beyond which we have no Concernment to know or to be. But this again will not serve the turn; for if our Senses be not true, or suppos'd to be so, then there can be no such things as Pleasure, or Pain, they are only different Names of suppos'd really differing Modes of Perception; if we cannot therefore be sure, or will not suppose our Perceptions themselves real, the bare Names will do us neither good nor harm. There's no manner of doubt, but there is difference enough between actually being in a Fire, and dreaming we are so; and that argues indeed that the Objects themselves really exist which produce them; but then, I say, that Argument is not from any *Idea*; for the *Idea* itself must be only in the Mind itself, and therefore can have no Connexion in Nature with the Object without it; so that if our Senses be not right, or suppos'd so, there could be no real difference between being in a Fire, and dreaming we are. I can have the *Idea* of the Flames of *Ætna*, with as little Pain as of the Waters in the *Thames*, and thence conclude, that real Knowledge is more than the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, and that no Knowledge is real unless the Objects either do or are suppos'd really to exist; and that real or supposed Existence can never be made certain or known to me till I feel some Operation upon, or real Relation to my Mind or Body. Whatever Satisfaction any Man may have of the Truth of any Proposition in his own Mind by *Ideas*, 'tis but just like that which he may have in his Dreams, but he will never be able to demonstrate the Truth of it to another, without supposing the real Existence of those Objects which he pretends to prove; and that he can never do without recourse to such Maxims as all the World are agreed in; and therefore must be some *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*, as well in Intuitive as Demonstrative Knowledge, neither of them are either real or useful Knowledge without the Supposition of the Truth of our Senses and other natural Faculties.

VI. Knowledge, my Author says is not always clear, where the *Ideas* are so; that is, a Man may have a clear *Idea* of a Circle and a Square, but not know the Proportion of one to the other, which in a Country Man's Language, is as much as to say, a Man may see clearly an Horse and a Dog, but cannot tell how much one exceeds the other in all the Dimensions of his several parts, which piece of Knowledge might prove as troublesome to gain by the most Artificial Gager, as the other is to the most sagacious Mathematician.

Knowledge
not always
clear, tho' the
Ideas are.

C H A P. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

How far
Knowledge or
Certainty ex-
tends.

I. **K**nowledge, in this Author's Account, being nothing else but *the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas*; or, in other words more proper, of the Relation one thing has to another; it follows,

1. That we can have Knowledge no farther than we can have *Ideas*: That is; since Knowledge is Perception, we can know nothing but what we perceive; and those *Ideas* being nothing but our several Thoughts, we can know nothing but what is the Object of our Thoughts, or what we think on.

2. That we have no Knowledge farther than we have Perception of that Agreement or Disagreement; that is, we cannot affirm or deny one thing of another, unless we perceive the Relation between them; and that Perception being either by immediate Intuition, or by our rational Faculties observing the Relation between two things, by the help or intervention of one or more things; or lastly, by our Senses; it follows,

3. That we cannot always have an immediate view of the Relation one thing has to another. Tho we may, for Example, know there is a Circle and a Square, yet we may not know the Relation of equality or inequality they bear to each other.

4. That we cannot always demonstrate that Relation, for want of a fit middle Term to do it, as in the instance of the Circle and Square.

5. That we can have no certain Knowledge of the Existence of things by our Senses ~~are~~ any farther than they are actually present. How probable soever it may be that there is a Sun in the Heavens, yet we cannot be certain that there is, any longer than we see or feel it.

This Author's
Inference from
those Premises
that Matter
may think
examined.

II. From all this he infers (tho' really it is the Summ and Substance of all the particulars above) that our Knowledge is narrower than our *Ideas*: The Sense of which is, there are many things in the World, of whose Existence we may be easily and fully satisfied, but of their Relation to each other we may be ignorant; and to the instance of Circle and Square he adds this, we may have *Ideas* of Matter and Thinking, but yet cannot tell but that Matter fitly disposed may think; and he gives this reason for that Assertion, because we can never by the Contemplation of our own *Ideas* without Revelation discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of matter a Power to perceive or think, it being in respect of our Notions not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he please, superadd to our *Idea* of Matter a Faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to Matter another Substance with that Faculty of thinking; which in plain English, is as much as if he had said, 'tis as likely, so far as we can judge certainly by our *Ideas*, that the Soul of Man may be only thinking Matter, or Matter organiz'd as our Bodies are, as that it should be a Substance distinct from Body: So that by this Philosophy of *Ideas*, Man may be only a Species of Machins; and that we call our Souls, may be nothing but the Contexture of several parts of our Bodies to perform those feats of Motion, which for an honourable kind of Distinction we call Thoughts, tho really they are only the Operations of Matter, qualified with the knack of thinking. As for *Revelation*, which he wedges in, I believe that upon Examination that can add nothing to our Knowledge upon his Principles, so the Exception might have been saved. However, he says he has not asserted this to lessen the Belief of the Immateriality of the Soul, and that also I shall easily grant was not his meaning; for if any one will give himself up to the conduct of his Principles,

ciples, 'tis as hard to prove that the Soul is material as immaterial; for all they lead to, is not confirming any one in the Truth of any Proposition whatever, only to doubt of the Truth of all. And tho he has hedg'd in a *salvo* for God, and pretends he has prov'd in his Chapter about the *Existence of God*, that 'tis no less than a Contradiction to suppose Matter to be that eternal first thinking Being; yet I am cruelly afraid, that according to his own Principles, neither that, nor indeed any thing else, can be proved true or false, and consequently a Contradiction. But at present I shall leave these Observations in this place.

1. This way of arguing, that its possible for Matter to think, from the Omnipotency of God, is not fair or Philosopher like; for he takes the Liberty to suppose Omnipotency, and thereby forces his Adversary either to yield what he wou'd thence infer, or be guilty of Blasphemy in denying it; unless he will allow him the same Liberty to suppose, that Omnipotent Being to be infinitely Wise and Good as well as powerful, for if that be not also allow'd, 'tis irrational to run upon Inferences that may be drawn from one Perfection of God abstracted from the rest. And amongst others, I desire it may be particularly noted, that if God were only suppos'd Omnipotent, it wou'd naturally follow that we may be deceiv'd in our Judgment of the most self evident Propositions; nay, more than that, we may be most in an Error when we think our selves most assured of the Truth; and this wou'd undermine the Foundation of all Knowledge and Certainty, and leave not so much as ground for arguing about Truth or Falshood; which would be Scepticism with a vengeance. But if he will allow his Adversary the same Liberty to suppose our Matter infinitely and immutably Wise and Good, as he does to suppose him Omnipotent, then he and his Adversary will stand upon even Ground. But then the Question should not be, whether God *can*, but whether he *has* made Matter capable of thinking; for we don't desire to make a new World to prove that Matter can't think; we are willing to take the World and the present State of our natural Faculties just as we find them, and desire no Principles allow'd or suppos'd true, but such as are agreeable to the common Sense of all the present and past World, and that our Senses and other Faculties are true, just such as our infinitely Wise, Good, and Powerful Author, who cannot be deceiv'd himself, and will not deceive us in the right use of those Faculties, has made them. All this we suppose indeed, and so must every body else, that pretends to Certainty or Knowledge of Truth; and upon that Supposition we build our Confidence that Matter cannot think, tho' we want the Ideal Knowledge which my Author requires in all Certainty.

The Author's way of arguing on this point not fair.

That Question about Matters thinking fairly stated.

2dly. I observe also, this Author supposes we have clear *Ideas* of Matter and Thinking; both which wants Proof. A Knowledge indeed we have, both of Matter and Thinking any thing that does, or is capable of affecting our Senses, we call by the common Names of Matter or Body, or Space: Those Actions or Operations of our Minds, of which we are continually conscious, we call by the common Name of Thinking; but we have no *Idea* of Matter, Body, Spirit or Thinking in the General. They are General Words; there are no such things as abstract *Ideas* in our Minds answering those Words: All our *Ideas* are of visible particular Bodies, when absent; when they are present they affect our Senses, and the sensible Qualities are but their Powers to produce several Perceptions in us; and all other Qualities are only the Modifications of Bodies, by which they do, or can affect us; and therefore to say as my Author does, that we cannot observe the natural Coherence or Incoherence there is between the *Ideas* of Matter and Thinking, is meer Gibberish; for no Man has any *Idea* of either; and therefore 'tis no wonder their Relation cannot be perceiv'd by the way of *Ideas*. But if the Question be put into plain Sense, it shou'd be thus; *whether the Actions or Operations of which we are conscious, and which we have the common Name of Thinking, can be perform'd by meer Matter*, and then it will be easie to discover by all the *Phænomena* in Nature, that Matter can no more think, than a Triangle can have Four Angles: For let Matter have what Figure, Bulk, Mo-

Matter does not think.

tion or Position of its Parts that can be imagin'd, it can no more perceive or be conscious of its own Actions or Motions, than a Stone can rise from the Ground of its own accord, or without the impulse of another Body. But we find by daily Experience, that we are not only sensible of what Impressions are made upon us from abroad, but also meerly by our own Thoughts, without any help from other Bodies, can give new and unborrow'd Motions to our own, and by their Mediation to other Bodies; and these Powers we have, and Matter wants; and these Arguments to us are as sufficient to prove Matter can't think, as that a Triangle can't make to itself a Fourth Angle. Whether Omnipotency can add to Matter that Faculty, we don't care for disputing; because we have no Notion of it abstracted from infinite Wisdom; and therefore are contented to say, that according to the present State of the World, and of our own Faculties employ'd in Observation of things without us, that if matter shou'd think it wou'd as much cease to be Matter, as a Triangle wou'd cease to be a Triangle if it had Four Angles. As for the old Objection, that we cannot perceive how Motion shou'd produce Sensation, or in my Author's new Dress, that Motion so far as we have any *Idea* of it can produce nothing but Motion; and therefore when we find it produces in us the Sense we call Pleasure or Pain, Colours, Sounds, Tasts, &c. We are forc'd to quit our Reason; we go beyond our *Ideas*, and attribute these Effects wholly to the Pleasure of our Maker. We have no Answer for it but this, that we don't pretend to know how Motion produces Sensation, nor perhaps the manner how any the least *Phænomenon* in Nature is produc'd; all that we pretend to know, is, that Sensation is not Motion; that Motion is not Pleasure or Pain; that Motion does in the present Constitution of the World produce those Effects, and of that we find our selves as fully satisfied (tho' not by the way of *Ideas*) as of our own Existence. But I confess that if any one cou'd prove that the Stones he presses with his Feet, or the Smith's Anvil every time he strikes upon it, feels Pleasure or Pain, he wou'd go a great way to invalidate that Argument; but till he does, we say, so far as we can now conceive, Matter cannot think just as he does; that the Stone and the Anvil do not or cannot perceive Pain or Pleasure.

See p. 11.
The same Argument which proves God is not Matter, proves our Souls are not.

3dly. Whereas he excepts God from being Matter, and owns 'tis a Contradiction to suppose Matter, which is evidently in its own Nature void of Sense and thought, shou'd be that Eternal first thinking Being, I readily concur with him: But then I say, it cannot appear to be a Contradiction by his Ideal Principles; or if it does, the same Argument which evinces that God is an immaterial Substance, will do the like for the Souls of Men. Matter he says is evidently in its own Nature void of Sense; I think so too; but the Evidence is not from our *Ideas* of it; for we can have no *Idea* of Matter in general, nor of all the individual Parcels of it that are or may be in the World; and therefore if they be senseless; 'tis more than we can know by the *Ideas* of them. But if the Evidence be (as I think it is) from the Experience we have of such Powers and Operations in our selves, as are incompatible with Matter, then the Evidence is as clear ~~for~~ the Immateriality of our Souls as 'tis of God; which will farther appear by considering.

2dly. How can we have assurance by the ways of *Ideas*, that God is not material? For our *Idea* of God according to my Author's Principles is gain'd only by the Reflection we make or Consciousness that we have of the simple *Ideas* of Existence, Duration, Knowledge, Power, Pleasure, or Happiness which we experiment in our selves, than putting them together and multiplying them *in infinitum*. From which then I ask of these simple *Ideas* however amplified can we prove the Immateriality of God which does not as cogently evince the same for humane Souls? Existence, Duration, belong to material as well as spiritual Substances, and so does Power in some Degree; Knowledge, if it be Perception, may also accrue to Matter, if it be (as he supposes) possible in the Case of humane Souls for matter to perceive or think, Pleasure is only Motion, or the

the effect of it ; and Happiness is only complete Pleasure ; and therefore there is nothing discoverable from the *Idea* either of God or matter, that can make it a contradiction for God to be material, but what will as fully Demonstrate it is a contradiction for the Souls of Men to be only *modified matter*. Not from the *Idea* of God, because the complex *Idea* of God is made up only of simple *Ideas*, which we find in our selves magnified in *infinitum* ; not from the *Idea* of matter, for we have none that is general or which extends to all the individual Systems of it in the Universe. He says indeed, that the ends of Religion and Morality, are well enough secured without Philosophical Proofs of the Souls Immateriality, since 'tis evident, that he which made us at first begin to exist sensible intelligent Beings, and for several Years continued us in such state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has design'd to Men according to there doings in this Life. These are all very good and very true words ; but still this Evidence again, that God can and will thus do, is not from *Ideas*. For the Proof of that great Truth of the Immortality, was chiefly owing to the Miracles wrought, and the Resurrection of the first most Glorious, clear Discoverer of it ; but neither Miracles, nor the Resurrection of one Person, how great soever, have any *Ideal* connexion with the State of Mankind in a future Life ; they are no proper *Ideas* for that purpose, for want of such Connexion in Nature. If a Man will prove or Demonstrate, that Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right ones ; he must in every step of his Demonstration have a view of the Relation between Three Angles and Two right ones ; they must be near a kin to each other ; but in this case, neither the Resurrection of one single Person, or the Miracles which he or others wrought, have any such Relation ; and therefore tho' they are unexceptionable good Proofs, yet they are not by the way of *Ideas*. Tho' I dare not say, that the certainty of a future Estate depends upon Philosophical Proofs of the Immateriality of the Soul, yet this I may, that he who endeavours to disprove it, do's as much as he can by Philosophy, to make a future Estate doubtful or uncertain ; and he that makes it impossible for God to reveal any true Proposition without discovering the connexion in Nature between the parts of it, flings it upon Omnipotence, abstracted from Veracity, Wisdom and Goodness, and thereby makes it barely possible, not probable, much less a certain Truth. We do not pretend to know the Truth of this Proposition, *the Souls of Men are immortal*, from the necessary Connexion which we can clearly discover between an immaterial Substance, as such, and Immortality ; because we have no clear Notion of an immaterial Substance abstracted from its Powers and Operations, any more than we have of a material Substance abstracted from all Properties, only taking our Souls to be such as they are, endued with Excellencies and Capacities for future Existence, beyond what we can perceive in any Systems of Matter, we ground the Evidence of their Immortality upon the equity of Divine Providence, special Revelation vouched by uncontested Miracles, the Wisdom, Veracity and Goodness of our Glorious Author. And thus resolve our belief of that and such clearly revealed Truths into the same Principles, as we do our belief of any other Propositions discoverable by our Senses.

3. All Knowledge being in this Author's account only the Perception of our own *Ideas*, and those *Ideas* being in his Phrase, either of *Identity*, *Coexistence*, *Relation*, and *Real Existence*, he attempts to shew the extent of Humane Knowledge under each of those Four Heads, and I shall follow his Method for the better explaining the Principles into which he and others finally resolve certainty ; His is, the Agreement or Disagreement only in *Ideas*, the common is the real Relation of one thing to another upon a presupposition of the Truth of our Faculties, or in other Words, the veracity of the Author of Nature.

As to Identity and Diversity, our Knowledge of it extends as far as our *Ideas*, that is, every Man knows certainly his own Thoughts what they are, and how they

Extent of
Knowledge ex-
amined in.

The particu-
lars before
mentioned.
1. Identity.

No Man thinks
any Proposi-
tion true upon
a tacit Suppo-
sition of real
existence.

they differ: This is true in that Sense; but then, I say, every Man do's unavoidably, and always suppose his own Senses and Faculties to be true; that he is not deceived in his own Perceptions or Thoughts; for otherwise no Proposition that he cou'd form in his Mind cou'd be said to be true, or the Affirmation or Negation right meely from the Agreement or Disagreement of his *Ideas*. Suppose, for example, that I have in my Mind the *Idea* of a Circle, and then of a Triangle (both which I may have whether I actually see them or not) the *Ideas* are in my Mind indeed, but still 'tis upon a tacit Supposition, that my Perceptions are just, otherwise I may be really thinking of a Triangle when I judge my self thinking of a Circle; for if that be not presupposed (tho' it is in all our Thoughts or Actions) then they are no more true *Ideas* of a Circle or Triangle, than this is a true Proposition, that I see a Circle or Triangle, when I only dream that I do, and I presume that no Body will say that is a true Proposition, unless he believe there is no real difference between Sleeping and Waking, between real Perception and Dreaming that we do perceive. Ah, but says my Author when you Dream you see a Circle or a Triangle, the *Ideas* of them are as really there in your Mind as if you was awake.

This is right again; but still 'tis upon a Supposition, that the Mind constantly makes that its own Perceptions or Thoughts are conformable to the real Existence of things, and there are really such things in the World as a Circle and a Triangle; for if the Mind did not make that Supposition, it wou'd not itself judge them true *Ideas*, or any Propositions form'd about them to be true Propositions. There is no need of that, he'll say, that the Mind shou'd presuppose any such things are or ever were, as real Circles or Triangles, only that its possible there may be such Figures. That is right again; but then he that supposes any thing possible do's always mean or tacitly suppose, that the thing either really has been or is really actually existent; else he himself wou'd neither judge they were true *Ideas*, or any Propositions formed about them to be true Affirmations or Negations. To explain this farther in another instance; suppose that whilst awake I shou'd have the *Ideas* of the Sun and Moon succeeding each other in my Mind, these are true *Ideas* indeed of those Two great Bodies, tho' they shou'd be both extinguished or destroyed, since, I actually saw them last: But for all that, I shou'd not my self think them so, or that any Proposition formed about them is a true Proposition, if I shou'd not suppose they had really existed *in rerum Natura*, or that they were now actually existing. I shou'd not judge this to be a true Proposition, that the Sun is not the Moon, unless I supposed they were really existent; for there is no Agreement or Disagreement between Two Nothings, or Two things which do not actually exist. If I suppos'd them both really extinguished, I might judge that was a true Proposition (because I suppose them to have really existed) but not that its now a true Proposition, because the Supposition is altered. So that if any thing be supposed possible, it implies the Mind supposes it as actually existent, because it has really existed. But if the Mind did not suppose a thing actually existent, because it has really existed, it would not judge any Proposition to be certainly true which is formed about it. So that all Knowledge of or certainty of the Truth of any Proposition is founded upon a tacit constant Supposition, both of the Truth of our Senses and Faculties, and of the real Existence and real Relation between those things which are affirmed or denyed of each other, and not of their Agreement or Disagreement in *Idea* only.

Knowledge of
Coexistence.

2dly, As to the Second sort of Knowledge, which he calls *the Agreement of our Ideas in Coexistence*, this in ordinary Words is the Knowledge of the Properties, Qualities, Accidents, Operations of Substances by which they have their mutual Relation and differently affect us. But to know a Substance in my Author's Style, is to have a *complex Idea* of it; and that *complex Idea* is to be made up of *simple Ideas*, which others call their *Modes*. And therefore according to his Principles there can be no certain Knowledge of them on these accounts.

1. Be-

1. Because we can have no *Idea* of substance abstracted from its Modes, and consequently can't certainly know the connexion there is between the Substance and any one of its Modes, for want of *Ideas* of the Relate and Correlate. 2^{dly}, We cannot know the necessary connexion between any one Mode and any one other; as between Yellowness and Malleableness in Gold, &c. 3^{dly}, Because their Secondary Qualities, such as Colours, Tasts, Smells, Sounds, Roughness, &c. depend upon the Primary Qualities, such as Figure, Motion, Bulk, position of their minute Parts, which are out of the reach of our Senses. All this is plain from his Principles, and he expressly owns it in these Words, *Section the 10th. This weighty and considerable part of Humane Science is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all.* This may seem a little surprizing (an Humour which my Author hugely affects) that his Reader shou'd be told to his Face, that he understands nothing certainly of Substances, tho 'tis them and their different Modes, is all the real Knowledge the wisest Man upon Earth has. But this seeming Paradox will become a very obvious Truth, when expressed in common Language; for 'tis in plain Words, no more than this, *that there is no one Substance in the world of which we have an adequate Knowledge, or know so much of it as is Knowledge*: We may know Horses, Men, Trees, Gold, and abundance of such things; but the inward constitution, the Figure, Bulk, Motion of all their Minute parts, by which they do or can Operate, or be operated upon by other Substances are out of our reach; this is all the means, and therefore my Author is more a Gentleman than to tell Men they are such Fools as they may imagine: No, no, he means civilly no more than this. When we feel pain, we know all that belongs to the *Idea* of it (or in other words, *we know what we know*;) but when we see any Substance, suppose an Herb, we don't know all the Primary or Secondary Qualities in it, the Bulk, Figure, Position and Motion of its insensible parts, all its active and passive Powers, all the ways it may operate upon all and every other Body in the Universe, and all the ways by which all and every other Body may operate upon it; and on this account we may be said to have no Knowledge, that is, adequate Knowledge of that Herb or any one other Substance in the World. And now we may set our Hearts at rest. He and all the World are in the same mind; only his Phrase is singular and very pretty and surprizing. Only this must be observed, that tho our Knowledge of Substances is not adequate, yet if our Senses and Faculties be right (which must be supposed in Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge) then so far as any Mans experience reaches, 'tis as certain and real Knowledge as that he calls Intuitive and Demonstrative; I can as certainly know that all the individual Parcels of Matter, to which I gave the common Name of Gold, was yellow and heavy, as he can that White is not Black, or that Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right Angles. And if that was a good Exception against the reality or certainty of my Knowledge of those individual Substances, that it is not adequate or complete, 'tis as good against the reality or certainty of my Knowledge of White and Black; and the property in the Three Angles of the Triangle; for I don't know, nor I doubt any body else, the Cause of Whiteness or Blackness, or all the Properties of Triangles. All the difference will be that if I meet with any parcels of matter that are Fusible, Malleable, Soluble, in *Aqua Regia*, that are not yellow and so weighty, then I must give it another Name, it shall not have the Honour of my Name of Gold; or in other words, it shall by me be reckoned of another Genus Species and different Essence. For I mean by those Three Words only Names of more or fewer Qualities or Properties, by which things agree or differ from each other. For I don't pretend to give Names by abstract *Ideas*, but only according to my experience, and so I guess do's every body else, according to the various extent of their experience. And so far their Knowledge is real and certain.

No Knowledge
of Substances
in this Au-
thor's account
and why.

His meaning
explained.

/all

Every ones
Knowledge of
Substances as
far as his Ex-
periences rea-
ches is as cer-
tain as Intui-
tive or De-
monstrative.

3^{dly}, As to *Relative Knowledge* (which is of the Third sort) that is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, which are so remote as to need other intervening *Ideas* to make their Relation manifest. The Knowledge of all

Relative
Knowledge.

Knowledge of
Relation very
improvable,
but not barely
in *Ideal* Rela-
tions.

sort of Relation. I take to comprehend all the Four sorts which my Author mentions. For let the *Ideas* he talks on, be what they will, if they be any real things, they must have Relation to themselves, or some thing else. But by relative Knowledge he means only the Relation of Numbers, Lines, Figures, Angles to each other, which is known by Demonstration, and perhaps also of abstract *Ideas* in Morality. But he thinks this sort of Knowledge very improvable, because it depends only on the sagacity of Persons to find out intermediate *Ideas* to discover the Relation one *Idea* has to another. But other People think that if that Sagacity was employed to find out other Relations that real Substances have to each other besides, in Numbers, Lines, Angles and Figures, it wou'd be more real and useful, especially if the Discoveries he means be only of Agreement or Disagreement in *Idea*, and were only formable in Peoples Brains, and not applicable to things without them. I am scurvily afraid People wou'd Nick-name them Maggots. For to what purpose they'll be apt to say, is it for them to know the proportion between 2, 3, 4, or 5, swinging Numbers, or between Circles, Squares, Trapeziums, Scalenum, Cones and Ellipsis, and all the hard Names in Mathematicks, if these Proportions are not applicable to things that are Numerable and Mensurable; and that they cannot be if only in *Idea*. What the Wonders are which my Author often mentions, that Algebra has or may do, I confess my self to be no Competent Judge; but so far as I cou'd yet learn, 'tis only or chiefly of use for an expedite way of calculating the Proportion of several and great Numbers by placing single Alphabetical Letters instead of the Numbers in Figure and Cypher; which I confess is a very clever Invention, and of singular use to prevent the confusion that might arise from the Repetition of those Numbers in Figure, but especially in Words. But this I am sure of, that the truly ingenious Sir William Petrys, and since him the really learned and singularly polite Dr. Davenant, have found out ways to make Arithmetick useful to great purposes indeed. But I presume they don't pretend to an *Ideal* Demonstration, only a rational Estimate. And if that Art, which they call Political Arithmetick, be further improved, and the Persons that are Masters of it be but made acquainted (as they may by easie inquiries) with the state of any Country, with the nature of its Soil, the Number of its People, and the manner of their Employment and Diligence in it, they'll be able to Calculate the Strength and Wealth of any Kingdom, Common-wealth or Country in the whole World. That wou'd be an accomplishment indeed of real use and worthy of great Minds.

Demonstration
in Morality of
little or no use

But this *Ideal* way of Demonstration my Author thinks may be extended to Morality; but so far as I can guess by the hints he has given it will be of no manner of use, except to an universal and absolute Monarch, and to him only for the gaining the pleasure of observing, that all his Subjects call every virtue and vice by the Name he has signaliz'd it with; but will make no Man the wiser or more knowing in the real Relation that any actions have to the Laws of God, the good or ill effects of them, but only by what Names they shall be call'd and wou'd serve no turn. But making my Author's Notion good, that the nominal and real Essence of Virtue and Vice was the same; especially if the Monarch, and all his Successors abstract *Ideas* did but always agree with one another. However as a Specimen of the feasibility of Demonstration in Morality my Author has given us Two Moral Definitions, which are, he says, as true as any Propositions in Euclid. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice. No Government allows absolute Liberty.* Which are indeed very true Propositions, but can be of no use according to his own Principles, because they are in sense *Identical*. For they amount only to these Two plain ones. *Where there is no Right, there is no Unrighteousness. And every Governour Governs.* So if all his Demonstrations in Morality be built upon such Definitions, I doubt they'll be but Castles in the Air. But I perceive my Author is under some fears, that Morality will not come to this Demonstrative certainty, because the desire of Esteem, Riches and Power will so byass Mens Judgments, that it will incline them to espouse well endow'd Opinions

This Author
owns Demon-
stration in Mo-
rality not to be
hoped for.

ons in Fashion, rather than naked Truth; by this one wou'd think, that when this Trojan Horse of Demonstration in Morality comes upon the Stage, it will give a most terrible Shock, not only to Philosophy, but Natural and Reveal'd Religion, and to all sort of Government; and therefore it will be dangerous giving these Ideal Men a Commission to form Schemes of Demonstration; but so far as I am able to guess, if there be not a Clause inserted, that they shall make a new World too, there will be no great danger. And till the Patent is passing the Seals for that, we'll be contented with our old Principles of Philosophy and Religion, and support them as well as we can till the Scene of the whole World is alter'd.

4thly. As to the Fourth sort of Knowledge, namely, of *Real Actual Existence*, this my Author extends no farther than the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration, of all other things by Sensation, which goes no farther than whilst the things themselves are actually present to our Senses. All this all the World owns and unavoidably presupposes. But this is not Knowledge by the way of *Ideas* again; for tho' I presume no body was ever so mad as to deny his own Existence, and I am apt to think of the Existence of God in earnest, but only to make a Figure of seeming wiser (whatever it cost them) than the rest of the World, or of the Existence of things without him; yet if he should be so sceptical my Author's Principles won't help him in the least. If he doubt of his own Existence, there is no *Idea* to be found that will serve his turn; to say his very denying or doubting of his own Existence proves it, is an unanswerable Proof of it indeed; but then that flings him upon an old fashioned Maxim, *Nihili nulla sunt Affectiones*. His very denying, his very doubting, nay his very being deceiv'd, is Proof of that; but that brings him to the Rock which gives the Offence to all honest Idealists. If he doubt of the Existence of God, there must be a *Praconcession* (a word that goes against the Grain again) of the real Existence of sensible things, which discovers and argues more Power, Wisdom and Goodness than upon Reflexion and Observation he finds in himself, in other Men, or any other sensible Creatures: If he deny or doubt of the Existence of things which he sees and feels, there is no Third *Idea*, but will need a Fourth; nor Fourth, but will stand as much need of a Fifth to prove its own Existence, and so *in infinitum*. Endless Scepticism. And tho I presume all the World is satisfied of the Truth of his own, God's, and the Existence of things without him, yet 'tis impossible ever to prove any of those Propositions to the Satisfaction of another, till he owns the Truth of his own Senses and Faculties; and then he may by the common Maxims of Reason, in which all the present and past World were and are agreed. But if after all he cannot be fully satisfied, yet it will carry this Satisfaction inseparably with it; if he be in an Error he has good Company, 'tis but the same under which all the World did and does labour; whereas if a Man happens to be in an Error by relying upon his own particular *Ideas*, he must be everlastingly plagued with it, because if he continue firm to his own Principles, he must certainly know or suppose, that there is no Person or any thing else without him to relieve him in that inextricable Doubtfulness.

IV. After my Author has in his way of *Ideas* settled the extent of humane Knowledge (which I think if it be only Ideal, is no Knowledge at all,) he enters upon a curious Inquiry into the Causes or Reasons of our Ignorance; in discoursing of which, he has indeed displaid the Art of Oratory, of which he is a great Master, with all its Beauty; but my Business being only to explain his main Sense, I observe he reduces the Causes of our Ignorance to these Three.

1. Want of *Ideas*.

2. Want of a discoverable Connexion between those *Ideas*.

3. The want of tracing those *Ideas*.

I. As to the first. I cannot devise what it is to want *Ideas*, but either to want Objects to employ our Thoughts about, or to want the Thoughts or Perceptions

Knowledge of Existence.

The Causes of Ignorance.

Want of *Ideas* what.

of

The true Reasons well assign'd by this Author explain'd.

1. Distance.
2. Minuteness.

of those Objects. He cannot mean the former, because he expressly owns in the same Paragraph, that there are an infinite Number of Objects, with which superior or other intelligent Beings in other parts of the Universe may be acquainted with, of which we are wholly ignorant. And of that, no body doubts, but there are numberless things in the World, besides those of which we have any Degree of Knowledge. If he means by *Ideas*, Thoughts or Perceptions of those Objects, what are those Thoughts but the Operations of our Minds employ'd about those Objects? And the want of them is the want of Knowledge. And it sounds oddly to make want of Knowledge a Cause or Occasion of Ignorance; for that is Ignorance itself. *Ideas* are some things without us or within us; of things without us there is no scarcity, the World is full; if we want notice of things without us, then we want Knowledge, Perception, Thoughts of them; and so we are ignorant of them, don't perceive, have no Thoughts of them. However, he makes us amends by telling us more plainly, that the occasion of our Ignorance of several things, is the Distance of some, and the Minuteness of others. This is to the purpose. The Reason we are ignorant of the Nature, Motions, Operations, Influences of the fix Stars, Sun, Moon, and other Planets, is their great Remoteness; The Reason of our Ignorance of the Properties of most Bodies is because their Particles are so very small as not to affect our Senses; and yet 'tis on the Number, Bulk, Figure, Position and Motion of those insensible parts of Bodies that their most sensible Qualities depend. And from thence he infers rightly, there can be no Science of Bodies, much less of Spirits; but then the want of *Ideas* can't be the Cause or Occasion of the want of Knowledge; for 'tis want of Knowledge or the Ignorance itself the Causes of which we are inquiring into. The distance of the Sun from us is the Reason why we can't know what daily Increase or Diminution there is in that Matter which feeds that vast Globe of Fire, and consequently we are ignorant of its various Influence upon the Air, Water, and other Terrestrial Bodies in the producing those great Alterations we find amongst us by Tempests, Winds, other Meteors and Tides. The Minuteness in the Particles that compose our Blood, that compose Loadstones, is the occasion of our Ignorance of the Fermentations in one, and the singular Virtues of the other; but this distance of the Sun, and that smallness in the Particles of our Blood and the Loadstone are not the *Ideas* of them; but the Reason why we want *Ideas* or Knowledge of the Properties of those Bodies. To feel Pain, to see Whiteness, to hear Shrilness, to smell or taste Sweetness, is to know them; and therefore unless we cou'd have *Ideas* of those Modes of Sensation without perceiving them or distinct from the Perceptions themselves, want of *Ideas* must either be want of Knowledge, or want of nothing; and want of Knowledge surely is but another Phrase for Ignorance, and differ no otherwise than the want of Light does from Darkness. This I only mention, to shew the abuse of the word *Idea*.

A 2d. Reason of Ignorance explain'd discoverable Connexion.

2dly. Another Cause of our Ignorance, is *want of discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have*. For Example; we find by Experience, that the Bulk, Figure, Motion, Position of several Bodies produce in us variety of Sensations, such as Colours, Smells, Tastes, Sounds, Pleasure, Pain; but these Properties or Mechanical Affections in our Bodies have no Affinity at all, no Connexion in Nature with the Perceptions themselves which they produce. What Connexion has Motion with Pain, or Circular Motion of *Globuli* about their own Centre, with Whiteness? None at all; and therefore all we can say is, that such or some such Causes produce such Effects by the wise appointment of the Author of Nature. Thus we find Motions from without produce Thoughts reciprocally, produce Motions in our own, and then in other Bodies; but the Mode of these Effects we are ignorant of. All this is true again, but this is not a Cause of our Ignorance, but is the very Ignorance itself, is the Imperfection of our Faculties we complain of. But my Author has one Observation under this Head that is pretty remarkable. Tho the Connexion or Relation between, for example,

ple, such a Motion or Impulse of Bodies, and such a Sensation, suppose a verticity of the Particles of Light and the Sensation of Whiteness, be mutable and arbitrary; yet the Relation of Equality between the Three Angles of a Triangle and Two right Angles, is immutable and independent upon the Pleasure of our Maker: Which Observation may sufficiently discover to us, that the Relation of Lines to Lines, Angles to Angles, Figures to Figures, Numbers to Numbers is only a verbal Relation; for if the Words are Signs of real things (as they must be ultimately for else they signifie nothing) then the Relation between one and the other is as alterable in one Case as the other. For tho we are ignorant of the Causes, and the manner how those Causes operate to produce their Effects, yet the same Effects may be constantly produc'd by the same Causes; and so the seeming variation may arise from our want of Knowledge in all the minute Alterations in the Causes themselves; and therefore the Relation of such a Cause to such an Effect may be as immutable as the Relation of Equality in the Three Angles of a Triangle to Two right Ones; and it seems as inconceivable to us in the present frame of our Bodies and their Relation to other Bodies how the light of the Sun or a Candle shou'd produce any other Sensations in us than what they do, as that the Three Angles of a Triangle shou'd alter their Equality to Two right ones. But if those Three Angles in a Triangle were suppos'd to be a Triangular Body, and the Two right Angles a Body having Two Angles (as they must be, else the Relation is meerly verbal) then the Relation of those Bodies wou'd be as alterable as the Relation between such a Motion and such a Mode of Sensation; the Relation of Equality between twice Two and Four is immutable; but if instead of twice Two and Four you put twice Two Bodies, these twice two Bodies will alter their Relation in every thing to the Four Bodies (except in their number, which is a meer sign) as other Bodies operate upon them every Moment. And from hence I infer, that the Relation between Numbers, Lines, Angles, Figures, is immutable only as they are suppos'd general Names; but if they be suppos'd the Names of real and particular things (as they must be if applicable and useful) they are as mutable as the State of the material and intellectual World is; and therefore if Demonstration be only shewing the Relation of the Name of one Line, Angle, Figure or Number to another, and is not applicable to real things out of the Mind, whatever it may be call'd, a Science or Knowledge, 'tis a very useless one, and whoever is Master of it, will receive no more Benefit by it than a Stone wou'd from Perception if it had it.

Knowledge in Mathematical Matters either no better than verbal, or mutable.

3dly. The third Cause of Ignorance is *want of tracing our Ideas*. That is, tho there may be a discoverable Connexion between things, yet we may be ignorant of that Relation for want of proper intermediate *Ideas*, or middle Terms to prove or explain that Relation: Thus it comes to pass, that many are ignorant of Mathematicks; not for want of *Ideas* of Lines, Angles and Figures, nor of the Names for them, nor for Natural Capacity; but meerly for want of due Application in acquiring, examining, and proper ways of comparing them in Order to know their Proportions. But this again in common Language is want of Diligence or Attention of Mind, but to express it the new Fashion is want of *Tracing Ideas*; and my Author thinks the main Reason why there has not been so great Progress in other Sciences as there has been in this of Mathematicks, has been from the ill use of Words; whereas Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the *Ideas* themselves (tho I doubt now and then the Lines, Angles and Figures too) have avoided a great part of that Perplexity and Confusion which has incumbred other parts of Learning. Now this is in a great measure true; however some are apt to assign another Reason, and that is, because Mens Interests, Lusts and Passions are more apt to mix in other Discourses than meerly in Mathematicks; and till all Mens Interests become the same (which is impracticable in this World) there will be differences in Mens Judgments, tho they were never so well agreed in the Signification of Words. I am cruelly afraid, that if all Men were agreed what the Words Religion, Faith

A 3d Cause want of tracing Ideas explain'd.

Abstract Mathematicks not
so useful as
commonly be-
liev'd.

Justice, Idolatry, Superstition, were to signify; yet in the particular Application of them upon emergent Occasions, the World wou'd be as full of Disputes in those matters as now it is; and yet without such particular Application the Definition, suppose of Religion and Justice wou'd as little contribute to promote rational Devotion, and prevent Law-Suits, as abstract Mathematicks, which are not applicable to Bodies, wou'd promote useful Learning. There are very few Men that are Lovers of Learning but are Lovers of Mathematicks, because it accustoms Persons to a great Presence of Mind, an admirable Coherence of Thoughts, and thereby fits them for a singular Understanding in any Faculty and for great Actions; and the eminently Pious Dr. *Barrow* Master of *Trinity* College in *Cambridge*, will be a lasting Monument of that Truth, who proved a Wonder in Divinity upon his quitting his Mathematical Studies and applying them to that Faculty; and for that Reason most Men highly value that Science. But I am cruelly suspicious (but I speak with Submission to better Abilities) that no useful Art was ever yet found out, or improv'd by meer abstract Mathematicks, but the chief use of it therein has been to shew by sensible Marks what Inventions and Improvements have been made by others by chance, their own Sagacity and Diligent Application, whether the Arts of Navigation, building Houses, Forts, Ships, Bridges, making Engines for the heaving great Weights, or any Engines of War, Clocks, Watches, Locks, Shoes, Saddles, or any Manufacture; the Arts of Painting, Limning, Printing, Embroidery, Embossing, Weaving, of making any sort of Tools for Smiths, Carpenters, Joyners, or using them were invented or in the least improved by an abstract Mathematick *Genius*, is very much question'd; and whether the great *Archimedes*, who so wonderfully defended the Walls of *Syracusa*, was not as much an Engineer as Mathematician, and the *Roman* Army and Fleet did not receive more mischief from the Carpenter than the Mathematician, is not plain to a Demonstration. And there are some that think, the celebrated Wonder of this Age, Mr. *Newton*, has been more useful to this Nation by his experimental Philosophy than by his most elaborate and refin'd Mathematicks. But these are Questions fitter for others to determine. But this I am pretty sure of, that any of those useful Arts are better learnt in Twelve Months by Persons of Diligence, tho not perhaps of Ideally refin'd Parts, than by so many Years study in that celebrated Science. And all this inclines me to think, that whatever is truly useful in Mathematicks, is not purely Ideal, and that easier ways may be invented to perfect Persons in the useful Parts of that Science than is commonly practis'd.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

This Author's
own Objections
against
the Reality of
Knowledge according
to his Principles.

I. **I**N examining the Reality of Knowledge, it must be own'd, that this Author has given the Objections that can be made against his own account of *Real Knowledge*, their full Length and Strength, which abating for his Rhetorical Ornaments, are in Substance these. If Knowledge be only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas* there will be difficulty in finding a Criterion by which to discern between Chimerical Imaginations and real Notions, between a sober and a mad Man, between the Visions of an Hot-headed Enthusiast, and the Ratiocinations of a serious and compos'd Mind, between Dreams and real Perceptions, or which might be express'd in one word, it will be difficult to know what *Ideas* are in his Sense. To these Objections of his own framing he makes the following Answer, which I come now to examine.

II. 'Tis

II. 'Tis Evident, he says, the Mind knows nothing immediately but only by the intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them; which Words I understand thus. The Mind has no application, contact or juxtaposition to things it has a Knowledge of, only by the Thoughts or Perceptions excited in it. But my Author seems to be singular in that which he means by the word *Ideas*, which is to me altogether unintelligible, to know or have the *Idea* of Whiteness, for example in my Sense 'tis to perceive a Body has Power to reflect Light in such manner; and that power as in the Body, I call its Mode or Modification; as in the Mind I call it the Perception of Whiteness. But I must confess that I have no *Idea* of Whiteness that is middle or distinct from the power in the Object and the Perception in the Mind. So again, I am said to know my own Thoughts, when I re-perceive, am conscious of, or remember what I thought on; but have no abstract *Idea* of Thoughts or Thinking in general. This is the plainest way I cou'd express my own meaning. But if my Author has any other, I must leave to Persons of more refined Thoughts than I pretend to have, to be his Interpreters.

His answer
examined.

III. However to go on in his way. He says, Knowledge is real only so far as there is a conformity between our *Ideas* and the reality of things. But this very conformity, I say, is not discoverable in any Case whatever merely by *Ideas*. To mention at present no other instance but what is the most obvious; no Man, I say, can discover that any Body is really White, or has the real Power of exciting that Sensation by *Ideas*, unless he has a dormant or abstract *Idea* of Whiteness, with which upon occasion he compares his actual Perceptions; and I must deny that any Man has any such *Idea* till I am better informed. To know Whiteness, or perceive a Body is White are equivalent Terms in my Language; when I see Milk, I know or perceive it is White; when I see Snow, I perceive it is also White; and the word *whiteness* is only the common Name which I use to signify that the Mode of my Perception is the same, or much the same when I have happened to see either of those Two Bodies: But I have no abstract *Idea* of Whiteness present in my Mind with which I compared the Perceptions of the Two Bodies, but only compare the Perception I had of one Body with that of the other, and finding they agree to affect my sight much after the same manner, I give them that common Name of White; and the word Whiteness is only the sign of that comparison which I have made in my Mind, and not the sign of any present abstract *Idea*. Conformity, I suppose, signifies Comparison, and that is always between Two things at least; but if there be really no such thing as an abstract *Idea* of Whiteness (as I assert) then there is nothing in the Mind distinct from the Perceptions with which to compare them, and consequently their conformity to the reality of the things or the real power in the Objects, cannot be discovered for want of some real Third thing to make that discovery. If Two Walls be of the same height and length, there is a Foot-measure to discover it, if Two Guineas be of the same weight, there is a Balance to make their equality manifest. But in this Case there is no such Third thing, between the real Power in the Body, and the real Perception in the Mind, to discover their conformity to each other.

The conformity between *Ideas* and the things of which they are *Ideas* not discoverable on his Principles.

IV. How difficult soever it may seem to invalidate these Objections against the reality of Knowledge in his way, yet he says there are Two sort of *Ideas* which we may be assured agree with things, and are therefore real; the first are, *Simple Ideas*; the Second are, *the Ideas of complex Modes*; both which I take to be Fictitious, and that there are no such *Ideas* at all.

No sort of *Ideas* real in my Author's way.

I. As to *Simple Ideas*; the Mind, he says, can by no means make them to itself, they must be the products of things operating upon it in a natural way; such are the *Ideas* of Whiteness, Bitterness, &c. To which I make this plain reply; that the Mind cannot, its true, create those Perceptions by any innate power of its own; and therefore that they are the Productions of Natural External Causes: But then, I say, that what we call Whiteness and Bitterness are only the Names of the Perceptions themselves, and not of *Ideas* or of any thing else distinct from those Perceptions; and consequently there are no such *Ideas*; 'tis a meer fiction,

As to simple *Ideas* there are none such.

they

they are Insignificant words. Take those Two, or any other Names of sensible Qualities, to be the Names of Perceptions, then it will directly follow, that our Knowledge or Perception is real, because 'tis the Knowledge of Perception of real Powers in external Bodies to produce them. But taking them for *Ideas*, or any thing distinct from the Perceptions they are the Names of nothing, unless it cou'd be proved there is any thing over and above before or after in the Mind distinct from the Perceptions themselves.

As to complex
Ideas of Modes
there are none
such.

2dly. All complex *Ideas* (except of Substances) being, as he calls them, *Archetypes* of the Minds own making, nor intended to be Copies of any thing, nor referr'd to the existence of any thing as their Originals, cannot want any Conformity necessary to real Knowledge; for that which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong Representation. Such are all *Complex Ideas*, excepting those of Substances, which he says, he has shewed in another place are Combinations of *Ideas*, which the Mind by its free choice puts together. These are my Authors Words or Sense; and he refers chiefly to *Moral Ideas*, such as Justice, Gratitude, Murther, Theft, &c. Now I say plainly again, there are no *Ideas* at all in the Mind answering to those general words before mentioned, or any other: Or, which is the same, those general Words are no signs of general or abstract *Ideas*, because there are no general or abstract *Ideas* in the Mind; there are abstract *Ideas* of Substances, but those are only of the visible Properties in particular individual Substances when absent; there are general or abstract Words or Names, but no *Ideas* of which they are the immediate signs. But more particularly as to moral Terms, they are only the common Names of a certain Set or Combination of several mix'd Actions, conformable or disconformable to the Laws of God or the Country; and the Notion or Knowledge we have of such mix'd Actions being agreeable or disagreeable to the declared Will of God, or our Superiors, is a real Knowledge, because 'tis the Knowledge of real actions of ours and their Relation to the will of God or our Governours declared unto us. But the Knowledge of an Agreement, or Disagreement of actions only in *Idea*, to any abstract or general abstract *Ideas* of Virtues and Vices, made arbitrarily by every ones own Fancy is Fictitious; because there are no such abstract *Ideas* in the Minds of Men. And tho every one will take the liberty of calling any Action or Actions by what Name he please; yet that won't alter their Relation to the will of God (on which all Humane Laws properly such are founded) because that Relation is unalterable, as the will of God is, as to Moral Good and Evil being grounded upon the absolute and immutable Union of the Divine Perfections, worthy Thoughts of our Maker commonly called Religion, endeavouring to promote the Happiness of Mankind commonly called Charity, giving every one his due commonly called Justice, can no more become Evil (whatever People please to call them) than that a Triangle shou'd have Four Angles, a part be equal to its whole, or Four be Five, and in short those general Names of Virtues and Vices are the signs of the Minds, observing such Relation to the declared Will of God or our Governours, and not the Signs of any such Fictions as general or abstract *Ideas*, for there are none such in the World. Nothing is General but Names. But my Author Judges the Knowledge of Actions, tho only in *Idea*, conformable to abstract *Ideas*, will as well deserve the Honour of being called *Real Knowledge*, as Demonstration in Mathematicks: For the Lines, Angles and Figures are only in *Idea*, only in Mathematicians Brains, because his *Ideas* are accurate and complete; those made upon the Plain are rude and imperfect, there being perhaps no such things in the World as true exact Squares, Triangles, Circles, &c. Now to this I reply, that if there be not actually, or ever were such actions really conformable or disconformable to the Will of God; the Knowledge of the *Ideas* of them being agreeable or disagreeable to abstract *Ideas* is no real Knowledge; and so again the Perception of the proportion of Lines, Angles, and Figures to each other only in *Idea* (as they must be if there never were or actually are such in *rerum Natura*) is not real Knowledge

The Author's
Evasion re-
torted.

ledge, 'tis not worth one Farthing. 'Tis only the Knowledge of Equality or Inequality of nothing to nothing.

Again, my Author thinks nothing necessary to make Knowledge certain, but only clearness of *Ideas*; nor to make it real, but their answering to the Archetypes; and the *Ideas* themselves being Archetypes, that is, not taken from any Copies existing, or that ever did exist, 'tis enough that it be possible for the future to exist, because that's enough to make them agreeable to the Archetypal *Ideas*; just as 'tis enough to make Demonstrative Knowledge real and certain, that there be such or such proportions between Lines, Angles and Figures, tho there is not, ever was, or perhaps ever will be an exact strait Line, right Angle, or true Circle in the World. These are his Thoughts, mine are that such Knowledge is neither true, real, certain, or useful; not true, because Truth is the Connexion of things, by words or other signs which are really connected or disjoyned, not certain; because if things be barely possible (as 'tis suppos'd in this Case) the Knowledge can rise no higher in degree than the possibility of the Connexion or Disjunction, and that's far enough from certainty; nor real, because if the Archetypes be more accurate than any thing without the Mind, they are so far at least not real; but besides, how shou'd any Man's Mind come by *Ideas*, that are more accurate than the things without? No more, I doubt, than a Blind Man by the *Idea* of Colours. However, let that pass, this is undoubted, that if the *Ideas* are such that nothing is or ever was comparable to them, they are not real *Ideas*; and therefore there can be no real Connexion or Disjunction except there be a Relation between Nothing and Nothing: Nor useful, because if the *Ideas* of the Actions are beyond any that are or ever were, and the *Ideas* of the Lines, Angles and Figures, are more exact than any Copies of them in Bodies are, or ever were; they are not applicable to Bodies, and consequently do not answer the ends of Knowledge, which is usefulness. And *Tullies Offices* (the instance he gives for the best Scheme of Morality) he says, are true Rules, tho' never any one did conform his life exactly to them. But I say they are no farther true than 'tis possible for Persons to observe them; and no one can rationally Judge any thing is possible, that is not or ever was done, except by special Revelation. To make what I mean plainer if possible; I have often seen the Picture of a Mermaid, and thence can form an *Idea* of it clear enough. If I shou'd say a Mermaid is a living Creature, wou'd any one think that to be a true real certain Proposition, unless he did in his own thoughts suppose there is, or ever was such a Creature in the World? Is it enough, I ask, only to suppose it possible by an imaginary Groundless Fictitious Omnipotence? The Application is easie to all I have said about Moral or Mathematical *Ideas*. But still my Author has another Fetch; he says that those Discourses which take up the Thoughts of inquisitive Men after Truth and Certainty, are general Propositions, in which *Existence* is not concerned. But surely in that he has taken wrong Measures; for all the general Propositions that I know which are certain real and true, are founded on a supposed real, not an imaginary possible Existence: It would not be a true real or certain Proposition, *that the whole was equal to all its parts*, if there be not, or ever was a Body in the World that is, or was a whole, or had or has parts; nor that *Two Parallel Lines will never meet*, but upon Supposition that there are or were Parallel Lines; neither wou'd they be true and certain Propositions, *that there will be a Resurrection of the Dead, or a Conflagration of the Earth*, unless there have been or are such *Phænomena* in the Universe; or it had not been specially revealed that there wou'd be such. A bare imaginary Supposition of the possibility wou'd not serve the turn to make them true certain Propositions; and so of the rest.

My Author is sensible of an Objection, that it wou'd breed a great confusion between Virtue and Vice if every one shou'd make what *Ideas* of them he pleased: But he pretends to salve this, by alledging, that it would create no confusion or disorder in things themselves, more than it wou'd do in a Demonstration, if a Man unacquainted with the common Names which Mathematicians give to

This farther urged by the Author and answer'd.

Another Obj. answered.

certain Figures, should call a Triangle a Trapezium, the Demonstration would run right if his *Idea* was only of a Triangle. But I reply, the Case is not altogether the same; because the Essence of the Triangle, or that which distinguishes it from a Trapezium is its real Properties, and those will be unalterable indeed; but if the Nominal and Real Essence of Virtues and Vices be the same (as according to his Principles they are) then if a Man alters the Name he alters the Essence in his own Judgment; if he calls taking away anothers Goods by force, Justice (except by a blunder in pronouncing the Words) that Man really Judges it to be so, 'tis agreeable to his *Idea* of Justice: But 'tis otherwise in the Figures; for notwithstanding the Mathematicians misinformation about the right Name of the Figure, his Judgment may be sound and good; therefore if Virtue and Vice were only the Names of every Mans own *Ideas*, there would be a confusion in the things themselves; nothing wou'd be certain, fixed, or immutable. But 2dly, I say, supposing the Mathematicians Knowledge of the Proportion of Lines, Figures and Angles to each other, be only in *Idea*; that is, there is not or ever was really any such Lines or Figures in the World, but only in his Brains; then the Demonstration is neither true, real, or certain Knowledge; and therefore if Moral Virtues and Vices are only in *Idea*, there is nothing real, certain or true can be affirmed or denied of them; the Mathematical and Moral *Ideas* may go together, they are equally Romantick. Such *Ideas* are signs of nothing.

An Evasion of
the Author's
not consistent.

One Caution my Author gives, which if taken in its full Latitude, will save his Bacon: But then I doubt it will overthrow or scurvily deface his whole Scheme of Moral *Ideas*; and that is, where God or any Lawgiver have defin'd any Moral Names, there they have made the Essence of that Species to which that Name belongs, and there 'tis not safe to apply them otherwise, say you so? What Virtues or Vices are there then, which neither God by Reason, Revelation or Lawmakers by Word or Writing have not defin'd? Very few, if any; and therefore I hope still Morality will stand its Ground, and there will be little room left for the ingenious *Idealist* to build his Airy Castles upon, except perhaps about Modesty, Frugality, or some such undefined Virtues, and the contrary Vices.

Why no real
Knowledge of
Substances ac-
cording to his
Principles.

Besides *Simple Ideas* and of *mix'd Modes*, there are a Third sort, which my Author calls *Complex Ideas of Substances*, of which he thinks there can be little or no real certain Knowledge attained. The reasons are plain by his Principles. 1. Because we have no *Ideas* of Substances abstracted from their Properties or Qualities. Nor 2dly, of the Connexion in Nature of any one of their Properties with the Substances to which they belong. Nor 3dly, of the natural coherence of any one Quality with another. But as I hope that I have in some measure evinc'd, that there are really no such things as *abstract Simple Ideas*, or of *mix'd Modes*; and that there is or can therefore be no real certain or true Knowledge of their Agreement or a Disagreement; so I shall now endeavour (for the farther explication of his and the common account of the Nature of Knowledge) to evince, that notwithstanding this pretended defect in the *Ideal* Connexion between Substances and their Properties, and the Properties themselves with each other, that all the real or certain Knowledge we have or can have in the World, is only of Substances, and their Modes on which their Relation to us or one another is founded: And so far as I can yet perceive, if my Author be put out of his *Ideal Trot*, and can but be prevail'd with to condescend to ordinary Folks Language, all the Dust he has rais'd in this whole Matter will fall, and that it will clearly appear he is quite out of the way or only introducing a new way of talking, and that not only our Knowledge of Substances and their Modes is real and certain, but that all the certain and real Knowledge we have is of them and their Modes and their real Relation to one another. Stop therefore a little. Cannot I be certain that I and all the individual Substances in the World that cou'd either read,

Tho all real
Knowledge is
of them their
Modes and Re-
lations.

write,

write, speak or act discreetly, were thinking Substances? Yes surely there is no more Reason to doubt of it than of my own or their Existence. But yet according to these Principles, this is by no means to be call'd certain Knowledge for want of an *Idea* of Substance, and consequently of the necessary Relation or Connexion between Substances and any of their Properties or Operations. Cannot I be certain that all the individual Parcels of Matter which have the common Name of Gold, are yellow and weighty? That all which is call'd Iron, is attractable by a Loadstone? And so of an infinite number of Propositions concerning Substances and their Qualities; and yet this must not be call'd real or certain Knowledge for defect of a necessary Connexion in *Idea* between these Substances and their Qualities; or of one Quality with another, tho all the World reckons themselves as sure in the Truth of these Affirmations as of their own or the Existence of the things themselves. What is the matter then? Why this Knowledge, he says, extends no farther than every Man's own Experience. That's true; and who but a Fool or mad Man pretends to more? Ay, but you can't form true and certain general Propositions about Substances. Why not, I ask? he answers, because we have no *Idea* of the real Essence of these Substances from which these Properties or Qualities flow; we have no complex *Idea* of them, which is so complete as to comprehend all the simple *Ideas* that compose those Substances; we can't comprehend all the active and passive Powers they have. Now all this is true; but in plain English is no more than this, that we have no complete or adequate Knowledge of these Substances; which is certainly true; neither have we indeed of any one single Quality; for that Contexture of Parts which makes a Body white, is as much out of the reach of our Knowledge as the latent Properties in any of those Substances. But for all that, what we do know of Whiteness, or of any other Qualities or Properties in Bodies, is as real and certain Knowledge as that which he calls Intuitive or Demonstrative. Ay, but still you can't form true certain and general Propositions concerning those Substances; you can't say, all Men are thinking Substances, all Gold yellow and weighty, all Iron attractable by the Loadstone: To which I give this Answer, which I hope brings us to the bottom of the misunderstanding in this whole matter, and that is. That what he calls Substances are not Substances. Man, Gold, Iron, are not Substances, but only the common Names of individual Men, individual Parcels of Matter that are so call'd. The Individuals only are real Substances, the others are but common Names. And therefore, in short, when we meet with an individual Substance that is not thinking, we call it by another Name; with an individual Parcel of Matter that is not yellow and weighty, we'll not call it Gold; or another that is not attractable by the Loadstone we'll give it another Name; but as for the Essence, the Properties that make it what it is really and distinguishes it from other Individuals, those we can't alter by altering their Names. So that when the matter comes to the Push all this Pudding and Confusion arises from these new enchanting Words, *Ideas* and Essence. For suppose, that instead of his Phrase of complex *Ideas* of Substances, one shou'd say, several Qualities and Properties united or combin'd, instead of simple *Ideas*, single Qualities; instead of Essence, all the Properties, Qualities or Accidents by which one individual Substance is distinguishable from another; instead of abstract *Ideas*, one shou'd put *Genus* or *Species*, or which is all one, the general or specifick Name given things for their mutual Agreements in several Qualities and Properties, then all this Smoke will vanish, we shall both see one another and plainly discover that our Knowledge of Substances and their Modes which are the Foundation of their Relation, is not only real and certain, but is the All we have or can attain; and that all other is meer whimsy, is a new Name for Nothing. As for the Perplexity which my Author wou'd involve this matter by the Instance about Changelings, they are easily avoided if People be willing to talk like their Neighbours. He asks whether Changelings be not a Species of Creatures between Man and Beast; and he resolves the Question affirm-

The misunderstanding in this whole Matter clear'd

All the Confusion arises from his new Sense of words

The Instance of Changelings consider'd.

ma-

matively, because the *Idea* of the Shape, Motion and Life without Reason is as much a distinct *Idea*, and makes as distinct a sort of thing from Man and Beast, as the *Idea* of the Shape of an Ass with Reason wou'd be different from that of Man or Beast and be a distinct sort of Animal from both. But to this I answer, methinks he seems a little too bold with our Maker, to suppose such a sort of Creature as an Ass with Reason, which he never yet made, (*Balaam's* Ass might utter by miracle rational Words, tho it had not Reason) and therefore the Comparison is a little too Ideal and Imaginary. But 2dly. I answer positively to the Question; a Changeling is not a Creature between Man and Beast, but is indeed a particular Species of Man, just as a Person of extraordinary Wisdom is a particular Species of Man in the other extreme, and no otherwise. Why then don't you as well say it is a particular sort of Beast? I answer plainly, because no Beast that I know of in the World, agrees with in the Figure and Frame of all its parts. Why then says he, does the Figure and Frame of the Body make it to be Man? I answer, it gives the common Name of Man, because the Author of our Nature has given me no other universal Sign of its being of Mankind; Man is a common Name, and every one does and will give Names, not according to what things really are in all particulars (for them we don't pretend to know in any one Substance in the World) but only what they seem to be; and therefore if you'll tell me what Man is in every particular Property, then I'll answer that Question better. Ay, but has a Changeling the Essence of a Man? I answer yes, if by the word *Essence* you mean as I do, the like Properties or Qualities by which it may be distinguish'd from every thing else that has not the same common Name; but if you mean by Essence the same individual Properties and Qualities, in that Sense 'tis not the same Essence any more than Two Men, or Two Guineas have (how like soever to each other) the same Essence; for every thing that exists, has something by which it's distinguishable from other things, and in that respect has a distinct Essence. Well then, says my Author is it rational to believe that God has affix'd eternal Life, or an everlasting State of Sense, Perception and Knowledge to a Mass of Matter however figured? To this I can give no positive Answer, because I dare not judge of the future Estate of any Persons; but when I do, 'tis always on the most charitable side. I dare not rob my glorious Maker of the Honour of disposing either of Changelings or Infants as he in his Wisdom shall think fit; I am willing he shou'd make what Allowance he please for the sake of their Parents in Honour to their Baptism of his own Institution. I have not learnt to set any other Bounds to Almighty Goodness than what by special Revelation he has taught me that he will. We give them the common Name of Man, because we know not the peculiar Contexture there may be in some of the inward Parts of their Bodies, which makes them to be, or at least seem to be less rational than other Creatures of their Shape. All that can be said is, what Properties are visible those we know, and give them the common Name of Man, because we know no better; just for the same Reason we call Guineas Gold, because they are yellow and very weighty, tho they may want for all that we know the Property of being soluble in *Aqua Regia*.

The instance
of monstrous
Births con-
sider'd.

As for monstrous Births, we judge them a sort of Creatures between Man and Beast, because they partake both of the Shape and Features of Beasts as well as of Men; and therefore esteem them the Products of unnatural Mixtures; and tho it's not absolutely impossible but they may be otherwise, yet because we have no way to judge what is possible or impossible but by our own Experience (because we can't tell the extent of all the Powers of Nature) we are forc'd to judge what is possible by what occurs to us in a Million or perhaps Ten Millions of Cases of the like Nature; and therefore if Persons destroy such Creatures we pass no ill Censure upon them; because we cannot make them or our selves wiser in penetrating into the secret Effects of natural Causes than our Author has been pleas'd to make us.

Where-

Wherever we perceive, says my Author the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, there is certain Knowledge; wherever we are sure our *Ideas* agree with the Reality of things, there is real Knowledge. But then I say, where there are no *Ideas* at all, there no Knowledge can be, either real or certain. But that's the Case both with simple and complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, there are none such, and therefore the Perception of their Agreement with each other, or the reality of things must be a meer Fiction. All Knowledge is Perception, and that Perception must be of things within us or without us; if within us, then it must be of our own Thoughts, and what are they but Perceptions immediately deriv'd from things without us, or the Transactions of our Minds about them? As for the Perceptions immediately deriv'd from things without us, I ask any one, whether he has the least *Idea* or Notion of them distinct from himself or the Person that feels them? Has he any manner of *Idea* of Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, distinct from the Perceptions themselves, of which those Words are the meer Names? Again, as to the other Operations of the Mind, such as doubting, affirming, denying, remembring and the other Modes of thinking: Has he any *Idea* or Notion of any of these abstracted from the Mind whose Actions they are or the things he doubts of affirms denies remembers or otherwise thinks of? As for things without us, such as Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, Figure, Motion, Bulk, Position, &c. Has any Man any *Ideas* or Notion of these abstracted from the Bodies which have or produce them, or the Perceptions themselves. Do any of these hang in the Air separate from their several Subjects or Bodies from which they are deriv'd? Are they any thing more when in the Mind than several Modes of Perception or Thought? When out of the Mind, then the Powers or Modifications of Substances? And if it be so, as I am confident every one finds it in himself, then his Knowledge of them is not of their *Ideas*: As to the complex *Ideas* of mixed Modes; suppose, for example, Justice, Theft; has any one the least Shadow of an *Idea* in his Mind when he hears any of those Words abstracted from the several mix'd Actions which denominate Persons just or thievish? They are, I say, only the common Names of such Actions, which the Mind finds to have the Relation of Conformity or Disconformity to the Will of other intelligent Substances. Therefore Knowledge is nothing but the Name of immediate Perceptions, or the Thoughts of the Mind concerning the Relation of some Substance or other to itself, to us, or other Substances. But if any one ask me, how we come to the Knowledge of this Relation; is it not by our *Ideas* of them? I answer, no; except we come to know by knowing; for to have the *Idea* of any thing, when there is any thing meant by that Word, is knowing it; but we come by our Knowledge of things by the different Effects of them upon us, or in other Words, by their differing Mode of affecting us or exciting in the Mind Thoughts or Perceptions which otherwise it wou'd not have had: And in this way Knowledge, so far as it extends, becomes real and certain; if of things within us, 'tis the Perception of the Modes of our Minds, of which we are as certain as of our own Existence; if of things without us, 'tis the Perception of some real Power, Action, or other Mode of some Substance or other, of which we are as certain again as of the Truth of our own Senses and Faculties, which the Mind always and unavoidably supposes in all its Inquiries after Truth, and all its other Actions whatever.

C H A P. V.

Of Truth in General.

What Truth
is.
His Definition
of it.

The common
Definition of
Truth.

The difference
between the
2 Definitions.

The 2d differ-
ence between
the Two De-
finitions ex-
plain'd.

T*Truth* my Author defines thus. *The joyning or separating of Signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another.* This joyning or separating of Signs, is that which is call'd Proposition; and in regard the Signs so join'd or separated are either Words, or *Ideas*, Propositions become verbal or mental; verbal are the joining or separating Words; mental are the joining or separating *Ideas*; and so verbal Truth is the joining or separating Words, as the things of which those words are the Signs agree or disagree; mental Truth is the joining or separating *Ideas* as they agree or disagree with the things of which we are said to have *Ideas*. Now, *Truth* according to the common Acceptation and Importance of that Word, is the Conjunction or Disjunction of things according to the real Relation those things have to each other; a true Affirmation or affirmative Proposition, is the joining things according to their real Relation of Agreement; a true Negation or negative Proposition is the disjoining things, according to their real Relation of Disagreement: And because all Agreement or Disagreement is either between one Substance and its own Modes, or between one Substance and another in their Modes, therefore real Truth is the joining or affirming, the disjoining or denying the Properties Qualities or Accidents of one Substance with itself or with others, as they are really related, or agree or disagree. A mental Truth, or true mental Proposition, is when our Thoughts agree with the real Relation which the things have to each other of which we think; and a verbal Truth is when the things themselves have that Relation really with the Words, of which they are made the Signs agree or disagree. Thus I have with all the plainness that I cou'd, set before the Reader both my Author's and the common Notion of Truth, that so by comparing them together he may the better perceive the difference between them, which he may find is chiefly in these particulars. First, that according to his Notion of Truth, 'tis the Agreement or Disagreement only in *Ideas* or Words: Now its confess'd on all sides, that where *Ideas* are to be had there may be said to be the shadow at least of Truth, tho only in *Idea*; but I doubt not real Truth. I mean thus. I can have the *Ideas* in my Mind succeeding each other, of the Sun, the Moon, of Fire and of Water, tho I neither see or feel in those Instants any of them; now, any one may if he allow himself Latitude in his talk, say, these Two are true negative Propositions, the Sun is not the Moon, Fire is not Water, because there is a Disagreement in the very *Ideas*; but I presume that when any one says or means those Two are true negative Propositions, he does not mean only with Reference to the Two different *Ideas*, but to the real Operation or Relation in which those Bodies stand to each other, or to our selves: And 'tis a strain upon the common Sense of Words, to say, those are true negative Propositions, if he mean with reference only to the *Ideas*. Secondly, the main Difference between the Two before mention'd Definitions of Truth, is, this that the Author goes upon the Supposition that there are abstract *Ideas* of the single Qualities in Substances, and of mix'd Modes, as he calls them; whereas we can find none such in our Minds. We have no *Ideas* of Whiteness or Blackness; or other single Qualities abstracted from the Bodies which have, or actual do produce in us the Sensations which have those Names; we have no *Ideas* of Sweetness or Bitterness abstracted from the Bodies which produce those Perceptions, or when we actually feel them distinct from the Modes of Perceptions themselves, of which those Two Words are the Names only. We have no *Ideas* of Circles or Triangles abstracted from some particular Body or other, of which those Figures are the Modes, and tho it's true the Mind considers the Figures, without re-

regarding the Properties of the Paper or other Body on which they are described ; yet we can never form the least shadow of an *Idea* of them separated from some particular Body or other ; and therefore we esteem Lines, Angles and Figures, nay and Figures in Numeration to stand only instead of Words, because they are better Signs than Sounds, and to be no other then Signs of Bodies measured or things numbered. To explain this particular a little farther ; when I draw such a Line — make such an Angle $\vee$. such a Figure Δ mark down such Figures in Number 2546, I do it only because these are better, more certain, more universally known Signs of my meaning, or are shorter ways of expressing than if I shou'd say a strait Line, an acute Angle, a Triangle or Isosceles, Two thousand Five hundred Forty six : But still they are but signs just as Mathematicians make such marks $=$ $\neq$ $>$ to signify equality, majority, minority ; or as 'tis in Algebra, where the Letter A. stands for the first, the letter B. for the Second, the letter C. for the Third Number, how big or different soever the Numbers are : But all this while they are but Signs, they are not the things signified which are always suppos'd Bodies measured or things numbered : And this occasioned my saying in another place, that if Demonstrations in Mathematicks were not applicable to real things, to things that are or have been in nature, they were trifling and insignificant, and *Ideas* of them are meer Fictions, are like Words without Thoughts answering them meer Sounds, and consequently of no use : And if this be right, as I conceived it commonly believed to be, then Truth must be something more than the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* ; because we have no abstract *Ideas* of the single Qualities of Substances nor complex abstract *Ideas* of mix'd Modes ; and therefore can never make Affirmations or Negations about them, simple abstract *Ideas* of the Qualities of Substances are nothing but the common Names given to Substances on the account of their Modes of affecting us or Relation to each other ; mix'd Moral Modes are only the common Names of mix'd actions given to a certain set of them which the mind finds conformable or disconformable to the will of other intelligent Substances ; but then it has no abstract *Ideas* or Notions of those single Qualities separate from the Substances, nor of the mix'd actions separate from some Agents, or other. And as for Mathematical Demonstrations, they are but shewing the proportion between Bodies measured, or things numbered, by better and more proper Signs of our meanings or thoughts about them than we cou'd do by words ; and hence it will follow, that where our Knowledge is real, 'tis only of Substances or their real Modes compar'd by the mind, and not of our *Ideas* only ; because we have no *Ideas* at all of Substances abstracted from all their Modes, nor of so much as one Mode of any Substance abstracted from the Substance itself ; nor of mix'd complex Modes abstracted from the Agents themselves, to which they belong ; and consequently shall have no real Knowledge or Truth at all, if it be only placed in the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* only.

My Author says 'tis hard to treat of mental Propositions ; 1. Because, when put into words they become verbal Propositions, and no longer are purely mental. 2dly, Because most Men use Words or Names instead of *Ideas* in their Thoughts or Reasonings within themselves, especially if *Ideas* be complex ; and this is true enough ; and therefore the best way that I know for the understanding what mental Propositions are, is to consider what Actions there cou'd be in our Minds, if we never had heard a word in our Lives, which is the Case of such as are born and continue Deaf and Dumb all their Days. That they affirm and deny, or discern the Agreement or Disagreement of things so far as their Observation reaches, there is no doubt ; and those are properly mental Propositions, and are true when their Thoughts agree or disagree with the real Relation there is between the things they think of. And I further conceive, that if there were any such things as abstract *Ideas* of single Qualities in Substances, or of mix'd Modes, such Persons, Mad-men, Enthusiasticks or People in Dreams, might be only the most wise, but the most happy People in the World ; the most wise, because their *Ideas* would be the

Why its hard
to treat of
mental Pro-
positions.

not

least

least confounded, their Perception of them the least diverted by the Cross Motions that are made upon others Minds by Sounds; the most happy to all the purposes of comfortable Subsistence, because they might frequently entertain themselves with all the grateful Smells, delicious Tasts, pleasant Prospects, moving Sensations, that ever they had before perceiv'd; but let them believe this that have *Ideas* distinct from actual Perceptions.

Mental Propo-
sitions ex-
plained by an
instance of the
Authors.

Demonstra-
tion never
meerly in *Idea*.

An Objection
of the Authors
answered by
himself, but
not fully.

The *Idea* of a
Centaur is as
capable of ex-
istence as of
Man, (that is)
neither of
them are at
all capable.

The instance which my Author gives of a mental Proposition, will with a little variation of his Phrase and more particular Application, clear this whole matter to all Capacities. Suppose one that never heard a word in his Life, he may meerly upon sight and use of a little discretion, observe that which we call a Square, the Diagonal or Cross Line, and the Side-line, and then form an *Idea* of that Cross-line divided be equal to the Side-line, and from thence into such aliquot parts, that a certain number of them may form this true Proposition in his Mind, that the proportion of the side to the Diagonal-line is as Eight is to Twelve. But now if any one ask how he shall prove this a true Proposition; it must either be by some Body of a certain Measure, suppose an Inch first applyed to the Cross-line, then to the Side-line; or it must be finding out some other Line that will be equal to $\frac{8}{12}$ ths of the Diagonal-line; and by this it will appear in the first way that the Demonstration was made by shewing the Proportion or Relation of one Body to another; or in the Second way by supposing the truth of that common Maxim, *That what things are equal to a Third, are equal between themselves*; and not by *Ideas* only in either way.

My Author is very sensible that his Notion of Truth is as obnoxious to an Objection as that of Knowledge is according to his Definition, namely, that after all we shall want a Criterion or standing measure by which to try whether *Ideas* be real or Chimerical and only Nominal. But he endeavours to salve it by telling us, that such are verbal Truths, wherein Terms are joined according to the *Ideas* they stand for, without regarding whether our *Ideas* are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in Nature. But then they contain real truth when these signs are joined as our *Ideas* agree, and when (mark this which follows) our *Ideas* are such as we know are capable of having an existence in Nature, which in Substances we cannot know but by knowing such have existed: And now I appeal to any thoughtful Reader, whether my Author has not left him in the lurch in his main inquiry. For the main inquiry was, how he shou'd know real *Ideas* from Chimerical: And the Answer, when it comes to the push, is, by being assured that our *Ideas* are capable of real existence, and so he is but just where he was; for he'll ask again how he shall be assured of that capacity of real Existence, and so he'll want a Third *Idea* to assure him of the connexion of the Two first and so must be a Sceptick *in infinitum*. For I ask, how he shall be assured his *Idea* is capable of existing in Nature? In Substances he says rightly, no otherwise but by knowing such have existed; and I add, that is equally true as to every thing else in the World; How shall a Man know that a Line, Angle, Figure, Motion, Rest, Colour, &c. are capable of existing, if he did not know they had existed (except by special Revelation?) Whatever is, was, or ever will be in the World, is either Substance or Mode of some Substance or other; and if we cannot possibly have an *Idea* of any one Mode in the World abstracted from Substance, then 'tis impossible to prove any Proposition to be a real Truth by the way of making an *Idea* the middle or proving Term. He confesses the *Idea* of a Centaur does agree with the *Idea* of an Animal, as much as the *Idea* of Man does with the *Idea* of an Animal: Why then I ask, is not this a true, real and certain Proposition; a Centaur is an Animal as well as this, a Man is an Animal? He answers, because we know that the *Idea* of a Man is capable of existing in Nature by the existence of Men, but not of the existence of the *Idea* of a Centaur by the existence of Centaurs, but herein lies the whole mistake; for the *Idea* of Man is as incapable of existing in Nature, as the *Idea* of a Centaur; for there is not, ever was, or ever will be in us such an *Idea* as that of Man. Man is only the common Name

7 and then from an *Idea* of that cross Line divided into such aliquot parts, that a certain number of them may be equal to the side line, form

Name of individual Men, 'tis no *Idea* at all; the *Idea* is only of single or individual Men, not of Man, Man is no Substance at all, 'tis only the Name of particular Substances; and as for the common Name of a Centaur, 'tis as capable of existing in Nature as the common Name of Man. And what I have said of the complex abstract *Idea* of Man, is applicable to the complex abstract *Idea* (as he calls it) of any other Substances; and the abstract *Idea* of simple Qualities and complex Modes; no one can have any such general *Ideas* answering to the common Names, any more than I can have an abstract *Idea* of what the Man in the Moon has this Day for his Dinner; and therefore no real Knowledge only by *Ideas*. If then there are no abstract or general *Ideas* of Substances, single Qualities, mix'd Modes, or indeed of any thing else, then all true real certain Propositions can be nothing else but the Conjunctions or Disjunctions of Substances or their Modes according to their real Relation to themselves, or each other, and not to their Relation which they have in *Idea* only. But then it will be pertinently asked me, if we cannot know a real Truth by the way of *Ideas*; by what other way can we come to the Knowledge of that Relation between the parts of any Proposition? To which I give these plain and obvious Answers.

Conclusion.

1. We suppose the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties; and this I say is no precarious Supposition, because the Mind does in all and every one of its Transactions unavoidably, whether it will or not, make that tacit Supposition; it does not require the least Proof of it, or indeed is capable of it, because it supposes it in all proofs in all its rational or deliberate acts whatever. If I do but stir my Finger, whether Dreaming or Waking, I necessarily suppose that I do so, if I do but think so; if I think of a Circle, or any other Object whatever, I always take it for granted that I do, so provided that I my self am conscious or think I do so.

2^{dly}, Again, as to things without us, we do unavoidably suppose their Existence: As the mind does never require any Proof of it, so neither is it capable of any if it shou'd; and it constantly Judges things without it such as they are represented, if its own Reason Grounded upon the Experience of its Senses don't convince and prepossess it with a belief to the contrary. If I did not foreknow that a Stick in the Water used to appear crooked, tho really strait; that in a Mist a Man may appear like a Bush; if I did not know by experience that things at a great distance appear less than really they are, that when my own Body is partaker of a motion, another Body might appear to move which really did not; in all such Cases, if I was not prepossessed with some Reasons to doubt, I shou'd without the least Hesitation infallibly conclude the Stick was really crooked, the Man was a Bush, the Sun was not much bigger than the brim of my Hat, that the Sun mov'd not the Earth. In a Dream the Mind supposes always things such as itself then thinks; and wou'd inevitably and everlastingly be in that Error, if nothing occurred afterwards to convince it of that Error. Thus then, the mind supposing its own Senses and Faculties true, satisfies itself in the reality of its own inward Thoughts and its Perceptions which come from without it, not desiring any Proof at all; when it perceives by its outward Senses, Figure, Motion, Colours, Smells, Tasts, Heat, Cold, Hunger, Thirst, Pleasure, Pain, it never offers to dispute the reality of them; it neither has or needs any Pictures hanging by it of any of these things, with which by comparison to convince itself that they are the very things it uses to call by such Names; it inevitably, by force of Nature's Arguments supposes or believes the reality of them.

3^{dly}, As we unavoidably suppose our own, so we do without any Proof, that the Senses and Faculties of other intelligent Beings in the like Cases are true also: For if we did not suppose that, neither they cou'd prove any thing to us, or we to them; and in consequence of that Supposition, we naturally conclude, that whatever Sentiments we find our selves and all others to agree in, are the real effects of Nature's Power and Operation; and therefore when Two or more things are propos'd to us, whose Relation to us, or each other we cannot discover by our own Senses or most diligent Observation, we do by the same unavoidable necessi-

ty of our constitution resort to those common Sentiments of all Mankind, as the surest Principles into which to resolve the reason of our belief of any Proposition which our own Senses or Observations could not discover, presuming inevitably, that such Universal Sentiments are the Impressions of the wise and undeceiving Author of our Natures. And thus I conceive all real Knowledge whether it be deriv'd to us by our own inward or outward Sensations, or by our regular use of them in all Searches after Truth, is finally resolved into the supposed veracity of God; and every Proposition becomes more or less certain to us, as it can with more ease or difficulty sooner or later be resolv'd into those common Principles of Reason; and tho it must be owned, that Persons may fully satisfy themselves in an infinite Number of particular Propositions as Self-evident as these common Principles are, yet it must be noted, that even in those particular Propositions and in all reasonings whatever, those very Persons suppose (tho perhaps they don't attend to it) the Truth of their own Senses and Faculties, and of these very Maxims also, which I shall endeavour to make manifest in a more proper place than this is.

C H A P. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

What Uni-
versal Propo-
sitions are.

AN *Universal Proposition* is, I think by, all agreed to be the *Conjunction or Disjunction of Words, or other signs of our Conceptions, where the Subject of the Proposition is the common Name or Sign of several individuals.* For we may easily observe, that the word or other sign of our Conceptions (commonly call'd the Predicate of a Proposition) is always as common, generally a more common Name or Sign than the Subject is; so that if the Subject of any Proposition be a general Word or Sign, the Predicate is, and must be so too. Thus these are Universal Propositions; Man is a living Creature; Gold is Malleable; a Loadstone will draw Iron; Two Parallel Lines will never meet; because the Subjects of them are common Names or Signs of our Conceptions. And this, if noted, as obvious as it may seem, will disclose all the grand Mystery which my Author has formed about *Universal Propositions concerning Substances*, by his running upon the mistake, that what is really nothing but the common Name of a Substance, is Substance itself; only to keep up the credit of abstract complex *Ideas*, whereas there are none such of Substances (nor indeed of any thing else) but only of visible absent and single Substances. What he calls abstract *Ideas* of Substances, are nothing else but the common Names of Substances given them for their agreement in Qualities and Properties. Man, Gold, Loadstone, are not Substances, but the common name given to individuals, and those individuals are Substances indeed. Lines, Figures and Angles are not Substances if taken for any thing else but parts of particular Bodies; if they be taken for any thing else or more, they are but common signs, just as words, or general Names are; but are indeed better, more sensible and clear, less dubious than words are. But if there are not Bodies or parts of Bodies in Nature which they signify, the *Ideas* of them are Fictitious, they are no real *Ideas* any more than the *Ideas* of Centaurs are.

One may form
general Pro-
positions
without words

II. All Knowledge is of general or particular Truths, and those general Truths seldom, he says, are apprehended, but as conceiv'd or express'd in Words; and he shou'd have added also, other Signs; for one may conceive or apprehend Two Parallel Lines will never meet (tho he never heard any of those or equivalent words in his Life) meerly upon sight of them; but so far it's true, he cou'd not express his apprehension to another without words. And 'tis no wonder at all, general Propositions cannot be treated of without words or other signs, because they

they are only the Connexion or Disjunction of Words, or such things as Signs, which stand instead of Words.

III. *Certainty*, he says, is two-fold; of Truth, and of Knowledge: *Certainty* of Truth is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for as really it is. *Certainty* of Knowledge is to perceive that Agreement or Disagreement. This is indeed a fair Distinction of Certainty. That there are *Antitheses* or *Antipodes* was a true Proposition always, tho it was not known to be so till of late Ages discover'd by (the *Idea* if you like the word) Navigation. But then the Certainty of the Truth of that Proposition or indeed of any other, did not consist in the Words exactly expressing the Agreement of *Ideas*, unless by *Ideas* he means there the things themselves (*i. e.*) the *Antipodes*; and if so, then the words Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* might have been better left out. But if by *Ideas* be meant any thing in the Mind, then Certainty of Truth and Certainty of Knowledge wou'd be all one; for to have the *Idea* of *Antipodes* implies having the Knowledge of them, or it implies nothing. But this instance I confess is not right to his Purpose: For in his account, nothing can be certainly known by any Testimony whatever. Well then, that there is a God, that the Three Angles of a right-lined Triangle are equal to Two right, these were always certain Truths; but not known to be such, till the Incompatibility of the *Idea* of Thinking with the *Idea* of Matter was invented, and till some sagacious Mathematician found out some other Angles that were equal to Two right Angles, and thence by an old fashion'd Maxim concluded, that what Two things were equal to a Third, were equal to each other, and now we have his meaning right concerning the difference between Certainty of Truth and Certainty of Knowledge.

IV. *No Propositions*, says he, *can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mention'd is not known.* To explain this Gibberish about *Essence* and *Species*, the best way is Examples. It cannot be known, that every Man is a thinking Substance; that Gold is yellow, because the real Essences of those Substances for which those Two Words stand can't be known; and therefore to connect Man with Thinking, or Gold with Yellowness, is to connect things of which we have no complete abstract *Ideas*. This I take to be the Summ of all his eloquent Harangue upon this Subject. But now if neither Man or Gold be taken for Substances, and what he calls their abstract *Ideas* be only common Names, and the Word *Essence* be taken only for those Properties which give them that Name, and *Species* be nothing but the specifick Name of Distinction; then all the Mist clears up, and we may discover that those Two Propositions about Man and Gold are as certainly true as any that can be form'd in Mathematicks about Triangles or any other Figure. He says indeed, that all Gold is malleable, is not so certain a Proposition as this, that Three Angles of all right lined Triangles are equal to Two right Angles: But I say it is, as I understand the Case, and as I think another shou'd. For suppose only Two sides of the Triangle to be strait Lines, and the Third to be the Arch of a Circle, or some such crooked Line, then the Three Angles may be bigger or less than Two right Angles. Ah, but says my Author this is nothing to the purpose; for I spoke only of right-lined Triangles. Say you so? And I spoke only of certain Substances that have the common Name of Gold. If you suppose your Triangle to be right-lined of all sides, I shall suppose my parcel of Matter to be Gold; and I am as sure that which I call'd Gold was malleable, as you can be that what you call'd a right lined Triangle had the Property you mention; and if I meet with a parcel of Matter that is not malleable, I alter the Name of it as you must of your Triangle if it have not that Property, and so we are even. Ah, but then I spoke of general Propositions, whereas yours, if limited to those Individuals to which you give that Name, is not a general, but a particular Proposition; 'tis no more than if you said some Gold is malleable. And so I say was yours; for 'tis no more than if

Certainty either of Truth or Knowledge.

General Propositions may be as certainly known to be true about Substances as Mathematical Propositions.

you

A Triangle is
but a common
Name just as
Gold is.

you said some sort of Triangles have that Property. No, you'll say, all right-lined Triangles have it and ever will; so say I, all Substances call'd Gold have, and shall ever have that Property. Well, but after all, that which you call Gold may lose that Property; so I say may your Triangle, for one of the Lines may in process of time become crooked. Never, you'll say; for my abstract *Idea* of a right-lined Triangle will ever be immutable: That's true, if you suppose all the sides right-lined; and so will Gold, if you always suppose it to have that Name; and if your abstract *Idea* of a Triangle with Three right-lined sides be any thing more than the common Name of that *Species* of Triangles, you have no more of any such *Idea* than I have of the smell of Malleableness. All your *Ideas* of right-lined Triangles were of several single Triangles, which succeeded one another in your Mind; to all which you gave that common or specifick Name; and so all the *Ideas* I ever had of Gold, were only individual, or single parcels of Matter, to all which I gave that common Name. Very few universal Propositions, he says, can be made of Substances, because the Coexistence of *Ideas* can in few Cases be known; the Sense of which so far as its true, is this; that we can have no adequate or complete Knowledge of any particular Substance whatever; we cannot tell the numberless Powers it may have of Operating upon all the several Bodies in the Universe, much less how they, upon Occasion offer'd, may operate upon it; all the Properties or Qualities that are in it, or are capable of being in it, cannot be known to us. This he calls its *Real Essence*; but if by the word *Essence* be meant only those Modes in any Substance by which we by name distinguish one Individual from another, those Modes may be, and are as certainly known as any Propositions in *Euclid*. I may as certainly know that all the Substances to which I give the specifick Names of Gold and Lead are heavy and malleable, as I can, that White is not Black, that parallel Lines can never meet, or any Propositions known by Intuition or Demonstration. I am as ignorant of the whole Combination of Properties that belong to Triangles, Squares, Circles and the Relation or Proportion they have to each other, as I am of all the active and passive Powers of Lead and Gold; but what I know of Lead or Gold, or so far as my Experience goes, I know as certainly as I do any thing of those or any other sort of Figures, and can form as many true, certain and universal Propositions concerning those Substances as I can of those Figures; and the Reason I can form no more about Lead or Gold or other Substances, is just the same as it is why I can form no more about Triangles, Squares and Circles, namely because I don't know all the Properties and relative Powers of one more than I do of the other. When I see a Triangle, Circle, or Square, I may perhaps better know at first view whether it deserves this or that common Name, than if I see several Bodies whether they deserve the common Names of Lead, Iron or Gold; but that does not in the least alter the Certainty of what I do know in one Case more than the other; for I don't give Names according to what they really may be, but according to what they appear to me to be. I can no more tell whether any of these Three Figures be exactly such as have those Names, than I can what are the latent Properties in any Parcels of Matter. But so far as my Knowledge reaches in Substances, 'tis as certain, depends upon as sure Grounds as that in Lines, Angles and Figures; its being more or less complete does not make it more or less certain.

Two good
Reasons why
we can't know
all the Pro-
perties of Sub-
stances given
by this Author
explain'd in
common
Words.

V. Under this Head concerning the Coexistence of simple *Ideas*; or in other Words, the single Qualities or Properties of Substances, my Author has given Two very true and philosophick Reasons why we cannot attain to an adequate Knowledge perhaps of any single Substance in the World. I wave that which he gives which is only in Opposition to the old scholastick Notions of *Species*, namely that Nature has set out by a real, tho unknown *Essence*, what belongs to each *Species* of Creature, because I presume the philosophick World is now pretty well satisfied that *Genus* and *Species* are only more or less general Names of Substances and their Modes according to their mutual Agreements or Relations

tions to us; and therefore that Reason might be spared at this time of the day. But the Two Reasons he gives which deserve Remark are in short these. First The first Reason. the sensible Qualities of Bodies, and from which they have their distinct Names, depend upon the insensible remote and unperceiv'd Operation of other Bodies upon them. We are very apt to think every Substance independent upon all others for its being such as it is, whereas perhaps there is no one Substance but depends upon an infinite number of others that are remote or insensible in their manner of operating upon it. Thus Gold, if there was no other Body in the World beside itself, wou'd loose all its Properties, if there was no Body to give it that Posture of its insensible Particles by which it reflects Light as it does; if none kept them in that Consistency it has, it wou'd loose its Colour, Fixedness, Malleableness and Weight; if there were no subtil and insensible Matter to twist and keep the parts of Water and other Liquors in a perpetual Motion, they wou'd loose their Fluidity. Bodies wou'd quit their Gravitation; the Loadstone its wonderful Virtues, if there were not other Bodies whose Mode of Operation we cannot discern that contributed a perpetual Assistance to them; and if the State of Bodies that are so homogeneous be thus dependent, then that of Vegetables and Animals must be much more: So if there was not some circumambient Matter that kept their solid Parts together and maintained their fluid Parts in continual Agitation, they wou'd dye, and become clear other sort of things than what they now are. Take but the Air from the greatest part of Animals, or alter its Operation upon them in the least, and they soon lose their Motion, Life and Sense. Tho the Sun may be distant from us many Millions of Miles, yet we find that if People or other Animals do but cross the *Aequinoctial Line*, or get up to the top of *Tenariff* or other high Mountains, it often costs their Lives; so that if that great Source of Heat shou'd be but a very little more or less (in comparison with its present distance) removed from the Earth, most Animals wou'd perish, like Fish out of their proper Element. And 'tis very probable that the Sun's Influence upon terrestrial Bodies depends upon the plenty and temper of that Matter which it continually borrows from the fix'd Stars and other Bodies, which by means to us indiscernably feed it; so that for all that we know, the present State of the whole Universe may as much depend upon the Frame and Contexture of every single part in it, as the vigour of our whole Bodies, or the regular Motion of a Watch do upon the good Order and Temper of all and every single Part. And therefore the very sensible Qualities in Bodies depending thus upon so many external remote and unperceiv'd Causes, it must be impossible for us to attain a complete Knowledge of the active and passive Powers of such Substances. 2dly, Another Reason of our Ignorance of all the Properties in Bodies is, because The Second Reason. we cannot by our Senses, or any other ways, certainly discover the true Figure, Bulk, Motion, Position of their minute Parts; and yet 'tis on them that all their sensible Qualities depend: These Two must be owned very just Reasons why we can't reach to a comprehensive Knowledge of any one Body or Substance whatever: But after all, the Knowledge we have is not the less certain for the defect of that Perfection in it. Tho Mathematicians have form'd abundance of Propositions about Lines, Angles, Figures and Numbers; and natural Philosophers about single Qualities in Bodies; yet neither one pretend to have discover'd all the Properties of them, and the infinite Relations and Proportions they have to each other; nor the other have found the Cause so much as of one single Quality whatever; and yet that does not hinder but that the Knowledge they have attain'd is true and certain. Neither can I yet see why that Knowledge we have of Substances should be deem'd less certain or true; for so far as I can yet perceive, all the difference arises from my Author's own Fancy, that all general Names must have abstract complex *Ideas* in the Mind answering to them, and that because we have (he thinks) more complete *Ideas* in the abstract of Lines, Angles, Figures and Numbers than we have of Substances, therefore our Knowledge of them is more certain than of Substances. But if it be true, (as I think

it is) we have no abstract general complex *Ideas* at all of Lines, Angles, Figures, Numbers or single Qualities, nor indeed of Substances, but single absent and visible, then the Knowledge of one and to'ther will stand upon the same bottom of Certainty, and all this Obscurity wou'd vanish, if instead of abstract *Ideas* we only said the common Names given them for their mutual Agreements or Relation to us; if instead of talking about the abstract *Ideas* of Man or Gold, for example, we shou'd only call them the common Names of such Substances, the Certainty of our Knowledge of them wou'd appear as plainly as of any thing else; 'tis as clear and certain that which we give the common Name of Man is a thinking Substance, the common Name of Gold is yellow, malleable and weighty, as that White is not Black, that parallel Lines will never meet, or any other Propositions which we are said by my Author to know the Certainty of by Intuition or Demonstration.

C H A P. VII.

Of Maxims.

What is commonly meant by Maxims.

This Author has misrepresented the sense of others about Maxims.

BY Maxims, or Axioms, all People mean such Propositions, whose parts (call'd commonly Subject and Predicate) consist of such general Words as imply the Relation between them is natural or immutable, whether that Relation be of Agreement in affirmative, or Disagreement in negative Propositions; sometimes such Propositions are call'd *Aeterna Veritates*, because the Relation between those things of which those general Words are the Signs, or common Names is immutable; sometimes self-evident Truths, because any one that does but understand the Words, assents to them without Proof or extrinseck Evidence: They are often term'd innate or natural Truths, because known to all that know any thing, without being taught or learn't otherwise than by natural Suggestions or Impressions upon the Mind. Sometimes they are call'd the common Principles of Reason, because they are such as all rational Beings do and have ever agreed in; so that if any Proposition that is not at first plain can be resolved into any of them, they are suppos'd to be sufficiently prov'd, because when so resolv'd they appear to be agreeable to the general Sense of Mankind, and need no farther Proof or Evidence, because they depend upon no Supposition but that of the Truth of our Faculties, which is and must be always made by the Mind in all its Inquiries after Truth, and all its deliberate Acts whatever. This I take to be the common Notion of Maxims or Axioms which my Author to make way for the new word of *Ideas* has industriously blended by representing them as Truths the first known, meaning by Children, and that they are the Principles and Foundations on which all sort of Knowledge is built: In which I think he has misrepresented them. They are said to be *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa* indeed, because the Actions of Children and Ideots seem to be govern'd by them, even before they can pronounce the Words in which they are express'd; and because as soon as they make the first steps towards the examining any Truths which are not plain at first view they discover their influence in all the Acts of Reason and Judgment; and in that Sense only are said to be *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*. Neither do I conceive that any one ever thought them of any great use to confirm Persons in the belief of particular Propositions which they may learn by their Senses. That Person that won't be perswaded that his whole Body is not bigger than his Finger, will not be satisfied by that Axiom, *The whole is bigger than any of its Parts*; because it is a Sign that Person knows nothing, has not common Sense; and therefore in such Cases they can very rarely be of any use, except it shou'd happen that a Person doubt of the truth of a particular Proposition, to convince him by telling it is so in all other Instances whatever, and

to shorten the Discourse by saving an enumeration of other particulars, just as it is in general words, to save the recital of particulars of which those words are the common Names. But the main use of these Maxims is, for the resolving less obvious or more remote Propositions into such obvious and universally acknowledged Principles, and in such cases they may be of singular use, tho not as my Author supposes they are thought for the improving or enlarging our Understandings (for that's contrary to the Supposition of their being universally known) but only to satisfy our selves, or others, of the certainty of those less obvious and remoter Truths. And this use of them my Author himself, and all the World besides makes in all Ratiocinations whatever. Having promised this, it will be easie to obviate all the Objections he has fram'd against them.

II. First then, he attempts (tho he says never any one did before) to shew the Reason and Foundation of their Clearness, Cogency and Evidence, but methinks he begins ill, namely by supposing his own Definition of Knowledge, *viz. That it is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas*. For I don't yet reckon that amongst Axioms; for if that was allowed to be a just Definition of Knowledge, I can't see how the Knowledge of these Maxims or indeed of any other Propositions, can evidently appear. First not these, and to instance in the most common Maxim; *the whole is equal to all its parts*; for what *Idea* I wou'd gladly know has any Man of whole, Parts, Equality abstracted from some individual Body or other which is a whole or has parts, and which are said to be equal. I take those words to be only the common Names of Relation. But have no abstract *Ideas* of them in my Mind and the like; for Cause, Effect, Subject, Adjunct, and all other Names of Relation. I pretend to no *Ideas* of them distinct from the things to which I give those common Names; and therefore if the Evidence of these common Truths must be measured by *Ideas* they'll come short cruelly; for there are no such *Ideas*, they are less than nothing. Secondly, At this rate I doubt we shall find Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge dwindle basely. He appeals to every ones Sense, whether he be not as fully satisfied that the *Idea* of White is the *Idea* of White, and not the *Idea* of Blue, a Circle is a Circle and not a Triangle, as he is that very thing is the same with itself. It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. What is, is. Now to these Questions I answer for my self. I am as well satisfied in the Truth of the particular, as I am of the general Propositions; but in neither of them by the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* only, because I have no abstract *Ideas* at all of White, Blue, Circle or Triangle, distinct from the Bodies of which the Colours are the Qualities, and the Figures the Modes. I am wonderfully well satisfied that a White Body is a White one, and not a Blue one, that a Circular Body is not Triangular; that a Body (suppose) this Paper, is the same with itself, and not the Ink I spill upon it; but I have not the new knack of making any abstract *Ideas* of White, Blue, Circle, Triangle, same, different; they are only the common Names which I give things upon my Perception of their Agreement or Disagreement with themselves or other things. All the Evidence I have that these Propositions are all equally true is from my natural Senses or other Faculties; and those Senses and Faculties I always and unavoidably suppose true: And tho my Author will not allow that the Knowledge of the Existence of things without us, is certain Knowledge, because forsooth we have no adequate Knowledge of any thing but only of our own Thoughts or *Ideas*; yet for my part I think my self as certain of things without me as of my own Existence, or of the Existence of my own Thoughts; and not only so, but that I shou'd not be able to satisfy my self of my own Existence or of my own Thoughts, if I did not suppose the Existence of things without me. But my Author must be allowed the favour of making some kind of doubt of the Existence of things without us, because I am very confident that by his Principles, it can never be prov'd, as I shall endeavour to evince in the Chapter for that purpose. His main Objections against these common Maxims are these Four. 1. *That they are not the Truths the first*

The certainty of the maxims or any other Propositions not known by *Ideas*.

known.

known. 2dly, That on them other parts of Knowledge do not depend. 3dly, That they may serve to prove contradictions. 4thly, Their Application dangerous to complex Ideas.

The Authors
Remarks upon
Maxims ex-
plained and
answered.
His first Ob-
jection an-
swered.

As to the first, it must be own'd, these Truths are not the first known to Children, in that Sense especially wherein my Author means, namely that the Terms wherein they are expressed are first known. 'Tis great odds, I confess, that they know Pleasure and Pain, Hunger and Thirst, Warmth and Cold, before they know their Names or form Propositions about them. However I guess they don't in their Minds play with the abstract *Ideas* like Babies, before they know that Pleasure is Pleasure, Pain is Pain, and that Pain is not Pleasure, and yet that Knowledge is but that every thing is the same with itself and not another; and when they grow old enough to be Philosophers, they don't need to be taught those Truths any more than they do that their Sucking-bottle is not the Rod, or a Stranger not their Mother; and that's all we mean when we say that such Truths are innate. What my Author says is wonderfully true, that the *Ideas* of particular things are first in the Mind (if he mean the Thoughts of single Objects) and that Children by slow degrees proceed to general *Ideas* (if he mean to more Objects.) But if he mean any more by general *Ideas*, then I confess on this side of the Country Children go on cruel slowly, for they never grow to the maturity of having general *Ideas*, as long as they live; but if by general *Ideas* he means only general Names, they are like other People, give general Names as fast as they can, learn wherein Individuals agree or disagree with others. Nay, my Author himself tho' a great Mathematician, seems sensible how hard it is to form the general *Idea* of a Triangle; for it must neither be oblique, Rectangle, Equicrural, nor Scalenum; it must be all and none of these at once; from whence this Corollary will fairly be infer'd; that there is no such general or abstract *Idea* possible to be formed; for he that can form the *Idea* of a Line that shall not be a particular Line, of an Angle, but shall be of no particular sort; of a Figure, without a determinate kind; of an Animal, and yet of no particular Species, or of a Species without an Individual, shall pass for a sight and get more Money in the Country than an Unicorn with many Horns. For we look upon these only as common Names of several Individuals.

His 2d. Ob-
jection an-
swered.

His 2d Objection, That these Maxims are not the Foundation of all our other Knowledge; and for the instances of Knowledge which he gives he is infallibly in the right. Is it impossible, he asks, to know that One and Two are equal to Three; that the *Idea* of Yellow is not the *Idea* of Blue without resort to these Maxims; that the whole is equal to all its parts and the same thing is not another? I answer if he be satisfied in the Truth of his Propositions which are particular without resort to the general ones, as he may very well be, if he trust his own Senses, all is well; but if he be not, then the general Propositions are ready cut and dried to satisfy him that 'tis true in all other things; and therefore if he'll trust to his own, and the Sense of all the World besides, he is upon a safe Bottom; and therefore they are only in reserve for such Scepticks in particular Propositions, as go in the *Ideal* road; because the abstract *Idea* of one Nothing and Two Nothings is neither equal nor unequal to Three Nothings; nor the abstract *Idea* of Yellow, at all different from the abstract *Idea* of Blue, because there is no Relation at all between Nothing and Nothing. He says in his passion against Maxims, they are of no use but to stop Wranglers Mouths, they never put a Man into the Possession of any real Truth, that they only influence *Identical* Predications. Well, but if they stop Wranglers Mouths 'tis something, for that they wou'd not do, if they were not the avow'd Principles of all the World; and as for bringing a Man into any new Knowledge, no Body pretends any more than the confirming them in the old which otherwise they might want; and as for influencing *Identical* Predications, I take it to be a great and just Encomium of them; for all the certainly true Propositions in the World are not clearly perceiv'd to be such till they are resolv'd into such Identity or the Negation of it. All the Demonstrations with which Mathematicians have improved Know-
ledge-

ledge, if they be applicable to real things are finally resolv'd into such Principles ; but if indeed their Lines, Angles, Figures and Numbers be only Signs of *Ideas*, and those *Ideas* be not signs of things that are, were or can really exist in Nature, then they are signs of nothing ; full out as useless as sounds, which are not signs of real and distinct Thoughts in him that makes them : But these Principles are the Connexion or Disjunction of words according to the real and immutable Relation there is between the things themselves of which they are ultimately the signs.

His 3d. Objection is, That these Maxims are so far from improving our Knowledge, that if our Notions be wrong, loose or unsteady, they may serve to confirm our mistakes and to prove Contradictions ; and he pretends to shew how to prove there is a *vacuum*, or no *vacuum*. Thus any one may go to work. He must suppose that Body, Space and Extension are all one *Idea* ; that is, those Three words signifie one thing ; and then 'tis evident that space is Body, or that there is no void space, from this Maxim, *every thing is the same with itself*. Another again must suppose, that Body is the same with Solidity ; or in other words, that the *Idea* of Body and Space are Two different *Ideas* ; and then 'tis as clear on the other side, that Space is not a Body, or there is a *vacuum*, from this Maxim *the same thing cannot be another*. But all this while, there is no fault in the Maxims, but the flaw is in the manner of probation ; for in both Cases the Question is supposed, that which shou'd be prov'd is first granted, and at that rate there is no need of Maxims or *Ideas* either ; and my Author adds, those Two Maxims are of no use to prove the Existence of Bodies, or what Bodies do exist. I think so too, but I never met with such a zealous Quack for those Two, or any other Maxims that said they wou'd cure all Diseases or prove all Propositions. But if there were need of it (tho I think there never can to one in his Senses) I can tell him of a Maxim which will outdo all his *Ideas* in the cure of that Scepticism, unless the Man will neither own the Truth of his own or any bodies else Senses and Faculties, and if in that case he is fitter for a Purge than a Proof, and that is, that every effect must have a Cause ; for since we are as sure of our being differently affected, as of our own Existence, those different Perceptions must have different Causes. But as for *Ideas*, they won't so much as do that job ; for since the *Ideas* are only within our selves, they can have no connexion in Nature with any thing without us, and therefore can never prove their Existence without, supposing that very thing which we wou'd prove, which is my Authors way, as I shall endeavour to evince in the Chapter where he offers to prove the Existence of things without us.

His 3d. Obj.
answered.

His 4th. Objection against Maxims is, that their Application is dangerous to complex *Ideas* ; and he chooses for an Instance, the complex *Idea* of which the word *Man* is a sign. First, he supposes a Child to gain his complex *Idea* of a Man from the sight of his Father, his Servants, Neighbours or Pictures, which are White or Flesh-colour'd ; when this Child sees a Negro, this cannot he says, be a Man, and proves it by this Principle *its impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*. 2dly, Another Person adds to the *Idea* of Man outward Shape, Laughter, rational Discourse, and by this Maxim *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, will Demonstrate Infants and Changelings not to be of Mankind ; and he has discours'd he says with rational Men of that Opinion. A 3d. Person makes up the complex *Idea* of Man, only out of the *Ideas* of Body in general, and the Powers of Language and Reason and leaves out shape ; and this Person will be able to Demonstrate, that a Man may have no Hands, may be a Quadripes, the shape being no part of his *Idea*. And now the Reader will discover as plain as the Nose in his Face, the danger of these Maxims in applying them to complex *Ideas*, or rather the danger of this new invention of complex abstract *Ideas*, which is so fruitful of *Utopian* Monsters. Would not all this have been saved by giving only some different Appellation or uttering the common Name ? What if the Child had said, only this Negro is not a White Man, and then indeed if need, his

His 4th. Obj.
answered.

Maxim which Nature taught him might have proved what he said was really true, that a Black Man is not a White Man, what if the Second Person had been contented with the old Phrase that Infants and Changelings are not rational? What if the Third Person upon sight of a Creature come strait from the Moon, or form'd in his *Ideal* Brain had said this was a new sort of rational Creature, wou'd he have been less wise for not making himself a Creator? The Maxims bred none of these Childish ill natured or wild Inferences; they are all the natural spawn of abstract complex *Ideas*; and therefore notwithstanding all these Objections against Maxims, tho they are not expressly the first known to Children, tho on them does not depend the Evidence for many particular Propositions, tho they may be abused by such as suppose what they should prove as 'tis in all the instances here produced, yet they are of singular use in the ready Proof of such Propositions, as are not discoverable meerly by the Senses, where sensible *Ideas* are not to be had; and that's the utmost we pretend. As for instances, we have no *Idea* of the Air, of Animal Spirits, of God; yet we are as sure there is such a Substance as Air by the sensible effects of it upon our own and other Bodies, as that we have and that there are other Bodies. We have no *Idea* of animal Spirits in the Nerves, tho by our organical and muscular Motions we are as sure of their Existence as of our Hands and Legs which they move: We have no *Idea* of God; yet we are as sure of his Existence by the sensible effects of more Wisdom, Power and Goodness than we find in our selves or any visible Object, as of the Existence of those Objects; and these arguings we resolve into that Maxim *every effect must have a Cause*. But of Cause and Effect we have no abstract general *Ideas*, they are only general Relative Words or Names.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

I. **A**LL Propositions, wherein the Predicate contains no more than what is included in the Subject, are in this Authors account trifling, meerly verbal; tho they may be certain, yet add no right to the Understanding, bring no increase to our Knowledge; and therefore he infers.

II. All purely *Identical* Propositions are trifling, because they are in effect but the Connexion of one word with itself. He that says, *what it is, every thing is the same with itself*, adds no more to his own or the Knowledge of other Persons than he does, that says, *a Circle is a Circle, a Soul is a Soul*; of which sort every Fool that can speak, can make an infinite number; but thereby shew himself no Wiser than a Monkey that shifts an Oyster from one Paw, to another, and back again.

Now it must be confessed, that such sort of *Identical* Propositions don't shew him that uses them, or make another wiser than he was supposed to be before; only directs the attention to what he himself, or the other said, thought, or own'd before in order to the making himself or the other wiser; and this is all the use that any one pretends of such Propositions, where the Predicate is only the Subject repeated; but that is not altogether so insignificant a means to improve Knowledge as my Author wou'd represent it: I presume no one has any Notion, Thought or *Idea* of bare Existence, or of Existence abstracted from the thing itself which exists; and yet all own, that every thing that exists, is something really distinct from every thing else in the World. He therefore that knows the Existence of any particular thing knows what that is which makes him say that it exists, or that it is the same with itself or distinct from every thing else, (otherwise he cou'd not know its Existence) and therefore he knows something and that something is more than nothing; he that knows White is White knows it is not Black, that a Circle is a Circle knows its not a Triangle, that a Soul is a Soul knows it

it is not a Stone or a Block, and he that thus compares one thing with itself knows more I guess than a Monkey does, otherwise he makes no Proposition, for the Words barely repeated are no Proposition at all, 'tis the act of the Mind apprehending that Relation of the thing to itself that makes the Proposition: Not the bare juxta-position of the Words.

III. 2dly. All Propositions where the part of the complex *Idea* is predicated of the Name of the whole are trifling. Or in other words. Where any Name which is more general is attributed to another Name which is less general, there the Proposition is meerly verbal. As, a Man is an Animal, Lead is a Metal: These are reckon'd by my Author trifling Propositions, because he that makes them does but in effect say that whatever thing has the less common Name of Man or Lead, has the more common Names of Animal and Metall. However I cannot see a wise Reason why those Two or any Propositions of that kind, which are innumerable in all Writings and Discourses shou'd be counted trifling, they are verbal indeed, the Predicates are but Explications of the Subjects, but they are not the less instructive for being so. Its possible a Person may have heard the Words Animal and Metall, and understand that the former is the Name of any thing that has Motion Life and Sense, the latter is the common Name of any thing that is dug out of the Earth and that is heavy fusible and malleable, and yet not have heard or understood the Signification of the words Man and Lead. And therefore to such a Person the Propositions are instructive, but thus far indeed these sorts of Propositions are, but trifling when the Persons know or are suppos'd to know what are the Properties of any Individual, or of those things which have a less common or specifick Name, in such Case he shall not need to be told them over again as in effect he is when a more common Name is attributed to them; He that knows all the Properties of those Individuals which have the Name of Man or Lead, shall not need to be inform'd that one is an Animal and the other a Metall; because he is suppos'd to understand them before. However he learns the Signification of the Words and a short way of expressing his thoughts and that is one Method of improving Knowledge.

IV. A third sort of trifling Propositions is when any one part of the Definition of the word defin'd is predicated of the whole, or any simple *Idea* is affirm'd of the complex: Which in common Language wou'd be express'd thus when the common Name of a single Quality is given to the common Name of particular Substances. All Gold is fusible heavy, &c. 'Tis he says but like the Author of a Romance his describing what kind of Animal he means by the word Palfry; be it so, I think that Author wou'd in so doing act very ingenuously, it wou'd be a sign that he was willing to be understood in the Sense of a word he shou'd often use, and some wish my great Author had in the use of the Word *Idea* condescended to imitate so good an Example. These are the Three sorts of Propositions which my Author reckons amongst trifling, and I must confess that what he says of other Mens Writings and Discourses is all true that if all such Propositions (besides them where Words are used unsteadily) were deducted, the Remainder might be put into a Nutshel. For I doubt all Writings and Discourses excepting some in Mathematicks and others, that he thinks might be fram'd in Morality wou'd escape very narrowly, if they were to undergo this severe Test, especially if it were but suppos'd that all Men were equally wise, and every individual Man understood as much as all other individual Men do, and in that Case demonstrative Propositions wou'd come under this Lash. But if that be not suppos'd there are none of these Propositions which are verbal wou'd lose their use but in some Measure become Instructive. However he has given Two or Three Instances (and I wish he had given more) that so we might have understood what real Knowledge is in his Thoughts. His first instance of instructive Propositions is this. In whatever thing Sense, Motion, Reason and Laughter are united, that thing has actually a Notion of God and wou'd be cast into sleep by *Opium*, this he reckons an instructive (not trifling) Proposition, because this wou'd be more than is contain'd in the *Idea* signified by the word Man. But stay a little is a Proposition

None of the 3
sort of Propo-
sitions before
are trifling.

The instances
he gives of in-
structive Pro-
positions are
trifling at that
rate.

position trifling or the less instructive because the Predicate is contain'd in the *Idea* of the Subject? Let every one speak for himself. I confess that I was more instructed from this Proposition of this Gentleman's Gold is soluble in *Aqua Regia* than by either of these Two, tho I suppose that Property to be one of those simple *Ideas* that make up the complex *Idea* of Gold. And tho neither of those Two Properties are contain'd in the *Idea* of Man. But besides if these Two instructive Propositions be a little inverted as every one that has got no farther than *Burgesdicius's* Logicks knows they may, they will by my Author's Rule lose their instructive Virtue. If it be true (tho I know my Author will not allow it to be so) that every Man has a Notion of God, then 'tis the Property of that *Idea* to be form'd in the Minds of all Men. And if it be true (tho I doubt it is not) that every Man can be cast into sleep by *Opium* then 'tis true that is the Property of *Opium* to cast Men into sleep. And with this inverting the places of the Subjects, it will appear the Predicate contains no more than what the Subjects do. So that either these Two Propositions are false and consequently not instructive, or else they come under the Lash of being trifling. Another instance he gives of an instructive Proposition. The external Angle of a Triangle is bigger than either of the opposite internal Angles, and it comes by this Honour (besides its being demonstrative) because 'tis not included in but is a necessary Consequence of the *Idea* of a Triangle, I confess I don't understand what external Angle any Triangle alone has, but I suppose he means that if any of the Three sides of the Triangle be produc'd the Angle made by that produc'd Line and the next side Line will be bigger than either of the inward opposite Angles, that this Proposition is true no body doubts, but if a Man shou'd tell me the sides of a pair of Gallows were wider at top than the sides of the Roof of an House, because the Angles in the Gallows were equal to that which was made between the Side and the Ground, I shou'd not reckon my self much wiser, and yet that Proposition abating the learned Form of Words wou'd be as instructive as that of *Euclid's*, besides tho the Truth of that Proposition is not included in the *Idea* of the Triangle alone, yet 'tis inferr'd from the *Ideas* of the inward and outward Angles compar'd, but adds no more light to a common Understanding than it wou'd be to be inform'd that ordinarily Horses are bigger than Dogs. And therefore if these be instructive Propositions I had rather trade with trifling ones and such in my Author's Account are such as follow.

Such as he
calls trifling
Propositions
of most use.

V. 1. Histories of Nature or of all the observable Properties that are in Minerals in the Air, Water, Fire, Winds, Tides, Currents, Mountains, Rivers, and such like Substances, for such Histories are but Relations of the particular Properties contain'd in the complex *Ideas* their Names stand for.

VI. 2. Histories of all great Actions which have been effected by humane Arts and Contrivance, of the present State, Rise and Decay of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, Wars, Battels, Revolutions, Descriptions of Buildings, Ports, Forts, Engines, Bridges and all sort of other Manufactures, these are trifling Propositions it seems because here will be nothing said but what is included in the *Idea* of those things of which they are said.

VII. 3. The History of the happy and unhappy Consequences of Actions egregiously good or ill, for tho these Consequences are not contain'd in the *Ideas* of the Actions themselves, yet they are but recitals of Effects which have no necessary Connexion in Nature with them, and therefore in my Author's Thoughts are but trifling Propositions in Comparison with Mathematical Demonstrations where every step is by Intuition.

VIII. 4. All Propositions in which the Predicate contains the whole of the Subject (provided it contains no more) or but a part of it, such are verbal and trifling. The first sort are, because they are Identical, the second because they are suppos'd to be understood by understanding the Sense of the Subject. And so all complete or partial Definitions of mix'd Modes, fall under this Censure. Justice is giving every one his right; Gratitude is a Branch of Justice. All of this sort,

fort, where the Predication is in abstract, are trifling, because only about the Signification of Words. This is my Author's Account of trifling Propositions. What then I ask will bear this Test, what sort of Propositions will have any Title to promote real Knowledge? Truly I can find none, but such as imply the Agreement or Disagreement of simple *Ideas*, mix'd Modes, such are to be found in Mathematical and Moral Demonstrations, which contain the mutual Habitude or Relation of one abstract *Idea* with another; and I doubt our Knowledge of such Propositions will easily lie in the Compass of an Epicurean Atome. The *Idea* of a Thought without the thinking Substance or that which is thought on, will take up but little room: Abstract *Ideas* of particular Qualities without their Substances will look very meagre. Abstract *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, tho they have distinct Names, will make but a small Figure; and as for Mathematical Demonstrations of the Relation between Lines, Angles, Figures and Numbers, if they be only in *Idea* and neither suppose the real Existence of Bodies or the Modes of Substances, or are applicable to them, they will dwindle into meer Words or Signs of nothing: And therefore all that is counted real Knowledge by my Author will be none at all in the Thoughts of others, and what is commonly esteem'd real by others will be reckon'd trifling or uncertain by him.

IX. In Conclusion my Author says that he can lay down this for an infallible Rule, that wherever the distinct *Idea* which any word stands for, is not known and consider'd, and something not contain'd in that *Idea* is not affirmed or denied of it, there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are not able to attain any real Knowledge. The Sense of which infallible Rule in a Countryman's Language, will amount to this: If a Man talk of any thing, suppose a Cock or a Bull, if he neither affirms or denies any thing that is one of the Properties, Qualities or Accidents which those specifick Names distinctly imply, or attributes that to the Cock, which is proper to the Bull, his Words are meer Sounds, he talks idly. Which is a wonderful Truth indeed, but whether this may not be added to the List of trifling Propositions, if he will not stand by the Arbitration of Countrymen, he may infallibly judge himself.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

I. **B**Efore this Author enters upon the Consideration of Existence, he thinks it proper to preface what he had so often repeated; namely, that Essences of things being only our abstract *Ideas* and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence, gives us no Knowledge of real Existence at all, and from thence he infers that universal Propositions of which we can have certain Knowledge concern not Existence; and that 'tis particular Propositions only that concern Existence, because they declare the accidental Union or Separation of *Ideas* in things existing which in their abstract Nature have no necessary Union or Repugnancy. All which deserves Remark as well as Explication.

II. First then I deny that the Essences of things are our abstract *Ideas*. The Essence of each thing is that in it which distinguishes it from every thing else; the Essence of a Spirit, or that which distinguishes it from Body is its peculiar Powers of thinking and Self-activity; the Essence of Body or that which distinguishes it from Spirit is its filling Space; the Essence of each individual Spirit is its proper Mode of thinking; its several Operations which it exerts within itself not in common with other Spirits; the Essence of every particular Body is its Combination of single Properties and Qualities by which it is distinguish'd from all other individual Bodies, and gains a distinct or common Name according to the Knowledge several individual Persons have of those Properties in which it agrees or disagrees from

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Essences of things don't concern Existence. This explain'd

Essences are not Ideas

The common Sense of the word explain'd in all particulars.

other

other individual Bodies; such are Figure, Bulk, Position, Motion, Rest and Number of all its Particles, from the variety of which all other Qualities are suppos'd to arise. The Essence of every single Mode of a cogitative Substance, is that Mode of Thought or Perception by which its distinguish'd from any other Mode of the same Substance; such as doubting, affirming, denying, perceiving, remembering, judging, loving, hating, fearing, &c. which every one is conscious of within himself, and of the difference between them which he cannot but observe. The Essence of each single Mode of any particular Body, is that which distinguishes it from any other Mode of the same Body, such as Figure, Bulk, Position, Motion, Rest, all which wou'd be in them whether we perceiv'd them or not. The other, commonly call'd sensible Qualities, are only Modes of our Perceptions; such as Smells, Tasts, Colours, Sounds, &c. The Essence of mix'd Actions is the Set or Combination of several Actions of several Agents, and their Modes and Circumstances, by which they are distinguish'd from all others; and the Essence particularly of mix'd moral Actions is their Conformity or Disconformity to the will of superior intelligent Beings. This I take to be the common Notion of the Word *Essence*, with Relation to these Particulars. And if it be true, as I conceive it is, then it follows,

1. That the word *Essence* is only the Name of that which distinguishes one thing from another, which in single Qualities, Properties and Operations, is unknown to us any farther than their different Modes of affecting us gives us Notice. 2dly. That *Essences* of things are not our abstract *Ideas* of them; because there are none such in our Minds, except of visible Substances.

Essences in natural things not made by us.

Essences do concern Existence.

General Propositions concern Existence.

3dly. That the *Essences* of things are not made by us, but only the Names of them, as we severally are capable of knowing them by their Properties or Qualities, in which they agree or differ from each other.

4thly. That Existence is concern'd in the Essence of things, because we can neither conceive Existence without Essence, nor Essence without supposing the Existence of that thing at the instant we conceive its Essence.

5thly. That general Propositions do concern Existence. No Man wou'd say or believe, that the whole was equal to all its parts; that Parallel Lines will never meet, if he did not suppose (tho tacitly he does necessarily) that there are whole Parts parallel Lines in the World; and so of all other general Propositions; they being only the Conjunction or Disjunction of common Names given to particular things, which are by the Mind suppos'd to exist.

Particular Propositions suppose Existence as well as general ones.

6thly. That particular Propositions, tho they do concern Existence as well as general ones, yet don't declare the accidental Union or Separation of *Ideas*, but the real Relation that is between Substances and their Modes or between them and our selves. I do not think or say there is a Sun in the Heavens from my Perception of the Agreement of the *Idea* of the Sun with the *Idea* of Existence; for I have no abstract *Idea* of Existence distinct from the *Idea* of the Sun itself; but I think and say there is a Sun, because I perceive its Heat and Light. The Subject of the Proposition is my self; the Predicate of it is the Sun; the *Copula*, or that which makes me affirm it is my Perception of the effects of it; and so the Relation is real, not in *Idea* only; and the Case is the same in all particular Propositions.

Existence of things is known. But not by comparing *Ideas*.

7thly. Existence is either of our selves, of God, or of things without us. The Existence of our selves is known by Intuition, that is, by the immediate Perception of our own Thoughts; and therefore neither needs or is capable of any Proof; there is nothing middle or between our selves and our Thoughts, nothing so near us as our own Thoughts, and therefore there can be no middle Term to prove our Existence; the Mind alway and inevitably supposes it; and if it did not, no Maxim or other Proposition cou'd evince it, because the Existence of those things which constitute the Parts of that Maxim, or other Proposition, wou'd need to be proved by another, and so *in infinitum*; and therefore this must be look'd on as a *Præcognitum* and *Præconcessum*. In all the Actions of the Mind *I exist* is a Proposition, which every one tacitly makes and supposes; for there is no *Idea* of Existence distinct from himself with which he can compare it

it for the Perception of their agreement; and therefore tho this is Knowledge, yet its not the Perception of the agreement of *Ideas* but of the real Relation there is between a mans self and his own Thoughts; the Terms that constitute that Proposition are the thinking Person, his own Thoughts, and the consciousness of those Thoughts: He that makes within himself that Proposition, *I exist*, does as good as say, I perceive that I exist; the Subject is the Person himself, the Predicate is his own Thoughts (not Existence, for of that he can have no *Idea* or Thought distinct in the least from himself or Thoughts) and the consciousness or reperception of his preceeding Thoughts are the *Copula*; else those Two Words cou'd not be a Proposition. And this I mention, to shew that even that which my Author calls *Intuitive Knowledge*, can't be the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; because in this Case there can be no *Ideas* distinct from the Person himself and his own Thoughts.

VIII. The Existence of God, my Author says, is known by Demonstration, which in that Sense is true, that it may be as clearly known as if it was discerned by the Senses, as Mathematical Demonstrations are.

The Existence of God certainly known, but not by the ways of *Ideas*. Nor of things without us.

IX. The Existence of things without us is known by Sensation. But neither the Exiencce of God or of other things without us, can be proved, I say, by his way of *Ideas* which I shall endeavour farther to evince in the Two next Chapters.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of God.

I. **W**AVING at present what this Author alledges against the innate *Idea* of God, because I have endeavour'd in the first Book to prove, that the Notion of God may justly be esteemed natural (tho not in the Sense he understands the words *Innate Idea*) I shall now contract the strength of his Argument, to prove the Existence of God, and endeavour to confirm it in that part which to me seem'd weak; and then to shew that it will abate or loose its force in being resolved into his *Ideal Principles*.

First he says; Every Man has a clear Perception of his own being. This is plain indeed, and needs no Proof, or is capable of any.

The Author's Arguments to prove the Existence of God:

Secondly, Nothing cannot produce any real being; which I think wou'd ^{better} never be express'd, every real Effect, must have a real Cause, and consequently some thing or other must have been from Eternity. All the World agree (Atheists not excepted) that if ever there was a time when nothing existed, no real thing cou'd have ever after have existed, because there wou'd have been no real Cause to produce it.

Thirdly, It is also evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must have all its Powers and Properties from that other; consequently, that whatever is the source of all being, must be also of all Power.

Fourthly, Every Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge, and consequently there is a knowing and thinking being in the World.

Fifthly, There was a time when no knowing being was, else there has been a knowing Being from all Eternity; and from hence he infers that there is an Eternal, most powerful and most knowing being. But now if it be asked, from which of these Five Propositions that Inference is made, it will not be easie to answer; from the Fourth indeed it may be infer'd, that there have been Men or some such intelligent Beings succeeding each other from Eternity, else the Knowledge they have must have been the effect of meer matter which he cleverly proves afterwards it cou'd never be, but that there shou'd be one eternal Knowing Being, that no one or all those united Propositions carry any Evidence for, and yet that is the main point on which the controversie

turns

The Argument would have all the force with out the going to the Notion of Eternity.

St. Paul's Argument the best.

see

An Objection against it answered

Another Obj. answered.

turns between the Deist and Atheist, if the Deist argues. There is a Cogitative Substance; meer matter cou'd never produce it, *Ergo* there has been a Cogitative being from eternity. The Atheist answers. There is matter or an Incogitative Substance in the World. A cogitative being cou'd never produce it, *Ergo* matter has been from eternity. And therefore so far as I can perceive the Deist and Atheist stand upon even Ground in that particular, because neither of them allow Revelation to be of any force to prove a creation either of Cogitative or Incogitative Substances. So that this Argument of my Authors for the existence of God wou'd have all the force which he afterwards gives it, if it was applied to the present State of the World, and then the Question wou'd plainly be this. Whether from what we daily find in things without us or within us, we cannot rationally infer the Existence of such a being of infinite Wisdom Power and Goodness as we call God. For my own part I dare not be so vain as to pretend that I was ever so much a Philosopher as to try whether I cou'd doubt of the Existence of God or not: Whether it was by the kind Impressions of the Author of Nature or Education I cannot distinguish, but so it was that I always found my self prepossessed with powerful Inclinations to believe it, and as I never found my self uneasie under that perswasion, but rather vastly pleas'd with the comforts it added to all the enjoyments of my Life, and the support it afforded under the misfortunes I met with, that I never thought it worth the while to stemm my natural inclinations with any such demurrs; but if I shou'd have made such an offer which some reckon honourable, I shou'd have gone no farther for an Argument to set me right than that of the Divine Philosophers. The invisible things of God from the Creation of the World are clearly seen from the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead, especially as 'tis managed with the beauty and strength which honest Dr. Scot has given it in his tract about Divine Providence. And that which makes me now to value that Argument above any other, is not owing wholly to the difference I owe to that great Name of St. Paul, but because 'tis the most intelligible, the most universal such as People of all Ages and Places without any teaching may feel the force of, as the World now stands I cou'd as easily believe all the magnificent Monuments of Humane contrivance were made by chance, or made themselves without the help of some thoughtful Being, as that the vast and regular Fabrick of the World and the order of all its parts was made by chance, or preserv'd in Beauty, and repair without the direction of such an Almighty Superintendent as God is. Neither any of those vast Bodies of the Sun, Moon, Stars or Earth, or any of their parts not excepting Men themselves, have any more skill to make themselves, then Stone and Wood have to frame themselves into Houses, and yet we find that they are form'd and preserv'd in order better than all the Artists in the World cou'd contrive, we cannot so much as make a Flye, or a Spire of Grass, and yet we find they are form'd with an unimitable art, if therefore convenient Buildings, Clocks, Watches and Pictures be Demonstrations of a Power and wit in some Agents Superior to unguided senseless matter; why shou'd not the regular Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, equally Demonstrate a Divine Handywork, and the orderly succession of things on this Terrestrial Scene the contrivance of some infinitely wise Director. As for the pretence that all these effects which carry the legible Characters of Wisdom and Power that they are wrought by Nature; 'tis so unphilosophical that it wou'd not be worth mentioning, if it were not common; for if they do not mean the Author of Nature, I wou'd ask what Nature is? Is it any thing but the Powers, Properties or Qualities in things by which they operate upon one another, and thence have the Names of Causes and Effects? And if so, 'tis as rational to say Gravity is the cause of Gravitation, Growth is the cause of Growing, Death the cause of Dying, as to say Nature is the cause of any Effects. I am very sensible, that the introducing or supposing such a Being as God is, there will be many Occurrences in the World which cannot readily be solv'd, because they carry some appearance of an Argument, that Humane Affairs are not conducted by so wise and good a Superintendent

dent as we conceive God is. But when we consider, that all, or most at least of the *Phænomena* in the World depend upon unperceiv'd and remote Causes, why shou'd we expect that the reason of all events which depend upon voluntary and free Agents shou'd be known to us? If we don't know the Cause or Reason of the Flux or Reflux of the Seas Magnetism, no not so much as of the descent of heavy Bodies, tho they are constant, certain and necessary; how shou'd we expect to know the Reason why the Wise and Good Governour of Humane Affairs, permits good Men to be sometimes unhappy and ill Men happy, which often depends on the voluntary actions of free Agents. We don't know indeed, how an infinite Spirit operates in the producing these common effects, no more do we, how our Souls move our Bodies; but for all that we reckon our selves as sure that they do, as of our own Existence; and therefore as all the difficulties we meet with in explaining the Mode of the production of these effects, don't shake our Faith concerning the reality of their Causes: So neither in Reason ought our Ignorance of the Mode of the Operation of God, or other Spirits, make us doubt of their Existence or Operations.

If then there are such numberless effects in the World, as palpably demonstrate the Existence of an Eternal, infinitely Wise, and Powerful Being, the only thing that can remain to be proved is, that this Eternal, Knowing Being is not purely material; and this my Author has evinc'd with great Clearness and Cogency. Suppose, he says, a Pebble or any parcel of Matter to have been eternal, and no other Substance in the World but that, it must and wou'd ever continue a dead or unactive lump, it cou'd not so much as give Motion to itself; or if it had Motion, it wou'd not have power to stop or alter it. Whatever alteration it shou'd undergo, it must have been derived from some other Body or Agent. Farther, if we shou'd suppose both Matter and Motion too from Eternity, whatever changes it cou'd produce, it could never produce Thought or Knowledge; for divide matter into as many parts as we please in order to the spiritualizing it, imagine it in all the Shapes and Figures that Mathematicians have, or can invent Names for, yet they will operate upon other Bodies and each other but just as other Bodies do of grosser Bulks; they'll but knock, impell and resist one another just as greater Bodies do; but will be as far from producing Thought or Knowledge, as they. So that if we suppose either nothing first or from Eternity, then Matter could never begin to be for want of a Cause to produce it; if we suppose Matter first or from Eternity then Motion could never begin to be, because Matter, as such, has not Power to give itself Motion. If we should suppose both Matter and Motion from Eternity, they could never produce Thought or Knowledge; all they could do would be only to begit variety of Motion in the several parts, but could produce nothing to perceive that variety. Beside, if we supposed Matter to be the first cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal infinite knowing being; but as the parts of Matter are divided, there would be an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative Beings independent upon each other, of limited Power, and distinct Thoughts, which cou'd never produce that Order, Harmony and Beauty, which is observed in the several parts of the Universe.

This Author's Argument to prove that matter cannot think or produce thought explained.

This argument unanswerable.

II. For the farther evincing that this eternal Thinking being is not, or cannot have been Matter, he says, if it was Matter, it must be all Matter, one Atome or a System of Atomes. It could not be all Matter, for then every Particle would have been cogitative and sensible, which is contrary to all Experience. Beside, there would be as many eternal thinking Beings as there are actually divided parts of it. 2dly, It could not be one Atome or individual Particle; for if that alone was eternal, then by the power of Thought it must have produced all the rest; and then those, against whom he argues now (the *Hobbiſts*) must quite their Axiom, *ex nihilo nil fit*, and allow the possibility of Creation by the power of Thinking, both which they deny. Or if all other Particles of Matter were eternal, then they would have been equally capable of the power of Thinking; for Matter, as such, is equally capable of any Figure or Motion, or any other imaginable

This farther cleared.

ble quality to fit it for the exercise of that Power. Whence therefore one or more Atomes should have that Preeminence above all the rest (without a wise Author, he means distinct from them) is altogether unaccountable: Nor 3^{dly}, could that eternal knowing being be any certain System of Particles of Matter, whether at rest or in motion; if at rest, it could have no power to act upon others; if in Motion, then Thoughts would wholly depend on Motion, and those Thoughts would be unavoidably accidental and limited, since all the Particles which make up this System being each of them without Thought, they could not regulate their own Motions, because the Thought would not precede the Motion, but the motion would precede the Thought, much less could they regulate the whole. All this I have the more largely set down; because, to my apprehension the force of this part of the Argument equally proves that the Souls of Men are immaterial, as that God is.

The force of
the Argument
put into a Syl-
logism.

The substance and design of my Author's Argument for the Existence of God may be contracted into this short Syllogism. *There is a Cogitative Being: Matter and Motion could never produce it; therefore there has been a Cogitative being from Eternity.* The Major Proposition needs no Proof; because every one is conscious that he thinks, the Miner Proposition he has fully proved: The only weak part of the Argument (as I intimated before) lyes there, that tho any Man may from the consciousness of his own Thoughts fairly infer there has been some Cause or other to produce himself and other Men, and make them such knowing beings as they are, yet it does not thence follow, that there was but one Cause; for there may have been as many as there are intelligent Beings, and have produc'd each other by Generation, and so in a perpetual Succession from all Eternity, unless special Revelation should be allowed a good conviction to the contrary, which my Authors Principles will by no means admit. And therefore I thought this Argument would be valid without going so far as Eternity to confirm it. But then, I confess, it must be upon supposal both of the Truth of our Senses, and the present regular frame of the World, which my Authors pretence to an *Ideal* Demonstration must not allow. But supposing, that the Argument would be unanswerable. *The Notion of God is of a self active, infinitely wise and Powerful Being. This Notion we cannot attain from any thing we find in our selves, or in any sensible things; therefore it must be the effect of some Cause superior to us or them.* The Major Proposition is by all own'd to be the true Notion of God. The Minor (which is the only Proposition that can need Proof) my Author has cleared by demonstrating that Matter of whatever sort, or however modified, could neither produce Thought nor the several regular effects in the World which need Thoughts to produce them; and so 'tis resolved into that of St. Pauls in the words cited by this Author for that purpose.

And is unan-
swerable upon
supposition of
the truth of
our Senses and
other Facul-
ties.

The effects of
Wisdom and
Power in all
parts of the
World con-
firm it.
Explained
how.

This Author has indeed elsewhere said that we gain this *Idea* or Notion of God by multiplying the Perfections we find in our selves *in infinitum*; such as Existence, Duration, Knowledge, Power; now, we can multiply as often as we please; 'tis a Natural Faculty; 'tis but the repetition of our own Thoughts; but we never apply it to particulars without a distinct Reason; we should not think or say that the Sands on the Sea Shore, that animate or inanimate Bodies were innumerable, unless they did appear so to us; and therefore the true and only reason we multiply these Perfections which are in our selves in less Degrees and Numbers, and ascribe them to God, is because we find there are numberless Creatures in the World, and each of them have such marks of Wisdom in their actions as we cannot comprehend; and these effects being taken notice of by us, are our reason why we believe there must be a Cause in which those Perfections are, which enable it to produce such effects. The most familiar way that I can express my own Sense in this matter, is by such instances as these; we have no *Idea* of our own Souls, nor of the Air immediately, they don't affect us as other Objects do that are visible, and of which in the proper Sense we may be said to have no *Ideas*, but only by the effects, by the Thoughts of the Soul of which we are conscious within our selves, and by the effects of the Air upon our own or other

other Bodies; but yet we are as sure there are such things within us, which we call our Souls, and such a thing without us, which we call the Air, as if we did immediately see them: And so tho'tis not by *Ideas*, yet 'tis by a rational Inference from the Effect to the Cause, that we believe there are such Substances. Thus, tho we don't immediately see God, or in that Sense can be said to have any *Idea* of him, yet we see and feel such Effects of Wisdom and Power in our selves, and in an infinite number of other Creatures, that we may be as fully convinc'd of his Existence, as if we did immediately see him. Animate and Inanimate Creatures are made every Moment with an unimitable Art; answer the several ends of their Production, move and act as if some wise Contriver directed them and superintended the whole Scene of their Actions; but neither we who are upon Earth, the superior Order, or any one of them, know the Manner so much as of one Transaction; and therefore we have all the Reason imaginable to believe there is a Being that has all the Degrees and Kinds of Perfection that are necessary to produce such regular Effects; for otherwise there wou'd be Effects without Causes; or, which is the same, there wou'd be Effects without a Cause of proportionable Power to produce them. To all this it may be added, that the Powers of our own Minds are such as evidently demonstrate that they are of nobler Extraction than the most refin'd Matter can afford; we are conscious that we have such Powers of Imagination, that we can carry our Thoughts in a manner over the whole World in a few Moments; that we can remember most of the grand Passages of our whole past Lives, and receive Objects how distant so ever, in Place how contrary soever, in their Qualities; we can meerly by a natural and uninfluenced Power of our own Minds, create new Motion and communicate it at our own free choice to our own and other Bodies within certain Bounds; and as these Powers of Imagination, Retention and Self-activity exceed all the Powers of the most exalted Matter, and are even contrary to the Rules and Measures which Bodies do and must observe, so they fully convince us that we are made of a diviner Substance than senseless and blind Matter, and are the natural Of-spring of that Originally Self-active, Eternal, Wise, Powerful Soul of the World, whom we call *God*.

The Powers of our own Minds evince that they are not matter.

But as for the Mode or Manner how this Eternal Author of Nature created, or does create Matter or Motion, Spirit or Thought, we do not pretend to penetrate. And 'tis no wonder we shou'd be ignorant of the Mode of Creation, since after all our Researches we are of the manner of the Production of the most familiar Effects we meet with. But as the want of Knowledge of the Mode of those Productions don't hinder us from believing they have real Causes, so in Reason ought not our Ignorance of the Mode of Creation or Preservation shake our Faith concerning the real Existence of such a Cause, as has, and everlastingly had Power to effect them. But how cogent or demonstrative soever this Argument for the Existence of God may be suppos'd, yet I think my Author has done well in not making use of his Ideal Phrase in the Management of it. He says indeed, in one of his Letters to the late Bishop *Stillingfleet*, that he wou'd the use of the word *Idea* in this Argument, on purpose to let it in to Mens Minds by common Words and known ways of Expression. But I doubt a better Reason may be given, and that is, because it wou'd have spoil'd and utterly enervated the whole Argument; for how true and plain soever any of those Propositions are which he advances, yet if he resolv'd into his Ideal Principles, they wou'd vanish or be wonderfully obscur'd and made doubtful, if possible; as will appear if we go over the Particulars.

The force of every one of his Propositions enervated by resolving them into *Ideas*.

The first; that every Man has a clear Perception of, and inevitably is convinc'd of his own Existence, no Body offers to doubt; but if that Proposition *I exist* was brought to the Ideal Test, I know not how it wou'd bear it. What *Idea*, I wou'd gladly understand, has any one of Existence in that Case in the least distinct from the *Idea* of himself existing; Bare Existence procures no *Idea* or Thought whatever; to exist and not exist is all one to the Mind, if it does not perceive

His first.

perceive something in that thing which does exist. The Reason why any one is inevitably convinc'd of his own Existence, is because he is immediately conscious of his own Thoughts; but of those Thoughts he can have no *Idea*, because they neither agree or disagree, are like or unlike one another, but as the Objects or Causes of them agree or disagree. If the Mind cou'd be suppos'd to have but one continued Thought, it cou'd not so much as perceive its own Existence; and therefore 'tis the Agreement or Disagreement of a Man's own Thoughts which arises from the variety of Causes or Objects that satisfies him of his own Existence, and not the Agreement of the *Idea* of himself with the abstract *Idea* of Existence, for of that barely he wou'd have no *Idea* or Perception at all.

His second.

His 2d Proposition is; *Nothing cannot produce any real Being*. How again can this be made out by the way of *Ideas*? Is there any *Idea* of Nothing in any Man's Mind? There is no Disagreement can be conceiv'd but between things really existing, or suppos'd to exist at that instant the Mind makes the Comparison; as in all negative Propositions. This Paper is not this Ink. The Mind supposes them both really existing at that instant it makes the Proposition. There is no Disagreement in *Idea* between Something and Nothing, between Paper and no Paper; because no Man can have any *Idea* of no Paper; if he has an *Idea*, it must be an *Idea* of something; tho every one therefore is fully satisfied of the Truth of that Proposition, yet it's not by Perception of the Disagreement between the *Ideas* of Something and Nothing, but of the real Relation there is between a Cause and its Effect. The Mind can indeed by its natural Power easily suppose any Cause to suspend or withdraw its Efficacy, and by its natural Powers perceive, where there is no real Cause operating, there can be no real Effect; but by this Instance it may appear there are Principles of Reason, where there can be no Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; for Nothing is the Negation of all *Ideas*.

His third.

3dly. He says 'tis evident, that *what had its being and beginning from another, must have all that which is in and belong to its being, from that other*: 'Tis a true and evident Proposition all the World confesses; but 'tis an Identical one, and therefore by his Principles trifling; for Being and Existence is one and the same to the Mind, with the Properties of the thing existing; and therefore I deny, that the evidence of the Truth of that Proposition is from the Perception of the Agreement between the *Idea* of Being or Existence, with the *Idea* of the Properties and Powers of the thing existing. Has any Man the *Idea* of the Sun, Candle or Fire, antecedent to, or in any way distinct from their Light or Heat; and if that be not so, then the *Ideas* or Perceptions of Existence, and the Properties and Powers of the thing existing, are but one *Idea*; they are the same to all Effects and Purposes, they begin and end together; and therefore 'tis but an Identical Proposition in the Mind's Account; 'tis just as if one shou'd say, *what has its beginning from another, has its beginning from another*, and therefore the Knowledge of the Truth of that Proposition is not the Perception of the Agreement of the *Ideas*, because they are in effect but one *Idea*; 'tis but connecting one thing with itself, and that which makes it to be a Proposition is the Minds comparing that thing with itself, as 'tis in all certainly true affirmative Identical Propositions.

His fourth.

His 4th Proposition is, *Every Man finds himself in Perception and Knowledge*. 'Tis true he does so; but not by the Agreement between the *Idea* of himself and the *Idea* of Perception or Knowledge; because he can have no *Idea* of Perception or Knowledge distinct from the Knowledge or Perception itself; to know or perceive, is all one with having an *Idea*, unless *Ideas* be something that is neither in, or out of the Mind; if it be in the Mind 'tis all we mean by the word Knowing or Perceiving; if out of the Mind, the Proposition is false; for nothing can be said to be perceiv'd or known till notice is taken of it by the Mind, and when 'tis

'tis there, 'tis nothing but Knowledge, Perception or Thought ; but of that there is no abstract *Idea*.

His 5th Proposition is. *There was a time when there was no Knowledge, or else there has been Knowledge from all Eternity.* All right again ; but how, I ask, shall a Man gain the Knowledge of this Truth by the way of *Ideas* ? For there is no Knowledge either of present or past Time, or of Eternity abstracted from something that is suppos'd either actually to exist, to have been, or to have been from Eternity ; and therefore if we cannot separate the Knowledge of Existence from that of the things that do or have existed, then 'tis the Perception of a real Relation between the things themselves, and not the comparing the abstract *Idea* of one time with the abstract *Idea* of another, because there are no such *Ideas* of Time, they are all pure Nothing : And so the Sense of that Proposition is, that Knowledge (just as everything else) must have had a Cause ; which no Body doubts of, because 'tis a Maxim.

But 2dly. How true all these Five Propositions are is obvious to every one ; but how they are obscur'd and as far as possible made doubtful by being brought to the Ideal Touchstone, is no less obvious ; but if we examine the Argument which they were design'd to introduce, we shall find it, I doubt, scurvily weakned by that way of managing it. But this indeed must be own'd, that if the Atheist goes upon this as his positive Reason for his Belief that there is no God, because Matter and Motion will serve the turn for the solving all the *Phænomena* in Nature ; then the Arguments he uses to prove that no sort of Matter, or however modified, cou'd never produce Thought, or that Order, Beauty and Harmony observable in the World, are altogether unanswerable. But then if the Deist's Reason for the Belief of God's Existence be the Effects which he finds in the Universe, or the Powers in his own Mind, then his Principles will be so far from affording him any Confirmation, that they will rather undermine the Foundation of his Faith, if possible : For first, I wou'd be glad to be inform'd how we can come by the *Idea* of God by these Principles. We are no better framed in the Constitution of our Natures for this *Idea* than any other ; it must be let into the dark Room of our Minds, either by our Senses or Reflexion ; our Senses afford nothing but the simple *Ideas* of Existence, Duration, Number, Figure, Motion and Bulk, &c. And these however compounded or united can produce no *Idea*, but what is the complicated *Idea* of these simple ones, and all these without any Substance, for of that we have no *Idea* in his own Account. And as for the Reflexion, that's but the Mind's gazing upon what is let in by the Windows of our external Organs, that cannot help us, that can't make any *Ideas* more perfect than they were in their Original. Ay, but my Author whispers that the Mind has a Power to multiply or magnifie these simple *Ideas in infinitum*. The Mind finds it has some Knowledge, a present Existence, and some Power, and it can naturally add some Knowledge to Knowledge, Existence to Existence, Power to Power, and so form itself an *Idea* in some Measure worthy of a God ; but I ask my Master what Reason we have by his Principles thus to multiply or magnifie these Perfections we find in our selves ; for if we exercise this natural Faculty in particular Applications without Reason, we shall act like Fools, and be no better than Infidels ; for if we make the numberless Effects in the World which discover the Marks of more Wit and Power than we have in our selves to be our Reason, we go beyond our *Ideas* ; we are corrected in our forwardness to suppose or believe the Existence of things without us ; we are not yet come to that ; we are talking of a demonstrative Knowledge which is before and in Degree above that by our Senses, that's founding Knowledge upon *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*, upon which the foolish part of Mankind have built so many gross Errors ; we must attend only to our clear *Ideas*, and what are they, I ask. The *Ideas*, he answers, of Matter and Thinking ; for they appear so clearly disagreeing that from thence only the Mind may discern an eternal and knowing Being. But, I ask again. If we don't first suppose the Truth

of our Senses, how shall we come by the *Idea* of Matter itself? and if we have not that, 'tis but a poor Employment for the Mind to compare that *Idea* which we have not, with the *Idea* of Thinking, and to fish out thence a Disagreement between them. Beside, if we had got the *Idea* of Matter, what Connexion is there between an *Idea* which is only in the Mind with that which is without it? None at all, if these Principles be allow'd; for there is no Connexion in Nature between *Ideas* and the things of which they are the *Ideas*. The *Idea* of any thing does not prove the Existence of that thing of which it is an *Idea* more than the Picture of a Man proves he is alive; and therefore if we may not either suppose or cannot demonstrate the Existence of Matter by the way of *Ideas*, I doubt the *Idea* of it how disagreeing soever from that of thinking, will not help us to any assurance of the Existence of an ever-thinking Being. Add to this; that it's utterly impossible for us to form any *Idea* of Matter, or indeed of any Substance in general: All *Ideas* are of particular Bodies; how then can we certainly know, that the *Idea* of Matter does not include a Power of Thinking, unless we knew the Powers and Properties of all the Bodies in the Universe? The utmost we can reach to is but knowing that so far as we can perceive no Body has that Power; and that indeed is Argument enough with such as allow the common Maxims and Sense of Mankind for a safe and sure Ground of Belief. But this Author's Principles will not admit of any such Arguments; they have no Connexion in Nature with the things they are brought to prove.

Conclusion.

If therefore, God has contributed nothing in the Constitution of our Minds, as they stand related to our own Bodies and other parts of the Universe, towards the forming any *Idea* or Notion of himself within us, nor any Notion of him can be gain'd by our Senses or Reflexion upon what enters by our Organs, we can neither arrive at any Degree of Knowledge suitable to his Nature, or any assurance of his Existence: But if we suppose the Truth of our Faculties and Senses (as we inevitably do in all our Reasonings) then I confess the Existence of God may be as clearly inferr'd from the necessary Observation we make of the Powers of our own Minds and the regular effects in the World, as the Existence of a Thinking Substance may from the Consciousness of our own Thoughts, and the regular effects of them in all deliberate Actions. And this I always took to be God's own way by which he impresses a natural Sense of his own Existence and Nature upon the Minds of all Mankind; and that all other artificial Arguments are finally resolv'd into it.

C H A P. XI.

Of our Knowledge of Existence of other Things.

Not possible to come to the Knowledge of our own Existence or of God's or any other Proposition, without supposing the Existence of things without us.

I. **I**T's not so easie (I think) as it may be imagin'd, to understand how we shou'd come by the Knowledge of our own Being, the Truth of Demonstrations, or of the Existence of God, without supposing the Existence of things without us. 1. Of our own Being; because we neither have nor can have any *Idea* or Notion of Existence without the thing existing. That which convinces the Mind itself of its own Existence; is its Perception of its own Thoughts succeeding each other within itself; and tho it may not know what those Causes are which produce those Thoughts, yet it cannot forbear supposing there is something or other without itself that does produce them. If we never had more than one continued or uninterrupted Thought, 'tis not conceivable how we shou'd so much as know our own Existence; but being conscious of a Succession of Thoughts within our selves, we are thereby both assured of our own and of the Existence of those things without us which produce that variety of Thoughts. 2dly. As to Mathematical Demonstrations, they are conversant about Numbers or Quantity; as to Number, as the Mind cannot but know that

that the more Thoughts it has had the longer it has existed, so the consciousness it has of succeeding or repeated Thoughts is all the Notion it has of Number, except we speak with Relation to the things Numbered, or the Figures which are the usual signs of Unity or a single Thought so often repeated or supposed to be repeated. And if the Demonstration be about sensible Objects such as Lines, Angles and Figures, the Mind does, and must suppose the existence of those things which it compares, else it could never make Affirmations or Negations; it could never judge Twenty more than Ten, or one Line, Angle or Figure bigger than another, if it did not suppose the Existence of things numerable and Quantities mensurable. Nor 3^{dly}, is it conceivable how one should be convinced of the Existence of God without supposing the existence of himself and of other things which should afford him the marks and signs of more Power and Wisdom than he can find in himself or them, which is the first step the Mind naturally takes to the forming all the Notion it can have of God. And therefore I wonder at my Author's Assertion, that the notice we have by our Senses of the existence of things without us, is not so certain as our Intuitive Knowledge or the Deductions of our Reason employed about the clear abstract *Ideas* of our own Minds; for I cannot conceive how we should have either intuitive or rational Knowledge without supposing the existence of things without us, unless there cou'd be Thoughts of nothing or reasoning about nothing; for if we think or know we must think of, and know something, else indeed our Thoughts would be abstract *Ideas* to some purpose, meer Nothings.

II. Since therefore the Existence of things without us is so necessarily supposed in all sort of Knowledge, it must be a singular gallantry to offer the proving the Existence of things without us. However my Author having come off well in the last Chapter in proving that a single Atome could not make the whole World, is so bold as to undertake the proving (tho every Body else thinks himself forc'd to suppose it without proof) that there is something in the World besides himself. But this we must suppose also he does out of a kind design to prevent our being imposed upon by Principles, by *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*; and therefore he is for supposing nothing, proving every thing; and it were to be wished that by his Principles he were able to prove his own Existence or of any thing else. He says indeed, God has given him assurance enough of the existence of things without him; yet I doubt if he had not supposed before he proved the existence of Matter, which surely is something without him, he would have wanted an *Idea* to set against Thinking, for the Demonstrating the existence of God himself; and therefore I am inclinable to suspect that all the very Arguments which he has brought to prove the existence of things without us, will vanish, unless after all his Zeal against Preconcession, he supposes the truth of our Senses, as ordinary People do, which in effect is supposing that which his Arguments were intended to prove. And the Reasons of this my Suspicion will appear by a short survey of his several Arguments.

All the Argument which this Author uses to prove the existence of things without us suppose the Question.

I. He says, 'tis evident several *Ideas* are produced in us by exterior Causes affecting our Senses, because those that want the Organs of any Sense, never can have the *Ideas* which belong to that Sense: A Blind Man, for example, can never have the *Ideas* of Colours. This I confess is notoriously true; but then I ask, how he knows the Blind Man has no such *Ideas*; was it not by his telling him so, or some sensible sign? Then it seems, he supposes the Truth of his own Hearing or sight. But he goes on; the Organs themselves can't produce the *Ideas*; a Man tho he had a mind to it, can't see Colours in the dark, nor smell Roses in the Winter, nor tast Pine-Apples without going to the *Indies*. All this is right again; but if he be for proving, I must take the liberty of denying; for I will be so bold as to say, that a Man may see Colours in the dark, smell Roses in Winter, or tast Pine Apples in *England*, unless he'll suppose the truth of his Eye-sight smell and tast; and if he supposes that, he begs the Question again: For without that supposition there could be no Colours, smells or tastes.

His first Argument supposes the truth of his Senses.

II. His

His 2d.

II. His 2d. Argument is; because an *Idea* from actual, and another from Memory are widely different. The sight of the Sun at Noon, the smell of a Rose, the taste of Sugar, are distinct *Ideas* from those of the Sun in the Night, the smell of the Rose and taste of the Sugar, when the Bodies are not actually applied to the Organs. All this is right again to an hairs breadth (tho by the way I don't understand what *Ideas* a Man can have of a smell or a taste when the Objects are absent, tho he may of the Objects themselves so far as they are visible) but still my denying humour comes upon me again; for if he won't confess, as I do, that our senses are true, I will be so obstinate as not to own there is any difference at all between those Perceptions at those different times; or rather, that there are or can be any Perceptions at all. Light, Heat, Smells, Tastes, are meer words, they are but the Names of Perceptions; and if you don't suppose them to have real Causes, there will be no difference in *Idea* but between those sounds, and so the Question is supposed again.

His 3d.

III. His Third Argument is, Because many *Ideas* are produced with pain, which we afterwards remember without the least trouble; the remembrance of Hunger, Thirst, the Headach, are not at all offensive, tho the actual Perceptions were. Ay, but I say there are no such things as those Perceptions, such as Hunger, Thirst, Headach or Pain, unless you'll suppose the Senses true, and that there is a real Cause without us to produce them, and then you run upon the old Rock of Preconception, and that spoils the Argument and makes it useless. Tho Mathematical Demonstrations don't, he says, depend on the Senses, yet the examining them by Diagrams gives great credit to the Evidence of our sight and a certainty approaching to that of the Demonstration. Now, what sort of Demonstration that is which does not depend upon the Senses and suppose their Truth, is hard to guess. 'Tis certain enough, a Man may have *Ideas* of certain Lines, Angles and Figures, and perceive their Relation to each other without an actual Perception of them: But if he could come by those *Ideas* without having ever seen or felt such Modes in Bodies, he must be very Seraphical; and how he could demonstrate that excess or equality so much as to his own, much less to the satisfaction of others, and consequently believe his affirmation thereof to be true without a supposal of their actual Existence, is much more unaccountable; so that the Demonstration in *Idea* does not give credit to the sight, but the sight rather gives credit to the *Ideas*, and satisfies himself and others, that what he thought, agrees to the reality of things themselves; and, as my Author says, it would be strange, that a Man should allow it to be an undeniable Truth, that Two Angles of a Figure which he measures by Lines and Angles in a Diagram should be bigger one than another, and yet doubt of the Existence of those Lines and Angles; and so say I also, and that 'tis much stranger still that any one should allow the affirmation of such inequality to be true, unless he had been informed by his Senses, that there were such Lines and Angles, and at this instant supposed there are such actually existing, so that Mathematical Demonstrations do not only depend upon the Senses, but in every step supposes the truth of the Senses and the real Existence of the Objects of them.

His 4th.

IV. His 4th. Argument to prove the Existence of outward things is, that our Senses assist each others Testimony; the feeling the heat of a Fire assists the sight of it: Right, for the heat could never put us to such exquisite pain by a bare *Idea* or Phantasm, unless the pain be a fancy too: This Argument is just of the same strain with the former, only in this respect weaker, that one greater Rogue comes in for an Evidence of the honesty of a lesser; the feeling of Heat for the truth of the sight of the Flame; I must take neither of their Evidences, there is neither sight of the Light, nor feeling the pain from the heat; they are both cheats, unless you'll suppose the Senses true; and if you do that, there is no need of any collateral Evidence. The Question between us, is not whether Heat, Light, Pain, Hunger or Thirst be meer Fancies, or not; for we that believe our Senses, take those things for the Names of real Perceptions derived from real Causes without

us;

us; but the whole Question is, whether, supposing a Man doubt of the Truth of his Senses, and the real existence of things without him he can satisfy himself by *Ideas*; if he could have in his Mind *Ideas* of Heat, Pain, Pleasure, Hunger, Thirst, distinct from the actual Perceptions themselves, then these Arguments would be ~~put~~ for the proving such *Ideas* real, that they were not the sport of the imagination but had a real Cause without him; for the different effects upon the Mind from the Objects when present, and when absent, would clear the doubt by its comparing the actual Perceptions with the preconceived abstract *Ideas*; but alas! there are no such *Ideas* so much as to make sport for the fancy, excepting the meer words; there are no such latent *Ideas*, no draughts of those Perceptions hanging in the Mind or Brain; they are only the Names of those several Modes of Perception; so that which my Author calls *Ideas* are meer Nothings or meer Words, or the Perceptions themselves; and he can never, I say, prove these Perceptions, have any real Cause without him, because that middle Term, or that intermediate *Idea*, in his Language, will stand as much in need of another Term to prove its own existence, as that does which its brought to prove, and so *in infinitum*. To make all this plain by the most familiar instance. I have now a Pen in my Hand; how shall I prove that I am not deceived in my sight? Shall it be by its Writing, its visible effect? yes; but alas! If I don't trust my Eye-sight in seeing the Pen, why should I trust it in seeing the Letters which are made by the drawing it; and so I am but where I was. Ay, but says my Author, the words you write may produce Thoughts, and a regular succession of Sounds in others that read or pronounce them, and so the Testimony is doubled; this is true indeed, but no more Testimony than I might as well have for the existence of the Pen; for that will not satisfy me but upon supposition, that the other Men's sight and my hearing are true and competent Judges, and so the matter is not the least mended; so that when all is said, the Senses and other Faculties must be supposed true in all reasonings, otherwise no Arguments will prove them to be so; and that's the flaw in all my Authors. And therefore 'tis no wonder he can so sensibly confute the Sceptick he deals with, who pretends that all we hear, feel, taste, see, think or do, is but a Dream; for he supposes the Truth of his Senses, and then refers him to the Tryal, whether the Heat of a Glass Furnace be not more than a Dream; but the Sceptick might easily reply, that if he supposed the truth of his Senses, he must yield it was so; but without that supposal, he could never be convinced there was, or could be any difference between real Perception and a Dream, for he remov'd that which made the difference; but if he went upon that Supposition, then he took that first for granted which he pretended to convince him of by Arguments. Other Folks that trust to the truth of their Senses (except they be prepossessed as they may in some Cases by reason grounded on experience to the contrary) and their own and other Mens Faculties can easily satisfy themselves in the difference between Dreaming they are in a fire, and really being so, by correcting the mistakes of their imagination when asleep by what they find when awake disagreeable to their own and all other Mens Senses. Their own and all other Mens Senses, if need be, can witness the Truth of what they see and feel when awake, but not so much as a Mans own outward Senses or any other Peoples (if not first allowed to be true) can attest what he himself or others have only in *Idea* and in their own Minds. However, according to my Author's Principles in Dreams, a Man's Knowledge is as real as when awake; nay, often his *Ideas* shall be clearer; and therefore a right Dreamer will have the advantage of comparing them better than a waking Man, and may uncontrollably claim the honour of being the most accomplished, the right *Ideal* Philosopher; and he will have that Prerogative above other Men and himself too, when he is so unhappy as to be awake, that he can neither confute himself, nor be confuted by any body else; his own *Ideas* will be the unappealable Judge and Witness too of the true agreement of his clear *Ideas*.

His conviction
of the Sceptick
depends on
that Supposition

The certainty
of our certain-
ty of Senses
the Foundation
of all other
Knowledge.

V. This certainty, my Author says of the existence of things without us, is as great as our present condition requires, which implies, that 'tis not so great as that of the Truth of Propositions which we have by intuition. But I can't yet perceive the least difference as to the degrees of certainty, for I reckon my self as certain that there are White and Black Bodies without me as that White is not Black (the former being an instance of Knowledge by Sensation as the latter is by Intuition) for 'tis not a true or indeed false Proposition that White is not Black, unless the Mind which makes it suppose the real existence of Causes without it, to produce those different Sensations; neither is it possible so much as to form the *Ideas* of Whiteness or Blackness abstracted from some Bodies or other that have those Qualities, Dispositions or Powers to produce them. He that makes that Proposition within himself, means only that such a Body that has the common Name of White, has not the common Name of Black; for the Mind can no more have such abstract *Ideas* of Whiteness or Blackness to compare, then it can have the *Idea* of the Bodies themselves, without those or some other Qualities or Properties; and so it can never compare any one Quality with the abstract *Idea* of the same Quality, but the complex *Idea* of one visible Body with another; but when the Qualities of any certain Body are not visible, all it can do is to compare one Perception with another, and in that Case, if People will stick to the *Ideal* Phrase, to have the *Idea* of any thing, is no more than to have the Perception itself; to have the *Idea* of the sweetness of a Rose, is to perceive it; because there is nothing in the Mind or out of it like it; when in the Mind, 'tis Perception; and that can't be like itself, because 'tis the same with itself, and when out of the Mind, 'tis only a Modification of the Body by which it has power to produce it; but is no more like it than the word Whiteness is like that Perception which the outward Body by Communication of Motion produces in the Mind.

The Testimo-
ny of our Sen-
ses not always
limited to
actual Sen-
sation.

VI. My Author observes rightly, that the Knowledge of the Existence of things without us extends as far as the Testimony of our Senses employed about particular Objects, but no farther; (that is) how probable soever it is that there is a Sun, Moon, Star, other Men, or finite Spirits, yet we can't be absolutely sure of their actual existence any longer than we actually perceive them by our Senses. The reason of which is, because necessary existence is not the property of any finite Being; 'tis the Prerogative of God alone. Or in other words, no finite Being is necessarily such as it is, but depends on the pleasure of its Maker. But God is such as he is, necessarily, depends upon no other being whatever for those Perfections which constitute his Divine Nature; but this must be understood with this Limitation, unless God has by special Revelation declared otherwise; for in such Cases we may be fully assured of the actual existence of things, though we don't actually feel the effects of them; just as we may of future events which in the course of Nature would not occur, because we do and have reason to rely upon the veracity of the Revealer as much as on the truth of our Senses. My Author intimates indeed, that concerning the Existence of finite Spirits and other things, we must be contented with the Evidence of Faith, as if the Evidence of what we believe by Divine Revelation was not so well grounded as that we have by our Senses; but I hope to make it appear in a more proper place, that in such Cases wherein Persons are assured any Proposition was revealed, they have as good reason to believe it, as they have to believe their own Senses; and that the reason why Persons that don't so readily believe what they are assured was revealed, as they do their Senses, is not so much from the difference or inequality of the Evidence, as from their want of attention to that Evidence and dispositions to rely upon the veracity of the Author of Nature.

From the whole Series of this Chapter my Author concludes, they are Two sorts of Propositions knowable; the first are particular ones, which concern Existence, such are these. There are such things in the World as Men, Elephants, Motion, Angels; but this Knowledge he extends no farther than the present Sensation. The 2d sort are general Propositions, which concern not Existence, they being only the Agreement or Disagreement of abstract *Ideas*. Of the former sort I have shewn there can be no Proof upon his Principles, nor indeed by any other, because they don't need it, or are capable of any Proof. They are the *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa* in all Ratiocination. As to the latter sort, he gives this for an Instance; God is to be obey'd by Men; or rather, Men are to obey God. However this Proposition does not, he says, prove the Existence of Men in the World; and in that he is in the right: And I never heard any one pretended that it did, or used it so impertinently. But this I say, which is as bad, that 'tis no true Proposition unless it be suppos'd or proved by him that makes it, that there are both God and Men in the World; for Truth is the Connexion or Disjunction of things really so related, as they are connected in affirmative, and disjoin'd in negative Propositions. He that makes that or any general Proposition, supposes the Existence of the Individuals of which the Subject and Predicate are the common Names. He that says Men are to obey God; the Whole is equal to all its Parts, supposes there are Men, there is a God, there are Wholes and Parts in the World, else the Propositions wou'd not be real Truths; else the only true Propositions that he cou'd make to that Purpose wou'd be, I am to obey God; my Body is equal to all its parts. There are no abstract *Ideas* of Man, Whole, or Parts, they are only common Names, and 'tis the Mind that observes the real Relation between the Parts of any Proposition that makes or believes it to be a true one whether it be general or particular. And in general Propositions the Subject and Predicate are common Names, not abstract *Ideas* or Signs of such, but Signs only of the Minds observing the Agreement between the Individuals which have those common Names. And such general Truths are call'd *Æternæ Veritates*, not (as my Author observes rightly) from their being written all or any of them in the Minds of Men as soon as they are created; that is but a Metaphorical Phrase when used for any thing relating to the Mind; but because they are not wholly acquired by the Senses as other Propositions are, and because the Relation between the Subject and Predicate is immutable. Men are to obey God, is a true Proposition, an eternal Verity, because the Relation between such a Cause as has the peculiar Name of God, and such an Effect as every individual Being which has the common Name of Man have such an immutable Relation to each other that Obedience is due from one to the other. The Whole is equal to all its Parts, is an eternal Truth, because whatever Body has the common Name of Whole, and whatever Bodies have the common Name of Parts have such an inseparable Relation to each other, that one may be denominated equal to all the other. But the Perception of this Relation between the parts of these or any general Propositions, is not from the abstract *Ideas* of their Parts compar'd; because there can be no abstract *Ideas* in the Mind of those Parts of God, of Man, of Cause or Effect, of Whole or Parts; these are only the peculiar or common Names of Substances, but from the Minds observing the Individuals so immutably agreeing: And such Propositions are often call'd innate Truths, because every one that perceives any thing, perceives their Relation to be such as is express'd in them, and shall not need to be taught them as in other Truths; he shall need only to know the meaning of the Names to procure his assent to them; nay, tho he never learn the Names (which is the Case of the Deaf and Dumb) yet he will unavoidably form them in his Mind, and take his Measures accordingly in all his Actions.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

The use of
Maxims not
rightly repre-
sented by the
Author.

I. **I**T has been, says my Author; the receiv'd Opinion amongst Men of Letters, that Maxims were the Foundations of all Knowledge; and that the Sciences were each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from which the Understanding was to take its rise. But the Occasion, he thinks, of this gross mistake, was the good Success that Men found in Mathematicks, wherein they perceiv'd others attain'd to great Degrees of Knowledge, and with that peculiar advantage of Certainty, Clearness and Evidence; whereas he says this Advancement was not owing to the influence of these Principles, but to the clear distinct complete *Ideas* their Thoughts were employ'd about. Now, I am apt to think, that the Men of Letters he means, have no such wild Concepts concerning the Influence of the common Principles of Reason; for I never met with one that was so fond of them, as to own, that all the Knowledge he pretended to in Mathematicks or any other Science, was the sole Product of those Maxims; all the help from them was but to expedite his Attainments, and to analyze his Knowledge of other Truths which were not so obvious, whose Certainty was not discover'd so readily into these Principles, and thereby satisfying himself that when he had so done, he had sufficiently prov'd them, because he cou'd then appeal to the concurrent Sense of all Mankind, and relyed upon nothing but the Truth of his own and all other Mens Faculties; for the Truth is, these general Maxims are no other than Identical Propositions or Negations of Identity; and that is it which makes them so clear, Self-evident and undeniable; for when a particular Proposition is Identical, its as clear as one of them; the Sun is a luminous Body; Two and Three are equal to Five; are as clear Propositions as those Two, every thing is the same with itself, and all the Parts are equal to the Whole: For the former Two Propositions are only Connexions of things within themselves, as they may be differently express'd in Words, just as the Two latter are; there is no more said in the Predicate than what is suppos'd to be included in the Subject. But still this Clearness or Self-evidence is not owing to the Perception of the Agreement of abstract *Ideas*; for there is no *Idea* of Whole or Parts (unless we speak of particular Bodies) nor of Two Three or Five (unless we mean our own Thoughts repeted or something else number'd) nor of every thing, unless we mean some particular Substance or Mode; so that the clearness of Self-evidence of any Proposition is its being Identical or a Negation of such Identity, and the Perception of its Relation to itself, how differently soever represented in Words; and all ~~the~~ Mathematical Demonstrations, are nothing else but Chains, every link of which is an Identical Proposition; so that tho these common Maxims don't improve our Knowledge directly, yet they serve the Mind in its Inquiries for these Two great Purposes; first, to satisfy it of the Certainty or Uncertainty of several Truths that are propos'd to it. Secondly, to expedite the Assent without running so great a length as the enumeration of many Particulars wou'd require, of which the Terms they consist are the common Names, and so in that respect they serve for the same Purpose that general Words do, to save the enumeration of Particulars.

The Author's
Questions
about the use
of Maxims an-
wer'd.

II. For the proving the Insignificancy of these general Maxims, my Author asks these Two Questions. Can't a Lad be convinc'd that his whole Body is bigger than his Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, that the Whole is bigger than its Part? I answer, yes; and the Reason is, because 'tis but the Negation of Identity, 'tis just no more than if he said the Finger is not the Body, or the Part is not the Whole. And he asks again, whether a Country Wench can-
not

not know that having receiv'd one Shilling of one that ow'd her Three, and another from one that ow'd her Three that the remaining Debt is equal without knowing that if you take equal from equal the Remainder is equal: I answer she might without ever having heard of that Maxim, but the Reason is, because One and Two are the same with Three; and so 'tis but knowing that every thing is the same with itself, and so 'tis but Identical as the general Proposition is. And tho the Lad or Girl might never have heard the Maxim express'd in Words, yet they might know them and govern their Actions by them just as Deaf and Dumb Persons do, who tho they never heard a Word, yet form them in their Minds as we perceive by their Actions as well as if they told us so. And that's the difference between the general and the particular Propositions, the Lad and the Girl knew the general Propositions as soon as they did the particular ones; but that Knowledge they cou'd not acquire by their Senses, as they might the others, because they cou'd never know all the Particulars by any of their Senses; but I deny that the general Propositions were made by the comparing the abstract *Ideas* with one another, because there are none such of Whole or Parts, they are but the common Names of single things; but those Names may be conjoin'd or disjoin'd without knowing all the Particulars as safely as if they were known, because the Relation between the parts of the Propositions is immutable; and tho indeed they are but verbal Propositions, yet they are in that but like other general Propositions, because nothing is general but words, but are not the less real Truths for that, because the Mind which makes them, supposes the real Existence of the Particulars of which those Words are the common Names, whereas if they were made only by the Connexion of abstract *Ideas*, they cou'd be no real Truths, because there are no such abstract or general *Ideas* in the Mind answering to them.

To what my Author says concerning the danger of relying upon Principles that are not founded upon, or in Reason, I readily subscribe; but the Instances he gives are wide of being such as all Mankind do or ever have agreed in, such as these. That all the World is Matter. That the whole World is God, the Æther God, the Sun God; Happiness is our only bodily Pleasure, Right and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest are only defin'd by Laws.

The Author's Representation of the danger of Principles not fair.

But yet such Propositions as these have had their Authors; but if admitted for Principles wou'd make odd Systems of Theology and Morality. But it will become the Caution of Inquirers after Truth to consider whether it be not as dangerous to go upon such Principles as will disettle our Belief of all Truth, as on such as will lead us into Error. Such as these, that the Author of our Natures has contributed nothing in the original Frame of our Minds to dispose us to the Belief of his own Existence, but left us at Liberty to gain all the Knowledge we have of him to the accidental Impressions that are made upon the Organs of our Senses; that there are no Laws of Nature but what every single Person makes to himself by his own arbitrary Combination of single Actions; that Virtue and Vice are not fix'd, but Names only of a Set of Actions agreeable to the humor of our Country or Familiars: That finite Spirits may be only thinking Matter; for tho such Principles may not lead us into Error, yet they may into the doubting of all Truth: They cannot indeed, if allow'd, lead us into Error, because Error is the Connexion of things really disjoin'd, or Disjunction of things really connected; but which is as bad, they may lead us into doubts, whether there be any such things as real Truth or real Error, real Good or real Evil; and that they are only Names of Distinction for the convenience of understanding each other in Conversation.

'Tis as dangerous to deny all Principles as to embrace false ones.

IV. Instead of owning any Principles of Reason, my Author proposes this Method to get and fix in our Minds clear distinct and complete *Ideas*, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant Names. And thus, he says, without any Principles, but barely thus considering those perfect *Ideas*, and comparing them one with another we may get more true Knowledge than by

The Author's Proposal for gaining Certainty without any Principles examin'd.

'Tis either the
old Method in
new dress, or
needless.

taking up Principles, and putting our Minds into the disposal of others. Well, but let's do nothing rashly, before we lay by those Principles of Reason, in which we and all the World are agreed in, let's first understand what this new Method means; for if it be new we may happen to be cheated; if the old Method, as I suspect it is a new Dress 'tis almost as hard to understand this Language as 'tis to improve ourselves in real and useful Knowledge. First then, I suppose he will own there are clear distinct and complete *Ideas* to be had of single Qualities as they are commonly call'd and of mix'd Modes, because our Knowledge of them is in Effect but knowing of our own single and mix'd Thoughts and the Objects that produce them. And as to single Qualities, I ask how we can improve our Knowledge of them; is it by gaining new *Ideas*? That's impossible; for we can have no *Ideas* of other Smells, Colours, Tastes, Sounds, tangible Qualities, Figures, Bulk, Motion, Rest, than what our Senses have or may afford; what is it then we may hope to gain by this new Art? Why we may get the Knowledge of the several Modes, Kinds and Degrees of those single Qualities, of their Mixtures, Relations to and Operations upon each other. All this I grant is very true; but if this be the meaning, this is the old Method; for I never met with any yet that pretended to improve their Knowledge of these Matters without inquiry after them, and observing the several Relations which either Substances or any of their Modes have to each other. As for mix'd Modes, such as Battels, Processions, Triumphs, Revolutions in Church or State, I am a Stranger to any Art of improving our Knowledge of them, but the observing and remembring the several Agents, their antecedent and consequent Actions, their several Powers, Inclinations, the Time, the Place, and all other Circumstances which concurr'd in particular Instances, and to compare them with others that have such common Names. And as for moral mix'd Actions, I cannot apprehend how we can improve our Knowledge in them but only by observing the several Actions and their Modes which make them conformable or disconformable to the Will of our Superiors, whether God or Men, and the constant and more usual Effects or Consequences of them for the promoting or hindring the general Happiness of Mankind; and if this be all my Author means, this is the old Method in a Mask. Well, but surely my Author's Thoughts run higher and finer by abundance, else he wou'd not talk of Demonstration in Morality, as well as in Mathematicks. Of this he has given us no Specimen, and therefore till he please to oblige Mankind with a reform'd Method we must be contented with the old one, which I always took to be this.

The old Method of gaining Knowledge in Moral Matters explain'd.

First, a fair Enumeration of the several good or evil Consequences, both personal and publick, commonly call'd natural good and evil, which in common Course of Providence are annex'd to particular Virtues and Vices commonly call'd moral Good and Evil. As to the Names of those Combinations of Actions, the Signification of them most People understand as well as they do their right Hand from their left. When any one hears the words Religion, Charity, Justice, Intemperance, Theft or Murther, in his own Language, he understands them and can distinguish one from the other as well as he can the Words Gold, Silver, Brass, Iron, Lead, or the common Names of Substances. The only dispute that arises is in the Application of these common Names to particular Actions and the Modes of them, and therein there is and will be wrangling as long as humane Nature is in its present State and under the powerful Influences of Education, Temper of Body, and worldly Interest; and no Definitions of Moral Words, except they have the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments, will stem the Influence of such powerful Impressions. Besides, it's impracticable to enumerate all the Circumstances that may concur upon emergent Occasions, to mitigate or aggravate those Actions for the making them less or more morally Good or Evil. But after all, tho' those natural good or evil Consequences are not demonstratively all certain, yet they do appear so far certain to every rational Person, as to make it highly prudent to practise one and avoid the other; just

just as it is (tho with less promising advantages than in moral Affairs) esteem'd an act of prudence, to hire the Toll of Bridges or Markets, or the customs of Ports for a less value than the usual profits, tho the parties can't be absolutely sure of one Horse, Cart, parcel of Goods or Ship to reimburse their Rent and pay for their care and pains. This case I confess is not parallel to that of Virtue and Vice, because the pleasure of an easie Mind and the pain of an uneasie conscience are sure, and he that don't value that is a Fool, and he that never felt one or t'other, is worse.

2^{dly}. Because those effects of Virtues and Vices are in some measure uncertain in particular instances, the next Method to improve Men in Morality is the confirming them in the certainty of a future Estate in which all the real or seeming irregularities in the present distribution of those effects, commonly called Rewards and Punishments, will be exactly accounted for and adjusted. These are the old ways of improving Persons in the Knowledge of Morality, and a singular Specimen of that way seems to me to be given by a modern Author in his Moral Essays and Remarks upon the abuse of the *English* Stages by Comedies and Tragedies; for tho he don't pretend to an *Ideal* Demonstration, yet he has set all the Virtues and Vices he treats of in all the Light which solid Learning, strong Reason and an unaffected Beauty of Style could well give them. But as to my Author's new Demonstrative Knowledge in Morality, so far as I am able to guess, it will amount only to the Definition of the Names of Virtues or Vices, which he calls, tho improperly I think, their Essences, and an enumeration of the several actions (which he calls the simple *Ideas*) which constitute the complex *Ideas* of which those Names are to be the common signs, which seems a work in a great measure needless, because almost every honest Countryman, tho he can't dress his Expressions in Courtly form, knows almost as well as he does the Fingers on his Hand. But if that be all the advantage it may learn us indeed, if every one was bound to follow the example to understand one another in discourse, but not advance us one step to the Knowledge of the good or ill effects of those Virtues or Vices, or how to apply those Names to particular Instances, which seem to me the only genuine Methods of improving People in Christian, that is, complete Morality.

His 2^d. way of improving Persons in morals.

V. As to the clearness to which Mathematical Demonstrations arrive I conceive as they relate to Lines, Angles and Figures, it's owing to these Three advantages which morality can never attain.

I. That the Objects of the Mathematicians Thoughts are visible, such as every one that has Eyes, presence of Mind, and a tenacious Memory is a Judge of; for 'tis easie to observe that when a Line or Figure alters its inclination insensibly, that then the Mathematician is puzzled, why can't he else demonstrate the proportion between a Square and a Circle, as well as between a Square and a Triangle; both are equally plain Figures to the Eye; but the inclination of the Arch of a Circle varying insensibly and in every point differing from the antecedent and consequent points, the alterations of the proportion become endless; and therefore whatever their pretences may be to abstract *Ideas*, yet the Objects of their real Thoughts are only what is visible and regular too: For if the Figures be not regular, they are as much put to it to state the excess of irregular Bodies to each other, as other Men, and content themselves with guesses.

Why the clearness of Mathematical Demonstrations not imitable in morality truly represented.

2^{dly}, That there can be no mixture of Temper of Body, Passion, Education or Interest, in the application to particulars; for 'tis equally the interest of all Men, good and bad, that Numbers, Lines, Angles and Figures have such a Relation to each other as they have.

3^{dly}, That the Names of their Lines, Angles and Figures, so far as they go, are well agreed and settled amongst themselves. This last advantage Morality is in some measure capable of; yet we may observe, that the circumstances of actions vary so infinitely, that it would be almost as impracticable to find different Names for them all, as 'tis to make Names for the different Figures of the Stones in the Streets,

Streets, unless People could prophecy of all future possibilities in the Modes of actions. But suppose a Person such an absolute Monarch as effectually to command the use of Moral Words in the same Sense; it might go a great way 'tis true, but whether it might not be as dangerous to Morality, as it would be to natural Liberty, unless the Person was as good as he would be great, is a greater Question than can be determined; and whether after all, the World would be Wiser, except in words, or better in practice which is all that is valuable, is still a greater Question.

The way of
improvement
in Natural
Philosophy.

Much the same
with that in
Morality.

VI. The method for advancing Knowledge in material Substances, my Author thinks must only be by experience in particulars; and so far as I can yet learn, it must be in all moral mixed actions also; for he that has not observed the particular Actions and Modes of them which are denominated good or evil, and the consequences of them in their several Combinations, will make but a young Moralist or Casuist; he may have learn't the Names of Virtues and Vices by roat, but will be not one dram the really Wiser. Any one indeed may know his own Thoughts, and give them what Names he please; but if his purpose be to improve those Thoughts, or make himself Wiser, I know of no better way than that which I would take to improve my Knowledge in the nature of Gold, Silver, Lead or Loadstones; I would try experiments, if I knew, how upon parcels of Matter that had those common Names, on purpose to find out what effects were wrought in them by other Bodies, and what they would produce in others: Thus I should learn the properties of those Bodies on which the Experiments were tryed, and by Analogy what in all probability they were in others that had all the same sensible Qualities. Why, just thus, if I was minded to improve my self in the Knowledge of the several Actions and Modes of them that went under the Names of Religion, Justice, Charity, Temperance, Murder, Theft, and Intemperance, I would make it my study to inquire and observe as well as I could what set of actions had those Names, and what were the usual effects of them for the promoting or obstructing the private or publick happiness of Mankind, that so I might confirm my self in the observance of one and abhorrence of the other: And this Method, *mutatis mutandis*, would be just the same as in Substances. No, says my Author you must observe the just contrary method to improve your Knowledge in Morality and Mathematicks than you do in Substances; in them experiment may help indeed, but those reach no farther than the individual Bodies on which the Experiments are made. But in Moral and Mathematical matters, you shall need only to compare your clear distinct complete abstract *Ideas* with one another, and thereby may be able to form general Propositions. Well be it so; but you must tell me first how I should get such *Ideas*, for I am sure you don't think they are born and bred in the Mind; but, so far as I can hear, no Body has invented an art to get such *Ideas*, but by their experience in the particular Instances, in which Moral Actions become such as gain them those common Names, or in Mathematicks, in such Individual Lines, Angles and Figures, as have such and such common Names; for as in Mathematicks the Demonstration reaches no farther than the particulars in view except others be commensurate to them, so in Moral Actions nothing can be affirmed more than in a particular instance, except others be in like manner circumstantiated. Beside, if there be no such things as abstract *Ideas*, except of single visible Objects, as I vehemently suspect there are not, for abstract or general *Ideas* sound to me just like Roman-Catholick particular General, then Knowledge in Moral as Mathematical matters must not be gained by comparing abstract *Ideas*, but particulars with other particulars, just as 'tis in material Substances. The way to improve our Knowledge in the Nature of Bodies, is by observing what Powers are found in particulars; and as far as we can, what Figures, Motions, Bulks and Positions of their parts give them those Powers to produce some Effects in other Bodies, and other Effects to be produced in themselves; just so, the method to improve our selves in moral or Mathematical Propositions is the very same; in moral, to observe the good and evil Effects which
such

such actions have in the procuring or preventing the happiness of private Persons or Societies ; in Mathematical, what Relations of excess or equality, such or such Numbers, Lines, Angles and Figures have to each other. So that in plain *English*, my Author's method for the improving Knowledge, *viz.* getting clear distinct and complete *Ideas*, amounts to no more than this, to inquire and observe the several effects of actions called good or evil, the Properties of Lines, Angles and Figures, and compare them with one another ; and that will improve your Minds with complete *Ideas* in Moral and Mathematical Matters ; and this is the old honest way in this new Phrase, and 'tis just the same we must take to improve our selves in Natural Philosophy or the Nature of Substances.

VI. Since our faculties (as this Author observes well) are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick or real Essences of Bodies (that is, all their Properties and the Causes of them) but are to discover to us the Being of God, and our Relation to him, it will be proper to employ them especially on that way which Nature leads us ; because that is every ones great interest to suit his inquiries to those things wherein not only his present, but his eternal interest is concerned. Thus far right honestly and piously. But yet, I hope, since this present Life is a part (tho incomparably small) of Eternity, it can be no breach upon the Rules of Reason or Religion, to make inquiries into the Nature and Properties of Bodies and Spirits, if it were only to have occasion thence to admire, revere, and glorifie our Maker (as he well expresses it) and thereby improve the present comforts of Life ; as far as they are consistent with our main designs, for a more durable and infinitely greater Happiness. So the Question between us is only which is the safest method to improve our Knowledge, which are the most effectual means to make our selves, as far as 'tis possible, always and completely happy ; the Question is, I say, whether its better to take such Principles for granted, which the Author of our Nature has inlaid with the constitution of all our Minds, or to fling them all by and doubt of every thing, and thereby trust only to the fortuitous Impressions which shall be made upon our Organs of Sense, by external Causes and Objects. 'Tis every ones Duty, we agree, to examine the Reasons of his Belief and Actions ; but I always thought that the Author of our Natures had by a kind Anticipation contributed to the forming in us such universal and certain Principles of Reason, by which as a standing Rule we might try particular Propositions and Actions ; for I never thought that perpetual and inextricable Scepticism was a Duty, tho Examination is : 'Tis one thing to examine, and 'tis clear another to go upon such Principles as will leave us no Principles as a Rule by which to make that Examination.

'Tis safer to go upon the common Principles in which all Mankind have agreed than doubt of every thing.

VII. I like very well the cautions my Author gives against relying upon Hypotheses in Natural Philosophy, till we have tryed whether they will solve all *Phænomena* as well as some particular ones ; and we must do the ingenious *Descartes* so much right, as to own that he expressly requires to be upon no other terms. And tho, for my own part, I always thought the *Corpuscularian Hypothesis* to be more simple and intelligible than his, because every body can easier form Notions of all the imaginable variety of Figures in Bodies than he can of his Three Elements, yet I presume the difference between his, that, and the chymical Hypotheses, is not so wide but that we may safely make use of any of them in explaining the mechanical Operations of Bodies upon one another ; for when all is done all the Properties in Bodies must be resolved into the difference there is in the Figure, Motion, Bulk, Position, and number of parts of which they consist ; so I never reckoned them Three Hypotheses any farther different than in the Phrase ; for he that can explain any *Phænomenon* in Nature by any one of the Three, can do it as well in the other Two, if he understand their peculiar Terms ; and for that reason, I think, we may with safety enough make use of any Hypothesis to help our Memories, and for mutual understanding in conversation in order to farther discoveries of the secrets of Nature ; tho' still I must confess, that when all the mechanical Hypotheses are refined to the height, they will never discover the Mode

This Authors cautions against Hypotheses in Natural Philosophy very good.

of the Operation by which the most common *Phænomenon* is produc'd. However we shall learn thereby the unavoidable necessity of owning the Existence, Wisdom, Power and Goodness of an infinite Spirit, to be the complete and adequate cause of all Substances and their necessary or natural Operations.

Conclusion.

Experimental
Philosophy
useful, tho it
cannot make
our Knowledge
of Substances
perfect.

This Author tells us in Conclusion, that the only way to improve our Knowledge, is, First, to get and settle in our Minds clear distinct and constant *Ideas*; and then, Secondly, to find out intermediate *Ideas* to shew the agreement or repugnancy of others which cannot be immediately compar'd. The sense and import of these Rules, I explained before; and thence it appears that this course will help us to very little Knowledge in natural Philosophy; because we can never arrive at any such complete *Ideas* of any sort of Substances, whether Bodies or Spirits; or, in other words, we can't attain the Knowledge of all their Powers and Properties; and therefore the comparing such imperfect *Ideas* will not advance our Knowledge to any degrees of certainty; and as for Experiments, which the Royal Society and all the Learned World beside, have been taught by my Lord Bacon, and since his time by the Honourable Mr. Boyle (the Two great Founders of Natural Philosophy) are the most proper methods to make Men wise beyond Words; these he thinks of no great use, because the Knowledge we gain by them, extends no farther than the individual Bodies in which the Experiments are made, and so far indeed he is in the right, that no Man will swear, can be absolutely sure. I mean, that the Experiments will succeed in any other parcels of matter, how like soever to them, yet this must be confessed it will go so far as to make it highly probable in others that agree in all sensible Qualities; and therefore tho it won't amount to a complete Science, yet it will learn us so much Knowledge as Men of prudence will venture their Lives, Health and Estate upon; and that's as sure a bottom as all the common actions of Men stand in; and therefore I think the History of Nature and Artificial Experiments will deserve some more encouragements than I doubt my Authors Principles will admit. Nothing will exactly fit his humour but Mathematical Demonstration; and yet I am afraid that so far as they are useful, our Knowledge of them will not in any case reach to an absolute certainty. For example; suppose that the Square of the Hypotenuse of a right Angle Triangle be equal to the Squares of the Two other sides, yet when I come to make use of this Demonstrative Knowledge, I would be glad to be informed what service my *abstract Ideas* (if there were any such) will do me? Let the Bodies be what they will, Solid or Fluid, or only the Superficies of a plain Body, I ask, whether it will not be necessary, either by Weight, by a Line, a Ruler, a Compass, or some such way of measuring, to try again whether these particular Bodies or Spaces upon a Superficies, have those Proportions to each other; and if it be so, as I suppose it is in all particular applications which only can make general Rules useful, then my *abstract Ideal Demonstration* has done me not a Farthing worth of good; for I cou'd by One or Two Tryals with a Ruler and Compass, or perhaps by Weight, have known there was such a Proportion between the one and the Two Squares, without running the race of 46 Propositions in *Euclid*, before I can come to the Knowledge of this 47th. And I have met with very ingenious Gentlemen, tho no Professors indeed of Mathematicks, that were of Opinion, that there was hardly a Proposition in *Euclid*, which is useful, but might be demonstrated more easily and intelligible than he or any abstract Mathematician has done; and tho it may not extend to such an *Ideal Demonstration* as some pretend to, yet to so full a Proof as will satisfy any Man that has his Senses, and be far more applicable to constant use. And I doubt not, but that there are many Artists in Architecture, Painting, Gaging, and Surveying (tho perhaps no complete Euclideans) that can more readily tell and prove the Proportions of Lines, Angles, Figures, and Solid or Fluid Bodies to each other, than any abstract Mathematicians whatever. And if the Case be thus, even with Mathematical Demonstrations, I ask again, how they can be made absolutely certain by *Ideas*; for the Ruler, Line, Com-

Mathematical
Demonstra-
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pals, Balance, for any other Measure, can't be applied to them for an adjustment so as to be demonstrated exactly true to a Point; and therefore when all is done, we must sit down contented with an high Probability, and perhaps not much higher than may be attain'd by wary, and repeated Experiments on natural Bodies. And as for moral Matters, every body daily sees the Consequences of all humane Actions are not demonstratively certain, but depend upon a Thousand, tho unforeseen, yet unavoidable Causes: And therefore our Improvement in them can never reach to an absolute Certainty; neither indeed is it suitable to the State of Mankind in this World, that it shou'd be otherwise. And as for the Knowledge of the *Simple Ideas*, as my Author calls the several single Actions that make up the mix'd Modes that have such and such common Names, it seems at present as needless to me, as to tell People how many Fingers they have, and fix Names to them. All Men know what Actions denominate Persons Charitable or Thieves, and so for the main as to all other Virtues and Vices, as well as they do Horses from Cows. However, if my Author or any one else, can teach Men to understand Virtues and Vices, their Duties and their Faults in a better Method than the common old way, I shall embrace their good attempts with all thankfulness, and at present shall only move, that they be cautious not to make their real Difference to consist only in the Names of them, which every one may alter at his Pleasure.

C H A P. XIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

I. **O**UR Knowledge is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly Voluntary. We cannot but know our own Thoughts, and the Effects of those Impressions which are made upon the Organs of our Senses; and 'tis not in our Power, to know things otherwise than they appear; we cannot but perceive that Black which appears so, nor judge that scalding hot which feels cold. And if we have any Memory we cannot but retain the Effect of those Impressions which we perceive by our Senses, and consequently judge them to agree or disagree with each other. And there are some Propositions, whose parts have such an evident Relation, that we cannot forbear our assent to them as soon as we understand the words in which they are expressed; such as these, that God is to be obey'd by Men; that parallel Lines can never meet; that every thing is the same with itself and different from every thing else; that Three and Four make Seven; and therefore all the Power the Mind has is to attend to this or that Object, and to observe its Relation to others; but in the Exercise of that Power lies in a great Measure an Ability in every Man to make himself wise or ignorant, as well as good or bad.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Judgment.

I. **J**udging has been commonly esteem'd that Power or Faculty in the Mind, by which it perceives the Relation between the parts of any Proposition, whether speculative or practical; and knowing (except it be taken as it often is for a single Apprehension or Perception,) is commonly esteem'd an Operation of this Power of judging as relating to such Propositions, whose Evidence is so manifest as to leave no Reason for doubting, but gains assent as soon as the Words

How judging
defin'd com-
monly.
or

This faculty seems too much limited by this Author's Definition of it.

or Signs are understood; but where the Conjunction or Disjunction of the parts of any Proposition are not so clearly or fully perceiv'd, there also this Power of judging is exercis'd in the Perception of the Arguments or Reasons *Pro* and *Con*: Which are offer'd to the Mind for its Assent, Dissent or Suspension, its believing, disbelieving or doubting. But this Author reckons this Faculty of judging to be limited only to such Propositions as are not certain and bestow'd on the Mind, to serve where Knowledge fails; whereas let a Proposition be never so clear and certain, probable or improbable, the Mind exerts this Power in judging it certainly true or false, probably true or false, according to the degree of Evidence it has for that Certainty or Probability; if the Evidence be so clear as not to admit of a Possibility to be otherwise, it judges it certainly true; if the Evidence be not so clear, as to admit a possibility to be otherwise, then it judges it likely to be true or false; but where the Mind compares one thing with itself or with another, where it affirms or denies, there it judges; when it reflects upon, knows, or is conscious of its own Thoughts then it judges itself to exist; when it perceives that one Body affects its Eye otherwise than another, then it judges those Two Bodies of differing Colours; when a Mathematician makes the Relation appear between the Parts of any Proposition manifest and undeniably certain, then it judges it true which is affirm'd; when several Arguments are offer'd to it, and none or very slight against any Proposition, then it judges it to be highly probable; if few or none to it, and many against it, then as improbable; when as many Arguments of one side as the other, then it doubts; but in all these Cases it judges.

This Author's Opinion about the difference between knowing and judging not agreeable to the common.

II. However this is my Author's Account of Knowledge and of Judgment. *Knowledge is the faculty whereby the Mind certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. Judgment is the faculty by which it puts Ideas together or separates them when their Agreement or Disagreement is not perceiv'd, but presum'd to be so.* Whereas the common Account of them is when the word *Knowing* is not used for a simple Apprehension, then 'tis the Perception of the necessary or immutable Relation between any things propos'd to the Mind: And *judging* is the Perception of that Relation between things, whether that Relation be immutable and necessary, or whether it be mutable and separable. And according to that Account there is no Difference between *Judging* and *Knowing*, but that Judgment is extended to all sort of Propositions wherein the Mind compares the Parts, and Knowledge is limited to those Propositions only whose Connexion or Disjunction of its parts is immutable, and clearly perceiv'd by the Mind to be such.

C H A P. XV.

Of Probability.

The bounds of Certainty assign'd by this Author examin'd.

I. **T**HIS Author having, as he says, found out the Bounds of *Humane Certainty*, is now entring upon the Inquiry into the Grounds of *Probability*. But before I follow him in that inquiry, it will not be out of the way to look back and consider, within what bounds he has brought *Knowledge* or *Certainty*.
1. To that of our own Existence. 2dly. The immediate Perception of our own *Ideas* or Thoughts. 3dly. The Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* by the Mediation of others. 4thly. The Existence of things without us: But that extends no farther than our actual or present Sensation. But now if this Knowledge be gain'd only by *Ideas*, I am apt to think they will be narrower still.

The Particulars. We don't know our own Existence by *Ideas*.

I. For first, as to our own Existence. No Man can have the *Idea* or least Thought of Existence distinct from the *Idea* of himself existing; so there can be no Perception of any Agreement between the Two *Ideas* of himself and Existence,

llence, because they are but one *Idea*, unless we cou'd have an abstract *Idea* of Existence, which is impossible: 2dly. As to the Perception of our own *Ideas* or Thoughts, that again is impossible, unless we cou'd have *Ideas* or Thoughts abstracted from the things of which we are said to have *Ideas* or Thoughts. If we were (suppose) to judge of the Truth of this Proposition, Two and Two make Four, by the immediate Intuition of those Two *Ideas* by comparing the abstract *Ideas* of twice Two with Four, we shou'd find our selves to have no such *Ideas* at all, in the least distinct from Two or Four things of which we are said to have the *Ideas* or Thoughts about: And so the Comparison can't be between *Ideas*, because there are none, but between the things themselves. 3dly. As for Mathematical Demonstrations which he brings under this Head; if they be the Perception of the Relation of one *Idea* to another by the Mediation of others, and not of any sensible Object of which they are the Resemblances, as he himself owns they are not, then they are the *Ideas* of nothing; and therefore there can be no Agreement discern'd between them. And as to the Existence of God which he brings also under this Head, and reckons demonstrable from our own Existence, without regard to the Existence of any thing else in the World beside our selves, 'tis altogether unconceivable how any one (especially if we don't allow any the least Notion of God natural, which his Principles don't) shou'd form a Notion of more Power, Wisdom or other Perfection, then he finds in himself, when he is suppos'd not to know or suppose the Existence of any thing but of himself. Well, let's now jog on, and try whether by the help of *Ideas*, tho we can't attain any Certainty, yet we may justly hope to arrive at Probability; for that will serve the turn in all humane Transactions. But that again at first view appears impossible: For how can any one know that any thing is probable, if there be not something suppos'd certain? How can it appear to me so much as in any Degree probable that there is such a Place as the *Indies*, if I don't suppose or am not certain, that my Senses of hearing or of seeing what is written be true. And that again 4thly cannot be prov'd by the way of *Ideas*, for there is no Connexion in Nature between that which is wholly within us, as *Ideas* are, and that which is wholly without us, as the Objects are, and consequently the Existence of one can no ways prove the Existence of the other without the Mediation of a third *Idea*; and that third Term or intermediate *Idea* will as much need a fourth to prove its Existence as any of the former, and so *in infinitum*.

II. As *Demonstration*, he says, is the shewing the Agreement or Disagreement of Two *Ideas* by the Intervention of others which have a constant immutable and visible Connexion one with another: So *Probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement or Disagreement by the Intervention of Proofs whose Connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceiv'd to be so, but is or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false, rather than the contrary. That *Demonstration* is a sensible shewing that things are the same or different from one another in Quantity, there is no doubt; and that other Propositions are in a metaphorical Sense said to be demonstrably true, where the Relation between the Parts is made as plain and intelligible as if they were shew'd to the Senses, is also certain; but I conceive my Author is mistaken in the Notation of the word *Probable*; for if it be softned a little and call'd Proveable, I suppose he and every Body else will allow that Mathematical Demonstrations are Proveable, and they rise a Degree higher in Certainty than the word *Likely*, as he has limited it. And therefore a Proposition is said to be proveable not only that has such Arguments producible for it, as may outweigh those that are brought against it, but such as are or may become certain, as Mathematical Demonstrations, or such also as may be made apparent to the Senses of one that are actually so to others; as that there is such a Place as *Jamaica*, that there are Inhabitants of the Earth under the Line, or near the Poles; tho it must be own'd indeed that the word *Probable* is very frequently taken for such Propositions only as are likely to be true, where

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the Sense of it.

Nor our own Perceptions.

Nor Mathematical Truths.

Nor the Existence of God.

Or of things without us.

Probability defin'd by the Author.

The Notation of the Word Probable, too much limited by this Author.

The Word often taken in the Author's Sense of it.

That may be certain to one which is only probable to another and improbable to a third Person.

Faith, believing or assenting may be on as certain Grounds as Knowledge.

The grounds of Probability.

What makes the Testimony of others more or less credible.

Before assent the Grounds of Probability shou'd be examin'd in matters of importance.

the Arguments are such and so many as may induce the Mind to believe them rather than the contrary. However it must be noted, that what is probable, nay, sometimes improbable to one, may be certain to another; that the Three Angles of a right-lined Triangle are equal to Two right Angles, may be certain to a Mathematician, which is only probable to another; that there is such a place as *Rome*, may be only probable to one that never was there, and may be certain to one on the Spot; that there are great Philosophers in the Moon, may be certain to those that inhabit it, but is altogether improbable to us; and from hence it appears, that knowing is properly the name of the Act of the Mind, which judges, and Certainty properly is the Name of the Propositions of which it judges; and that Probability does not, as my Author seems to suppose, supply the defect of Knowledge; for even in the lowest Degree of Probability there is one Degree of Knowledge or Certainty, but rather supplies the want of Evidence to make any thing fully known or certain. Neither can I see any Reason so to narrow the Sense of the Words, Faith, Believing, or Assenting, as to make them incompatible always with Knowledge; for a Man may have a Faith, may believe, may assent to a certainly true Proposition, to such as leaves no room for doubting, as well as those that are uncertain in that Degree, as to leave a possibility to be false; and therefore, judging includes not only such Acts of the Mind where the Relation between the Parts of the Propositions are mutable, and in which it may be mistaken, but all Acts of the Mind whatever, wherein it makes any Comparison between the Parts of Propositions, whether the Relation between them be mutable or immutable.

III. The Grounds of Probability my Author reckons are only these Two. 1. The Conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge, Observation and Experience. 2d. The Testimony of others vouching their Observation and Experience; and for making the Testimony of others more or less valid are to be consider'd. 1. The Number of Witnesses. 2dly. Their Integrity; for the honestest Persons are and the freer from Prejudice, their Relation of any thing is the more credible. 3dly. The Skill of the Witnesses, that is, in such Cases where there is need of it; for in some there is none but only the use of their Senses. 4thly. The design of the Author, where a Testimony is out of a Book, which in matters of Fact related is easily understood by any one that understands the Language and the common Sense of Words. 5thly. The Consistency of the Parts of the Relation; for where that fails, there is a Contradiction which spoils the whole Testimony. 6thly. Contrary Testimony, for in such Cases wherein one Man's Testimony does not agree with another, the Testimony is so weakned that the whole strength lies upon the different Opinions others have of the Skill and Integrity of the several Reporters.

IV. In such Cases (as my Author says rightly) the Mind before it assents rationally or dissents, shou'd consider all the Grounds of Probability, and upon a due ballancing the whole, reject or receive with a more or less firm assent proportionably to the preponderancy of the Reasons on one side or t'other: And the Instance he gives is very pat to explain these Two sorts of Probability. If one sees a Person walk upon the Ice, this is Knowledge above Probability; but if he hears another say he did see one in *England* in the midst of a sharp Winter, this is an high Degree of Probability, because it agrees with what he himself has observ'd in the like Case: But if one has always lived under the Line, and that never saw Ice in his Life, but finds its contrary to what he has observ'd in the Nature of Water, there the Testimony is more or less valid as the Witnesses in Number are more, or more or less unprejudiced. From all this 'tis easie to infer, that particular Persons Judgment of the certainty or likelihood of the Truth of Propositions, depends upon the Evidence which appears to them, not on the Degrees of Evidence of which they are capable; so that what is certain to one, may be only probable, or sometimes altogether improbable to another. But it must be noted, that as there is a visible connexion of each part of a Demonstration with
that

that which is next to it, and so to the end of the Chain, so in all Probabilities there is always something supposed to be known, and certain; and that Knowledge increases in degrees as the Probabilities do: If a Man to whom I am a perfect Stranger tells me, that there is such a place as *Jamaica* in the *West Indies*, this tho the lowest degree of Probability in a matter of Fact, or which concerns Existence, yet there is some thing certainly known, namely, that he said so in my hearing: If one that is my acquaintance tells me the same Story, here is another addition to the Probability and to my Knowledge; if Three or Four others agree in the same Relation here is a Third degree of Probability, and likewise of my Knowledge; if all the Men I meet with, and Books I read, concur, and no Body contradicts it, here is a Fourth degree of Probability and Knowledge; if I find many Persons venture their Estates, Health and Lives upon this presumption, here is a Fifth degree of Probability, and as many additions to my Knowledge: And from hence 'tis easie to observe, that bare Testimony, tho there is no discoverable connexion in Nature between that and the parts of the Proposition, may convince a Man to that degree, that a bare possibility to be otherwise can be no rational Ground for dissent, for if the bare possibility to be otherwise might be admitted as a good reason against the belief of any Proposition, no humane actions whatever cou'd be rational: 'Tis possible that the Sun may never rise, that is once set, that all the Victuals we eat may poison us; nay when Mathematical Demonstrations come to be applied to real use they may fail; the Compass may be wider or narrower, the Measure I use may become really shorter or longer every moment, tho I don't perceive it.

V. Upon these Two Grounds only my Author judges the probability of all Propositions depends; and he will by no means admit that the Opinion of others in any Case, can come in for a share of the reason for Assent or Action; and he gives this seemingly unanswerable reason for his Assertion; for if that was admitted for the Ground of assent, then Men have Reason to be Heathens at *Japan*, Mahometans in *Turky*, Papists in *Spain*, Protestants in *England*, and Lutherans in *Sweden*; to which he might have added, that if Persons admit the Opinion of others, for a complete reason of their Faith, no one could rationally have been converted from Judaism or Heathenism to Christianity. But this is easily answered in one word; that all these several Persons had reason to be of these several Religions and Opinions till they knew better. That may be a good or justifiable Reason to one that is not so to another; for I ask, has not a Child a good Reason to judge a stick is crooked in the Water which appears so to him? Had not the King of *Siam*, of whom my Author tells the pleasant Story, a good Reason to think the *Dutch* Embassadour lyed, when he told him that Water in *Holland* might be so hardened in Winter as to bear an Elephant? When Persons come to know more, they may have good reason to alter their Opinions; for then indeed the case quite alters; but till they do, 'tis no Argument of Folly, or any ways unreasonable to yield their Assent to such Opinions that are agreeable to the Sense of their Superiors, their Parents, their Familiars, their Country; for if that be not admitted as a Probable reason, I would be glad to hear why Governours or Parents should think it their duty to instruct their Subjects or Children in that Religion which they themselves profess and think the best; and if that be not their duty, whether it be so to Educate them in Scepticism, and teach them that should be the only Article of Faith, there is no Religion true? But I suppose the great Masters of Scepticism will hardly go so far as to reckon that a Duty because inconsistency with that Principle, they must doubt of the Existence of God, which is the Foundation of all Duty. It cannot therefore be hence inferred, that a Sceptick will think it is his Duty to establish his Dependents, Friends, and Children in Atheism; for that is a Sect as well as any other, (tho not in Religion indeed) yet in positively believing there is no Ground for any Religion; whereas Scepticism is a refine upon Atheism; and if a Sceptick owns any Duty, 'tis only this, of keeping others from believing any thing positively; or, in other words, perswading all Men that 'tis the most rational to believe nothing is rational;

The Opinion of others no Ground of certainty but may be of probability.

nal ; which I think is a contradiction : For whence a Man should have his reason to believe nothing is reasonable is beyond my apprehension : What I have here said about a Sceptick, does not in the least affect my Authors Person. Neither would I have it by any means to be interpreted to have the least reflection that way ; and I should reckon my self unworthy the Name of a Christian, if I should offer to make such a Judgment of any Man, especially of one that has made a noble Essay to prove the Existence of God. But whether the way of resolving all Certainty into *Ideas*, does not lead to it as far as it is possible is worthy a serious consideration.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

The Evils of
Scepticism and
wrong Principles
compared.

I. **T**hat *Assent* ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability there is no Question. And since these cannot always be in actual view, there is no help for it : We must trust our Memory that we have once seen and sufficiently examined the Grounds of our present belief ; this is also very plain. So the only Question that can arise is this ; how we shall be secure from Scepticism on one side, from new Arguments that may be started, and obstinacy on the other by being unmoveable from our former Opinions ; of both these postures in the Mind there are many and great inconveniencies. Of Scepticism (tho my Author does not very particularly mention them) there is this manifest evil, that we must believe nothing, and consequently sit still and do nothing ; for Belief is the Spring of all humane Actions, and they all turn only upon Probabilities, at least don't stand upon such certain Ground as to leave no room for a possibility of mistake. Of obstinacy in Opinion the evils are represented by my Author in their full length and strength, which in Substance amount to this one, that 'tis the source and cause of all the gross Errors and dangerous Opinions which People embrace in any part of the World ; and which is worse, those generally, he says, are the most fierce and stiff in maintaining their old Tenets, who have least of all examined them. This is indeed a Question of mighty importance ; but I don't find he offers any resolution of it, but only makes it, as indeed it is, a good reason for mutual charity in the midst of this unavoidable difference in Opinions in Matters of Religion especially ; and I fear his Principles will not admit of any other Expedient. As for Charity, I always esteemed it the most genuine effect and surest mark of true Principles both in Natural and Revealed Religion ; and that the grand design of Christianity was to perfect Humane Nature in the Knowledge of such Truths as are most adapted to accomplish our Minds with Charity and all sort of solid Virtue, and thereby make them partakers of the Divine Nature and Happiness ; but yet I am not convinced that Charity does extend so far as to cancel all Obligations to submit to Government as well in Religious as in worldly Affairs ; but rather that it is an Essential part of Charity to propagate such Principles, as may dispose People to submit their Opinions and Practices in Matters of Religion, as well as civil Affairs, to the regulation of such as Divine Providence has let over them in Church and State, till they understand manifest reason to the contrary. Not that I conceive any particular Men or Society to be infallible, but rather just contrary, that such are the most deceiv'd themselves, and most apt to deceive others, that pretend to any such Privilege. But the reason I say so is, because otherwise there could be no establishment whatever either of a National Religion, Peace, or Property, which are so absolutely necessary for the Happiness of Mankind, that no inconveniencies that can arise from Errors can counterpoise them.

And so the Question, if fairly stated, is not whether there be not numerous Evils from submitting our Opinions till we understand better to the Authority of others ;

others; but whether those Evils be more and greater than Scepticism and Anarchy, which must go together. I never yet heard or read of so much as one single Person that avow'd absolute liberty; all the difference has been, that they wou'd have the Laws of Church and State modelled in their own way, that is, wou'd be Governours themselves, then all wou'd be well; and such are often the greatest Patrons of Universal Liberty that wou'd be the greatest Tyrants, and make the loudest complaints against others, that administer the justest ground of complaint themselves. But the Question being thus stated, as I think it ought, 'tis easily resolved to be a better Expedient to submit to an established Religion, tho mixed with many Errors, than to have none at all; just as 'tis to have a mixture of bad Laws, rather than no Laws or Government at all; and here will be room enough left for the exercise of Charity in the variety of Opinions that will unavoidably arise. And it becomes every honest and wise Man to suppose, that the great Governour of all the World, knows how to extend his Favour to such Errors as he has not afforded means to rectifie, as well as we do to regulate our Charity, and that he will be as gracious in pardoning as we in reason can think our selves obliged to be just in our Judgment of other Mens Errors.

II. But to return to my Author he reduces Probability to these Two sorts. Probability of Two sorts.
 1. Either concerning some particular Existence, commonly called matter of Fact; and falls under Observation and is therefore capable of humane Testimony.
 2^{dly}, Concerning such things as are beyond the discovery of our Senses, and are not capable of any such Testimony.

As to the first sort, commonly called matter of Fact, there are Three Degrees Three degrees of Probability as good as Certainty. that come very near Certainty or Knowledge.

I. Where any particular is attested by the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, and is agreeable to our own constant experience; such as these. Fire warm'd a Man, made Lead fluid, changed the colour and consistency of Wood, Stones descended, Loadstone drew Iron, and in general all the stated Properties of Bodies and the regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary course of Nature.

II. The next Degree of Probability is, when the matter is usual, tho not constant, but is attested in the particular instance by all that mention it; as that *Tiberius Caesar* prefer'd his own, before the Publick Interest.

III. When a matter is indifferent, but is unanimously attested by all Historians that mention it; as that there was such a Person as *Julius Caesar* about 1700 Years since; that he overcame one *Pompey* in a Battel; that there were such Cities as *Rome* and *Jerusalem*: These need no explication; only I think that the Second Degree of Probability mentioned is not so high as the Third, because every Mans common senses cou'd Witness the Third sort, but the Second needed some more than ordinary Observation, and the Reporters were more liable to prejudices than in the other. In these, and such like Cases, the Grounds of Probability are so evident, that they determine the Judgment to Assent as easily as Demonstrations; so the difficulties that arise can only be when the matters related contradict common Experience; such suppose, as the Prodigies very frequently mentioned by *Livy* in his Roman History; or 2^{dly}, when Witnesses contradict each other, then it is that diligence, attention and exactness is required to make a right Judgment, and to proportion the Assent to the different Degrees of Evidence; in both these Cases the Veracity, the Disinterestness of the Reporters, and their natural capacity to make the Observations, are to be the leading Reasons for determining the Judgment; and tho in some Cases there may be great exactness required to weigh all the Arguments of both sides, yet 'tis easie to observe that where matters occur that are not determinable by common attention and discretion, they are generally of no great consequence for the making others considerably Wiser; and therefore let the Issue be Belief, Conjecture, Distrust or Disbelief, is not very material.

The Cases in which judgment is most necessary.

Traditional
Testimony the
less valid, the
farther from
the Original
proved not al-
ways true.

III. Traditional Testimonies my Author says the farther removed from the Original, the less their Proof. By Traditional Testimonies he means such Attestations of Words or Actions which are offered to others by Writings or oral Repetitions; and he endeavours to confirm this Allegation of his by this Maxim in the practice of Law, that though the Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy, tho never so well attested, and never so credible Witnesses will not be admitted, as a Proof in Judicature. Now what the design of this Allegation, or of the Argument to enforce it, may have been, I don't offer to Divine; but in regard 'tis generally expressed and without any limitation or exception, it will not be altogether unworthy the cautious Reader to consider whether it be not applicable to the holy Scriptures, and may not be used for an Argument that any Testimony from them for the Truth of any Proposition or Matter of Fact, is insignificant and invalid, because the original is not extant or can be produced with which to compare our present Copies? I am bound in Charity to suppose this was not my Author's meaning; yet because the Words are capable of such an Interpretation, it will not be altogether impertinent to be armed with caution against it; or I at least shall be pardoned for a digression by any that will be so ingenuous as to consider for what sort of Persons my Notes were chiefly designed. First then,

The LawMax-
im right, but
limitable in
some Cases.

Admitting the Law Maxim to be grounded on Equity and Reason, yet with submission to the Professors of that Faculty, it is, I conceive, limitable to such Cases only where the Original is producible: For if it can be fairly prov'd, or rationally presum'd, that the Original has been destroyed by Fire, or other Accident, perished by Time, or lost, that in such Case the Copy of a Copy is a good Proof in any Court; especially when there are any concurrent Actions or Circumstances to confirm it; such as possession, or other ways receiving the Profits of that which any one claims by virtue of such original. And this is notoriously the Case of the holy Records containing the Gospel History: In this and many Ages since their Originals must have perished meerly by Time; but there has been a constant and uninterrupted profession of the main things whether relating to Faith or Practice, therein contained in all Ages of the Christian Church by Persons of differing Parties. There has been in the Three first Centuries, especially Millions of Persons Lives voluntarily Sacrific'd to attest the grand Truths and Precepts, as distinct from Heathenism and Judaism, which therein are delivered, all Parties how differing soever in their Sentiments in other matters have fetch'd their Arguments from those sacred Books, and thought themselves safest under the Protection of their Divine Authority. Great Revolutions in all the Kingdoms and Common-wealths in these Three known parts of the World, have turn'd upon the suppos'd agreement of our Copies with the Original in the main points at least; nay it cannot be well imagined, that the great Impostor *Mahomet* cou'd or wou'd have compos'd a Scheme of Religion so much mixed and blended with Judaism and Christianity, if he or his assistant had not seen a suppos'd Authentick Copy of the New and Old Testament; so that if there be not a rational Ground for any ones belief of the Original Truth of the Holy Scriptures upon such Evidence, it will be hard to find a good Reason for any ones keeping his Estate or Title of Honour any longer than Persons can attest, *viva voce* those Writings Deeds or Grants by which he claims his Original Right; and if the Copy of a Copy of a Law be not all allowed a good Evidence in a Court of Judicature, it will be difficult to justify the Whipping, Branding or Hanging of a Criminal, tho never so clearly convicted of the Fact. What Judge or Jury in *England* can produce the Original Law by which most Villains are to be so treated? Or if they should pretend to such an Original, how can any one attest that very Individual Paper or Parchment, with all the parts of the Writing, were regularly read in the House of Lords and Commons; that the Majority gave their consent, that the King signed it, that that was his own Hand Writing or other mark of his Royal Assent? My Author says that he did not mean by that alle-
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gation to lessen the credit or use of History ; and I say that the History of the Life, Death, Resurrection, Miracles, Doctrines and Precepts of Christ and his Apostles are infinitely better attested by the Holy Scriptures than the Actions of *Alexander the Great*, the *Roman Commonwealth*, of *Julius Caesar*, or any other Persons by any Author's History whatever, and that it will be very hard to form any Argument against the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, which will not be much stronger, not only against any common History, but even against any Statute Books, tho agreeable to constant Practise, or any Deeds or Writings, tho vouch'd by uninterrupted Possession, and all the corroborating Evidence that can be devis'd.

IV. In things which the Senses cannot discover Analogy, my Author says is the only Rule of Probability ; and of this he gives these Three sorts of Instances. 1. The Existence, Nature and Operations of immaterial Beings without us, such as Spirits, Angels, Devils. 2dly. Of material Beings, which either for their smallness or remoteness from us cannot be taken notice of by the Senses ; as whether there be any Plants, Animals or intelligent Beings in the Moon or other Planets. 3dly. The manner of the Operation in most part of Natural Bodies. We see Animals generated, nourish'd, grow, move ; that the Loadstone draws Iron, but cannot tell how : And the only help we have is by Analogy ; in this he is in the right ; and I think indeed in many Cases is a very rational way of arguing, and much more intelligible and proper than that of *Ideas*. Analogy is a way of arguing from the Effect to the Cause, from a sensible Effect to an insensible Cause. As for Examples. Thus when we see or hear of such Appearances, as plainly demonstrate more Power and Wit than what we can justly ascribe to the Power of meer senseless Matter, we rationally argue and infer, that they are the effects of some such thinking and intelligent Beings as we find ourselves to be ; to which we give those common Names of Spirits, Angels or Devils ; for we cou'd never know by our Senses that there were any such things as finite Spirits good or bad, but only by such ways of arguing ; neither shou'd we rationally believe there are or were such (excepting by special Revelation) but by inferring their Existence from such sensible Effects. Thus again, from the sensible Experience we have of the manner of Operation of some Bodies upon others by their various Figures, Bulks, Positions, Motions, Mixtures and Fermentations, we rationally conclude Animals are generated, nourish'd, grow, decay by the like Operations ; from our Observation that by the immediate impulse and forcible Application of our own Bodies to others, that they are moved from or towards us, and the like in other daily Experiments in other Bodies ; we infer that the descent of heavy Bodies, the Attraction of Iron by the Loadstone, are wrought by the contact and force of some Particles of Matter tho singly insensible, acting upon, driving or impulse. Thus also from our experience that Velvets, water'd Silks, Corn-fields, Pictures and several other Bodies change their Colours and Appearances, meerly by the alteration of the Position of their Parts to our Eyes, we fairly argue, that the difference in Colours does in a great Measure depend from the different Arrangement of the Particles of Bodies, by which they variously reflect or refract the Rays that fall upon them, and come from them to our Eyes. All these are Instances of the Mind's common Method of proving Causes from sensible Effects, commonly call'd *Analogy*. But how the gradual Declension of rational Beings upon Earth to those which are meer senseless Matter, can be made an Argument to prove that the Planets are inhabited, or that there are infinite Orders of Spirits from humane Souls till we come to the infinite and supreme Spirit, which we call God, this is not so readily understood as my Author represents it. For how probable soever it may appear that the Planets are inhabited, or that there are as many Orders of intelligent Beings in the Universe as there are of Creatures upon Earth, the Arguments that represent it probable are usually drawn from a preconceiv'd Judgment of the unlimitable Perfections of our Maker, and that he has or may have exercised his

Analogy the only Rule for Probabilities in things not obvious to the Senses.

Power;

Power, Wisdom and Goodness in making the Planets for such purposes and in producing such effects. So the Argument seems to be from Cause to Effect, and not from Effect to Cause, as in the former Instances: However if any one please to call this way of arguing Analogy, there is no great harm done by stretching the commonly receiv'd Sense of the Word.

Miracles not the less credible for being contrary to common Experience.

V. There is one Case this Author says, in which the strangeness of a Fact, or its not being agreeable to our constant or frequent Experience, don't lessen or weaken the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it; this is the proper Case of Miracles; for where such natural Events are suitable to the ends aim'd at by him (he means either God or the Person who immediately works them) that has the Power of changing the Course of Nature, there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief (he means I suppose to things declar'd by him that works the Miracles) by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation.

Reveal'd Propositions may be certain because attested by God.

This point not fully explain'd by this Author.

How commonly Persons satisfy themselves of the Certainty of Revelation.

Eye-witnesses might be ascertain'd in their Faith.

VI. There are, he says, also one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest Degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony, whether the things agree or disagree with common Experience or not. The Reason of which is, because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceiv'd, and that is of God himself; and this is call'd Revelation; and our Assent to it, Faith. All this is right, and the Caution he annexes, highly rational; namely that we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation, and that we understand it right, else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancies of Enthusiasm, and all the dangerous Errors of wrong Principles, if we shou'd have Faith and Assurance in what is really not divine Revelation: For, as he adds, our Assent can rise no higher than the Evidence we have of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expression in which it is deliver'd: But here I must confess it is that I want my Author's Explication, how it is possible according to his Principles, for any one in any Case to come to that Assurance of a Divine Revelation, or a Testimony from God for the Truth of any Propositions. Now the common way by which others who resolve Certainty into the Wisdom and Goodness, which they call the Veracity of God, is this. 1. They suppose the Person to whom the Revelation is originally made, to have such an extraordinary Alteration in his Mind or Body, or both, which he has found by his own Experience accompanies such Inspirations. 2dly. That the Person is conscious of his own Integrity, which every Man may as certainly know as he does his own Thoughts. 3dly. That he has a Power to work Miracles, which are as it were the Language by which God signifies his Mind, and are his Hand and Seal by which he confirms the Truth of that which he would have declar'd? To others, 4thly, that God can discover his Will by as plain or intelligible Words, as one Man can to another: And thus the Truth of a Divine Revelation may be as well ascertain'd as any other Proposition. But in the way of *Ideas* 'tis not so easie to conceive of what use or efficacy Miracles can be to the proving any thing more than an extraordinary Power in him that works them; because there is no discoverable Connexion in Nature between a Miracle and either part of the Proposition reveal'd, which it is brought to prove or confirm, which is in my Author's way (tho not in the common) a necessary Condition of Knowledge, and the only Foundation of all Certainty. However, since he allows Miracles and special Divine Revelation, I will not presume to interpret his silence in that main particular to be any Argument that he does not judge Miracles, when well attested, in some Cases a proper *Medium* to confirm a Reveal'd Truth. All that I am concern'd for is only this, that the Faith of such as saw the Miracles which Christ and his Apostles did, may be resolv'd into such certain Principles as all the World agree upon as true; but for such as were not Eye-Witnesses of the Miracles, tho the Reasons of their Faith cannot be resolv'd into such Principles as have the same Degree of Certainty, but into such they may as leave no Ground for either a rational disbelief

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or doubting; the same sort of Arguments that can induce any one to believe that there was such a City as *Rome*, may be used to convince him that there was such a City as *Jerusalem*, can be fully satisfied that there was such a Person as *Julius Caesar* that lived in one of them; so he may as well that *Jesus Christ* lived in the other. Can he be assured that *Julius Caesar* won many Victories, afterwards fought and beat one *Pompey*, and made several Laws for the Government of the Roman Commonwealth? So he may that *Christ Jesus* wrought many Miracles, taught several Doctrines for the Rules of Faith and Manners; can he be ascertain'd that *Julius Caesar* was murther'd in the Senate-house in *Rome*? So he may that *Christ Jesus* was crucified at *Jerusalem*; may he be fully satisfied that *Augustus Caesar* succeeded *Julius*, and settled the Government of the Commonwealth upon himself and Heirs? So he may that the Apostles of *Christ* succeeded him and wrought many Wonders to confirm his Resurrection from the Dead and other Doctrines he taught them. Thus tho neither in one Case or the other, we can rise to an absolute Degree of Certainty, yet we may to such a Degree as leaves no room for a rational Account of Infidelity. He that can by reading of Books written for that purpose, gain a full assurance of any branch of the Roman or Grecian History of any great Importance, may have the like Assurance if he use the same Diligence, and be as free from Prejudice of any Matters of universal Importance in the sacred History; and tho he may not arrive at Demonstration, or such a sensible Evidence as those had, who were Eye or Ear-witnesses, yet he may have all the Reasons for his Faith that the wisest of humane Actions require, and by which most and the greatest Concerns of the intellectual World are daily govern'd; and there are still and have as many, as great, as permanent Effects depended upon the Belief of the fundamental Truths of the Christian, as there are or have been upon any one Branch of the Roman, Grecian, or any other History upon Record.

Such as were not Eye Witnesses may be as certain as of any thing they did not see.

Such a certainty as leaves no rational ground to disbelieve or doubt

C H A P. XVII.

Of Reason.

I. **T**HE word *Reason*, as my Author observes well, is commonly taken. 1. For true and clear Principles, such as all Men are agreed in. Of this sort have been commonly reckon'd, the Truth of our Senses and other natural Faculties, some speculative general Propositions, and others practical, whose Parts have an immutable Relation to each other; the former of which every Man finds himself unavoidably disposed by Impressions from the Author of Nature to believe; and the latter to observe and practise without any teaching, and antecedently to any humane Laws or Constitutions; the former are commonly call'd Maxims; the latter, Laws of Nature. But what my Author means by Principles of Reason, I don't well understand; and therefore he rather tells us the common Sense of others than his own. 2dly. By the word *Reason* is frequently understood clear and fair Deductions from such Principles; but how again there can be any such Deductions from Principles, when there are none suppos'd, is pretty hard to apprehend; how any one can infer that Three Angles of a right-lined Triangle can be equal to Two right Angles, before or without supposing there are things without him as really have any Angles, or how he can infer the Existence of God from the visible Effects of his Power and Wisdom, before he owns or supposes there is a World or things in it besides himself, is hardly intelligible.

The several Senses of the word Reason.

3dly. *Reason* is taken for the Cause, and particularly for the final Cause which in intelligent Beings (for such only can have an end or design in their Actions) is only modally distinct from the Efficient. To this might be added, that some-

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times

times it is taken for the Essence of things or that by which one thing is distinguish'd from another; as when we meet with the words *ratio formalis* in Authors.

He treats of it only as taken for a natural Faculty.

But 4thly by *Reason* my Author in this Chapter means only that Power or Faculty in Men, which he says is supposed (by the Vulgar he means) to distinguish them from Beasts.

The necessity of this faculty of Reason.

II. But before he forms the Definition of this Faculty, he asks himself this Question, what need there is of it? For if general Knowledge be the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of abstract *Ideas*, and those only the Collection of simple ones, what has the Mind to do more than by its native Power of Reflexion to observe them? But this he answers, by telling us, there is very great need of it for the enlargement of our Knowledge and regulating our Assent; and therein he is certainly in the right; but whether with a just Consistency with his own Principles is not very plain. He says indeed, Reason contains Two of the intellectual Faculties, namely Sagacity and Illation: As for Sagacity, that is only a new Name for that which others call Attention or Consideration; for how without Attention of Mind any one shou'd find out intermediate *Ideas* (that is, things that have Relation to others) without or by any other means than diligent Observation of their several Properties or Modes by which they have that Relation to each other, is a Mystery; and if they be discover'd that way, or by chance, there will be no need of a new Name for that old Faculty or Casualty, which I guess is no Faculty. But as for Illation or Inference, therein indeed consists the proper Exercise of Reason consider'd as a Faculty; but if the Mind be not predisposed to believe any Propositions or Principles by Impressions from natural Causes operating upon it, rather than the contrary to those Propositions, it will hardly know where or how to begin by what Standard to try its new Acquisitions, and so may continue in everlasting doubtfulness, and give its assent to nothing: As for example, in demonstrative or probable Propositions in each step the Mind makes, it must observe an immutable or mutable Relation between their Parts: But how, I ask, shall the Mind perceive this mutable or immutable Relation between things, and judge thereof without Suppositions and Principles that are ready prepar'd by Nature for that Work? How shall it know, for example, the mutable Relation between God and Existence; the mutable between finite Beings and Existence; the Agreement between twice Two and Four, the Disagreement between White and Black? Shall it do this by its *Ideas*? But how it shall get the *Ideas* is the first Question, what if it has no *Ideas* of God or any finite Beings before it has observ'd their several Nature or Properties, of twice Two and Four; before it has been conscious of so many succeeding Thoughts within itself concerning things without it; of Whiteness or Blackness till it has perceiv'd white or black Bodies? And if it be thus with the Mind, that it can't exercise this Faculty without these previous Observations, then it must run upon Suppositions of those differing things that produce those differing or agreeing Thoughts or Perceptions; it must be possess'd with a Belief that what affects it after the same or different manner is really the same or different, else it can neither affirm or deny, or practise at all; and the Suppositions and Preconceptions must be the Foundation of its Knowledge and Judgment; it cannot compare things before it perceives things to compare, and it cannot infer the Truth or Falshood of one Proposition from others, before it has compar'd their Parts; and all this work cannot begin, carry on, or conclude without Suppositions and Preconception of Principles, that are of Natures, or rather the Author of Natures Impression.

This faculty can't be exercised without presuppositions.

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The Author's Definition of Reason.

Reason my Author defines thus. *The Faculty in the Mind, which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in one sort of Propositions, and Probability in others.*

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The commonly received Definition of it is, *That its the Faculty in the mind which infers the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition by its Perception of the mutable or immutable Relation between the parts of that, and other Propositions with which it is compared.* And so the Reader may take his choice; the difference is chiefly in this, that my Author makes Four parts, degrees or offices of this Faculty; others reckon that of making the inference or conclusion to be the chief or only proper Exercise of Reason: The Four parts or degrees of Reason which my Author reckons, are these. 1. The discovering of Proofs or intermediate *Ideas*. 2^{dly}, A regular and Methodical disposition of them, and laying them in fit order to make their force be plainly perceived. 3^{dly}, The perceiving their Connexion. The 4th is the making a right Conclusion. The Three first are commonly ascribed to that we call Thoughtfulness, Attention or Consideration; the last is usually esteemed the proper Exercise of this Faculty; but what this Author and they mean will be easily understood by this homely Instance; suppose one to have a mind to know the difference in height between Two Horses, for the Case is the very same, tho it don't look so learnedly as between the length or inclination of Two Lines, Acuteness or Obtuseness of Two Angles, the excess or equality of Two Figures; first, he would place the Two Horses as near one another as he can, that by such juxtaposition the Eye may go as far as it can. This my Author calls *a regular and methodical Disposition of the Ideas*. 2^{dly}, He would make use of some common Measure divided into small and proportional parts; this is in his Language *using an intermediate Idea*. 3^{dly}, He would clap the common Measure first to one Horse, and then the other; this he calls *Perception of their Connexion*. 4^{thly}, From that common Maxim, that what Two things are equal or in any certain Degree unequal to a Third, are equal or in that Degree unequal to each other; and this he calls *making a right Conclusion*. And so the common measures shew the just equality or excess which the Eye could not certainly discover immediately. But if any one will call all these Actions the Exercise of his Reasoning Faculty, because they all are Actions of a rational Creature, or only the last; every one may for me, enjoy his Liberty. However in this or any other Instance that can be fram'd, there is a supposed certain Measure or Rule; there is one Maxim or other that helps, or at least expedites the Perception of the certainty of the Conclusion.

The common Definition of Reason.

The difference between the Two Definitions explained.

There being in my Authors Opinion these Four Offices of Reason, he will by no means admit of Syllogism to be of any use for the improving our Knowledge, but rather an hindrance to it. Now, Syllogism is only a Form of Words, in which Three Propositions are so dispos'd as from the Truth of the Two first to infer the Truth or Falshood of the last; but that it may not be allowed a proper Instrument in regard of its shortness and order to expedite the Mind's Perception of the Relation that things stand to each other, and of singular use in publick Conferences or other Discourses to make the Matters in debate more readily perceived by the Hearers or Readers, seems not so plain as my Author endeavours to represent, or his Arguments prove; which are these.

This Author's Objections against the usefulness of Syllogisms answered.

I. Because Syllogism serves Reason but in one only of the forementioned parts, that is, only to shew the Connexion of the Proofs in any one instance, and no more; and in this respect is of no great use, because the Mind can perceive that Connexion, where it really is, as easily, nay perhaps better without it. For the understanding this Argument the Reader must observe, that what he calls here Proofs, is the same he calls intermediate *Ideas* in other Places. As in the familiar Instance last mentioned about the Two Horses, the common Measure is the Proof or Intermediate *Idea*; and if so, I would be gladly informed whether the use of it, and application of it first to one Horse, and then the other, be not some help? The Mind indeed by the Eye can in that Case come near the perceiving the Relation between the Two *Ideas* (which in that instance are the Two Horses) but that's not the Question; but whether so readily and exactly, as when there is an immediate clapping of the common Measure first to one and then the other Horse; and that's

His first Argument against Syllogisms answered.

that's the very use and office of Syllogisms to set things together that are at a distance, by a middle Term. My Author tells us, that he who will look into some parts of *Asia* or *America*, will find Men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, tho they have not so much as heard of a Syllogism; no nor perhaps of *Ideas*, I add: But shall we need to go so far for Instances of that kind; there are abundance such at home that are not infected with that Scholastick Distemper, not only of Persons of Quality, but of Day-labourers can do that, and in their way and if matters within their reach, as well as the best Schoolmen; who ever made any Question of that? The only Question is, whether those acute Reasoners don't in their Discourses make Syllogisms, tho they never heard the Word, or their Discourses would not be as intelligible; or when they don't they are not longer looser and obscurer. I am sure he whom my Author introduces perswading the Country Gentlewoman not to go abroad after a fit of Sickness, does, or if it be not one, his Discourse would be as pertinent if he had, what in short does all his Reasoning amount to more or less than this? A South West Wind and lowry Weather are Signs of Rain; Rain will endanger a Relapse; therefore it is not convenient for you to stir abroad; and if the Gentlewoman does not think the Connexion good or probable between such a Wind and Cloudy Weather and Rain, then she denies the Major Proposition; or if she think Rain will do her no harm, that is, that there is no Connexion between Rain and Relapse, she denies the Minor; and, so the Lady and her Doctor discourse Syllogistically whether they know it or not. And so it is in all rational Discourses; even in Mathematical Demonstrations, if any one was minded to prove in words that the Three Angles of a right-lined Triangle are equal to Two right Angles, what shorter or more intelligible could he use than such a form as this?

When one of the sides of a right-lined Triangle is prolong'd, the Angle it makes is equal to the Two inward opposite Angles.

The Two Angles made by the prolong'd Line, and the next inward Angle are equal to Two right Angles.

Therefore, &c.

Or thus.

The Three Arches of a Circle that subtend the Three Angles of a right-lined Triangle, are a Semicircle, or 180 Degrees.

The Arch of a Circle that subtends any Two ^{right} Angles, ^{is} ~~are~~ a Semicircle, or an 180 Degrees.

Therefore, &c.

In any of those Two Instances the Demonstration is in the form of a Syllogism: But 'tis confessed indeed this is not so clear a way as shewing the same would be by the Lines and Angles themselves; but that's because they are better apprehended than any words, and therefore nothing to the purpose; for the Question in hand is, whether this be not as good or a better form of words than any other.

His 2d Argument answered.

His 2d. Argument against Syllogisms is, that tho they shew the Force or Fallacy of an Argument made use of in the usual way of discoursing, by supplying the absent Proposition and so setting it in a clear light, yet it no less engages the Mind in obscure equivocal, and fallacious Terms. Be it thus, yet here it must be noted, that my Author owns that they are of singular use to set things in a clear light by supplying the absent Proposition, which in familiar Discourses is often left out, and exposing the naked Truth or Falshood of Arguments, which is often disguised by long, loose, and flourishing Harangues. And as for the obscure, equivocal, and fallacious Terms, that's not the fault of the form of words, but of the words themselves, which in all Disputations the Defendent may be required to explain before they go any farther; and if that be done as 'tis allowed to be in all regular Conferences, then this Argument fails; or if it was of any strength, it would be as valid against all sort of Discourses or Conferences, for they are no less liable to the Ambiguity of Words than this Syllogistical Form.

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His 3d. Argument against Syllogism is, that if they were allowed useful in Demonstrative Truths, yet they can't be in Probabilities; because the Assent being to be determined by the preponderancy after the weighing of all the Proofs with all the Circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind as this Form, because it runs away with one assumed Probability, or one topical Argument, and pursues that till it lead the Mind out of sight of that which is under consideration. Now it must be confessed indeed, that the Defendent of any Proposition must be in the same posture with him that defends a Town, when besieged; he must provide for the weakest part especially, and against the strongest Batteries; but then it must be also considered, that this is the common practice in all sort of Conferences, if any one pretends to maintain any sort of probable Proposition, he that opposes it will use his strongest Argument, and attack it in the weakest part; and if he make good what he offers, he will not perhaps fully prove the Falshood of the defended Proposition, because there may be other Arguments as strong on the other side; yet still he that hears or reads will retain his liberty to give his full Assent; yet by this means he will have gained one Argument or probable Reason to put into the balance in order to the determining the Assent, which he had not before considered, and that is all that is pretended either in Syllogistical or any other form of rational discourse or arguing: And all that is aimed at in any Disputation.

His Third Argument answered.

His 4th Argument against Syllogisms is, that they serve not to increase Knowledge, but only to fence with that we have; because they fail our Reason in that part, which if it is not the highest Perfection, yet is its hardest Task, and that is finding out Proofs and making new Discoveries: A Man first knows, and then he is able to prove it Syllogistically. All this is so far true; but is not in the least to the purpose. Who ever said that a Man cou'd make a wise Argument meerly by knowing the Mood and Figure into which in publick Conferences especially he must form it? No, no; He that uses a Syllogism must find out the middle Term himself; the form of placing his words won't do that: The Question is only whether that which he has prepared to say or write, would not be as well or better expressed in as few, and those as intelligible, in the form of a Syllogism, as any other form of words; and therefore my Author's Appeal to the King of *Spain* using Mattocks and Shovels to find the Mines of Gold and Silver in *America*, is a little too far of the business in hand; for no body pretends that Syllogisms will find out new Countries, will make holes in the Ground, cast away Earth, separate Moulds from Metall: I am clearly in my Author's Mind that Rustick Industry well encouraged and directed with Reason will go farther towards the discovery of the Natures or Properties of Bodies, and add more to the stock of Humane Knowledge, than Scholastick proceedings in Mood and Figure. But I don't meet with any such Bigots for Syllogisms that think otherwise, or that pretend that by them the 47th Proposition in *Euclid* so celebrated for usefulness, or the Virtues of *Kin Kina* (which I don't understand but guess 'tis his new name for Jesuits Powder) or the several Arts of using or improving Iron, which he reckons the main excellency of the *Europeans* above the *Americans*, or the wonders of the Loadstone, or the Arts of making Gunpowder or of Printing, were invented by the method of disputing Syllogistically, or indeed in any other form. But I have met with some that think, that after these things were invented by accident, by Study or Industry, by repeated Experiments or Labour; that the advantages of them were propagated and communicated to others as well or better in that Form of words, than any other; and I wish the calling every new invented Power or Property in any Bodies by the new Name of *Ideas*, may contribute more to the increase of useful Learning or making new Discoveries than Syllogisms have.

His 4th Argument answered.

There's another Objection against Syllogisms which my Author has wedged in, and that is, that no Syllogistical Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has one at least general Proposition in it; whereas he says in Truth, the immediate Object of all our reasoning is nothing but particulars; every Man's reasoning

A 5th Argument answered.

ing about the *Ideas* existing in his own Mind, which are truly every one of them particular Existences, and our Knowledge and Reasoning about other things, is only as they correspond with those of our particular *Ideas*: Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular *Ideas* about which it is, are such as more than one particular thing can correspond with and be represented by in this Paragraph, which I think that I have exactly transcribed, there is, I conceive, a mistake in my Author about the Rule of Syllogisms; and in the other part, a contradiction to his whole Scheme about abstract general *Ideas*. For first, there are Rules about Syllogisms where every Proposition is particular; but I confess there is no great matter in them that requires Reasoning, because 'tis so very sensible and obvious as not to need either that or any other form of words to convince another. This Paper has a plain and regular Superficies: This Pen has not so: Therefore their Figures are different.

In this Syllogism all the Propositions are particular, and the Conclusion right. But let that pass; as for the rest of the Paragraph, if it be true as he says it is, and I think clearly so that every *Idea* is a particular Existence, then there can be no general abstract *Ideas*. If, for Example, Whiteness and Triumph be *Ideas* then they are *Ideas* only of a particular White Body, and a particular Triumph; and therefore all that he must mean by general abstract *Ideas* must be only the general Names given to particulars, unless there could be *Ideas* that are both general and particular, which is beyond my skill to make Sense of.

A Specimen of
Syllogisms to
shew their use.

Here is a great deal of stir about Syllogisms. Now the fairest way to shew their use, will be to give some Specimens of them, that so an indifferent Reader may judge whether they be not as short, proper and intelligible Forms of Speech as can be deviz'd; and this I choose to do in opposition to some of my Author's singular Opinions about *Ideas*, especially on purpose at one view to expose the naked Truth or Falshood of his, or the common Notion about those matters which are the Subject of the Debate.

I. Every *Idea*, is the Image or Resemblance of some Object out of the Mind.

There can be no Image or Resemblance of any Object out of the Mind, but of some particular visible Object.

Therefore there can be no *Idea* of any thing but of a particular visible Object.

II. Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, &c. are only the Names of several Modes of Sensation: No one can have *Ideas* of those Modes of Sensation, *therefore they are not Ideas.*

III. Every simple *Idea* must be an uncompounded abstract *Idea*.

Its impossible to frame the *Ideas* of Motion, Rest, Figure, Bulk, Position, uncompounded or abstracted from the Bodies of which they are the Modes; therefore there are no simple *Ideas* of them.

IV. Colours, Smells, Tafts, Sounds, and all Qualities that affect the Touch, are only the Mind's Perceptions of several Motions communicated to its Organs of Sense, the Mind cannot have *Ideas* of any such Perceptions:

Therefore there are no *Ideas* of such Qualities.

V. Mixed Modes or Actions are combinations of several mixed Actions of several Agents.

The Mind cannot form one *Idea* of the several mixed Actions of several Agents.

Therefore there are no *Ideas* of mix'd Modes or Actions.

VI. The real Essence of any particular thing is that which makes it really what it is.

The nominal Essence of any particular thing is that only which makes it call'd so.

Therefore the real Essence and Nominal Essence of any particular thing is not the same. Or thus,

There is no Reason in Nature for the Name of any thing:

There

There is a Reason in Nature for the Essence of any thing :

Therefore the Name and Essence of every thing is different.

VII. The real Essence of moral Modes or mix'd Actions are not mutable without the change of the Actions or Laws to which those Actions have Relation :

The nominal Essence of moral Modes or mix'd Actions are mutable at every single Person's Pleasure :

Therefore the real Essence and Nominal of mix'd Actions or moral Modes is not the same.

VIII. The real Essence of all sensible Qualities is not known :

The Nominal Essence of them is known :

Therefore their real and nominal Essence is not the same.

IX. The real Essence or true Reason (suppose of White and Black) is that various Motion, Position, Bulk and Figure in the parts of Bodies which fits them to reflect Light :

Their nominal Essence, or the Reason they are call'd White or Black, is only their affecting our Eyes in the same manner other Bodies do that have those Names :

Therefore their nominal and real Essence is not the same.

X. There is nothing general but Names common to several particular Substances or Modes :

Abstract general *Ideas* are not Names common to several particular Substances or Modes :

Therefore there are no such things as abstract general *Ideas*.

I do not pretend these Syllogisms are made according to the exact Rules which some Logicians give us as to Mood and Figure ; yet I am pretty confident they wou'd not be excepted against in the Universities for any defect in their Form ; and the only Fault which wou'd be found in them is in the Truth of the Propositions, which it is not my business in that place to defend, but am apt to think that I have done it sufficiently in other parts of this Tract.

Reason my Author says penetrates into the Depths of the Seas , and elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads through the vast Spaces and large Rooms of this mighty Fabrick, yet it falls short of the real Extent of even corporeal Beings, and therefore fails in these Particulars.

First where our *Ideas* fail, that is, in other words, we cannot reason about things of which we know nothing ; which every Body grants is a great Truth, tho it is but a very plain one if that be the Sense of it ; and if it be not, I must confess that I cannot understand it has any.

2dly. When our *Ideas* are obscure or imperfect ; for example, we have but an obscure imperfect Knowledge of Infinity ; therefore our reasoning about the Division of Matter *in infinitum*, the infinite Expansion of Space or Matter must be confused : The Mode of the Operation of our Minds, and indeed of all Bodies, is imperfectly known, therefore our reasoning about them cannot be very clear or perfect.

3dly. Our Reason fails, because we want intermediate to shew the certain or probable Agreement of Two other *Ideas* ; that is again, there are many things in the World which we know, but the Relation we don't for want of means, Arguments or common Measures to discover that real Relation between them. We know, for Example, there are a Sun, Moon and Stars ; but we cannot judge of their Magnitude, their Distance, from us or one another, because we want common Measures to try or prove them by. And the Case is the same in all or most Bodies that have irregular Figures : We see Dogs and Horses Stones and Trees, but can't arrive at the Knowledge of the just Proportion of their several Parts, for want of middle Terms to measure them by. My Author here speaks of the Wonders again of *Algebra*. I shou'd be glad to hear of any such Discoveries as these which it had made, for these wou'd pass for Wonders. However, what he means by the want of intermediate *Ideas* is discoverable enough by

Where Reason fails.

by those familiar Instances, which in the Ideal Phrase is something mysterious.

4thly. Our Reason fails when we go upon wrong Principles; for this often involves us in Contradictions. This concerns those that suppose what needs Proof, but not those that suppose nothing but what every Man does and must in all his Reasonings; and them also that out of a groundless fear of wrong Principles will pretend to prove every thing by such ways they can't prove any Proposition is certainly true or false.

5thly. Our Reason is often foil'd by doubtful Terms or uncertain Signs, for these perplex our Reason as much as insignificant Words, that is, such as have no Thoughts or real *Ideas* in the Mind of which they are the Signs. To this may, I think, be added another perplexity to our Reason, and that is, the pretence to *Ideas* when there is nothing in the Mind, or out of it, of which they are the *Ideas* or Signs: In which Classis, I doubt, all my Author's simple, general, abstract *Ideas* of Substances, Modes and moral Relations will be found when duly examin'd.

Intuitive Knowledge not certain but on Supposition of things really existing without us.

V. Intuitive Knowledge my Author says is the highest Degree of Certainty we can arrive at; which may I conceive be own'd, provided the *Ideas* we have in our Minds be suppos'd the Signs or Resemblances of things really existing without it; otherwise they will be no real *Ideas*, nor the Propositions form'd about them true or false. For Example, there can be no Propositions more certain than these Three; Two added to Two are equal to Four; the Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle; the Whole is equal to all its Parts; but these are none of them true or false, but on supposition of real particular things existing which constitute the Propositions of which those general words are the common Names or Signs. How can any one say, that Two and Two make Four, unless he suppose the real Existence of things number'd? Can he say it merely by the Agreement of the *Ideas* of twice Two with the *Idea* of Four? But then I ask, what *Ideas* are in his Mind of those Numbers (except he mean the Figures 2 and 4 which are but Signs) abstracted from all particular things really existing? And if he find none, as I doubt he will not, then he supposes the Existence of things without him, else his Proposition will amount to a Connexion of Two Nothings. The Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle no doubt, but there is no *Idea* of a Circle in general; if he has any *Idea* it is of a particular Circle, and then he supposes again the real Existence of that particular Circle, and so 'tis the real Inequality between that Circle and its Arch that makes the Proposition true, and not the Ideal abstract Disagreement. And so for the third Instance; the Whole is equal to all its Parts, is no true Proposition, except there be suppos'd real Bodies existing which have that Relation, for there are no abstract general *Ideas* to be found either of Whole or Parts. And therefore intuitive Knowledge is no Knowledge at all, but on Supposition of the real Existence without us, which is contrary to my Author's Method and Meaning. However from hence he infers;

1. That intuitive Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement of Two *Ideas* immediately compar'd, which needs no other Confutation than the Three Instances last mention'd; for how certain soever those Propositions are, yet there are no *Ideas* in the Mind answering to the Terms which constitute them: They are true only on the Account of the real and immutable Relation between Particulars, of which the general Terms are the common Names.

Nor Demonstrative Knowledge without the like Supposition.

2dly. The next Degree of Knowledge is that which is call'd Demonstrative, which is nothing else in his Language but the Perception of the certain Agreement of Two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of a third. But then again, the Certainty of Demonstrative Propositions supposes the real Existence of things perceiv'd to be so related; the Three Angles of a Triangle cou'd be never said to be equal to Two right Angles if the Mind did not condescend to Particulars; for it wou'd

wou'd not find in itself any things to compare, or any ground for its judging of the Agreement or Disagreement. To this Degree of demonstrative Knowledge my Author takes rational Knowledge, which he makes also to be the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any Two *Ideas* by the Intervention of one or more other *Ideas*. But others extend rational Knowledge so far as to comprehend all that Knowledge we have by humane Testimony, when constant and universal; or by divine Testimony, when uncontested Miracles are wrought for the Confirmation of any Proposition; but this my Author does not reckon for rational Knowledge because there is no discoverable Connexion between any sort of Testimony; and the Parts of the Propositions which its design'd to prove but only rational Belief a diminutive sort of Assent or Judgment. Tho it be never so probable to an Englishman that never saw *France* or *Paris* by the universal Consent of all he ever spoke with, and all Authors he ever read, yet 'tis not Knowledge unless he has seen them. So tho all the Christian World agree that many Miracles were wrought to confirm the Resurrection of the dead, nay those that saw them wrought cannot know the Truth of that Proposition for want of Agreement in the *Ideas* of the Parts of the Propositions and the humane Testimony in one Case and the Miracles in the other. This seems to be a pretty nice Distinction, and without a Difference, when the Cases come to Action or useful Application; for all Men of common Sense will venture their All upon such Assurances, and that's as much as any Man can do upon intuitive demonstrative or sensitive Knowledge. But this you must note is only to keep up the Honour of *Ideas*; for in my Author's way no Man can certainly know any thing but his own Thoughts; but how he shou'd so much as know them certainly, unless he supposes something without him that is the Cause or Object of them, is not so easie to explain as may be imagin'd, without first supposing the Truth of our Senses, which my Author's Principles about the Degrees of Certainty will by no means admit: And yet without such Supposition it will be hard to prove the real Truth of any Proposition whatever, as I have elsewhere endeavour'd to evince.

Rational Knowledge farther extended than the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*.

VI. 3dly. To supply the narrowness of this intuitive or demonstrative Knowledge, my Author places Judgment or judging, which he describes thus; *The acquiescing of the Mind in the Truth of Propositions, without the Perception of any certain Agreement or Disagreement of Two Ideas immediately, as in Intuition; or mediately, as in Demonstration or rational Knowledge, but only of likely probable or usual Agreement or Disagreement.* Whereas commonly this Faculty is thought to be exercis'd in all Cases wherein the Mind has compar'd things, whether the Relation between them be immutable or certain, mutable or uncertain. It judges that Two and Two make Four; that the Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to Two right Angles, as well as that there is or was such a Place as *Rome* or *Jerusalem*; that there are Inhabitants of the Earth near the Poles or under the Line, or of any such probable Propositions. And therefore herein my Author seems to have too much limited this Faculty, as he has that of Rational Knowledge, which is commonly extended to all such Knowledge which leaves no room for a rational doubt, as in the Case of Humane Testimony, when Constant and Divine, when vouch'd by Miracles.

Judgment of larger extent than by this Author assigned.

VII. There are Four sorts of Arguments commonly used: 1. The first he calls *ad verecundiam*. For example, when the Opinions of Men are alledg'd, whose Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other Cause, has gain'd them a Name in common esteem with some kind of Authority, and so 'tis reckon'd a breach of Modesty to question them. This sort of Argument my Author rejects as in no Degree good, because it brings no real Knowledge with it; but instead thereof involves us in the hazard of Errors. All this which he says must be own'd true; but after all, this Argument is not so contemptible as he wou'd make it, and may very fairly stand in the place of a good one, till each Man for himself can find a better, which is all that is by wise folks pretended. And till all People are made equally wise, which will hardly be till they are all of an Age, all have

Four Sorts of Arguments commonly used.

Ad verecundiam rejected by this Author as of no use.

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equal

equal Capacities of Mind and Body, have all the same Education, and other advantages for Improvement, are all of the same Trade, Art, Profession and Authority, I doubt this Argument will be in fashion. And therefore as long as the World stands in the same Posture it does, will pass for a good one, till the new World is made, or some ingenious Sceptick has found out the Art of resolving all his own and other Mens Doubts infallibly, both which I fear will require some time.

Ad ignorantiam rejected also.

The 2d sort of Argument he calls *ad ignorantiam*, as when Persons are driven to submit to others Judgments and receive their Opinions or assign a Reason for a better. This is indeed foul play to drive or force another to be of his Opinion; this is plainly taking a little too much advantage of his Ignorance; but it shou'd, I think, be first proved that it's even possible to force another to be of his Opinion. He may go a great way in obliging another to profess it, but to believe it, which is clear another thing, is out of all humane reach. However this sort of arguing is not altogether impertinent, because it may convince an ignorant Person that he is ignorant, and thereby lay an Obligation upon him not to be too peremptory, and to study how to become wiser.

Ad Hominem.

III. The 3d sort of Argument he calls *ad Hominem*, when one presses another with Consequences drawn from his own Principles; and this seems fair enough, and is often of singular use to convince a Man that his own Principles are ~~not~~ liable to Objection, and that's one step towards the making him wiser. But this advantage a Sceptick has, that he has no Principles to defend, only to oppose all others; and he is secure against the Name of an odious Sect, for his business is to find fault in them all, which is generally a very easie Task, and yet the ready Road to get the Honour of being shrew'd and profound.

Ad Judicium.

This is the best but the other of some use for improving Knowledge.

IV. His 4th he calls *ad Judicium*; when any one uses Arguments drawn from the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This must be confess'd the best sort of Argument, and the most proper for the making People directly wiser. For no one is the wiser for knowing another is esteem'd wise, as in the first sort of Argument; or for not knowing more than he does, as in the second; or for going upon wrong Principles, as in the third. However, the being taught all or any of these Three things that other Men are esteem'd wiser than ordinary, that he himself is more ignorant than he thought, that the Principles he goes upon are more doubtful than he was aware of, are all helps to the making any Man in some Degree wiser. But he indeed that uses Proofs fetch'd from the very Foundations of Knowledge or Probability, is the Master Artist. But nevertheless he that offers to instruct another, must suppose him grounded in some Principles or other, else he will want a Rule by which to try the Proofs he brings; and whether any such can be had by the resolving all Certainty into meer *Ideas*, is a Matter that deserves a serious Consideration.

What things are according to, above, or contrary to Reason in this Author's Account.

VIII. From the account which my Author has given of Reason he infers that we may be able to make some Judgment of the Distinction of things into those that are *according to*, *above*, and *contrary to* Reason. 1. *According to* Reason, are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those *Ideas* we have from Sensation and Reflection, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable: 2d. *Above* Reason, are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3d. *Contrary to* Reason, are such Propositions as are inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Existence of one God is according to Reason; the Resurrection of the Body after Death, above Reason; the Existence of more than one God, contrary to Reason. This is his Account, and these are his Instances; and I shall now examine how these, or any other Propositions can appear agreeable to, above, or contrary to Reason meerly by *Ideas*. That there is one God is a true Proposition, we agree; but that it appears agreeable to Reason by examining or tracing the simple *Ideas* of Existence and Thinking (which is his way) is the Question. Now I say there are no simple *Ideas*, and particularly either

But not by the way of *Ideas* proved in the particulars not according to Reason.

either of Existence or Thinking ; not of Existence without the thing existing, nor of thinking without the Substance of which it is the Action, or the Object about which it is exercised, or the thing thought on ; just as there is not of Motion, without the Body moved or moving : How then, I ask, by examining or tracing these *Ideas*, can we be lead to the perceiving there is one God. The *Idea* of Existence leads us no farther than the perceiving our own Existence by the consciousness we have of our own differing and succeeding Thoughts within our selves ; and thence we may be lead indeed to conclude there are some things really existing without us, which produce those Thoughts ; but then that inference is made from that common Maxim, *every Effect must have a Cause* ; but of either of the parts of that last Proposition we have no *Ideas*, because every *Idea* is of a particular Object ; and as to the *Idea* of Thinking, that will lead us no farther than the Perception of our own Existence, who are the Thinking Substances, unless we have *Ideas* of the things about which it is exercised, or on which we think ; and that involves us in the necessity of supposing the real Existence of things without us, for 'tis from them, and what we discover in our selves and them, that we deduce the Existence of one God ; and so the Mind, before it can make any Inference or Conclusion, is inevitably brought to suppose the real Existence of things without us ; and that supposition of the Existence of things without us, how necessary soever it is in all our Reasonings, can never be proved by the way of *Ideas* ; because there can be no Connexion in Nature between any *Ideas* wholly within us, and any Objects wholly without us, and consequently no certainty of their real Existence ; because all Certainty, according to my Author's Principles, is founded only in the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*.

2dly, As we cannot apprehend the agreeableness of any Proposition to Reason, meerly by *Ideas* ; so neither can we the Truth of any Proposition which is above Reason. That there will be a Resurrection of the Body after Death we are fully agreed is a true Proposition ; but that it is discoverable to be so by *Ideas*, I deny ; for no one has the *Idea* of more Powers or Properties than what he finds in himself or other visible Causes ; he may indeed rationally infer, that there are such Powers in some invisible Being or other to raise the Dead, from such miraculous Effects as demonstrate Power equal to that of raising the Dead ; but those Effects will help him to no *Idea* of such a Cause ; and tho the Miracles may be a very good Proof of the Truth of that Proposition, yet 'tis not by the way of *Ideas* ; for there is no Connexion in Nature between the Miracles and either of the parts of that Proposition ; they are extrinick and foreign to the whole matter : Neither can I yet perceive, how any Proposition, by whom soever revealed, or however confirmed by Miracles, can in this way of *Ideas* be made either certain or more probable thereby. There are many Propositions that are above our Reason to apprehend the connexion of their parts, and yet we rationally believe them to be true tho we have no *Ideas* of the manner of their Relation : We believe the attraction of Magnets ; the Flux and Reflux of the Seas ; the descent of heavy Bodies, but shall perhaps never attain the perfect Knowledge of their Causes, or the Mode of their Operations, but rely on the Testimony of our Senses ; and if our Assent was to be suspended in those and infinite more cases till we had clear and distinct *Ideas* of those Modes, we might have the advantage indeed of being secur'd from Error, but not a dram the Wiser, unless it be Wisdom to be everlastingly Idle ; for such we must be, if all our Actions must depend only on the agreement of clear and distinct *Ideas*. And as for Humane or Divine Testimony, they don't in any case advance or improve our perceptive Faculties, and therefore why we should trust them, or act accordingly, without being condemned to the Paradise of Fools by our *Idealists*, is not very accountable.

3dly, As we cannot discover what Propositions are agreeable to, or above Reason, if that Faculty be exercised only about simple *Ideas*, for such only are clear and distinct in my Authors reckoning, so neither can we what are contrary to Reason ; for no simple *Ideas* are coherent or incoherent with one another : The simple

Nor above Reason.

Nor contrary to Reason.

simple *Idea* of Motion is neither different from, nor contrary to, the simple *Idea* of Rest ; all the contrariety or difference arises from the Bodies in which they are united with other Modes ; and in this instance there is no contrariety or difference between the simple *Ideas* of One Two Three, or a Thousand, all that there is is between the things Numbered. The Reason why there cannot be more Gods than one, is because one Being, whose Essence or distinguishing Excellency is, that it is the Cause of all other Beings cannot be more than one, because if there was more than one, each being would cease to be that which denominates it such as it is, namely, the Cause of all other Beings ; but this inference is not made from clear and distinct *Ideas* of Number, because there are no such simple *Ideas*, but from the repugnancy there is of being one thing and another, or of being a Cause and an Effect. This by the way farther evinces what I have so often repeated, that there are no simple *Ideas* in the Mind of any sort. Whatever we have the Image of in our Minds, whatever is the immediate Object of thinking is complicated : And what my Author calls simple *Ideas* are the meer Names of the Thoughts or Perceptions themselves, of which Thoughts or Perceptions we have no manner of *Ideas*, such as Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold ; or are the Modifications or Powers of Substances, of which also we have no *Ideas* abstracted from the Substances of which they are the Modes or Powers.

Another sense
of the word
Reason as op-
posed to faith
very improper.

IX. There is (as my Author tells us) another vulgar Sense of the word *Reason*, wherein it is opposed to *Faith* ; but he owns, as most others do, that 'tis very improper ; for Faith grounded upon Divine Testimony is nothing else but a firm Assent of the Mind Grounded upon the highest Reason, and therefore can never be contrary to Reason. The difference between Assent to the Truth of any Proposition, whose parts are either immediately or mediately perceived to be related, and Assent or Faith in any revealed Proposition, is chiefly in this, that Assent to such Propositions is founded upon the Truth of our Senses and other Natural Faculties, and Divine Faith is founded upon the veracity of the Author of Nature which in the last result is much the same. He that believes that the Arch of a Circle is less than the whole, relies upon the Testimony of his Senses, and that they don't deceive him ; and he that believes a Life after this, or any other Revealed Proposition attested by sensible Miracles, relies upon the Wisdom and Goodness of the Author of Nature, who will not and cannot deceive him, or suffer him to be deceived in a matter of such importance ; and so the Ground of every Mans Faith to whom a Revelation is immediately made, or that is an Eye-witness of the Miracles, is much the same as to Evidence ; or rational Assent.

I freely subscribe to what my Author says, that he who believes any Proposition to be true, in religious matters especially, without any Reason, does not seek Truth as he ought, or pay that Obedience which is due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him from Error or Mistake. But then I crave leave to add, that as he must not believe, so he must not doubt without Reason. In the great Court of Equity which God has erected in Heaven, Men will not be adjudged to everlasting Happiness or Misery barely by the Number of Propositions they have believed or disbelieved, because that in a great measure depends upon natural capacity and circumstances of Life, which are almost unavoidable ; but on the sincerity of their endeavours to use all their Powers to know as much and as many Truths, and to avoid as many Errors as they can, and live and act according to that Knowledge ; and herein I conceive my Authors Sentiments, though perhaps differently expressed, agree with all others that have honourable and worthy Thoughts of their Maker.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

I. **I**N order to the laying the just Bounds of Reason and Faith my Author premises these Definitions of them, as contradistinguished, tho he as well as others judge such contradistinction improper, for the Reasons mentioned in the last Chapter.

This Author's and the common Definitions of Faith and Reason given.

Reason is the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at, by the Deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its Natural Faculties, viz. Sensation and Reflexion the common Definition runs thus. Reason is the discovery of the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition by the Mind's perceiving the immutable or certain, and the mutable or uncertain Relation between its parts in the use only of its Senses and Natural Powers. The difference between the Two Definitions is chiefly in this, that the former supposes simple general and abstract Ideas; the latter needs no such suppositions for the exercise of this Faculty in the discovery of Truth.

Faith, he defines, the Assent of the Mind to any Proposition not made out thus by the deduction of Reason, but upon the credit of the Proposer, as coming immediately from God, which is called Revelation. But I conceive Divine Faith might be more properly and intelligibly defined thus. *Faith is the Assent of the Mind to any Propositions where the Relation between its parts is not discoverable by the use of our Natural Faculties, but the Reason of the Assent is Divine Testimony.* That which again makes the difference in these Two Definitions of Faith, is, That its commonly thought where such Divine Testimony is given which is chiefly by Miracles, there the Assent is as rationally grounded, as 'tis when grounded upon any deductions made in the use of our Natural Faculties; which I doubt is something more than the Ideal Principles can admit. But in that I am not positive, because tho my Author allows Miracles, yet I don't find it plainly said in any part of his Essay, that they, or any concurrent or corroborating Evidence are sufficient Indications of a Divine Revelation.

However, for the clearer stating the distinct Provinces of Faith and Reason, he advances these Propositions well worthy of a cautious Examination.

II. First, *No Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new simple Ideas, which they had not before from Sensation and Reflexion.* We must give our Author leave to be as fond of simple Ideas as he please, because no Body, that I know of, owns them but himself. The Senses gives us notice of Figure, Motion, Rest, Magnitude, Position and Number of the parts of Bodies, when they are gross enough to affect our Organs; and from the variety of them we collect by Analogy all the other varieties in Bodies, such as Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, and all tangible Qualities do arise; but having no Ideas of any of these abstracted from the Bodies of which they are the Modes or Powers, we are not very curious in our inquiries whether any inspired Man can reveal any new or any old simple Ideas, or not. And as for the rest of his Tribe of simple Ideas, such as Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, they are nothing but the Names of Modes of Sensation, of which we have no abstract Ideas. All that we are concerned for in Relation to the former sort, are complex Ideas, Substances, with those Tacklings united to them, or inherent in them; and as to the latter, we are only solicitous for the possibility, probability and certainty of the Revelation of greater degrees of them, than we can naturally conceive: And in this Sense we are apt to think, that if God think fit by immediate Inspiration to reveal to any Persons the Knowledge of such Objects, or greater degrees of those Sensations, that he can furnish those Persons with power by words or other signs to produce the like Ideas or Perceptions in others which were communicated in

Several Observations of this Author examined.

No need of new simple Ideas in order to Supernatural Knowledge.

the Original Revelation. And as for the Instance he gives us, of the effect of St. Paul's Divine Extasy, it does not in the least prove the incommunicableness of Supernatural Knowledge to others. Allowing St. Paul's expression to imply that there were such Pleasures in Heaven reserved for good Men, as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, or hath entered into the Heart of Man to conceive; but he does not say they were such degrees of pleasure as he had no conception of, or were incommunicable to others; but rather just contrary; for he expressly tells us in the very next words, God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit. We shall not need to be told that words by their Operation on us cause no other *Ideas* or Perceptions but of their natural Sounds, and that 'tis by the custom of using them for signs that they excite in our Minds latent *Ideas* or Perceptions: To which my Author adds (something more than I dare) such only as were there before. For I have not yet learnt a Reason so far to limit the Divine Power, as to suppose it cannot by words excite greater degrees of pleasure or trouble of Mind, or new combinations of Thoughts, which are complex *Ideas*; for what, I ask, shou'd hinder the Divine Power from so refining the immediate Instruments of our Sensations, the animal Spirits, as to make them capable of new Motions from separating them from grosser parts, and ranging them into any form or order and so representing a new Scene of things to the Imagination? Why God should not be able to do this as well as we find it daily by Men, in their Description of foreign Animals, Plants, and innumerable other particulars, is altogether unaccountable. All this, if granted possible, as there is not the least Reason to deny, yet will not, I confess, amount to the forming new simple *Ideas*. But then it must be considered, there is not the least need of it; for the Modes of Substances which we know already, are capable of an infinite variety in Degrees and Mixtures, and the words we have are equally capable of being formed into an infinite number of Propositions, so that in order to the making Divine or Supernatural Discoveries there will be no need of more Organs of Sense, of new Words or new Modes of Substances. And therefore I conceive this Proposition of my Author's might as well have been saved, and so indeed might my Notes upon it, but that possibly an unwary Reader might hence infer, it was impossible for God to communicate any Supernatural Knowledge; whereas if he carry that caution along with him, that there are really no old simple *Ideas*, he will easily infer there is no need of new ones in order to Divine Revelation.

Traditional Knowledge not so certain as immediate Revelation or rational Deductions, and why.

III. 2dly, He says, *Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same certainty that Reason doth.*

By *Original Revelation* he means, he says, the first Impression which is immediately made by God on the Mind of Man; and by *Traditional* those Impressions delivered over to others in words and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another. As for instance, God might by Revelation discover the Truth of any Proposition in *Euclid*; but then if we discover the same Truth by the Knowledge of our own clear *Ideas*, it will be always certainer to us than if it was conveyed by Traditional Revelation. All this may be admitted, provided it be limited to Traditional Revelation, as my Author seems to have intended it shou'd. And the Reasons are very obvious. 1. Because no Man can be so certain that any Proposition which contains matter of Fact, was delivered by an inspired Person, as he may of the Truth of a Proposition whose parts are discoverable to have a certain Relation to each other by his own immediate Perception or rational Deduction: For example; no one can be so certain that the material World was formed by God in such a manner, order or time, as is related by *Moses*, as he may, that there is a God; because all the Evidence he can have for the former is only from the Writings which *Moses*, an inspired Author is supposed to have delivered to Posterity. But no Man can be so sure that *Moses* wrote the Book of *Genesis* as he may by his own rational Deductions of the Being of God, from the visible effects of infinite Wisdom and a regulated Power which he discovers in himself and the visible parts of the Creation.

2dly, Be-

2dly. Because no one can be sure that this or that was the Sense of the Words in which the Proposition was deliver'd, as he may of the Sense of those words which he uses himself; he cannot be so absolutely certain, that what he calls the Heaven or the Firmament was created the second Day, as that there is such a thing which he himself calls by that Name, which he sees with his own Eyes. And the like holds good in matter of Fact immediately discoverable by our Senses. We cannot be so certain, that there was such a Deluge as is described in the Books of *Moses*, as if we had either seen the Deluge our selves, or seen *Moses* write the History of it, or heard it from his own Mouth. But all this must, as I intimated before, be limited to *Traditional Revelation*: For as to *Original Revelation* it seems too great a restraint of the Divine Power to suppose God can't make the Coherence of the Parts of any Proposition as plain to any one's Mind immediately as by his external Senses; and there is no doubt but the inspired Prophets had as clear a view and prospect of several past and future Events as if they actually had seen them; and there is as little, but that several inspired Men and Holy Martyrs had as clear a Sensation of some of the Pleasures of Heaven which were design'd for the Rewards of their steady Piety and Patience, as if they were actually in Heaven; else the Chearfulness and Courage with which they voluntarily underwent the Torments they suffer'd, was as great a Miracle as most we read of; 2dly. This must be understood with limitation to such Books only reputed to be written by Divine Inspiration, are not vouch'd to be such by other Persons divinely inspired; for such as are Eye-witnesses of Miracles wrought by Persons divinely inspired, have the same Reason or Evidence for their Faith as those had who heard the Propositions deliver'd with their own Ears, or saw them written by the first Revealer. And therefore this is not wholly applicable to the Books of *Moses* and other Prophets, because in many particulars they were vouch'd by Christ or some other of his inspired Apostles.

This must be limited only to Traditional Revelation else not true.

IV. 3dly. He says, *That no Revelation can be admitted against the clear Evidence of Reason.* This must be own'd unexceptionably, right; because if any Proposition whatever shou'd be admitted true, which is contrary to our Reason, then the Ground and Foundation of our Belief or Assent to any Truths, whether in religious or inferior Matters wou'd be entirely undermined, and a Door open'd for Enthusiasm, and all the Confusions which the unguided heat of some Mens Brains and extravagant Fancies cou'd create. Suppose, for example, that a Person shou'd tell me that it was reveal'd that what my Senses, and other Peoples too, represent as a piece of Bread, was really an entire humane Body; I shou'd presently ask him, why I shou'd believe it, he may answer, because it was deliver'd by one that was divinely inspired and gave Evidence of his being so, by many and uncontested Miracles which he wrought. But the Reply is natural; if I must not believe my Senses and other Peoples, why shou'd I believe there were any such Miracles wrought; if I must not trust to the clear Deductions of my own Reason, why shou'd I believe those Miracles were a clear Proof of the Person's Divine Inspiration that reveal'd it? This is the common obvious Reason which is given for this Assertion. But my Author's Two Arguments to confirm it, seem not altogether so intelligible or conclusive. His first Argument is, because the Evidence that we don't deceive our selves in ascribing that to God, which is the effect of our own Imagination, can never be so good as the Perception of our own *Ideas*. But it deserves to be consider'd. 1. Whether a Persons own Probity or Sincerity of his own Designs may not be as certainly known to himself, as any *Ideas* he can have in his Mind. 2dly. Whether a Person's Knowledge that he has the Power of working Miracles for the Confirmation of himself concerning his Inspiration, may not as thoroughly convince him that his Revelation comes from God, as any rational Deductions whatever can satisfy him of any sort of Truth? For my part I dare not deny either of them, or therefore rely on the strength of that Argument. His second Argument is, that the Evidence we understand it right can't be so good as that a Proposition is true which we learn by

No Revelation against clear Reason and why, but this Author's Reason not so plain or convincing.

In-

Intuition or rational Deduction. This again, seems something derogatory to the Divine Power, that it shou'd not extend so far as to make any thing as plain by Words or other Signs, by lively Impressions upon the Imagination of the inspired Person, as the Person himself can by his own Senses, or use of his natural Faculties. Besides, if my Author's Notions of Knowledge were right, that it required nothing to make it complete or certain, but only the Perception of the Agreement of clear *Ideas*, as 'tis in Dreams, one wou'd think that Exception shou'd not come well from him tho it might from another, who its likely wou'd require some extrinick Arguments, such as a Power to work Miracles to convince himself or others that he was not deluded. However, we all agree, that no Proposition ought under any pretence of Revelation be receiv'd as true, which is contrary to our natural Reason; because if that was allow'd it wou'd overturn all the Principles of Knowledge and Morality, and make our sensitive and intellectual Faculties altogether useless, and consequently make us incapable of discerning Truth from Falshood, in Religions as well as any other Matters.

An inference
of the Authors
examin'd.

V. The 4th Proposition which my Author adds to the Three former, is, that if nothing can be admitted true which is contrary to Reason in original, much less in traditional Revelation, which may be admitted right for the same Reason before mention'd; and for this over and above, because we cannot be sure that the Words in which is conveyed to us by oral or written Tradition have the same Sense in which they were meant by the original Speaker or Writer without use of our Reason, and therefore cannot interpret them against it without defeating the use of that very Faculty which we use in making the Interpretation. But hence he takes Occasion to insinuate, that since, as he says, Faith has nothing to do with any Propositions but those which are divinely reveal'd, he cannot see how those that make Revelation alone the Object of Faith, and not of Reason, can say that it is Matter of Faith and not of Reason that such or such a Proposition to be found in such or such a Book is of Divine Inspiration, unless it be reveal'd that, that Proposition, or all in that Book, was communicated by Divine Inspiration. But stop here, and consider whether it does not follow from hence, that no Proposition found in the Holy Scriptures can be the Object of Divine Faith, or can be sufficiently proved to be of Divine Inspiration for its being found there, and consequently that they can't be of any use to prove the Truth of any Proposition above Reason. For no body pretends that every single Proposition in the Holy Scriptures is made known to us to have been deliver'd by inspired Persons by having the attested Revelation of any one or more Persons for the whole Book and every part of it, but besides if there had been any such Attestation given by the Apostles of Christ, yet in the succeeding Ages it cou'd not have been known with the like Certainty without a Repetition of the same Declaration and that attested by Miracles and those Miracles seen by every single Person concern'd; all which is impracticable; and therefore if Divine Revelation be the only Object of Divine Faith and no Revelation can be sufficiently known to come from God but either by the seeing some inspired Person writing or hearing him speak, or some other Person or Persons vouching every particular by Miracles, then the Holy Scriptures according to this Doctrine can afford us no secure Ground for Divine Faith. And if this be the Consequence of that Principle, either there is some mistake in my Author or else the Christian World, especially the Reform'd Part of it are under a gross mistake about the usefulness of the Holy Scriptures in Matters of Faith. But I am willing to think that this Author's endeavours to cut an Hair between Faith and Reason, between Knowledge and rational Assurance have carried him too far in this grand Point. For first it is not over plain that Divine Faith has nothing to do with any Propositions but those which are reveal'd. For as I cannot see a Reason why the Laws of Nature which serve for the regulating Humane Actions may not be call'd Divine Laws as well as those that have been especially reveal'd, so neither can I, why assent given to Propositions which afford any powerful Reasons to conform our Actions to those Laws may

A caution.

Rational Faith
and Divine
Faith only dif-
fer in Degrees
of Evidence.

may not properly enough be call'd Divine Faith, for its generally suppos'd that there are several Propositions worthy of a rational Assent, and yet are the Objects of a Divine Faith only for their being farther confirm'd by Revelation. Thus that there is a State of Life after this is an highly probable Proposition antecedent to or without Revelation by Arguments (tho not Ideal) drawn from the Properties we find in Humane Souls which argue their Immateriality, and from the Justice and Equity of Divine Providence; but yet that Proposition is the Object of Divine Faith in the strictest Sense; because 'tis farther confirm'd by the Resurrection of Christ and by the many and great Signs and Wonders wrought by his Holy and inspired Apostles, who both attested his personal Resurrection, and the Truth of his whole Doctrine, but especially of that Proposition; so that in that particular, rational Assent and Divine Faith seem to differ only or chiefly in the Degrees of Evidence.

Neither 2dly am I convinc'd that a Proposition is the less Object of Divine Faith for our making use of Reason for the proving it was of Divine Original; or, in other words, that any Proposition to be found in the Holy Scriptures is the less an Object of Divine Faith for our using humane Testimony and Reason to prove it was originally deliver'd by inspired Persons: It must be confess'd indeed, that the Degree of Certainty is not altogether the same for our Belief that any Proposition was deliver'd by an inspired Person, as it wou'd be if we had seen him write it, or heard him speak it; yet the difference is so minute and inconsiderable as to make no manner of Alteration in the Reason of humane Actions, which is the best Rule by which to try the Firmness or Degrees of Faith or Assent. To make what I mean plainer by an obvious Comparison: Is it less certain that a Malefactor is executed according to Law for Murther, because perhaps the Law was made a Thousand or Seventeen Hundred Years since; provided, as the Case is suppos'd, the daily and constant Practise has been accordingly; and when many Thousand Persons Lives and nearest Interests have depended upon the suppos'd Truth of the Matter of Fact? And therefore in such Cases, with my Author's leave, Matters of Fact do not become less certain for the distance of time from the Original. And if it be thus in such Instances, why then I ask, is a Proposition found in the Scriptures the less certain, and consequently the less an Object of Divine Faith, because it was deliver'd by an inspired Person so long since when the Profession and Acknowledgment of the whole Christian World has been conformable to it ever since the first Delivery; and Millions of Persons Interests have depended upon the Supposition of the original Tradition? The difference in the Degree of Evidence is much the same as between our Evidence that live now, that there were such Persons as *William the Conqueror*, and that he made such Laws now in our Statute-Books, and the Evidence such had who saw his Person and were Eye or Ear-witnesses of the making those Laws; which is such a difference as makes no Alteration in any rational human Action. He that will not obey a Law, unless he saw the whole Transaction in the making with his own Eyes, will not obey it if he had. And so, I think, that I may confidently say, that he who will not believe a Proposition recorded in the Scriptures, when attested by the concurrent Profession of the Christian World, wou'd not believe it if he had heard it spoken, or seen it written by an inspired Person. He that will stand upon such *Punctilios* must not for the same Reason believe a Malefactor in *England* legally condemn'd except the King and Parliament attend every Assizes and Sessions to make or confirm every tittle of the Law on which the Sentence turns. Such Scruple-makers will make fitter Advocates for Malefactors than for the King and Nation. Such in *England* as scruple whether there be such a place as *France*, or such a Person as *Lewis the Fourteenth*, because they never saw either, will do more service to this Nation upon Occasion with their Hands abroad, than by their ingenious Heads at home; provided they be let Blood before they go, to cure them of their Phrensy. Humane Testimony therefore, with such corroborating Circumstances for any Truth attested origi-

The use of Reason and Humane Testimony does not make a Proposition to be the less an Object of Divine Faith.

The difference explained.

'Tis so small as not have an influence upon Action.

nally by Miracles, does not make the Assent less firm or less the Object of Divine Faith, or the Reason of the Faith less convincing; and tho there may be allow'd some Minute difference in the Degree of the Evidence, yet he must have microscopical Eyes that can discern it; or that in humane Actions can perceive the Distinction between Faith and Knowledge, between Assurance and unexceptionably rational Evidence.

What things
are properly
Matters of
Faith when
reveal'd.

No clear Ac-
count given by
this Author
why we shou'd
believe any
Proposition
tho reveal'd
to be certain.

Such

How this is
commonly
stated, or why
reveal'd Pro-
positions may
be certainly
known to be
true.

VI. My Author owns that there are many things wherein we have imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past present or future Existence, by the natural use of our Faculties we have no Knowledge at all; these, when reveal'd, are the proper Matters of Faith. Thus, that part of the Angels lost their first happy Estate; that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again; these and the like Propositions being beyond the discovery of Reason, are purely Matters of Faith. All this is consonant to the commonly receiv'd Opinion in these Matters, provided he mean those words *beyond the discovery of Reason* naked or unassisted Reason, for when they are reveal'd by inspir'd Persons, and whose Inspiration is attested by Miracles, there it is no less agreeable to the common Principles of Reason to assent to them, than it is to any other Propositions deducible from natural Reason. So that all that I want in my Author's Preference of Revelation to probable Conjectures or rational Deductions, is only how we shall come to the certain Knowledge that any Proposition was really reveal'd. He says indeed as plainly as can be desir'd, that what God has reveal'd is certainly true, coming, as he well expresses it, from the Fountain of all Knowledge; but I have not yet observ'd, that he any where tells us how we shall certainly know any Proposition is reveal'd or comes from God; and so we are but where we were before the Revelation; for what signifies Revelation, or the Certainty of the Truth, if it be not certainly known to us? that a Proposition's being found in the Holy Scriptures in the former Paragraph he seems to disown, as an Argument that it's the Object of Divine Faith, unless the whole Book, or that particular Proposition was seen to be written by an inspired Person; and so the Holy Scriptures to us are no better than means of Information, and we must look for Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, and so we are never the nearer Certainty or Probability for the Revelation. He says as plainly again, Miracles when well attested give credit to other Truths that need it; but then, I say, they give those Truths credit no otherwise than as they shew that the Person who delivers them has an extraordinary Power; so that unless we be possess'd with the Supposition that they are the works of God, that is, of a Being so wise that he cannot be deceiv'd, and so Good that he will not deceive, they will add no Reason for the Belief of those Truths, because they convey no new Perceptions of the Agreement or Disagreement between the Two *Ideas*, as my Author calls the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition; and therefore I fear there can be no proper Mediums, according to his Principles, to prove the Truth of any Proposition; both for want of that Ideal Agreement, which he makes necessary to all Knowledge; or for want of that Supposition of the Veracity of God, which I can't any where find he allows, or his Principles indeed (which are against making any Suppositions) can with consistency admit. But in this Suggestion I am not positive, because my Author has not, I think, explain'd his Sense in that particular, and therefore I design'd it only as Matter for Caution and further Inquiry. But this I take to be the common Opinion, that tho neither Miracles nor any other Medium are a sufficient Proof of any Proposition that is contrary to our Senses or Reason, yet they are proper to shew the Connexion between the parts of any Proposition which is only above Reason: Or, in other Words, where any Proposition is reveal'd that is not contrary to the natural Dictates of common Reason or our Senses, there its Truth may be as certainly known by Miracles wrought in Attestation of it, as the Truth of any other Proposition deducible from the common Principles of natural Reason, because those supernatural Events are as plain Indications from the Author of Nature of the true or real

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Relation between the parts of those Propositions above Reason, as sensible Observations are of the true or real Relation between the parts of those Propositions which are according to Natural Reason. Where the connexion between the parts of any Proposition is discernable by the use of our Senses or other Natural Intellectual Faculties, there is no need of special Revelation; but where there is need, as to be sure there is in all the Doctrines in the Christian, so far as 'tis distinguished from or above Natural Religion, there Miracles stand in the place of common sensible Observations; and are the Reasons or Grounds of Assent or Faith; and where such Reasons meet with attentive and unprejudic'd Minds they procure as ready Assent in Religious as other rational Arguments do in civil matters when offered to Persons of the like teachable Spirit and Temper.

C H A P. XIX.

Of wrong Assent, or Error.

I. **K**nowledge, my Author says being to be had only of visible certain Truths, Error is not a fault of our Knowledge but a mistake of our Judgment, giving an Assent to that which is not true; that is Knowledge being of Truths which are either self-evident, or by the exercise of our Natural Faculties easily discovered, Error is not from any defect in our Natural intellectual Powers to lead us into Truth which is within their reach, but the negligent use or wilful abuse of those Faculties, in assenting to Truths before we have examined them; and therefore since all Errors that are very dangerous especially are voluntary, and yet no Body designedly is in Error, my Author's Inquiry is how there comes to be so many Errors in the World; the Reasons of which he reduces to these Four.

1. Want of Proofs.
2. Want of Ability or Skill to use them.
3. Want of Will to use them.
4. Wrong Measures of Probability.

II. First by want of Proofs he does not mean (he says) want of such as are no where to be had, but of such as are in being, or might be procured. This is the unhappy state of such as by the hardness of their Fortune in the World cannot make Experiments themselves, and whose provision for the necessities of their own and Families will not allow them leisure to make Observations of any thing that is remote for the improvement of their Knowledge, for want of conversation with Books and Men and such like helps for the collecting the Sense and Testimonies of others: And from hence he takes occasion to move a very material Question. Are then the greatest part of Mankind subjected to an unavoidable Ignorance of things that are of the greatest importance (he means matters of Religion) have such no better Guides than Chance and Accident, or which is the same in effect, than such as teach one thing in *Turky*, another in *Christendom*, one thing in *Italy* another in *England*? Shall a Day-labourer be everlastingly happy for being born in *Italy*, and another miserable for being born in *England*, or *vice versa*? To this important Question, the Substance of his Answer is this: That no Man is so wholly taken up with the means of living as to have no spare time to think of his Soul, or inform himself in matters of Religion; and if Men were as intent upon that as they are on things of lower concernment, they might find vacancies if well Husbanded to the advantage of their Knowledge in such matters. Thus right well. But I must tell him, that most Men think out of honour to their Maker, that he has in the very frame of all Mens Minds and Bodies laid such Foundations of Natural Religion and Morality, as to make it easie (if not unavoidable)

Want of Proofs. The particulars explained and examined.

Hence a material Question started by the Author but not fully answered by him.

How answer'd by others.

dable) to the meanest capacity, and even the most necessitous People to form in their Minds a belief of his own Being, and so much Knowledge of his Nature and Will as may lead and incline them to a dutiful Sense of their dependence upon him, and in the main to suitable Actions. But this was cross to my Author's Principles which will by no means admit of any innate Dispositions to believe any speculative or practical Propositions or any Inclinations to obey the Laws of Nature; tho if this was admitted, it wou'd mightily help to resolve that grand Question of his, which otherwise I am afraid is altogether unanswerable. Suppose every ones Mind like an *Abrasa Tabula*, equally capable of any inscriptions of Truth or Falshood, Good or Evil, inclined or disposed to no Duty, except that may be called so of doubting of every thing, furnished with no Principles by which to try or examine any thing that shall be offered to its consideration, in this way its confessed the Mind might be secured from Error (if any such thing as Error be allowed) but where it shall begin, or where it shall lay the first Stone for the Foundation of Certainty, is not so easily resolved as it may be imagined. Whereas those that own some Principles of Knowledge and Natural Religion, are apt to believe that the Author of Nature whom they worship has been so kind to the whole race of Mankind as not only to give them their bare Powers and natural Capacities, but to sow as it were some such Principles or Seeds of Knowledge and of moral Inclinations as may dispose them necessarily to believe some Propositions, and do some Actions rather than the contrary; so that they may not wholly depend upon the contingency of Education, and thereby the Fruits or Effects of Natural Religion may be of easie growth: But if there were no such Principles or Dispositions antecedent to artificial teaching, and Impressions, 'tis as hard to conceive how Persons shou'd ever think of any concerns superior to that of gratifying their present Sensations, as my Author seems to suppose; or how indeed they shou'd grow or improve in Wisdom or Virtue more than Plants do without Seeds; notwithstanding the natural capacity of the Earth for fruitfulness; but such as have felt any of the Powers, especially of the Christian Principles, are apt to believe the righteous Governour of the intellectual World knows how to be favourable to the Errors of Men, as well as the best of us do how to be charitable in our Thoughts of them; and such as these hope that God has contributed so much to dispose even Day-labourers to believe and act accordingly to the Principles of Natural Religion, that all the refined Arts of doubting which are daily infused into them will not be able to cancel and eradicate. And therefore it will deserve the consideration of ingenious Scepticks whether such People may not be the true Philosophers at last.

A 2d Reason
of wrong
Assent.

III. A 2d. Reason of wrong Assent is want of Skill or Ability to use those Evidences which may be had of Probabilities, and to weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies, and give every circumstance its due allowance for the preventing their Assent to Positions that are not probable. This is the fate of all such as want natural Capacities: But whether the difference in Mens Intellectuals arise from the Organs of the Body adapted to Thinking, or the dullness and untractableness of those Faculties for want of exercise, or the natural difference in Mens Souls, he does not determine, neither is there any wonder; for 'tis not in his way to determine any thing positively only to oppose the Sentiments of all others. But if any one should be so bold as to say, that the Body was the Thinking Substance, and 'twas by the defects of its Organs in the exercise of the knack of Thinking he would find my Author a very favourable Adversary. However this is evident, he says, that there is more difference in Mens Understandings (taking the Measure, I suppose he means by the number of *Ideas*, and nothing else) between some Men and others, than between some Men and Beasts. But most People think (tho perhaps it may be for want of intelligence from *America* or acquaintance with *Drills*) that the difference is not so wide as between the Wi-sest of Men, (unless they be supposed Angels) and the lowest rank of Men, between them and the most accomplished Beasts; not only in Features of Body, but in

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Intellectuals too ; and that 'tis not owing to the unavoidable, or absolute Incapacity of *Ideots*, that they are ~~not~~ so in apprehensive of Religion as they often prove, as the neglect of their Parents and Relations in the care of their Education, and their own wilful, though rectifiable obstinacy ; and that capacity for Religion alone is an excellency whatever others may think of it that will distinguish them from the most Philosophical Brutes that are in this part of the World.

IV. A Third Reason of Errors is want of will to use those Proofs that might be had to prevent them : And this is the state of those that neither want Natural Parts, Leisure, Riches, Books, Conversation or any other helps necessary for their accomplishment in all useful Knowledge ; but yet wilfully neglect them, and waste their time in the drudgery of worldly business or inferiour Pleasures, without any regard to their future estate which even the common Principles of Prudence would represent as every Mans main Interest. This is so plain and true, I doubt, as to deserve the witty Reflexion which my Author makes upon the Defaulters. They take great care, he says, to appear in a splended and neat outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse Cloaths or a patched Coat, and yet contentedly suffer their Minds to appear abroad in a Pie-bald Livery of coarse Patches and borrowed Shreds, such as it has pleased chance or their Country Taylor (he means he says the common Opinion of those they have conversed with) to Cloath them in. This is indeed smart enough ; whereas if these Persons of Quality would be in the Fashion to some purpose, and cast off all old Opinion, as they would Second-hand Cloaths, they might not only have a new set of Opinions every Day, but also if the Soul itself be only modified Matter (as 'tis by some acknowledged possible) they might have a new Soul for every Day of the Year, as new *Ideas* may be started by external Impressions, and by that means they might surpass the vulgar indeed, who are contented with old common Opinions, and one old Soul all their Days ; but whether this would mend the habits of their Minds, or make their condition more desirable than that of Day-labourers, is worthy a serious consideration ; at that rate they might have new Principles, new Opinions, and new Souls so often, as at last to have none at all.

A 3d Reason of wrong Assent.

V. A 4th. Reason of wrong Assent, is wrong Measures of Probability ; or, in common words, Prejudices which obstruct Persons impartial consideration of rational Argument when proposed. And of this sort he Names Four.

A 4th Reason of wrong Assent, and from whence that arises explained.

1. *Doubtful Opinions* taken up whilst People are young, for indisputable Principles, which are often so powerful as to make them even doubt of the Truth of their own Senses, even in cases where they are competent Judges ; as in the Instance he gives of the Popish Doctrine of Transubstantiation, which arises from their imbibing the Principle of the Popes or their Churches Infallibility ; and not much short of that and which is indeed Popery in another shape, the Opinion of some Enthusiasts, that their Teacher is inspired, tho he can work no Miracle to prove he is so, but that which with giddy People serves instead of one, prodigious boldness and assurance ; in both which Cases People become unmoveable by the most clear and apparent probable Arguments, and are placed above the reach of the highest Reason, and are thereby often betraid into the disbelief of the common Principles of Sense and Reason, and not only so, but in consequence thereof to the practice of greater Barbarities and Immoralities than a sober Heathen's Principles, who never heard of the Name of Christ, would suffer him to be guilty of. This is a just and wise Remark of my Authors, but affects only doubtful Opinions, not such Principles as all the World are agreed in.

2d, *Received Hypotheses*. This is the condition of them that don't bid defiance to their Senses and common Reason as the former do, but will admit of no explication of any *Phenomenon* but what agrees with their presupposed Principles or Hypotheses ; but whether there be any such danger from the commonly received

Hypotheses in Philosophy, as my Author seems to apprehend, I cannot perceive; for very few now adays are such sworn Devoto's to any one Hypothesis, but will be ready to quit it for another that explains the *Phænomenon* better; and make use of any Hypothesis indifferently which will serve the turn for the making their Discourse more intelligible. 'Tis hard, as my Author expresses it (with a keenness peculiar to him when he inveighs against the Opinions of others, especially old ones) for a learned Professor to have his Authority of Forty Years standing, wrought out of hard Rock, *Greek* and *Latin*, with no small expence of Time and Candle, confirmed by general Tradition and a reverend Beard, overturned by an upstart Novellist; and he made to confess that what he taught his Scholars Thirty Years ago, was an Error and Mistake, and that he sold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear rate. This must be confessed indeed hard Doctrine; but it would be harder again, if the Novellist offer no solid Reason for the alteration of his old Opinion, but only some new Words without any Sense at the bottom. I presume this piece of Wit was not designed for a Reprimand to those Four Reverend Persons that fill the Chairs in Divinity Exercises in the Universities; for if the learned World are not grossly mistaken in their Personal Qualifications, they are able without pelting their Auditors with hard words to defend any of the old Hypotheses they go upon, which I take to be no other than the Principles of Natural Religion, in which the whole World are pretty well agreed, and of the Christian Religion as they are convey'd to us in the holy Scriptures, in which also the Christian World, how different soever in other matters, have consented to have had their original from Divine Inspiration. But if any Novellist can either offer Arguments deducible from the common Principles of Reason, or work any such Miracles for the introducing any new, as there were wrought for the confirming the old Hypotheses, they will not be so stiff for any doubtful Opinions, how old soever, as not to quit them for such new ones as bring such ample or divine credentials: And if any should limit the Sense of the Scripture Words, *Repent to the doing Penance* (the instance he gives) I am confident they would not only be as ridiculous as my Author is pleased to make them, but in their Opinions deserve as severe Discipline as the most ingenious Brain could invent, or the keenest Spight could inflict.

A Third Reason of Peoples assenting to false Propositions is, *Predominant Passions*. These indeed blind Mens Eyes or make them altogether unfit for due attention to the clearest and strongest Reasons; Earthly Minds, as my Author elegantly expresses it, like Mud-walls, resist the strongest Batteries. All Men are apt to believe that they wish to be true; and to be very uneasy under the influence of such Principles which lie cross to their debauch'd Appetites: And this indeed is the most comprehensive Reason both of Error and Infidelity; these breed more dangerous Errors, especially when mix'd with a large infusion of Self-conceit, than all the rest put together. And tho there are some Probabilities which carry so much native Evidence with them as easily to outweigh all that can be oppos'd to procure a suspension of Assent, yet where any great worldly interest or strong Inclination from corrupted Nature are put into the opposite Balance, they'll make an imaginary possibility look like a Demonstration, or which is as bad will divert the Mind to other considerations that are more easie and consistent. As in the pat instance which my Author gives, tho 'tis as improbable that a blind fortuitous concourse of Atoms not guided by an Intelligent Agent, should constitute the Bodies of Animals, and he might have added any other regular Bodies, as the promiscuous jumble of printed Letters, should fall into a rational Discourse. Yet 'tis well known, that a Sect of Philosophers, whose debauch'd Lives made the Sense of a wise and righteous Providence sit uneasy in their Minds, swelled this imaginary possibility into a Demonstration; and as improbable as that may seem to unprejudiced Persons, yet 'tis not much more improbable than that these Atoms, however ranged or disposed, should be made capable of all the Functions and Operations of Humane Souls: For an imaginary Omnipotence, abstracted from Wisdom, may extend to that as well as the

the other. The difference is not so wide as at first view it may seem. The first gives the Title of Omnipotence to Matter; the second gives the Name of Omniscience to Motion, both equally absurd.

The 4th and last wrong measure of Probability which my Author mentions, and which as he lays keeps in Ignorance more than all the rest, is, *Giving up our Assent to the common receiv'd Opinions of our Friends, Neighbourhood and Country.* He that questions whether this be not one powerful Reason of false Tenets in Religion, may as well dispute whether there be any false ones in the World. But withal it must be consider'd, that as Humane Nature is fram'd 'tis almost as possible to deny our Senses as refuse some Compliance with the Sentiments of our Parents, Neighbours and our Superiors in Age and Authority; and therefore the Point worthy debate is, not whether we are not bound in gratitude to our Maker to examine the Opinions of others, for without that Allowance our intellectual Faculties wou'd become in a great Measure useless, and we shou'd never be capable of becoming wiser or better; but whether before we are well capable of examining things, or before we can discover any Reason for doubting we are not justifiable in yielding our Assent to such Opinions as are commonly receiv'd, and in some Measure impos'd upon us; and then the whole Question comes within this Compass, whether Men act more rationally in assenting to such commonly receiv'd Doctrines, and conforming their Practice accordingly, or in doubting of every thing and consequently doing nothing; or, in other Words, whether the Mischiefs and Dangers of some false Principles and ill Practices, be more and greater than of an everlasting Estate of Scepticism and Inactivity: Whether a Mixture of false Principles with true ones, of bad Laws with good ones, be more dangerous than no Principles, no Laws at all. If we suppose the Author of our Nature has laid into our Constitution any Principles of Knowledge to inable us to distinguish between true and false, good and evil, it will be unavoidable, but as Persons grow in Years, Experience Discretion and Reason, they will by Application and Diligence proportionable to the importance of things, be able by the help of those common Principles in some Measure to master the Prejudices of their Youth, or at least it will be their own Fault if they don't. If Men were suppos'd equally wise, all of one Age, Temper, Capacity, Trade, Faculty, and Power then, indeed this Proposal of doubting of every thing, every one judging for himself, and a state of Indifferency to all Actions might look plausibly, as it does popularly, but in the present state of Mankind it's altogether impracticable; it does not tend only to the cancelling all Obligations in Governours and Parents to instruct their Subjects and Children, but must intirely subvert the Foundations of Government and Order, and make Mankind in a worse and more desolate Condition than that of Brutes.

That all these before mention'd are the Occasions of Errors no Man in his right Senses will question: But then it becomes any one that is really desirous to make others wiser and better, not only to find Faults, for that may be only gratifying ones own Pride, which is as fruitful of Errors as any thing else, but he must propose Expedients to bring them into the way that leadeth into certain Truth; and on this point turns all the Controversie which any one can have with this ingenious Author, namely, whether the way he has chalk'd out, will not only secure us from Errors, (for doubting of all Principles will as infallibly do that, as hanging a Man will cure him of all Diseases,) but put us into the way to any certain Truth, or be of any use to improve us in any useful Knowledge. Suppose that a Person perswaded by the Power of his Rhetorick (tho there is no great need of it for that purpose) that there's an infinite swarm of Errors in all parts of the World, and that some of those he mentions are the Causes of them, the next inquiry is, what Course shall we take, not only to be arm'd against them, but to be establish'd in certain and defensible Truth. Now if I have not all this while misunderstood my Author's Scheme, his Advice wou'd in plain Terms be this; first, doubt of every thing; admit no Principles, they are the

The Conclu-
sion.

Sources

This Author's
Scheme to
prevent Errors
summarily
review'd.

Sources of all Errors; they are all Cheats, they are the Infusions of Nurses, the Spawns of Officious Parents; they are well endow'd Doctrines of Persons in places of Trust and Authority. Observe only this one Rule, which is worth all the Principles that are talk'd on tho never so commonly receiv'd: Get clear and distinct *Ideas*, compare them with one another, if they agree, then form affirmative; if they disagree, then negative Propositions, and so you'll be certain, and where no such Agreement or Disagreement in *Ideas* can be clearly discover'd, there weigh the Arguments (which he is pleas'd to call *Ideas* too) of one side and t'other, and then determine your Assent on that side, where the *Ideas* are more or clearer. This is the Summ of his Proposal. Now then lets take a short Review of the Advantages of this Method to come at Certainty or Probability.

Particularly
proved to be
insufficient.

VI. First, I ask, how shall we be sure of our own Existence? Must that be by comparing the simple *Idea* of Existence with that of Thinking? Will our simple *Idea* of doubting, which is one Mode of Thinking, set us right? Yes plainly, for that which doubts must exist. This we all agree is plain enough; but it does not appear so by comparing those Two simple *Ideas*; for no Man has any sort of *Idea* or Thought of Existence distinct from the thing existing; nor of doubting or any other Mode of Thinking, without the thing of which he doubts or thinks; and therefore to say, we exist because we think, is no more than saying, we exist because we exist, because the existing and thinking things are both one, and so there are no Two *Ideas* compar'd, but the same *Idea* repeated; and so that which in itself is clear and indisputable, is either made obscure and disputable by resolving all Certainty into *Ideas*, or we must be forc'd to sit down with the Assurance we have of our own Existence from that old Maxim, *Every thing is the same with itself*.

2dly. How shall we be certain of the Truth of such Propositions whose parts we immediately perceive, have a certain Relation to each other, such, as White is not Black, a Triangle is not a Circle, any whole is equal to all its parts? Must this also be by comparing their *Ideas*, and observing their Agreement or Disagreement? But what shall we do if we have no such *Ideas*, of Whiteness or Blackness abstracted from the particular Bodies of a Triangle or Circle, without particular Bodies or Space that have those Figures, of whole or parts without particular Bodies that have those relative Names, how shall we make any such Comparisons? And if we must go so far, then we must suppose the real Existence of those particular Bodies whose Powers Modes or Names they are, for else they are not real or true Propositions, and then the Foundation of their Certainty will not be grounded in the Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas*, but in the things themselves without us, that are so compar'd. Therefore as the real Existence of things without us is necessary to produce those Sensations in us, so that real Existence must first be suppos'd or proved before we our selves shou'd think those Propositions form'd about them to be really true. But this is quite contrary to my Author's Method; for he makes intuitive Knowledg the first and highest Degree of Certainty; whereas if the Existence of things without us be not first suppos'd, there can neither be any intuitive Knowledge, or any real Certainty at all.

3dly. How shall we be made sure of the Truth of Mathematical Demonstrations? Must that be by perceiving that the intermediate *Ideas* have a certain Connexion with one, or both parts of the Propositions we wou'd demonstrate? That again is impossible, for we can have no more perfect *Ideas* of things without us than we can derive from our Senses, and our Senses barely cannot give any Assurance that Two Lines, Angles or Figures are of the same length or bigness; neither can they afford us any *Ideas* of perfectly strait Lines, exact Circles, or other Figures; and therefore it will be impossible to arrive at any Certainty of the Truth of such Propositions as state the Proportions of Lines or Figures meerly in *Idea*. We can indeed convince our selves that any Line may be straiter, or
other

other Figure may be exacter than is to be made upon any Superficies, because the Superficies may have Concavities and Protuberances, Hills and Dales, but that Conviction cannot be from the *Ideas*; for they can be no perfecter than our Senses afford. Besides, if *Ideas* were perfecter than of any thing really existent without us, they wou'd be so far Resemblances of Nothing; nay, if they were perfecter than what we cou'd gain from our Senses they wou'd be of no manner of use; and therefore Demonstrative Knowledge depends upon the Truth of our Senses, which neither my Author's Principles or Method will by any means admit; for he reckons Demonstrative Knowledge an higher Degree of Certainty than Sensitive.

4thly. How shall we be certain of the Existence of God? In his way 'tis only from the *Ideas* we have of Thinking and other Powers we are conscious that we have our selves, and adding to them the *Idea* of Infinity; but then we must first be inform'd from whence we shall fetch our Reasons to add one Degree of any Power to another, or to perswade our selves there is more Power, more Wisdom or Goodness in the World than we find in our selves, if we don't first suppose that there are an infinite number of things in the World besides our selves, and such as carry evident marks of such Powers and Perfections as we ascribe to such a Being, and if we then are forc'd to supposing the Existence of such things without us, we cannot by tracing the *Ideas* of Thinking or of other Powers within our selves arrive at Demonstrative Knowledge of God's Existence, because before we suppose the Existence of things without us, we shall want the intermediate *Ideas* or Proofs which are to be the Ground of our Certainty or Knowledge; and this again is quite contrary to our Author's Method, which must admit of no Suppositions.

5thly. How can we by the way of *Ideas* be assured of the real Existence of things without us? For no *Idea* in the Mind has any Connexion in Nature with any thing that is without the Mind: The *Idea* of a Centaur or Mermaid does not prove the Existence of any such Creatures; neither indeed does the Perception of any visible Object prove the Existence of that Object any longer than whilst it is actually perceiv'd, and of that actual Perception we can have of no *Idea*; for an *Idea* is only of something that is absent, that does not at present affect our Senses, and consequently the *Ideas* signifies nothing to the proving the Existence of that thing of which it is the *Idea*: So that after all is done, we must be forc'd to suppose the real Existence of things without us, and the Truth of our Senses and other Natural Faculties without any Proof, because they are not capable of any; for that which we should offer to bring for the Proof or intermediate *Idea* in this Author's Language, will need another to prove its Existence, and so *in infinitum*; and therefore sensitive Knowledge which my Author reckons the lowest Degree of Knowledge (and which indeed his Principles do hardly admit to be call'd Knowledge, because properly in his Sense of that Word, Knowledge is only of our own Thoughts) is the Foundation of all Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge; and unless that sensitive Knowledge be first suppos'd to be real (for it can never be proved so by the way of *Ideas*) all other sort of Knowledge is imaginary and groundless.

6thly. If *Ideas* can afford us no Certainty, then much less any Probability; for before any Proposition can appear to us probable, we must suppose something certain. How probable soever it be that there were such Persons in the World as *Julius Caesar*, or *Alexander the Great*, or such Places as *Rome*, or *Pella*; yet if we are not first assured of the Truth of our Senses, and the Existence of things without us, we shall have no Ground or Reason at all to believe them, or any other Propositions in the least Degree probable, and therefore all Probability being built upon that Foundation of Certainty, must fall. To all this I must add that this Author's whole Scheme is built upon the Supposition, that simple *Ideas* are the Foundation of all Knowledge; whereas really there are no such *Ideas* in the Mind of Man or in Nature, all *Ideas* are complex, as no simple Mode of any Sub-

stance can exist separate from the Substance of which it is the Mode, so neither can it be conceiv'd in the Mind abstracted from some particular Substance or other: As we cannot have the *Idea* of any Substance abstracted from all its Qualities or Modes, so neither can we of any Mode or Quality abstracted from its Substance; and so again, all that he calls general or abstract *Ideas* are nothing else but the common Names of particular Substances or their Modes; neither are there any *Ideas* in the Mind answering to them, and consequently there can be no Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any such *Ideas*; or, in other words, any real Knowledge grounded thereupon; whereas if by *Ideas* be meant only Substances and their Modes, then to say all Knowledge is founded in simple *Ideas*, is in plain English to say no more than that all Knowledge is of something; for there are but those Two sorts of things in the whole World. And therefore so far as I am able, yet to understand the resolving all Certainty or Probability into *Ideas* will no ways contribute to improve us in any sort of useful Knowledge, and can serve to no other purpose than only to help Disputants with new fashioned Arguments to oppose any positive Truth, either in Natural or Reveal'd Religion, and to involve our Minds in inextricable Scepticism.

How others
satisfie them-
selves of the
Certainty of
Propositions
who don't
go upon the
Ideal Princi-
ples.

But now if I be ask'd how I satisfy my self of the certain Truth of some and Probability of other Propositions, I will give the best Answer I can for my self and leave every one to judge for himself upon the examination of his own Thoughts, but I do freely confess that it seems to me every whit as rational to suppose such things as are not capable of a Proof as to doubt of every thing; for pretending a Reason to doubt of every thing seems so notorious a Contradiction that I can't avoid the perceiving it, for I am not able to understand from what topick a Man shou'd draw his Reason unless he supposes the Existence of something from which to have that Reason, and therefore,

First, I suppose my own Existence and am fully satisfied therein without any manner of Proof but the consciousness of the Succession of my own Thoughts.

2dly. I suppose also the real Existence of things without me, and that they are such as by my own Senses and the use of my natural Faculties they are represented; for this is the Ground and Foundation of all Reasonings. And 'tis to no Purpose to talk of Reason, of Truth or Falshood, but on that Supposal.

3dly. As I suppose the Truth of my own, so I do of every other Persons Senses and Faculties, and in consequence thereof that in whatever single Objects or Propositions form'd about them by comparing one with another all the intelligent World, whose Organs of Sense and Natural Faculties are in due Order, agree with me, those I take to be true or real, and am the more confirm'd therein, because such a general Belief can be nothing else but the effect of some one wise and good Author of all our Powers and Natures. And therefore when any Object seems black and bitter to me, which seems white and sweet to every body else, I judge my self mistaken not by comparing my present Perception with any abstract *Idea* of that Colour or Taste, for I confess that I have none such, but by comparing the present Temper of my Organs of Sense, with what it uses to be at other times; or if any Proposition seem false to me, or not to have that Relation between its parts which seems true to every body else, I judge the defect is in my own natural Faculties which shou'd make that Perception clear to me as it does to others. But when I suppose our Senses true, my meaning is not that they represent all that is in the sensible Object, for there may be rational Evidence that they don't; but my meaning is, that what, or so much as they do represent is real, or that there is a real Cause in the Object or Organ for that Perception or Mode of Thought which is produc'd in the Mind at that time. This

Paper or the driven Snow may have Particles in its Superficies, which if our Organs were more exact than they are, might make us perceive a mixture of other Colours; and so for all other sensible Qualities, if the Organs by which they

they are perceived were more acute ; but our Senses are nevertheless said to be true, because though they don't represent all, yet do represent no more than what there is a real Cause for without the Mind ; and the like for Propositions, tho by the use of my natural Faculties I cannot attain a complete Perception of all the Relation there may be between the parts of it, yet what I clearly perceive there is, that there really is, and my Judgment formed accordingly is true.

4thly, As to general Propositions, commonly called Maxims, I satisfy my self in the Truth of them by perceiving the immutable Relation between their parts in every one of the particulars which have come to my Observation, of which the general words in those Propositions are the common Names or Signs. Thus, that the whole is equal to all its parts, not because the abstract *Idea* of whole agrees with the abstract *Idea* of all its parts, for I have no such abstract *Ideas* of whole or parts ; but because I find every individual Body to which I give the common Name of whole, has the immutable Relation of equality to all the Individuals to which I give the common Name of parts. And tho by my Senses I cannot have come to the Knowledge of all the Individual wholes or parts in the World, yet by what I have observed, I am as sure of it as if I had that there is that immutable Relation between all things that can have those common Names given them ; and for that Reason such Propositions are called innate, not acquired Truths. And as for particular Propositions, that are as Self-evident as those general ones are, they are only particulars compriz'd under those general ones. Every thing is the same with itself in affirmative, or every thing is different from another in Negative Propositions, and are *Identical* or a negation of Identity. Thus, for example, I satisfy my self, that Two added to Two are equal to Four, not by comparing the abstract *Ideas* in my Mind of Twice Two with Four, for I have no such abstract *Ideas* of twice Two or Four, but by comparing twice Two Bodies, or other real things, with Four other Bodies or real things, and perceiving that immutable Relation of equality in Number between them. Thus also, that the Sun is a luminous Body, not by comparing the Perception of Light with the abstract *Idea* of Light, for I have no such abstract *Idea* of Light, but by comparing that Mode of Perception with any other to which I use to give the common Name of luminous. And so again, that White is not Black, I don't reckon that a true Proposition by comparing the abstract *Idea* of Whiteness with that of Blackness, and observing their Disagreement, but by comparing one White Body with another which is Black, and observing they produce Two such different Modes of Perception, which have those common Names. So that I do not satisfy my self in the Truth of any general or particular Self-evident Propositions by comparing the *Ideas* that I have of their parts, but by observing the real Relation there is between the things, of which the words which constitute them, are the Names or Signs.

5thly, As for Mathematical Demonstrations, I am convinc'd of their Truth by a sensible Perception of the Relation between all the parts of which they consist, but the certainty of them depends upon the suppos'd Truth of our Senses, because no rational Deductions could be made but on that supposal.

6thly, The Mind in all its reasonings tacitly supposing its own, and the existence of things without it ; the Truth of its own Senses, and other natural Faculties is inevitably led to suppose and believe the Existence of such a Being as we call God ; for it cannot but perceive in all the Observations it makes, that every Effect has a Cause ; and finding within itself, and in all other sensible Objects, such Properties and Powers which it is conscious it neither did or could produce, or can perceive those other things could have from themselves, it unavoidably concludes there must be some other Being distinct from itself, and those visible Objects, that was and is the continual cause of those Properties and Powers. And the way the Mind takes in making this inference is agreeable to its common practice in all its reasonings about other matters. When it sees a Picture so contrived as to represent the Features, Colours and Proportions of that which it's designed to represent,

sent, it unavoidably concludes, that some such thoughtful or intelligent Being like itself contriv'd it; and because again it finds it is made with more art than its conscious of within itself, it naturally infers that the Author of it had more Wit and Understanding than itself; just thus the Mind every moment experiencing in itself and all the rest of the sensible World clear Characters and Marks of Power and Thoughtfulness which it is conscious it has not within itself, or can perceive the Signs of in any visible Objects, it concludes there is in the World an Intelligent Being that is the cause and Author of them: And tho' we are apt indeed to ascribe every good or bad Effect of which we don't know the Cause, to something to which we give the Name of *God*, and are thence prone to believe there are many Gods, of which the Heathen Polytheism and Idolatry is too plain an Evidence; yet all that, was only a Demonstration of the Universal force of that natural Maxim, *every Effect must have a Cause*; yet when we come to observe that all the effects in the World are regularly performed, and all the parts of this stupendous Fabrick are framed in exact Weight Measure and Proportion, and with a just subserviency to the design of the whole, we do by the like necessity conclude, that all things are made and directed by one Sovereign Lord and Governour: Neither did we ever hear of or read of any Nation in the World that made a Law for the belief or Worship of one supreme God (tho' for inferior Deities and the Modes of external Worship, there have been many in several Countries; which is an Argument that the belief of God's Existence needs no inforcement but what the common course of Nature sufficiently impresses, and that the Being of a God is and has been the general supposition or presumption of all Mankind: Insomuch that the Heathen themselves in the midst of their Idolatry and in the croud of their inferior Deities, did acknowledge one supreme God. Lastly, The Mind thus supposing, or being possessed with an assurance of the Existence of a Cause of all Powers and Properties, or Nature, when any Propositions are discovered to it whose parts have no Connexion discernible by its Senses or use of its Natural Faculties, yet if they be attested by such sensible Effects as are above all the united Powers of visible Causes, then it naturally concludes such Propositions as certainly true, as if such Connexion has been discern'd by (the) Senses or rational Deductions. For tho'tis improper to say any real event is above the Power of Nature, because *Nature* taking that word in its just and full Latitude includes the Original Cause of all those Properties and Powers which give any other thing the Name of a Cause; and in that Sense nothing is above Nature: But taking that word in the limited and most common Sense, any effect is said to be above Nature, which is different from our own and others constant Experience and Observation. Thus we reckon giving a Person his sight immediately, who was born Blind, or restoring one to Live that was Dead, are Effects above Nature; because they are different from the constant Observation that we and all others have made concerning the power or efficacy of words, or the concurrence of any sensible Causes whatever; and therefore when Persons vouch any Propositions that are not contrary to our Senses and natural Reason by such effects we reckon them as certainly true as those we learn from our Senses or rational Deductions; because, tho' no Miracle has any such Connexion with either of the parts of the revealed Proposition as there is in Mathematical Proofs, yet because the Mind and Will of the Author of Nature is thereby signified as well as it would be by Impressions on the Organs of our Sense or Natural Reason, we esteem the Evidence for our belief as well grounded in that case as in the other. The defect of such visible Connexion between Miracles and the parts of the revealed Proposition being no juster an exception against the Reason of yielding Assent, than any has who never saw *Rome*, *Jerusalem* or *Paris*, from believing there were such Places from the Testimony of Travellers and Writers; for there is no more connexion in Nature between those places and such Testimony or the consent of all Mankind if it was practicable to have it, than between Miracles and the parts of a Proposition so discovered to us. Neither indeed is there any Connexion in Nature between Motion and the Modes

Modes of Perception, which we call Heat, Cold, Pleasure, Pain, Light, Hunger and Thirst; and yet we look upon our selves as fully assured that these Modes of Sensation are produc'd in us by the various Impressions of external Bodies upon our own, as if we had Demonstration for it; and therefore the Reason of our belief of revealed Propositions above the apprehension of our Natural Faculties, is resolvable into the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker, just as our belief is of other Truths discoverable by our common Senses and Reason: For the veracity of the Author of Nature is as much concerned for the Truth of such Propositions so attested by Miracles, as for the Truth of such as are attested by our common Senses; or rather indeed more, because if our Senses were deceived in common Objects, yet it would equally answer the ends of this present Life, because we find by daily experience they fully serve us to promote our present Happiness and prevent our present Misery; but if many of these revealed Propositions were not true (besides other innumerable evils) Millions of well disposed Persons would have lost their lives and all the endearments of them by a voluntary conformity of their Actions to the belief of them upon such Divine Testimony of their Truth. So that, tho there be no agreement between the Subject and Predicate of revealed Propositions or *Ideas*, as my Author calls them, and Miracles, yet the certain Truth of them stands upon the same bottom, namely the veracity of the Author of Nature, as all others do, and wou'd appear as rationally believed as any Mathematical Demonstrations, but that the mists that arise from present Objects obscure their Perception, and divert the Mind to other considerations which breed prejudices against them. And the Truths of the Christian Religion are as well ascertained by Miracles, as any Propositions agreeable to our common Sense and Reason. But Christianity has not only the advantage above all other Sects in Religion, that its attested with numerous and undoubted Miracles, but in this respect also, that all its Doctrines are such as if heartily believed and practised are naturally adapted to improve our Minds in all the virtues that make them partakers of the Divine Nature and Happiness, and is so far resolvable into the Principles of Natural Reason, that without the help of any extrinsick Arguments, if its Articles of Faith had their genuine effect upon the Minds of Men, they would be sufficient to demonstrate its Divine Original and manifestly evince, that it was worthy the eternal Son of God to be the Founder of, worthy the most generous and most aspiring Minds after Truth and Virtue to believe and practice.

There is, I think, but one Objection against this way of resolving Certainty in revealed Truths into the veracity of the Author of Nature, namely, that is arguing in a Circle; First, by supposing the Truth of our Senses, and thence proving the Existence of God from the effects of Wisdom Power and Goodness which we discover by our Senses; and then back again from the suppos'd Existence of God, proving the Truth and Certainty of our Senses. For at this rate we cannot be absolutely sure of the Truth of any revealed Propositions without being first assured of the Existence of God; nor on the other side of the Existence of God without presupposing the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties in the use of which we discover his Existence. But this Objection is easily answered; for whatever this way of arguing may be called, 'tis no other than what the Mind takes in all its reasonings whatever. We constantly suppose the Truth of our Senses in all our voluntary Actions; I suppose this Ink Black upon the first view; but I am more confirmed in it, am made more absolutely sure of it in the use when it is compared with the Paper on which I write; and in like manner the Paper itself I suppos'd White at first sight, but am more certain of it by comparing it immediately with the Ink. The Stone or Ground on which I am next to set my Foot seems to my Eye sound, and not easily disjoined from the next Bodies; but I am more confirmed in it by my Tryal: And thus it is in all Actions; the Mind requires no other degree of certainty for the beginning or continuing its Actions but only probability, because that is sufficient to induce it to those Actions; but then all the Actions themselves are so many repeated Experiments to confirm it in that which at first it only judged probable: Just thus, the

Mind from the consciousness of its own succeeding Thoughts and Perceptions naturally supposes that there are some real Causes without it (tho it may not know what they are) of those Thoughts; but finding within itself and in other Objects more Wisdom and Powers to manage and contrive an infinite number of Effects than what its conscious are in itself, or can perceive in the things themselves in which those effects are produced, it is led to suppose by a like necessity of Nature that there is some Cause or other of those effects, to which it gives the Name of *God*: And having thus attained to the Knowledge of such a Cause, all the Observations it makes add so many fresh Arguments to confirm its belief of the veracity of the Author of Nature, because every thing by experience approves itself such as it was represented by its Senses and other natural Faculties; as, a single Experiment upon any Body makes any Proposition grounded thereon in one degree probable, and constant Experience makes it certain; or as the single appearance of any Object to one of our Senses fairly induces us to believe it is probably such as it appears; but when it constantly appears such to all our Senses, and every Bodies else, we have no room left for the least Scruple; exactly so, from the suppos'd Truth of our Senses in the Observation of sensible Effects, we discover the Existence of such a Being, as neither can or will deceive us; and thence are led back again to believe it certain that our Senses have not deceived us, because all our Sensations and other Actions of our natural Faculties are the effects of the Wise and Good constitution of the original Author of all our Natures. So that tho we must first suppose the Truth of our Senses, because in the constitution of our Natures the Objects of them are nearest to us, for the furnishing our selves with Arguments to perswade us to believe the Existence of God, yet when we are grounded in that Faith, we are absolutely confirmed in the Truth of our Senses and other natural Faculties, because the Truth of them is grounded upon the veracity of such a Being, who neither has, will, or can deceive us in any thing; which we clearly perceive by our daily Experience is agreeable to our own and the common Reason of all Mankind.

C H A P. XX.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

I. **I**N Order to the making a complete Division of the Sciences, my Author has I think rightly stated the Account of the several things which are capable of being known; tho by the way, not very agreeable to his own Principles; for inconsistency with them nothing is capable of Certainty or Knowledge but our own *Ideas* or Thoughts.

1. The nature of things in themselves, their several Relations to each other, and the manner of their Operation upon us and one another.

2. That which Man ought to do as he is a voluntary Agent for the procuring any end, especially his own Happiness and that of Societies and the rest of the Intellectual World.

3^{dly}, The ways and means whereby the Knowledge of both these are attained by our selves, and communicated to others.

The first of these he calls, and properly enough, *Physic*, or, *Natural Philosophy*, which comprehends the Knowledge of the nature of all Substances, whether Spirits or Bodies, their several Powers or Faculties, their several Actions or Operations, their Modes, Qualities, Accidents, Affections, and Properties; for this is to know their Natures; for in the Knowledge of the Relation in which Substances and their Modes stand into themselves, to us, and one another, consist all the Arts or Sciences to which we can attain, as might be easily explained in all the Instances that can be named.

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The Second of these he calls *Ethicks*, which consists in the Knowledge of all the several Actions which are in the Power of Man to perform, and their several effects for the promoting or hindering our own Personal, our Families, our Countries, and the welfare of all Mankind, and the rest of the Intellectual World that may be concerned therewith.

The Third sort he calls the *Doctrine of Signs*, and those being chiefly Words may be aptly enough call'd Logick; the main business of which is to consider the Signs or Marks which the Mind uses or makes for the gaining to itself the Knowledge of things, and conveying it to others. But by what I can guess of my Author's new Model of this part of Logicks, it wou'd be a kind of Dictionary explaining all general words; if of Substances, for example, by an enumeration of all or the most leading Properties or Qualities in which the several Individuals agree, and which give them those common Names; such as Man, Horse, Tree, Gold, &c. if of single Modes, such as Figure, Motion, Rest, Bulk, Position, Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, &c. by an enumeration of the main Sorts, Kinds, Degrees, Proportions, Relations with their Names, if they have any; if of complex mix'd Modes, such as Triumph, Procession, Murther, Theft, Justice, Temperance, Obligation, by an enumeration of the several Actions and their Circumstances by which they are distinguishable from one another: And all these particulars thus to be enumerated are to be call'd simple *Ideas*. Now to this Project I have nothing to except, but that first it wou'd require skill in all Arts and Sciences, and wou'd comprehend them all: 2dly. It wou'd be too voluminous if not endless: And 3dly it wou'd need a Sanction by Law to oblige Persons to use those Words in those Senses and no other; and this I doubt in *England* wou'd take up too much time, unless the Queen and Parliament were very much at leisure, or wou'd refer the whole Matter to my Author or some such ingenious Person as he is, which will, I fear, be hard to gain: But since Logicks are commonly design'd only for a short Introduction to all other Sciences, it might, I guess, be as well contain'd in its usual Limits; namely, 1. An Enumeration and Explication of the common Names of the several Objects of our Thoughts, which out of the Mind are only Substances, and their several Modes; when in the Mind are commonly call'd simple Notions, Apprehensions or Conceptions, because there is nothing affirm'd or denied; and when the Objects are visible and absent, they may properly enough be call'd simple *Ideas*; *Ideas* because they are Resemblances of some things without us; simple because tho the Objects have several Properties united in them, yet they are conceiv'd by the Mind at once, and by one act of it call'd *Imagination*.

2dly. An Explication of such general Words or Names as are given to particulars on the account of their Relation to others; such as Cause, Effect, Subject, Adjunct, Whole, Part, &c. which are commonly call'd *Relative Terms*, or *second Notions*.

3dly. An account of the several sorts of Affirmations or Negations commonly call'd *Propositions*, which are nothing else (except they be meerly verbal) but the Minds Declarations of its Perception of the several Relations there are between Substances and their Modes of which its words which constitute the Propositions are the general or particular Names or Signs, and are commonly call'd complex Notions. If the Propositions be meerly verbal, that is, when one meer Name is affirm'd or denied of another meer Name, then they are only the Mind's Declaration that those Words agree or differ in their Signification.

4thly. Rules for placing Two or more Propositions with one another for the easier and quicker Discovery of the Relation there is between the things themselves of which the Terms the Propositions consist of are the Names or Signs, thereby to help the Understanding and Memory, commonly call'd *Syllogism* and *Method*.

This I take to be the common Sense of most concerning the proper use of Logicks. But to this part of it my Author is for adding a new one, to be call'd the

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Doctrine of Ideas; for which he gives this Reason, because the things which the Mind contemplates are none of them besides itself present to the Understanding, and therefore it's necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, shou'd be present to it. But I am apt to think this part of Logicks may be better spared. For tho its true there is nothing present to the Mind, but itself; yet all that is, or can be present to it, is only its own Perceptions and Thoughts, and of them it has no *Ideas* or Resemblances to contemplate; all that it has any *Ideas* of are of things without it. Heat, Cold, Pleasure, Pain, Hunger, Thirst, Sounds, Smells, Tasts, &c. are only the Names of the Minds own Modes of Sensation; but it has no *Ideas* of them, unless we call the actual Sensations themselves *Ideas*; and then to have the *Idea* of Heat, for example, is but another Phrase for feeling it; and it will make us never the wiser to know a new Name meerly. Hardness, Softness, Smoothness, Roughness, &c. are only the Names of several Perceptions produc'd in us by the several Sorts and Degrees of Motion or Cohesion of the parts of Bodies, as they relate to the Organs of our own Sensations; but the Mind has no *Ideas* of them abstracted from the particular Bodies of which they are the Modes; of Colours, Figures, Motion, Rest, Bulk, Position, the Mind has *Ideas* indeed, but never single, never abstracted from the particular Bodies to which they belong; or if we had simple or abstract *Ideas* of them, they wou'd be of no use. The simple *Idea* of Colours wou'd not improve our Knowledge in the Art of Painting, without the Knowledge of the colour'd Bodies; nor the simple *Idea* of Figure in Mathematicks without the Body figured; nor the simple *Idea* of Position in Geography or Hydrography, without the Lands, the Buildings, Seas or Rivers, &c. nor the simple *Ideas* of Motion and Position in Astronomy without the Heavens or Star: And therefore these simple *Ideas*, if they cou'd be got, wou'd do us no manner of service. And besides, all the Knowledge we could possibly gain by this part of Logicks, wou'd be only to call Properties, Qualities or Modes by the Name of single *Ideas*, and that wou'd not encrease real Knowledge in the least. But if these simple *Ideas* be consider'd by the Mind as they must be in Conjunction with the Substances of which they are the Modifications, then at this rate Logick must comprehend all sorts of Arts and Sciences. And as for the whole Tribe of general abstract complex *Ideas*, either of Substances or mix'd Modes, there are no such things in the Mind of Man; the former are only the common Names given to individual Substances on the account of their agreeing Properties, and the latter are only the Names of a certain Combination of mix'd Actions and their Circumstances; but there are no such things as general abstract *Ideas* of them in Nature. However if any one will enrich the learned World with a new fashioned Logick, I shall be so far from envying him the Honour of the Invention, that I shall embrace it with all gladness as I do any thing that is new, if innocent, and useful to promote Learning and Religion.

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